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Abstract
This thesis presents an overview over the history of the concepts of nation and 
nationalism in Thailand. Based on the ethno-symbolist approach to the study of 
nationalism, this thesis proposes to see the Thai nation as a result of a long process, 
reflecting the three-phases-model (ethnie, pre-modem and modem nation) for the 
potential development of a nation as outlined by Anthony Smith.
The four main points put forward by this thesis are as follows: First, the Thai 
nation is the result of a long process with roots within several cultural cores. When the 
modem nation came into being in the early Bangkok period, it was characterised by an 
indigenous interpretation different from the western understanding of a nation. Second, 
Thai nationalism as an ideology originated in the mid-nineteenth century. It was a 
consequence of an intra-elite struggle between the nobility and the monarchy. The kings 
actively used nationalism to strengthen their position and to bind the loyalty of the 
people to their institution. As a result, Thai nationalism at the very beginning was 
‘monarchical’ with the monarch himself embedding the nation and lacking a popular 
component. Third, Thai nationalism in the twentieth century was characterised by 
alternate interpretations of the nations by different ruling elite groups. This resulted in 
three competing nationalisms, namely monarchical, statist, and royal nationalism. 
Fourth, the period since 1980 saw a revival of monarchical nationalism. The current 
ruler, King Bhumibol, adapted monarchical nationalism to a modem and democratic 
political system. He interprets the modem nation as a self-sufficient, trans-ethnic and 
moral community and disseminates the ideals with the help of the state via monuments, 
art, stamps, ceremonies, legends and festivals.
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Note
1. The romanisation of Thai words in this thesis follows the “General System of 
Phonetic Transcription” of the Royal Academy of Thailand.
2. Thai names are given with the names first. Names of royals, politicians, 
academics and writers are romanised following their personal styles of spelling 
or they are spelt in the way by which they are usually known. In other cases, the 
transcription of names follows the system of the Royal Academy.
3. For place names, I follow the spellings commonly found in newspapers or other 
books on Thailand. The term ‘Thailand’ is used throughout this thesis for a 
better understanding while her older name, Siam, appears only in quotations, 
titles or at relevant locations.
4. All translations from Thai language sources are my own. These translations 
were made to support my arguments and do not, as in the case of poems, claim 
any representation of the artistic value of the works. Translations found in 
English language sources are marked as such. My translations of book titles are 
mostly done directly from the Thai title. There are exceptions where the 
translation was given by the authors themselves and, in rare cases, deviate from 
the original title given in Thai.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Wenn mich ein Hochasiate firuge, was Europa sei, so miXsste ich ihm 
antworten: Es ist der Erdteil, der ganzlich von dem unerhdrten und unglaublichen 
Wahn besessen ist, das die Geburt des Menschen sein absoluter Anfang und er aus dem 
Nichts hervorgegangen sei. ”
Arthur Schoppenhauer, 1788-1860
Historians of South East Asia increasingly reject a nation-state based analysis. 
They argue that in order to gain a fuller picture of the region, it is necessary to think 
outside a centralised framework and to include the people as actors on the historical 
scene. David Wyatt, for example, pointed out that many outlying areas were not 
connected to a Thai central government until the 20th century. Therefore, scholars 
should not fall into a ‘national trap’ by focusing on political, administrative, economic, 
religious, educational or cultural institutions. Only the concentration on local histories 
and other alternatives to the national history could be the way forward.1 Like Wyatt, 
Thongchai Winichakul pleaded to pay more attention to local histories and to include 
trans-border relationships between neighbouring regions in order to record ‘history at 
the interstices’.2 Scott Barmd went even one step further when he criticised ‘traditional’ 
historians for using the ‘Great Men’ theory. He argued that by explaining Thai history 
with Thai kings at its centre, these historians would say ‘generally little about 
commoners being the harbinger of political and social change and renewal’. This one­
sided focus on the royal elite would therefore be nothing else than a strong academic 
endorsement for official Thai nationalist discourse.3
Based in the field of nationalism studies, this thesis, however, in seeking to 
understand thoroughly the concepts of Thai nation and nationalism, deviates from this 
scholarly trend. As the Thai nation is built around the core culture of the Thais and their 
institutions, it is inevitable to centre the analysis on this dominant ethnic group. It is this 
group (especially its leaders and intelligentsia) which shape the nation and nationalism.
1 Wyatt, David. “History is More than the Study o f the Nation”, Paper Presented at the 8th International 
Conference on Thai Studies, Nakhon Phanom 2002, p. 2
2 Thongchai Winichakul. “Writing at the Interstices: Southeast Asian Historians and Post-National 
Histories in Southeast Asia”, Paper Presented at the 8th International Conference on Thai Studies, Nakhon 
Phanom 2002, p. 1.
3 Barm6, Scott, Woman, Man, Bangkok, Lanham 2002, p.3.
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For the Thai case in particular, nation and nationalism cannot be understood without 
paying special attention to one institution: the monarchy. Love and loyalty to the king is 
a widespread phenomenon and very much connected to a sense of nationality. Taking 
the national flag on the lap of honour, for example, is a standard procedure for winners 
in sports. However, not many sportsmen show a picture of their king in the moment of 
their biggest triumph as Thai sportsmen do. Another example can be seen in the case of 
the best tennis player of Thailand, Paradom Srichapan. When he won a tournament in 
New York in August 2003 for the second time in a row, Paradom told the crowd that 
victory the year before gave him the chance to have an audience with the King and to 
present him his trophy. He explained that for Thais, the King meant everything and he 
would again present his new trophy to the monarch. A Thai newspaper reported that 
while the local crowd was listening quietly and applauded loudly at the end of the 
speech, Thai fans on the stand could not help shedding their tears because they shared 
the love Paradom has for the King.4
Not only official representatives of the Thai nation show loyalty to the King so 
openly. Ethnic minorities such as hill tribe villagers in the North also display this 
attitude as can be seen in an interview by the BBC when asked about the importance of 
a visit of the King to their village:
“It has a great meaning and merit for the village... loyalty will rise 
in the village, our love for them [the royal family] will increase having 
seen them with our own eyes. We’ve heard his [the King’s] voice from 
his own lips and have spoken to him with ours. We have heard his voice 
over the radio, but now we have actually seen him. He is a real live 
person.”5
The in-flight magazine of Thai International Airlines, Sawasdee, printed a 
eulogy to the king in 2003 which attempted to explain this allegiance of the people to 
the monarchy:
“It’s an inexplicable feeling, greater than love, bordering on 
sanctity, and ingrained in the heart of every Thai citizen since the first 
day of his or her life. The Thai love of the monarchy is legendary, almost 
mythical, as it’s an invisible nucleus of the clockworks that keeps this 
country running.”6
4 Thai Rath, 27.08.2003, p.5.
5 BBC Written Archives, Soul o f A Nation, LCA T854K, 7 January 1980, p.47.
6 Sawasdee, April 2003, p. 19.
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It appears that only in a few countries does the monarchy play such a central role 
in public consciousness. The question arises whether this loyalty to the monarchy 
lessens the loyalty to the nation? Is Anthony Smith’s postulate of the ‘world of nations 
in which no unit claiming political sovereignty can evade the dictates of nationalism’7 
flawed in the case of Thailand? For a student of nationalism, it would be tempting to 
confirm a flaw but I propose that Thailand is no exemption from the rule. Nevertheless, 
with the monarch not simply being the symbol of the nation but its embodiment, 
nationalism in Thailand does follow a different pattern when compared to neighbouring 
countries.8 What makes the monarchy so crucial for the understanding of the Thai nation 
and nationalism? To answer this question, a study must look beyond politics to find the 
key to its appeal to the masses, as Guibemau pointed out: “any attempt to investigate 
nationalism needs not only to take into account its political dimension, but also to 
explore less ‘rational’ but not less important areas concerned with feelings and 
emotions.”9
In the Thai case, all indicators show a close link between the king and the 
nation. However, the dominance of modernist approaches in existing studies resulted in 
a lack of explanation for this phenomenon. This thesis, therefore, proposes a new 
approach to the study of the Thai nation and nationalism. Apart from focussing on the 
role of the monarchy in the emergence and development of the Thai nation and 
nationalism, the thesis will include a fresh look at the origin of the nation, an analysis of 
indigenous elements and thoughts that formed the nation and nationalism and a novel 
classification of various visions of the nation. This chapter will start with a discussion 
on existing studies of the Thai nation and nationalism. In the second part, I will put 
forward my own approach of study and will define and explain its key elements.
1.1. Theoretical Views on the Thai Nation and Nationalism in Existing Studies
The earliest writings about Thai nationalism were published during the Second 
World War when Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram (1938-1944 and 1947-1957) 
brought Thailand into alliance with Japan. Their contents were mostly coloured by the
7 Smith, Anthony. “State-Making and Nation-Building”, Oxford 1986, p.258.
8 The basic difference is that Thai nationalism is not based on anti-colonialism. See Chatterjee, Partha. 
“Whose Imagined Community?”, London Reprint 1996, p.217.
9 Guibemau, Montserrat, Nationalisms, Cambridge 1996, p.65.
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political opinion of the writers.10 The period of the Vietnam War, which was the heyday 
of South East Asian Studies, saw many works on Thailand but these books did not 
feature nationalism as their main theme.11 It was not until 1978 when the first in-depth 
study of Thai nationalism in western languages appeared. In Chaiyo- King Vajiravudh 
and the Development o f  Thai Nationalism, Walter Vella examined nationalism in 
connection with persons and events and considered King Vajiravudh (r. 1910-1925) as 
the ‘founding father of Thai nationalism’.12 After Vella’s path-breaking work, 
western scholars paid more attention to the creation of Thai identity. Scott Barme, for 
example, analysed the work of Luang Wichit Wathakan, the ideologist behind Phibun’s 
policies.13
As for Thai academics, the initial study of nationalism appeared in 1970 with the 
work of Chulla Ngonrot. Chulla set the frame for a top-down approach to nationalism, 
always closely connected to the political leaders and identified the reign of King 
Vajiravudh and the Phibun era as core periods of Thai nationalism, stressing that Phibun 
was the one who created a popular Thai nationalism.14 Since then, many studies 
conducted by Thai academics followed this concept.15 Although most of these works 
written by Thai scholars are valuable in terms of historical studies, they are lacking a 
theoretical analysis of nationalism. The term nationalism is somewhat ill defined and
10 One good example was a comment by the Japanese Foreign Ministry which praised the ‘awakening of 
the Thai people to the importance of their position as an East Asiatic nation’ in 1940. On the opposite 
side, Virginia Thompson called the Thai elite ‘imperialists’. In another article, she accused the Thai 
government o f ‘unprecedented chauvinism’ and ‘super-nationalism’. See Tokyo Gazette. “Japan and 
Thailand”, 1940, p.54; Thompson, Virginia, Thailand- The New Siam, New York Reprint 1967, p.9 and 
Thompson, V. “Thailand: Nationalism and Prosperity”, Current History, 1952, p.98.
11 See for example Skinner, William, Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History, Ithaca 1962 and 
Wilson, David, Politics in Thailand, Ithaca 1966.
12 Vella, Walter, Chaiyo- King Vajiravudh and the Development o f  Thai Nationalism, Honolulu 1978, 
p.xiii.
13 Barm6, Scott, Luang Wichit Wathakan and the Creation o f  a Thai Identity, Singapore 1993. Other 
important studies are Reynolds, Craig (ed), National Identity and Its Defenders- Thailand, 1939-1989, 
Clayton 1991 and Smalley, William, Linguistic Diversity and National Unity, Chicago 1994.
14 Chulla Ngonrot, Kamnoet lae khwampenma khong latthi chatniyom nai prathet thai [The Origin and 
Development o f Nationalism in Thailand], Bangkok 1970.
15 The main reason was that these scholars connected their understanding o f nationalism with obvious or 
direct campaigns by King Vajiravudh and Prime Minister Phibun. See for example, Atcharapon 
Kamutpitsamai, Udomkan chatniyom khong phunam thai [Nationalist Ideology o f the Thai Leaders], 
Bangkok 1982. The main study o f King Vajiravudh’s nationalism is Kanpirom Suwunnanonda, 
Phrabatsomdetphramongkutklaochaoyuhua kap kansangchat thai [King Vajiravudh and His Nation- 
building Programmes], Bangkok 1981. Many other works focus on Phibun’s nationalism such as 
Thamsook Numnonda, “Phibulsongkram’s Thai Nation-Building Programme During the Japanese 
Military Presence, 1941-1945”, JSEAS, 1978; Charnvit Kasetsiri, Thamrongsak Petchlert-anan and Vigal 
Phongpanitanon (eds), Chompon Po Phibunsongkhram kap kanmueang thai samai mai [Field Marshal 
Phibunsongkhram and Modem Thai Politics], Bangkok 2001.
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the current face of nationalism is rarely explained, assuming a unitary development 
since its origins.16
However, the last twenty years saw the development of the ‘revisionist’ school 
of Thai historiography which has been successful in explaining the origins and 
development of the Thai nation and nationalism in a more theoretical and convincing 
way. This school is firmly in place because its proponents follow the same approach and 
use quite the same set of data. Important proponents of this school include both Thai 
scholars such as Thongchai Winichakul, Nidhi Aeusrivongse, Chai-anan Samudavanija, 
Kasian Tejapira, Thirayuth Boonmee, Kullada Kesboonchoo and foreign scholars such 
as Michael Connors, Matthew Copeland and Mauricio Peleggi. The central figure, 
however, is Benedict Anderson whose modernist concept of the nation17, greatly 
influences the modem debate about Thai nation and nationalism.18
This revisionist school of Thai historiography called into question existing views 
on the Thai nation and the role of the monarchy.19 Anderson commented: “ambiguous 
rubrics like ‘uniquely Thai values’, anachronisms such as [19th century] ‘Thai 
nationalism’, and questionable axioms such as ‘the monarchy is essential to the Thai 
national identity’, encourage us to base our thinking on a wholly imaginary eternal Thai 
essence.”20 What were the new ‘axioms’ of the revisionist school? Without exception, 
the proponents accepted Anderson’s main argument that the nation is an imagined 
community.21 They, therefore, shared the ‘standard total view’ that the Thai nation was 
newly imagined and a construct of the ruling elites in the late nineteenth and early
16 A good example o f ill-defined terms and a classic perception o f Thai nationalism as a unitary block can 
be seen in Pompen Hantrakool. “Thai Studies in Thailand: A Review”, Asian Research Trends, 1991, 
pp.2 and 6.
17 The modernist and post-modernist theories o f nationalism seem to be popular approaches to the studies 
of nationalism in the so-called developing world. Modernists, like Eric Hobsbawm, Ernest Gellner and 
John Breuilly, argued that the nation is something novel and the product o f modernisation. Hobsbawm, 
Eric, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge 1990, p. 10; Gellner, Ernest, “Do Nations Have 
Navels?”, Warwick Debate 1995, p. 3 and Breuilly, John, Nationalism and the State, Manchester 1993, 
Introduction. The first one applying the modernist approach to Asia was Kedourie, Elie. “Introduction”, 
New York 1970, p.23. For an overview of these approaches see Smith, Anthony, Nationalism and 
Modernism, London 1998, pp.223-224.
18 This is obvious not only in historical and political studies but also in fields such as literature and 
theatre. See, for example, Manas Chitakasem. “Nation Building and Thai Literary Discourse: The Legacy 
of Phibun and Luang Wichit”, Bangkok 1995, pp.29-55 and Jiraporn Witayasakpan, Nationalism and 
Transformation o f Aesthetic Concepts: Theatre in Thailand During the Phibun Period, Cornell 1992.
19 See for example National Identity Board (ed), “Thai Culture in Brief’, Bangkok 1981, p.6. An older 
example is Prince Wan Waithayakon, A Diplomatic History o f Thailand, Bangkok Reprint 1991b, p.7. 
For a recent example, see Somchai Wudhiprecha. “Cultural Preservation is National Preservation”, 
Bangkok 1989, p. 141.
20 Anderson, Benedict. “Studies o f the Thai State: The State o f  Thai Studies”, Athens 1978, p.226.
21 Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f  Nationalism, 
London 1991, p.6.
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twentieth century.22 The view of the Thai nation as being newly constructed seemed to 
‘have led a whole generation of historians and political scientists away from the 
acceptance of the importance of cultural traditions as sources for nationalism in the non- 
European world’.23 The revisionist school, therefore, paid less attention to the study of 
Thailand before the late nineteenth century in terms of the pre-modem ethnic bases for 
Thai nationalism. Indeed, categorizing Thai nationalism and its promoted identity as a 
‘modem enterprise’24 made such pre-modem identities irrelevant.
The revisionist school argued that this ‘newly imagined’ nation began to evolve 
in 1855 when a far-reaching treaty between the United Kingdom and Thailand was 
signed. The Bowring treaty gave the Europeans not only full access to the Thai 
economy but also was the beginning of modernisation of the Thai state and society 
under King Mongkut. It resulted in a transformation of the royal realm from a loosely 
structured tributary state system into a centralised, absolutist state under King 
Chulalongkom. The royal elite, especially Interior Minister Prince Damrong, organised, 
for example, frequent ‘administrative pilgrimages’ of local bureaucrats to Bangkok and 
the increased use of Central Thai as standard vernacular contributed to the creation of a 
picture of a unified political, economic and linguistic entity. Together with modem 
technology, such as print media, this picture helped to imagine the Thai nation in a way 
which was previously not possible. Anderson, therefore, concluded that the 
“construction of the centralizing ‘colonial’ style late 19th-century state was effected by 
the monarchy”.25
Considering the Thai nation as an imagined community, the revisionist school 
also gave more importance on the external factor, the contribution of the West to the 
development of Thai nation and nationalism, both institutionally and ideologically. In 
their writings, the effects of European imperialism in South East Asia were identified as 
key factors for the creation of the modem nation. First, the colonisation of the Thai 
neighbours resulted in the elimination of the military threat to Thailand. Traditionally, 
constant warfare with countries such as Burma and Vietnam bound many resources
22 See for example Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped- A History o f the Geo-Body o f a Nation, 
Honolulu 1994, p. 142; Kullada Kesboonchoo, The Rise and Decline o f Thai Absolutism, London 2000, 
p. 12; Rosenberg, Klaus, Nation und Fortschritt- Der Publizist Thien Wan und die Modernisierung 
Thailands unter Konig Chulalongkom (r.1868-1910), Hamburg 1980, p.84; Likhit Dhiravegin. 
“Nationalism and the State in Thailand”, 1988, p.93 and Murashima, Eiji. “The Origin o f Modem Official 
State Ideology in Thailand”, JSEAS, 1988, p.81.
23 Dahm, Bernhard. “Cultural Traditions and the Struggle for Nationhood in Asia”, Kota Kinabalu 2001,
P:3-
Connors, Michael, Democracy and National Identity in Thailand, London 2003, p.5
25 Anderson, 1978, p.211.
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from the central government. With such military campaigns a thing of the past, these 
resources could now be used to expand the power and influence of Bangkok over lesser 
kingdoms and chiefdoms.26 The Thai nation itself came into being in 1893 during the so 
called Paknam crisis of 1893. The Thai ruling elite realised the importance of maps 
when the French underlined their claim to territory with the help of maps (and gun 
boats). The map gave birth to the ‘geo-body’ of the Thai nation, a new entity 
represented by the image of Thailand on it. This firstly-depicted image clearly 
demarcated borders and included formerly independent political units. The geo-body 
was therefore not a gradual evolution from the indigenous political space to a modem 
one but was a sudden replacement of the former. Consequently, the rulers needed a new, 
national identity.27 They substituted earlier local identities with a ‘Thai’ identity with the 
help of a constructed bureaucratic culture.28
Another key factor crucial for the development of Thai nation, according to the 
revisionist school, was economy. The Bowring treaty of 1855 deprived the Thai 
sovereigns of an important element of their sovereignty, namely the control over foreign 
trade.29 However, this change also offered the ruling elites the chance to participate in 
the trading boom by transforming the Thai economy from a subsistence-orientated into 
an export-orientated economy. To increase the production of export goods, Thai society 
had to be reformed (for example with the abolition of slavery) and the state centralised 
(under strong foreign guidance). Kullada argued that although the country frequently 
interacted with various capitalist world-economies in the past, it remained a pre-modem 
state. However, this changed when Thailand’s economy was linked with the European 
world-economy .30
The revisionist school also shared the idea that the establishment of European 
colonies on the borders of Thailand, provided the ruling elites with a new threat 
scenario which enabled them to create the image of a monarchy as saviours of the 
nation. This claim to national leadership was reinforced by refashioning the monarchy 
as modem and civilised: ‘by contemplating themselves in their new clothes, new 
domestic settings, new urban spaces, the Siamese court ended up convincing themselves
26 Anderson, 1978, pp.202-203.
27 Thongchai, 1994, p. 165.
28 Chai-anan Samudavanija, Watthanatham khue thun [Culture is Capital], Bangkok 1997, p. 12.
29 Anderson, 1978, p.209.
30 Kullada, 2000, p. 178.
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of being modem’.31 The position of the monarchy, however, was increasingly 
questioned by the non-royal bureaucracy. Case studies, such as Copeland’s thesis on 
critical cartoons and newspaper articles directed against the monarchy in the reign of 
Rama VI, seemed to confirm that the answer of the king to this pressure was an 
intensified promotion of nationalism in order to safeguard his rule.32 A coup d’etat by 
military and civil bureaucrats ended the monarchical rule in 1932.33
Another focus of the revisionist school was the role of the monarchy after Field 
Marshall Sarit came to power in 1957. This period saw a revival of the monarchy which 
was moved into the centre of the Thai official nationalism (see below). King Bhumibol 
was positioned with the help of ceremonies and other public appearances to symbolise 
the Thais. Connors argued that for this reason “the king may not be transgressed, for 
that would be a transgression against all Thais. The hegemonic message was ‘we are all 
one’, all tied to the destiny of the geo-body of Thailand.”34 This image of the king was 
‘carefully built [by the palace and the state]’35 and Anderson saw the new interpretation 
of traditional roles of the king as the decisive factor for its success. While the military 
dictators took on the role of the secular ruler (punisher of crimes, collector of taxes etc), 
King Bhumibol played the role of the Buddhist ruler (consecrator of authority etc) and 
this resulted in the resacralisation of the king’s person.36 The state, led by military 
dictators, instrumentalised the monarchy to provide legitimation and moral lustre for 
their rule, the rapid modernisation and development of Thai society as well as the fight 
against communism. The aim, so the argument, was to ensure security and prosperity 
for the bourgeois strata. The king’s sacredness was safeguarded with the help of a strict 
enforcement of lese majeste and made sure that ‘the compulsory respect was shown to 
the institution’.37 The current incumbent, King Bhumibol, was willingly cooperating 
with the efforts of the state which are still ongoing.38
Another focus of the revisionist school was the role of the monarchy after 1957. 
This period saw a revival of the monarchy. The ‘standard’ argument was that the 
military dictators instrumentalised the monarchy to provide legitimation and moral
31 Peleggi, Maurizio, Lord o f  Things: The Fashioning o f the Siamese Modern Image, 2003a, p.3.
32 Copeland, Matthew, Contested Nationalism and the 1932 Overthrow o f the Absolute Monarchy in 
Siam, 1993.
33 See chapter 7 for details.
34 Connors, 2003, p. 147.
35 Peleggi, 2003a, p. 166.
36 Anderson, Benedict, The Spectre o f  Comparisons- Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World, London 
1998, p. 165 and Peleggi, 2003a, p. 166.
37 Connors, 2003, p. 133.
38 Kasian Tejapira in Pravit Rojanaphruk. “A Nation Still in the Making”, 1994.
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lustre for their rule, the rapid modernisation and development of Thai society as well as 
the fight against communism. The aim, so the argument, was to ensure security and 
prosperity for the bourgeois strata. This was achieved by a reinvention of the monarchy 
as a sacred institution and by positioning the king as an advocate of Thailand’s 
underprivileged rural population. This happened under the leadership of the state which 
also safeguarded the king’s sacredness with the help of strict enforcement of lese 
majeste and made sure that ‘the compulsory respect is shown to the institution’.39 The 
current incumbent, King Bhumibol, was willingly cooperating with the efforts of the 
state which are still ongoing.40
An important aspect in the discussion about Thai nationalism in the ‘standard 
view’ is the assumption that it is an instrument of the ruling elites. Therefore, the 
categories official and royal nationalism were introduced. The term official nationalism 
found its way into Thai studies through Anderson, who defined it in relation to King 
Vajiravudh’s reign as ‘an anticipatory strategy adopted by dominant groups who are 
threatened with marginalisation or exclusion from an emerging nationally imagined 
community’.41 Anderson emphasised that this kind of nationalism appears after and in 
reaction to a popular nationalist movement. Thongchai later introduced the term royal 
nationalism. The Thai elite, stated Thongchai, used Thai historiography as an 
instrument and created a ‘royal-national history’ which emphasised the role of the 
monarchs as saviour of the sovereignty of the nation. The royal nationalism was a tool 
to spread the power of Bangkok into all directions. Even after the revolution in 1932, 
this approach has been maintained in general terms until today. A slight change 
occurred in 1973 when the ‘bourgeois’ leaders adapted the royal nationalism to 
propagate democracy and to create the image of a monarchy which serves the people. 
Thongchai termed this new interpretation neo-royal nationalism,42
The analysis of studies of the revisionist school showed that we have to give 
credit to the (post-) modernist arguments regarding their explanation of some elements
39 Connors, 2003, p. 133.
40 Kasian Tejapira in Pravit Rojanaphruk. “A Nation Still in the Making”, 1994.
41 Anderson, 1991, p. 101. Anderson adopted this view from the earlier definition o f Seton-Watson, who 
defined ‘official nationalism’ as “a doctrine which replaced the principle o f dynastic loyalty as the basis 
of legitimacy of government. The leaders see it as their task and moral duty to impose their nationality on 
all their subjects- o f whatever religion, language or culture.” Seton-Watson’s definition fits with the 
situation after the revolution in 1932. The new rulers, a clique of civil and military bureaucrats, really had 
to replace the principle o f dynastic loyalty as the basis o f legitimacy o f government with the intention of 
justifying their own power. Seton-Watson, H., Nations and States, Boulder 1977, p. 148. Emphasis added.
42 Thongchai Winichakul. “Prawattisat thai baeb racha chatniyom [Royal-National Thai History]”, 
Sinlapawatthanatham, 2001, pp.56-65.
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of nation and nationalism in Thailand (for example the construction of history and the 
influence of the West).43 However, the uniform approach (based on the same data) 
applied by the proponents of this school limited the possibilities of new explanations 
and ideas about Thai nationalism, particularly the role the monarchy play in it.44
Although celebrated by the revisionist school, Anderson’s approach drew 
criticism from a number of scholars, particularly some specialists in South East Asian 
nationalism. Dahm disagreed with Anderson’s connotation of Asian nationalism as 
something alien in origin. He saw, on the contrary, the existence of a kind of non- 
European nationalism. In Dahm’s opinion, Anderson may have described correctly the 
attitudes of leaders but failed to explain the acceptance of this imagination by the 
masses.45 Tonneson/Antlov also rejected the modernist approach to the study of Asian 
nationalism. For them, Anderson has disregarded the impact of pre-national conditions 
and traditions in various parts of Asia on each existing national form. His emphasis on 
modem imagining ‘led him to downplay the limits as to what could be imagined by a 
significant number of people in each specific case’.46 A theorist of nationalism, Anthony 
Smith, also doubted Anderson’s central argument on print capitalism as the decisive 
force in the creation of a national consciousness. For Smith, literary analysis of 
nationalism cannot substitute for causal explanations of the rise, content, form, timing 
intensity and scope of a given nation and nationalism. He doubted that anybody is 
willing to sacrifice his life because ‘print capitalism’ has forged everybody into 
solidarity.47 Anderson’s argument, stated Smith, failed to accord any weight to the pre­
existing cultures and ethnic ties of the nations that emerged in the modem epoch, 
thereby excluding any understanding of the popular roots and widespread appeal of 
nationalism.48 Despite this strong criticism, Anderson’s theory had a great influence on 
the studies of Thai scholars. The idea of the ‘imagined communities’ and the Thai
43 See Nidhi Aeusrivongse, Chat thai mueang thai baep rian lae anusawari wa duai watthanatham rat lae 
rupkan chitsamnuek [Thai Nation, Thailand, Textbooks and Monuments: Towards Culture, State, and 
Conscience], Bangkok Reprint 1995, p.70.
44 This could have been the reason why David Wyatt saw the earlier mentioned need for a new approach.
45 Dahm, 2001, pp.3-6. For more criticism on Anderson’s approach to non-European nationalism see 
Chatterjee, Partha, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World, London 1993, pp. 19-22.
46 Tonneson, S./ Antldv, H. “Asia in Theories o f Nationalism and National Identity”, Richmond 1996, 
pp.8-9.
47 Smith, Anthony. “The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?”, MJIS, 1991, pp.360-362.
48 Smith, Anthony, Myth and Memories o f the Nation, Oxford 1999, p.9. For more theoretical criticism on
Anderson see Smith, A., The Nation in History, Oxford 2000, pp.55-60, Hastings, Adrian, The 
Construction o f Nationhood, Cambridge 1997, pp.2-4, Breuilly, John. “Approaches to Nationalism”, 
London 1996, p. 159 and Motyl, Alexander. “Inventing Invention: The Limits o f National Identity 
Formation”, Ann Arbor 1999, pp.58-71.
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nation as a construct has been so deeply engraved on the minds of Thai academics that it 
has become common academic practice to start an article with a reference to Anderson’s 
concept.
The leading Thai authority on Thai nationalism is without doubt Thongchai 
Winichakul. His study Siam Mapped-A History o f the Geo-Body o f a Nation received 
wide interest from Thai and western academics. Thongchai’s work is an outstanding 
contribution to the debate about nationalism in general and the Thai nation and 
nationalism in particular. As I consider Thongchai as a good representative of the 
revisionist school, I will mainly use his work as basis for criticism on this approach.
Firstly, Anthony Smith criticised Thongchai’s line of argument because he 
‘failed to enter the world of national sentiments and ideas or to explain how and why 
non-elite Thais became attached to the modem Siamese nation’.49 Indeed, Thongchai 
did not explain why the vast majority of the people in Thailand would identify with the 
country and the monarchy when the Thai nation is just an invention of the elite. It seems 
that the use of the modernist approach creates problems when trying to understand non- 
western cultures. Chatterjee portrayed this situation as dilemma for any academic when 
beliefs held by other peoples turn out to be manifestly irrational and false in terms of 
western criteria of rationality or truth. The question arises of ‘how is one to interpret the 
fact that large numbers of people collectively hold beliefs that are false?’50 Aware of this 
problem, Geertz demanded that academics should use less time to decry nationalism, 
which would be a little like cursing the wind, and focus more on figuring out why it 
takes the forms it does.51 The main question to ask, therefore, is why Thai nationalism is 
popular with the people? If Thai nationalism and identity would be felt as something 
artificial or invented, Thai society would never have been relatively stable in the 
twentieth century (compared to its neighbours).52 How would it be possible for ‘the’ 
elite to manipulate the people in the same way over generations? How could such a 
‘project’ go on for more than a century without succeeding to create a uniform identity? 
The vivid local identities of the Muslims in the South or the Khmer in the southern Isan 
[North East] are the best counter-arguments. This thesis will pay attention to popular 
elements such as beliefs, values and traditions in Thai national identity and nationalism.
4' Smith, Anthony, Chosen People, Oxford 2003, p. 133.
5( Chatterjee, 1993, p.l 1.
51 Geertz, Clifford, The Interpretation o f Cultures, New York 2000, p.253.
52 For a theoretical discussion o f the connection between the ‘feeling o f invention’ and ‘stability’, see 
Featherstone, Mike. “Localism, Globalism, and Cultural Identity”, London 1996, p.62.
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A second criticism is Thongchai’s argument that the concept of the ‘geo-body’ 
suddenly displaced former ideas of indigenous political space after the crisis of 1893. 
Thongchai said that this situation was responsible for the development of nationalism 
and as a result of the Thai nation. In the light of Shils’ statement that ‘a nation is never 
an affair of a single generation...a nation is by its nature a trans-generational entity’53, it 
seems strange that the Thai nation came into being as a consequence of one specific 
event. One must doubt that the level of emotion reflected in newspapers in Bangkok 
during the Paknam crisis in April 1893 (‘we will form our ranks and give our blood for 
our country, our king, our religion, and our race’54) were just the product of a newly 
invented imagination. The reason why the modernist approach fails to explain this is 
connected to the fact that the majority of existing studies understand the nature of Thai 
nationalism as ‘official nationalism’. This term found its way into Thai studies through 
Anderson, who defined it in relation to King Vajiravudh’s reign as ‘an anticipatory 
strategy adopted by dominant groups who are threatened with marginalisation or 
exclusion from an emerging nationally imagined community’.55 This implies that a 
ruler, who developed nationalism only as a response to popular nationalism from below, 
is a passive figure that reacts rather than leads a nationalist movement from the 
beginning. Nationalism is reduced to be a pure instrument to control the masses and 
thus the possibility that nationalism is perceived positively within the population 
because of its emotional dimension is excluded. It means further that nationalism can 
only arise when the masses develop an awareness of being a nation in times of 
modernisation and industrialisation. As this thesis will show, official nationalism was 
neither the first nor the only kind of nationalism in the case of Thailand.
A third criticism is that Thongchai’s concept is problematic when applied to 
recent periods of study. He concluded that “the definition and domain of nationhood are 
not given. They are constructed, carved, inscribed, fabricated.”56 Thongchai implied that
53 Shils, Edward. “Nation, Nationality, Nationalism, and Civil Society”, Nations and Nationalism, 1995,
p. 100.
54 Cited in Landon, Kenneth. “Thailand’s Quarrel With France in Perspective”, Far Eastern Quarterly, 
1941, p.34.
55 Anderson, 1991, p. 101. Anderson adopted this view from the earlier definition o f Seton-Watson, who 
defined ‘official nationalism’ as “a doctrine which replaced the principle o f dynastic loyalty as the basis 
of legitimacy o f government. The leaders see it as their task and moral duty to impose their nationality on 
all their subjects- of whatever religion, language or culture.” Seton-Watson’s definition fits with the 
situation after the revolution in 1932. The new rulers, a clique o f civil and military bureaucrats, really had 
to replace the principle o f dynastic loyalty as the basis o f legitimacy o f government with the intention of 
justifying their own power. Seton-Watson, H., Nations and States, Boulder 1977, p. 148. Emphasis added.
56 Thongchai, 1994, p.173.
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Thainess and Thai nationalism in its basic form was static since its supposed beginning 
in the late nineteenth century (with a slight exception in the period between the 1930s 
and 1950s).57 This static view towards the Thai elite and society as whole is debatable. 
Already Max Weber and Otto Bauer stressed the changeability of the ‘national 
character’.58 This character can alter in decades. Did Thai society remain unchanged 
over a long period of time? Elites are not a unified block, neither are the masses. A 
change in society would automatically reflect in Thai nationalism and nation. The 
argument of an ‘unchanged nation and nationalism’ becomes already weak on the 
surface when we compare Thai society in the 1960s and the vibrant Thai civil society a 
few decades later: “Below the decision makers and administrators lies the bulk of 
Thailand’s 31 million population with few, if any truly autonomous associations to 
press or represent their interests. The nascent post-war trade union movement was easily 
tamed; political parties, never of wide membership or organization, were banned in 
1958; peasant organizations are unknown; student organizations are strictly non­
political; the press, radio and television keep criticism of the government muted to the 
point of inaudibility; the Buddhist clergy remains apolitical; and leading members of 
trade associations have intimate business relations with the officer corps.”59 The fact is 
that the current Thai society is different from that description and as a logical 
consequence, the interpretation of the Thai nation and nationalism must be different as 
well. It can be assumed that the difference to Thai societies in history would even be 
bigger. This thesis will show that a uniform and static view of the Thai nation and 
nationalism is invalid.
A fourth criticism is that Thongchai seemed to equate the ‘geo-body’ with the 
Thai nation-state instead of the Thai nation. The similarities are at least in Giddens’ 
definition of the nation-state obvious: “The nation-state, which exists in a complex of 
other nation-states, is a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an 
administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries (borders), its rule 
being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal and external 
violence.”60 There is no doubt that the centralization of state power and the development 
of a modem bureaucracy under King Chulalongkom represented a Thai nation-state but
57 Thongchai W. “A Short History o f the Long Memory o f the Thai Nation”, Victoria 2003, pp.6-7.
58 Weber, Max, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Tubingen Reprint 1956, p.560 and Bauer, Otto. “The 
Nation”, London Reprint 1996, p.41.
59 Hindley, David. “Thailand: The Politics o f Passivity”, Pacific Affairs, 1968, p.358.
60 Giddens, Anthony , The Nation-State and Violence, Cambridge 2002, p. 121.
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does not eliminate the possibility of an earlier Thai nation. Therefore, this thesis will 
have a look into history in order to find earlier elements of the Thai nation.
Lastly, there is still the lack of explanation of the role of the monarchy in nation 
and nationalism. (Post-) modernist approaches, anti-elitist per se, declare the monarchy 
simply as initiator of the ‘national imagination’ which was later carried on by the 
political rulers. This fails to pay enough importance to aspects such as the emotional 
meaning of the monarchy to the Thai people as can be witnessed with the current 
incumbent, King Bhumibol. Although I acknowledge that the monarchy was not the 
sole agent in the development of the Thai nation and nationalism, it was central in 
shaping them. Therefore, this thesis will focus on the activities and ideas of the 
monarchy.
To sum up, what is the current view of Thai nationalism in the academic debate 
dominated by the revisionist school? It seems to be the joint project of ‘deconstructing 
the Thai nation’61. This process is based on the perception that the elite used nationalism 
to gain control of the society when facing modernity. The argument is backed up by the 
same historical events and theoretical approach: Firstly, the monarchs started this policy 
at the end of the nineteenth century because they saw it as a means to expand their 
power and to prevent any calls for democratic change. Therefore, Thailand is another 
case where nationalism created the nation. This implies that nationalism or the nation 
were not indigenous ideas but imports of western concepts. Secondly, the civil and 
military bureaucracy after the revolution in 1932 took over this view and created a 
uniform and, for ethnic minorities like the Chinese, suppressive Thai culture. Thirdly, 
Thai nationalism and identity until today are still following the similar pattern, even 
though there is now more room for expressing someone’s identity, especially on the 
grass-root level. Finally, the argument was recently added that the biggest challenge for 
the Thai nation and Thai identity in the future is globalisation and the development of 
the cyberspace.62
This thesis will apply a different approach in order to address the shortcomings 
existing in the current literature on the Thai nation and nationalism.
61 This term was used by Thirayuth, Boonmee, Chatniyom lae lang chatniyom [Nationalism and Post­
nationalism], Bangkok 2003, p.27.
62 Thongchai Winichakul. “Chatthai, mueangthai lae nidhi aeusriwongse [Thai Nation, Thailand and 
Nidhi Aeusrivongse]”, Bangkok 1995, p.37 and Prasert Chittiwatanapong. “Challenges of and Responses 
to Globalisation”, Oxford 1999, p.74.
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1.2. A Different Approach to the Study o f the Thai Nation and Nationalism
This thesis will make four basic arguments. First, the Thai nation was not an 
invention of the late-nineteenth century but developed gradually out of an ethnie and a 
system of cultural cores [centres of culture with significant influence on Thai culture in 
politics, society, religion or art], to become first a pre-modem, then a modem nation. 
Thus the current Thai nation is based on a long existing symbol-myth complex centred 
on a Thai interpretation of monarchy and Buddhism. However, the current Thai nation 
cannot be directly equated with earlier forms. Second, Thai nationalism as an ideology 
was first and foremost a product of an intra-elite power struggle between the monarchs 
and the nobility in the nineteenth century. It was not a reaction to pressure from ‘below’ 
and it was based on existing national sentiments. The monarchs actively shaped 
nationalism in their favour with the help of the existing symbol-myth complex, creating 
an ideology different from comparable countries such as Japan. This nationalism will be 
called monarchical nationalism. Third, Thai nationalism was never a fixed ideology and 
changed as a result of competing views of the nation within different ruling power 
groups and the intelligentsia. This resulted in a contest between monarchical, statist and 
royal nationalism. Fourth, the current monarch, King Bhumibol, is actively forming the 
Thai nation and draws on earlier forms of monarchical nationalism. Charisma is a key 
element in this process.
In order to sustain these arguments, this thesis will have to answer several 
questions first: What are the basic definitions of the terms used in this thesis? What 
theoretical approach is suitable for the study of Thai nationalism? “When is the Thai 
nation?” How do different nationalisms compete with each other? What kind of 
charisma plays a role in the appeal to the masses? Last but not least, a timeframe for this 
thesis has to be set.
Nationalism ’ and Nation ’
At the beginning, it is necessary to define the theoretical terms used in this 
thesis. Like many studies about nationalism, this thesis will include a wide range of 
meanings and connotations, thus reflecting the multi-facetted existence of this word. 
The basic working definition of ‘nationalism’ is understood as “an ideological 
movement for the attainment and maintenance of self-government and independence on 
behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or
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potential ‘nation’.”63 Closely connected with ‘nationalism’ is the term ‘nation’ which 
follows Smith’s definition as ‘a group of human beings, possessing common and 
distinctive elements of culture, a unified economic system, citizen rights for all 
members, a sentiment of solidarity arising out of common experiences, and occupying a 
common territory’.64
One necessary adaptation follows the argument of Brubaker that nationalism 
should not be conceived as ‘essentially or even as primarily state seeking. Nor should it 
be understood as nation-based’.65 If we add Lofgren’s proposal that the nation is not an 
abstract idea but rather ‘a cultural praxis in everyday life’66, the need for an expanded 
understanding of nationalism becomes even more evident, especially when discussing 
non-European forms of nationalism. Modernists and post-modernists emphasised the 
European nature of nationalism and deny the existence of indigenous variants in Africa 
and Asia.67 Chatterjee argued that such an approach is Euro-centric and implies that 
non-European people are not capable of acquiring the values of the Enlightment.68 
Jackson saw the danger for South East Asian theorists in using the tools of 
‘deconstruction’ to criticize local forms of authoritarianism.69 They could become 
marginalized from local discourses and context by reliance upon a ‘foreign’ conceptual 
frame of reference whose tone and nuances are insistently Euro-American.
Stuart Hall called for transculturation or transcoding of western theory.70 
Western theory of nationalism could therefore be ‘translated’ and when necessary 
stretched for the Thai context. It should also address indigenous forms of nationalism, 
which on the first view do not fit the classical western conception of nationalism. The 
basic definitions of the term ‘nationalism’ and ‘nation’ should be expanded with a 
cultural dimension, related to tradition and history and mirrored in the belief and 
feelings of the general population. With the aim to clarify these two dimensions, 
Meinecke proposed an analytical separation between the ‘Staatsnation’ (political nation)
63 Smith, Anthony, Theories o f  Nationalism, New York 1983, p.171.
64 Smith, 1998, p. 188.
65 Brubaker, Rogers. “Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism”, 2000, p.278.
66 Cited in Reicher, Stephen/Hopkins, Nick, Self and Nation, London 2001, p. 15.
67 See, for example, Kedourie, 1970, p.29 and Anderson, B. “Untitled”, 2003, p.l.
68 Chatterjee, 1986, p. 10.
69 Jackson, Peter. “Mapping Poststructuralism’s Border: The Case for Poststructuralist Area Studies”, 
Sojourn, 2003, p.63.
70 See Jackson, 2003, p.51.
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and the ‘Kultumation’ (cultural nation).71 Naim took a similar road when he analysed 
the role of the British monarchy in his fictive cultural dimension of ‘UKania’, or what 
he called the ‘spirit-country’.72
In this thesis, I attempt to pay attention to the relevant cultural forces and 
institutions such as Buddhism. The main focus, however, is on the monarchy.
Ethno-symbolist Approach to Nationalism
This thesis regards the ethno-symbolist approach to study the Thai nation and 
nationalism as the most suitable because it is able to shed light on the role of the 
monarchy. While modernist theories focus on the impact of politics on ethnicity and 
nationalism, the ethno-symbolist approach attempts to explain the impact of ethnicity, 
culture and nationalism on politics. At the heart of this concept is the idea that 
nationalism get its power from the myths, memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic 
heritages and the ways in which a popular living past has been, and can be, rediscovered 
and reinterpreted by modem nationalist intelligentsias.73 Smith emphasized that 
traditions, especially religious ones, often shape and inspire the national identities and 
nationalisms of the modem world. History and culture form integral parts of the fabric 
of popular visions, and of the social structures and processes in which the designated 
populations are embedded and through which their elites must forge their strategies.74
Out of his concept, Smith formulated this definition: “Ethno-symbolism aims to 
uncover the symbolic legacy of ethnic identities for particular nations, and to show how 
modem nationalisms and nations rediscover and reinterpret the symbols, myths, 
memories, values and traditions of their ethno-histories, as they face the problems of 
modernity.”75 All these myths, symbols and memories shape the nation. For Smith, they 
are not simple ‘instruments’ of leaders and elites of the day, not even of whole
71 Meinecke, Friedrich, Cosmopolitanism and the National State, Princeton Reprint 1970, p. 10 and 18. In 
his opinion, the cultural nation produced the nation-state and therefore, the state is simply a product o f  the 
national culture.
72 Naim, Tom, The Enchanted Glass, London 1988, p.92.
73 Smith, 1999, p.9.
74 Smith, Anthony. “The ‘Sacred’ Dimension of Nationalism”, MJIS, 2000, p.795.
75 Smith, 1998, p.224. Smith emphasised that his concept is not a theory. For that reason, I refrain from 
calling it one. See Smith, Anthony. “The Poverty o f Anti-Nationalist Modernism”, 2003, p. 359. Smith’s 
ethno-symbolist approach was criticised repeatedly by other academics. See for example Babadzan, A. 
“Anthropology, Nationalism and the ‘Invention of Tradition’”, Anthropological Forum, 2000, p. 150, 
Ozkirimli, U. “The Nation as an Artichoke? A Critique o f Ethno-symbolist Interpretations o f  
Nationalism”, Nation and Nationalism, 2003, pp.339-355 and Breuilly, 1993, p.3.
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communities. They are potent signs and explanations, having the capacity for generating 
emotions in successive generations. Included is an explosive power that goes behind the 
rational ‘uses’ which elites and social scientists deem appropriate.76
Smith doubted that nationalism could be explained by emphasising solely the 
construction efforts of the elites.77 Elites do play a crucial role in choosing cultural 
material but this material must be selected out of pre-existing repertoires of ethnic 
symbols, myths and values. Although nationalism (the ideology and the language used) 
is a product of intellectuals on the cultural level, their share on the political level is 
much less evident.78 Smith thought that it is the ‘intelligentsia’- in his words ‘the new 
priesthood of the nation’, who benefits from and disseminates the ideas of nationalism. 
The intelligentsia consists of professionals on all levels and the intellectuals are a part of 
it.79
Smith’s approach is specifically suitable for this case study of Thailand. His 
emphasis on traditions fits with the historical and political situation in South East Asia 
as described by Dahm. Drawing on experiences in colonized countries, Dahm stressed 
the role of cultural traditions in the region. They did determine the identity of ethnic and 
religious groups and were able to mobilize the masses in their defence before the elites 
even started to think about the form of an eventual nation-state. Together with religion, 
the cultural traditions form a constitutive part of Asian nationalism.80 Dahm identified 
so called ‘bridge-builders’ as crucial for the success of nationalism. These leaders, for 
example Sukamo, used the revitalized cultural traditions politically, which made the 
masses recognise the visions and aims in symbolic pictures.81 Dahm argued further that 
cultural traditions should be seen as the result of a continuous process of selective 
adaptation of new elements and their integration into social systems. These social 
systems have proved in the past to be able to meet the needs of groups, which are 
concerned about the preservation of their cultural identity. The developed long-lasting 
norms may be disregarded in normal times but they become important in a time of 
crisis.82
76 Smith, Anthony, The Ethnic Origin o f Nations, Oxford Reprint 2002, p.201.
77 Smith, 2003, p.361.
78 Smith, Anthony, National Identity, London 1991, pp.l 18-120.
79 Smith, 2002, p. 157. ‘New priesthood’ because in pre-modem times ideas were mainly disseminated by 
priests.
80 Dahm, 2001, pp.3-4.
81 Dahm, Bernhard. “Postkoloniale Staatenbildung in Sudostasien”, Stuttgart 1992, p.81.
82 Dahm, 2001, p.6.
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‘When is the Thai Nation? ’
In the academic discourse, Walker Connor’s question ‘When is a nation?’ 
inhabits a central position.83 It is without doubt a tricky question as its answer depends 
very much on the definition of the term ‘nation’. Max Weber started to define the term 
‘nation’ with a list of what it is not?4 Hastings applied, among other criteria, the term 
‘nation’ to any social group, who made the transfer from oral tradition to a standardised 
written vernacular which defined a ‘fixed’ field of readers.85 Smith, however, pointed 
out that Hastings did not take changes in the social and cultural environment over long 
historical time into account.86 Smith saw the nation as a process, continually forming 
and dissolving over different periods.87 For this reason, the question should not only be 
‘When is the nation?’ but also ‘What, where and who is the nation?’88
The concept of the nation barely appears without the concept of ‘nationalism’. 
Their connection to each other is vital for the understanding of both terms. We have to 
ask what came first, the nation or nationalism? Depending on the answer to this 
question, the analysis of nationalism changes dramatically. As stated, the proponents of 
the modernist approach argue that nationalism has to exist first in order to create a 
nation with the help of the state. This is achieved by elites using nationalism as a tool 
and the invention of its contents as a mean to make their vision of an independent nation 
a reality. Smith refuted this view “because nationalism is widely seen as a modem 
ideology, the idea that it creates nations assumes not only that there were no nations 
before nationalism but there can be no pre-nationalist nations...[My] argument is that 
earlier meanings of the term ‘nation’ are necessarily quite different from and have no 
connections with modem nationalism-dependent meanings...In different parts of the 
world are different criteria necessary.”89 He argued that nations could exist well before 
nationalism. Modernists, he stated, took the wrong assumption that all nations must 
have similar features such as well-defined borders like the existing modem nations.90 In 
another article, Smith saw the formation of a nation as a long process {longue duree)
83 Connor, Walker, Ethnonationalism- The Quest fo r Understanding, Princeton Reprint 1994, pp.210-226.
84 Weber, 1956, p.528.
85 Hastings, 1997, p. 12.
86 Smith, Anthony, “Theories o f Nationalism”, London 2000, p.2.
87 Smith, Anthony. “When is a Nation?”, Geopolitics, 2002, pp. 11-14.
88 Smith, 1999, p.276.
89 Smith, Anthony, Nationalism, Cambridge 2003, p.93.
90 Smith, 2002, p. 15. See also Smith, Anthony. “The Problem of National Identity: Ancient, Medieval and 
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with ‘recurrent activities, which had to be renewed periodically’.91 In his opinion, a t 
nation cannot just be created by a singular event or simply by the creation of suitable 
institutions or infrastructure.
To avoid the limiting framework of the modernists, Smith developed a model of 
three phases to identify the development of a common cultural identity which forms the 
nation. He himself, however, pointed out that the lines between the phases could not be 
drawn sharply and that not all nations were the result of direct continuation but were 
more modelled on earlier ethnic communities.
In the first phase, the earliest organised communities with identity should be 
called ethnie. An ethnie, defined Smith, is ‘a named community of shared origin myths, 
memories and one or more elements of common culture, inclusive an association with a 
specific territory’. The next level of collective cultural identity is the nation, whereby 
Smith did not explicitly declare that this phase is only an intermediate. Smith called this 
state of the nation a pre-modem nation.92 Smith defined it as ‘a named community 
possessing an historic territory, shared myths and memories, a common public culture 
and common laws and customs’.93 Pre-modem nations, he argued, are not ‘inventions’ 
of nationalists, although they often have rediscovered their existence and significance 
for designated popular raw material out of which nations may be created. Since such 
elements are ubiquitous and historically recurrent, there is a real possibility of creating 
‘nations before nationalism’, even if pre-modem nations differed in important respects 
from modem mass citizen-nations.
The modem nation includes a much wider variety of criteria. Smith defined his 
ideal type of a modem nation with following elements:
- The growth of myths and memories of common ancestry and history of the 
cultural unit of population.
- The formation of a shared public culture based on indigenous resource 
(language, religion, etc.).
- The delimitation of a compact historic territory, or homeland.
- The unification of local economic units into a single social-economic unit based 
on the single culture and homeland.
91 Smith, 1986, p.206.
92 Hutchinson, John/Smith, Anthony. “General Introduction”, London 2000, p.xxxv. For a similar view, 
see Reynolds, Susan. “The Idea o f the Nation as a Political Community”, 2005.
93 Both definitions (ethnie and pre-modern nation) in Smith, 2002, p. 15.
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- The growth of common codes and institutions of a single legal order, with 
common rights and duties for all members.94
Central to all the phases and therefore to Smiths’ ethno-symbolic approach itself 
is the argument that nations have historically been formed mainly around ethnic cores or 
dominant ethnies, which have provided the cultural and social basis for the nation. If 
such a core is missing, like in some African nations, the success of this nation is 
doubtful.95 The cultures of the dominant ethnies continue to provide the unifying 
elements of the modem nation without corresponding on a one-to-one basis.96 An 
important factor for the consolidation of states into ethnies and nations was inter-state 
warfare. It mobilised the members of an ethnie, created a bond of solidarity between 
them and produced heroes and heroines and other material for myth making.97
Applying Smiths’ concept to Thailand, I will attempt to trace back the origins of 
the elements which contribute to the Thai nation. It is misleading to understand the Thai 
nation as an inflexible unit. At no time in history did the Thai nation exist in a fixed 
state. The Thai nation was always an ongoing process which has resulted in a fluid 
nationalist ideology. Lacking the cataclysmic effects of direct colonisation, the 
participants in this process, either active or passive, had the chance to develop an 
ideological framework of nation and nationalism without the constraints and forces of 
an anti-colonial struggle. The elements of Thai society contributed in one way or 
another ideas, perceptions, visions, beliefs, loyalties and emotions to the creation of the 
basic features and elements of what we call the Thai nation and nationalism at various 
stages in history. The result was a highly flexible interpretation of the Thai nation with 
only a few unchanging cornerstones such as the monarchy and Buddhism.
Although Terwiel warned that it is a mistake to equate certain persons 
(especially kings and political leaders) with the idea of an ideology or the policies in 
his/her period98, it would be a similar blunder, especially in a hierarchical society like 
Thailand, not to examine the ideas of the leaders and their impact on the historical 
development within a period. Leaders, ideally, are of utmost importance for the
94 Smith, 1994, p.381. For an alternative ideal type, see Hobsbawm, 1990, p.37.
95 Smith, 2000, p. 13.
96 Smith, Anthony. “History and National Destiny: Responses and Clarifications”, Nations and 
Nationalism, 2004, p. 197.
97 Smith, 2002, p.23.
98 Terwiel, Barend. “The Development o f Consensus Nationalism in Thailand”, Clayton 1991, pp.133- 
134.
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intellectual orientation of policies and sentiments. Therefore, it is justifiable to expand 
the question ‘when is the nation?’ to include also ‘why, who and what is the nation?’.
I propose that the analysis of the Thai nation throughout its history should 
follow the Three-phases model of Smith: identification of the ethnic and cultural core 
{ethnie), the pre-modem nation and finally the modem nation. This mirrors the idea that 
the Thai nation developed over the longue duree out of an ethnic core of the Thais. The 
Thai ruling elite did not invent the ‘nation’ ex nihilo after the Paknam crisis in 1893.
Competing Nationalisms: Political and Cultural
John Hutchinson proposed that most nationalisms can be categorised either as 
cultural or political nationalism and it is possible that both of them are in competition 
with each other.99
According to Hutchinson, cultural nationalism as an ideology perceives the 
nation in organic terms as a spontaneous order and it operates as a movement of 
communal self-help, throwing up informal agencies in order to ‘re-create’ the nation 
from the grass roots up.100 It is therefore not surprising that in normal times, cultural 
nationalism is only a small-scale movement and to be found in the circle of historical 
scholars and artists.101 As a political movement, its primary concern is the regeneration 
of the historical community against the levelling power of the state.102 During this 
process, old symbols are to be transformed and modernised. ‘Folk’-elements are revived 
and become fashionable. There is generally a belief in the existence of an indigenous 
high civilisation, now fallen into decay by alien materialism.103 The heroic integration of 
a golden age serves the cultural nationalists as guidance; history becomes a propulsive 
mechanism for future progress.104 In contrast to the homogenizing citizenship ideal of 
the state, the cultural nationalist demands that its members must cherish the natural
99 The terms ‘political’ and ‘cultural’ nationalisms are in use for a long time. An early example can be 
found in Briffault, Robert. “The Nationalist Craze in Culture”, Current History, 1933, p.521. The earliest 
mention in the context o f South East Asia is in Landon, Kenneth. “Nationalism in Southeastern Asia”, 
The Far Eastern Quarterly, 1943, p. 139.
100 Hutchinson, John. “Cultural Nationalism, Elite Mobility and Nation-building: Communitarian Politics 
in Modem Ireland”, BJS, 1987, p.497.
101 Hutchinson, 1987, p.482.
102 Hutchinson, John, The Dynamics o f Cultural Nationalism : The Gaelic Revival and the Creation o f the 
Irish Nation State, London 1985, p.312.
103 Hutchinson, 1985, p.3 8.
104 Hutchinson, 1985, p.36.
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divisions within the nation- sexual, occupational, religious and regional- for the impulse 
to differentiation is the dynamo of its creativity.105
Hutchinson defined that “cultural nationalists perceive the nation not as a state 
but as a distinctive historical community, which continuously evolving, embodies a 
higher synthesis of the ‘traditional’ and the ‘modem’. Since a community is a 
spontaneous order of different groups and individuals, knit by common sentiments, it 
cannot be constructed like a state from above, but can only be re-animated from 
below.”106 Who are the cultural nationalists? Hutchinson identified two groups. The first 
one, the intellectuals, is the formulator of cultural nationalism. The second group, and 
more important, is the intelligentsia. The intelligentsia constituted a novel social stratum 
of knowledge specialists and appeared in Europe since the eighteenth century. Their 
characteristic is a secular activism, deriving their identity from their ‘technical 
training’.107 The intelligentsia, seen by Hutchinson in a broad sense as professionals, 
developed by the expansion of education by the modernising state and by efforts to 
induct the young into an official standardised culture based on the requirements of the 
political centre.108 The members of the intelligentsia are crucial for the dissemination of 
the ideas of nationalism.109
The rising intelligentsia, argued Hutchinson, felt ‘excluded’ by the state and 
began to search for roots in the community. Political nationalism is seen as 
‘unauthentic’. The final switch to cultural nationalism is accomplished by the growing 
attraction of it as a political option for the intelligentsia. The dominant political 
nationalism ossifies into a bureaucratic oligarchy, remote from the community it 
purportedly serves. This increases the feeling of the intelligentsia to be excluded from 
power and status in the community, not just by the state but also by an oligarchic 
machine that has lost legitimacy as the national leader. The intelligentsia is then drawn 
to the dynamic integral vision of cultural nationalism. This vision, concluded
105 Hutchinson, 1985, p.32.
106 Hutchinson, 1987, p.486.
107 Hutchinson, 1987, p.488.
108 Hutchinson, 1987, p.490.
109 Hutchinson, 1985, p.391. Intelligentsia is defined by Hutchinson as a stratum that may contain a 
diversity o f social groups (usually professions). These groups are distinguished first by their possession of  
higher educational or professional qualifications which are recognised by society as endowing them with 
a special occupational expertise. Important with this definition is the inclusion of groups outside the usual 
circle of academics, intellectuals or artists.
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Hutchinson, offers both a return to roots in the historical community and a modernising 
alternative to the worn out legislative panaceas of political nationalism."0
Hutchinson proposed as competitor for the cultural nationalism a political 
nationalism, whose members “perceive the nation in rationalist terms as a homogenous 
collectivity of educated citizens. They wish for a state representative of the nation which 
will break with tradition and raise the people to the level of the advanced ‘scientific’ 
cultures. Although essentially modernist, they appeal to historic ethnic sentiments in an 
instrumental fashion in order to mobilize religious and rural support for their goal.” 
Hutchinson argued further that both cultural and political nationalisms are co-existing 
and their rise and fall are to be viewed as part of an interactive cycle.1" Periodically the 
cultural nationalism can expand into a major ideological movement that challenges both 
established political nationalist movements and the existing state in order to regenerate 
the nation on communitarian lines."2
Crucial is the argument by Hutchinson/Smith that mass nations are not simply 
forged by elites, but are created through a complex interplay between rival elites."3 The 
question is whether a cycle of competing nationalisms can be found in Thailand? This 
thesis proposes that Thai nationalism was never a fixed ideology and was changing 
along competing views of the nation within different ruling power groups and the 
intelligentsia. This thesis, therefore, accepts Hutchinson’s concept as suitable for the 
case of Thailand.
As this thesis will focus on monarchy and nationalism, it is helpful to briefly 
introduce two terms, namely royal and monarchical nationalism, in order to distinguish 
the different roles monarchs can play in nationalism. In my understanding, royal 
nationalism is a nationalism where the monarch is the primary defmer of the nation but 
plays a symbolic rather than an independent political role. As the state is the leader in 
this kind of nationalism, I would categorise royal nationalism as political nationalism. 
Monarchical nationalism, on the other hand, is a nationalism where the nation is not 
only tied symbolically to the figure of the king but the king is also the dynamic 
(sometimes primary) political agent. With its emphasis on cultural traditions such as the
110 Hutchinson, 1987, p.498.
111 Hutchinson, 1985, p.426.
1,2 Hutchinson, 1987, p.482.
113 Hutchinson/Smith, 2000, p.xxxvi.
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traditional role of the king, monarchical nationalism can be regarded as a kind of 
cultural nationalism.114
Charisma and Barami
Samuel Huntington made a gloomy prediction in 1968: ‘the future of the 
existing traditional monarchies is bleak’. However, he saw a way out for beleaguered 
kings: “Those monarchs survive who identify themselves with popular nationalism; 
those monarchs perish who remain more committed to traditional values, class 
perspectives, and family interests than to national ones.”115 Looking at the strong 
position of the monarchy in Thai nationalism under the current incumbent, King 
Bhumibol, it is inevitable to call monarchical nationalism ‘popular’. Jones described 
such popularity of a monarch as a ‘mysterious identification of king and people which 
reaches deep into the unconscious mythology that is behind all this complex 
relationship’.116
Western political thought explains this ‘mysterious identification’ with the help 
of the term charisma. Max Weber defined that ‘the term charisma will be applied to a 
certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from 
ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least 
specifically exceptional powers or qualities’.117 Norbu saw an inseparable link between 
mass mobilisation and charismatic leadership. He stated that the charismatic leader is 
the medium through which the masses express their aspirations and sentiments at a 
critical juncture of their history. He argued also that the charismatic leader is a sort of 
priest who invokes and interprets tradition, as well as a political leader who analyses the 
common situation faced by the masses and formulates rational solutions to common 
problems.118 Only when a leader is able to fulfil this requirement, he can hope that the 
people would follow him as Greenfeld has described in her definition of charisma: 
“Genuine charisma thus means the ability to internally generate and externally express 
extreme excitement, an ability which makes one the object of intense attention and
114 The detailed explanation o f these two terms can be seen in chapter 4.
115 Huntington, Samuel, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven 1968, p.165 and 191.
116 Jones, Ernest, Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis, London 1951, p.231.
117 Weber, Max, The Theory o f  Social and Economic Organization, New York 1964, p.358.
118 Norbu, Dawa, Culture and the Politics o f Third World Nationalism, London 1992, pp.l 13-114.
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unreflective imitation by others”.119 Shils identified another aspect of the charismatic 
leader when he argued that such a person is ‘the creator of a new order as well as the 
breaker of routine order’. Such a charismatic person would influence the ‘central value 
system’, which is the central zone of society.120
This thesis proposes that in the monarchical nation, charisma can play an 
important role in generating the love of the masses to the king and through him to the 
nation. To apply the concept of charisma to the case of Thailand, it is important to 
understand the Thai idea of barami which shares many characteristics with charisma as 
it reinforces the effects of the symbol-myth complex of the monarchical nation by 
combining the individual, religious and institutional dimensions and elevating it to a 
spiritual level deeply rooted in the beliefs, myth and tradition of Thai culture.
In the present day use, the word barami means ‘prestige, influence, grandeur’.121 
To understand the concept of barami clearer, it is useful to look at the original meaning 
of this term which derived from Buddhism. In the Pali language, parami or paramita is 
translated as ‘perfection’. This concept describes the ten principles of ‘perfection’ 
leading to Buddhahood: almsgiving and liberality (dana), morality (sila), renunciation 
(nekhamma), wisdom {panha), energy (viriya) forbearance {khanti), truthfulness 
{sacca), resolution {adhitthana), all-embracing kindness {metta), and equanimity 
{uphekkha).]22 According to Buddhist canonical texts, the Phothisat [Bodhisattva, the 
one destined for Buddhahood], who was ‘concerned about the welfare of living beings, 
not tolerating the suffering of beings, wishing long duration to the higher states of 
happiness of beings, and being impartial and just to all beings so that they may be 
happy’123, performed these perfections in order to be bom as the Buddha in the last life. 
This would enable him to teach the universal truth to enlightened human beings in order 
to lessen their suffering in a religious sense (to eventually reach nirvana).
In the Thai case, inscriptional evidence showed that the concept of barami was 
connected to the monarchy in the fourteenth century when a king openly declared that 
he was the Phothisat who practised the barami in order to reach Buddhahood.124 
Politically interpreted, the comparison of the king to the Phothisat indicated that the
119 Cited in Lindholm, C., Charisma, Oxford 1990, p.26.
120 Shils, 1975, p.4 and 129.
121 So Sethaputra, New Model Thai-English Dictionary, Bangkok 1987, p.528.
122 Nyanatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary: Manual o f  Buddhist Terms and Doctrines, New York 1950, p. 110.
123 Nyanatiloka, 1950, p.l 10.
124 Thepparatratchasuda, Somdetphra, Thotsabarami nai phutthasatsana therawat [DasaparamT in 
Theravada Buddhism], Bangkok 1982, pp.128-129.
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king ruled the kingdom with virtue. His political power was therefore reinforced by his 
religious power. The connection between the Phothisat and the king continued until the 
eighteenth century with the expansion of the meaning. Barami now meant not only the 
principles for becoming Buddha but was also seen as something the monarch had 
practised in his former lives which enabled him to gain power (being king) in the 
current life.125
In the nineteenth century, the term barami gained the present meaning, 
reflecting the prestige, influence or power associated with a king. In order to achieve 
barami, the king had to follow the Ten Kingly Virtues (thotsapitratchatham) to become 
a great king. Elements described in these ten kingly virtues closely resembled those ten 
principles to become a Buddha in content:
1) giving (dana): To give help to those that need help because they lack certain 
things.
2) self conduct (sila): To refrain from doing evil things which would create 
enmity.
3) giving up (pariccaga): To give up something of lesser use for something of 
greater use, for example giving up wealth or the own life in doing what is 
right or in performing one’s duty.
4) straightness (ajjava): To be honest with other people and while carrying out 
one’s work and duty.
5) gentleness (<maddava): To speak gently and to be polite without being 
arrogant.
6) perseverance (tapa): To have courage to do what should be done and to do 
one’s duty with regularity and without shortcomings.
7) non-anger (akkhoda): To have a heart full of kindness based on good wishes.
8) not causing injury (avihiijsa): Not to cause troubles for other people both 
directly and indirectly.
9) endurance or patience (khanti): To have the capacity to endure hardship: 
cold, hunger, thirst and all other unpleasant and unenjoyable things.
125 Thepparatratchasuda, 1982, p .132.
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10) not going wrong (<avirodhana): Not to do what he knows to be wrong. To 
maintain fairness and not to be biased because of love, hatred, delusion or 
fear.126
When practising the ten kingly virtues, the king will have barami and be loved 
and respected by the people. This implies an active position of the monarch which was 
mirrored in the various titles which were bestowed upon the king and defined his roles 
in traditional society. For example, the title of phrachao phaendin (lord of the land) 
meant that his duty was to ensure that the land was protected. The king had to be not 
only a great warrior but also needed barami to gain power to provide protection to his 
people. This power was reflected in expressions used while addressing the King such as 
‘we escape all dangers owing to your Majesty’s barami’ and ‘we live happily under the 
shade of your Majesty’s barami\ The king also owned all the land and granted the right 
to use the land to the people. The king had the duty to provide prosperity to the land as 
well; a drought or flooding was a sign that he had failed. King Bumibol, for example, 
took this responsibility seriously as his development projects such as artificial rain- 
making showed. Another title for the king was phrachao yuhua (lord who is the leader). 
It meant that the king was the head or leader of the people and the country. 
Phramahakasat (great warrior) again emphasised the duty to be a great warrior and to 
be the leader of the troops. He had to defend the sovereignty and to ensure stability and 
safety of the country. Chaochivit (lord of life) meant that the king had the power to 
execute or grant amnesty. This implied that the king had the duty to protect the life of 
people and to preserve the stability of the country.127 All these functions could only be 
successfully fulfilled when the king had enough barami.ni
The concept of barami is important in the relationship between the people and 
the monarch for two reasons. First, the ten kingly virtues promote the benefit and
126 Nyanasamvara, Somdetphra. “Religion and the Ten Guiding Principles for a King”, Bangkok 2000, 
pp.258-265.
127 Kanok Wongtra-ngan, Naeo phraratchadamri dan kanmueang kanpokkhrong khong 
phrabatsomdetphrachaoyuhua [King Bhumibol’s Concept of Politics and Government], Bangkok 1988, 
pp.22-23. With the introduction o f a constitutional system, the role o f the monarchy was legally defined 
as the Head o f State, the Grand Supreme Commander o f the armed forces and the patron of all religions. 
See Chetsada Pornchaiya, Phraratchaamnat khong phramahakasat khong prathet thai kap phrathet 
angkrit [The Right of the Kings of Thailand and Great Britain], Bangkok 2003, pp.168-172.
128 In practical terms, ‘success’ o f a monarch depended very much on the nobles who not only ran the 
administration and royal trading activities but also controlled directly most o f the population necessary 
for campaigns such as warfare or public works. The nobility, however, was not a closed group. Even 
foreigners were able to join the nobility when appointed by the king. See Baker, Chris/Pasuk 
Phongphaichit, A History o f  Thailand, Cambridge 2005, pp. 14-19.
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happiness of the people. Just like the Phothisat wanted to reach Buddhahood to help 
alleviate the spiritual suffering of humans, the monarch aims to be a Great King in order 
to help alleviate the suffering of human beings in the secular realm. Second, the people 
profit from the protection of the king not only in times of crisis. He provides ‘the 
cooling shade’ necessary for a stable and peaceful society. In times of crisis or rapid 
change, the people can rely on the king as an emotional re-assurance and problem 
solver. The monarch himself gains benefit from following the ten kingly virtues for it 
enhances his legitimation. The fact that barami was originally connected to Phothisat 
and then later transferred to the king provided sacredness for the monarchical owner 
which was even more enhanced by the adaptation of ceremonies of the thewaracha cult 
during the Ayutthaya period.129 The king’s barami makes him a ‘Great King’ which 
gives a constitutional monarch influence beyond his constitutional limits.
Timeframe o f the thesis
Analysing the emergence and development of the Thai nation and nationalism 
requires naturally a wide timeframe where historical, political, economical, social and 
cultural events are to be considered. Although the origin of the Thai nation cannot be 
dated precisely, this thesis will look into its various roots in history. It will begin with 
the most important core elements of the modem Thai nation, starting in the thirteenth 
century. The end of the study lies in the years 2000/2001. The election of Thaksin 
Shinawatra for Prime Minister in January 2001 initiated a new phase of Thai 
nationalism. For the first time in modem Thai history, members of the business elite 
took direct control of the state. With their pragmatic attitude to support economic 
development, nationalism lost many of its political functions and was increasingly seen 
as an instrument to generate economic growth, for example by using national symbols 
such as the national flag to promote products. This process of a new interpretation of the 
Thai nation as an economic powerhouse is still ongoing. It must, therefore, remain 
subject of another analysis in the future.
In order to cover such a long period of time, a variety of sources had to be 
consulted. My empirical data mainly came from literary works and public speeches but 
also from the works of Thai academics. Most of this data has never been used in a 
western language study and grants a new perspective on the Thai nation and
129 For details, see chapter 2.
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nationalism. However, as this thesis covers a period of several centuries, I was not able 
to study historical primary sources such as palm-leaf inscriptions but had to rely on 
published data. Due to the fact that the role of monarchy is rather neglected in 
nationalism studies, I propose a new concept to theoretically explain the function of the 
Thai monarchy in the nation. The idea of competing monarchical, statist and royal 
nationalisms could hopefully be employed in other case studies as well.
Last but not least, this thesis is using the terms ‘Tai’, ‘Thai’ and ‘Siam’. 
Following conventional usage, the term ‘Tai’ refers to the wider ethnic group in an 
anthropological and linguistic sense, otherwise ‘Thai’ stands as general term for parts of 
that group living in the area of modern-day Thailand. The Thais did not use the term 
‘Siam’ but called themselves ‘Thai’. ‘Siam’ was first mentioned in an epigraphy of the 
Cham in the 11th century and in engravings at Angkor Wat (12th century). The term was 
‘re-introduced’ by Western travellers during the Ayutthaya period and made ‘official’ 
by King Mongkut in the nineteenth century. ‘Siam’ was mostly used in communication 
with foreigners and became interchangeable with ‘Thai’ similar to ‘English’ and 
‘British’ (in the eyes of the English). The official name of the country was changed 
from ‘Siam’ to ‘Thailand’ in 1939.130
To sum up, the thesis will present an overview of the origin and emergence of 
the Thai nation and nationalism. It will focus on the interpretation of that nation by the 
monarchy which was able to dominate other visions of the nation for extended periods 
of time. The monarchy is leading, shaping and embodying this King’s Nation. To 
understand the connection between monarchy and nation, it is necessary to start with a 
look into the roots of the Thai nation.
130 Charnvit Kasetsiri. “What’s in a Nation’s Name?”, The Nation, 21 February 2000, p.Cl.
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Chapter 2
Tracking the Roots: The Pre-modem Thai Nation
This chapter has two objectives. First, it discusses the two early stages of 
Smith’s model in the emergence of a nation, ethnie and pre-modem nation. Second, it 
identifies theoretical elements regarding kingship that are central for the understanding 
of the monarchical nation and nationalism in later periods. Contrary to the revisionist 
school’s view, I propose that there is evidence of existing (certainly among the elites) 
strong trans-ethnic attachments to the Thai monarchy which provided building blocks 
for the later development of the nation. This chapter, therefore, proposes that a Thai 
ethnie gradually developed from the thirteenth until the sixteenth century within the two 
political units of Sukhothai and early Ayutthaya. Both kingdoms represented cultural 
cores for the Thai nation. The pre-modem nation of late Ayutthaya progressed slowly 
into another cultural core from the sixteenth century onwards.
2.1. Early Aspects
Most nationalisms address a myth of origin for the respective ethnie or nation. 
Although some Thai nationalists referred to the origin of the Thais, it cannot be 
regarded as a dominant or even important feature in Thai nationalism throughout the 
periods. This anomaly was caused by the fact that despite an intensive academic debate, 
no proven theory about the origins of the Thais could be established. The basic question 
is whether the Thais migrated into or always had lived in that area what we now call 
Thailand.1 For this thesis, this debate is left out because it is not a significant theme for 
Thai nationalism itself. As a starting point, this thesis accepts the assumption that 
Tai/Thai settlements existed probably as early as the seventh but most likely in the ninth 
century.2 Two noticeable elements influenced the future development of the Tai tribe in 
this area from that time on. First, the Thai groups did not occupy empty space but had to
1 For the discussions about the origin o f the Tais/Thais, see Charnvit Kasetsiri, The Rise o f Ayudhya, 
Kuala Lumpur 1976; Winai Pongsripian. “Nan-Chao and the Birth o f Sukhothai: Problems of the 
Twentieth-Century Thai Perception of the Past”, Silpakorn University Journal, 1990; Baker, Chris. “From 
Yue to Tai”, Journal o f the Siam Society, 90, 2002 and Paisal Sricharatchanya. “Tangled Roots of Nation 
Stir Domestic Debate”, FEER, 18 February 1988, p.51.
2 Charnvit, 1976, p.34.
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share their territory with other ethnic groups, most importantly the Mons3 and the 
Khmer whose Kingdom of Angkor was by far the most dominant force during that 
period.4 Contact with other cultures was therefore not uncommon. Second, the 
individual Thai groups were only loosely connected with each other due to 
inaccessibility of many areas. This was a familiar feature of early South East Asia (with 
the exemption of a few highly developed kingdoms such as Angkor) and was described 
by Kulke as a system of ‘multiplicity of centres’.5
This structure in connection with poor communication links affected the 
development of a common culture resulting in a lack of a central cultural identity. The 
relative isolation of political centres led to the existence of a multiplicity of cultural 
centres as well. In my opinion, some of these cultural centres, to be called cultural cores 
in this thesis, provided the basic elements for the later Thai nation. Although there had 
been a number of cultural centres during a long period of history, this chapter will focus 
only on two centres, namely Sukhothai and Ayutthaya. This choice is based on two 
reasons: First, linguistically, the writing system existing in the area of Sukhothai 
merged with the writing system of the later kingdom of Ayutthaya in the 15th century. 
Out of this merger, the modem Thai language of the Thai nation-state developed. 
Although other cultural centres such as Lanna and Lan Chang based their writing 
system on the Sukhothai model as well, they developed their own distinctive scripts, for 
example the latter one evolved into Lao.6 This indicates different cultural identities 
which had only minor influences on the main culture of the Thai nation. The second 
reason for this choice is that this thesis attempts to explain the history of the Thai nation 
and nationalism. Since the beginning of a linear understanding of Thai history, either 
the Kingdom of Sukhothai or the Kingdom of Ayutthaya are commonly perceived as the 
start of Thai history and culture. This plays an important role in the indigenous
3 The Mon kingdoms o f Dvaravati and Haripunjaya were among the top cultural and political centres in 
mainland South East Asia in the first millennium. See Briggs, Laurence. “Dvaravati, the Most Ancient 
Kingdom of Siam”, Journal o f the American Oriental Society, 65, 1945, pp. 101-104 and Phasook 
Indrawooth. “Haripunjaya: The Early Buddhist Centre in Northern Thailand”, Hull 1994, pp. 117-124. 
About pre-historic cultures see Higham, Charles/Rachanie Thosarat, Prehistoric Thailand- From Early 
Settlement to Sukhothai, London 1998.
4 The oldest known Khmer structure in Thailand is from the 7th century. Settlements such as Phimai and 
Lopburi (which controlled the entire Chaopraya river valley from the 11th until the early 13th century) 
were major centres of the polity o f Angkor with direct road links to the capital. Talbott, Sarah/Chutima 
Janthed. “Northeast Thailand Before Angkor: Evidence From Archaeological Excavation at the Prasat 
Hin Phimai”, Asian Perspectives, 2001, pp. 179-191.
5 Kulke, Hermann, Kings and Cults, New Dehli 2001, p.265.
6 Suchit Wongthet, Akson thai ma chak nai [Where Did the Thai Script Come From?], Bangkok 2005,
p. 106.
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interpretation of Thai nationalism, therefore, this chapter follows suit and starts to 
analyse the ethnie of the Thai with Sukhothai (without the implication of a straight and 
linear development towards the modem Thai nation).
2.2. The First Cultural Core: the Kingdom o f Sukhothai (ca. 1220- l t fh Century)
This thesis proposes to see the Kingdom of Sukhothai as a first major 
consolidation of power of an ethnic group and the beginning of a common culture of the 
Thais. It became the first political and cultural centre of what Smith called an ethnie.
Thais took control of Sukhothai, a Khmer city in the lower Northern part of 
modern-day Thailand, in the 1220s.7 While its peak political power lasted only until the 
mid-fourteenth century, the city continued to play an important role in Thai affairs for 
centuries. What made this kingdom ‘succeed’ in contrast to other Thai political entities 
in terms of its long lasting effects on the Thai nation? It was the rule of one man who 
acted as a catalyst to transform a ‘normal’ kingdom into the dominant Thai kingdom of 
its time. The reign of the warrior-king Ramkhamhaeng (r. 1279-1298) was crucial in 
many regards. On the political front, he was able to integrate other lords (mostly Mon 
and Thai) into a single royal elite by offering ‘a kind of Thai brotherhood to subordinate 
opponents’, in which he saw himself as ‘father lord’ (phokhun).8 The King himself 
advertised this image in a famous inscription of 1292.9 He depicted his rule as just, 
benevolent and himself as accessible and beloved by the people.10 His most important 
move was this connection between kingship and Buddhism. From then on, Buddhism 
(with its emphasis on moral achievement not birth rights) legitimised the king whose
7 Coedds, George, The Indianised States o f Southeast Asia, Honolulu 1968, pp. 191-219. In another article, 
Coed£s described the take-over as ‘a coup de force, d’inspiration ‘nationaliste’, dirigde contre le 
‘resident’ khmSr qui repr6sentait l’autoritd de la Cour d’Angkor’. Coed6s, George. “L’Art Siamois De 
L’Epoque De Sukhodaya (XII£me-XIV6me Siecles)”, Arts Asiatiques, 1954, p.293. For a theoretical 
discussion about state formation in early South East Asia see Kulke, Hermann. “The Early and Imperial 
Kingdom in Southeast Asian History”, Singapore 1986, pp.5-14.
8 O’Connor, Richard. “Sukhothai: Rule, Religion and Elite Rivalry”, Bangkok 1991, pp.277-289.
9 The UNESCO declared the inscription as World Cultural Heritage in 2003. A number of academics 
doubted the authenticity o f the stone and saw it as an invention from the nineteenth century. See for this 
discussion Chamberlain, James (ed), The Ram Khamhaeng Controversy: Collected Papers, Bangkok 
1991 and Kaye, Lincoln. “Rock of Ages, Set us Free’, FEER, 8 November 1990, p.36. However, like the 
majority of historians, I base this chapter on the assumption that the inscription is authentic.
10 Wyatt, David, Thailand- A Short History, Bangkok 1984, p.43.
41
characteristic of being a good or great king depended on being a good Buddhist and on 
his support of Buddhism (practising dharmau).
On the cultural front, Ramkhamhaeng’s extraordinary power and resources 
created an environment ideal for the development of a distinguished culture of 
Sukhothai. It should be noted beforehand that one outstanding feature of South East 
Asia is the process of ‘selective adaptation’.12 This process means that foreign cultural 
elements (in the case of the Thais in Sukhothai mainly from India, from the Mon and 
the Khmer) are accepted and merged into a new cultural amalgam. It was the Thais’ 
mastering of this ability to absorb seemingly beneficial elements of foreign cultures that 
contributed to their fast rise to one of the most pre-eminent peoples in mainland South 
East Asia. Selective adaptation did not weaken Thai culture but, on the contrary, 
strengthened it.13 In the reign of Ramkhamhaeng, two main foreign elements were 
adapted in such a way and turned out to be crucial for the advance of the Thai ethnie. 
One was the connection between Buddhism and kingship, the other one was the 
introduction of a Thai script, described by Coed&s as an ‘improvement’ of an existing 
script which was itself an adaptation of Khmer cursive writing.14 Both elements, 
Buddhism and Thai script, eventually gave birth to one of the earliest works of Thai 
literature in the fourteenth century.
Written by King Li-Thai in 1345 with 33 books of the Buddhist Pali Canon as its 
main sources, Traiphum Phraruang (The Three Worlds of Phra Ruang) represents the 
first systematic construction of a Buddhist cosmology in Thai. The Traiphum described 
the conditions and characteristics of all beings which inhabit the various realms of the 
Buddhist universe. For this thesis, it is important to see the Traiphum from two angles: 
First, following Pollock’s argument that literature addresses, sometimes calls into being, 
a particular socio-textual community15, there is no doubt that with a Thai language 
literature an important element of a Thai ethnie came into existence. Second, the 
Traiphum had not a religious role alone but was intended by its author “to confirm the
11 As an exception to the transliteration rules, this thesis uses dharma instead o f thamma for a better 
understanding.
12 Dahm, Bernhard. “The Role o f Tradition in Historical Developments in Southeast Asia”, Archipel 57, 
1999, p.21. See also Wolters, O.W., History, Culture, And Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives, 
Singapore 1999, p.209.
13 Mulder pointed out that ‘behind all the forms that are borrowed and added to the existing we find 
uniquely Thai meaning’. Mulder, Niels. “Modern Times, Thai Culture, and Development”, JSSR, 1979,
p. 100.
14 Coedds, 1968, p.197.
15 Pollock, Sheldon. “The Cosmopolitan Vernacular”, JAS, 1998, p.9.
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meaningfulness of karmically calculated human lives within a given multi-tiered 
universe. Human beings should lead a moral life and by doing so reap the appropriate 
heavenly rewards.”16 Besides being a guideline for a moral life, Sombat/Chai-anan 
pointed out that Li-Thai aimed to instrumentalise Buddhism as a political tool.17 When 
considering the circumstances of Li-Thai at the time of writing, this argument can be 
underlined. An uncle who claimed the throne for himself sent Li-Thai, a grandson of 
Ramkhamhaeng, to Sri Satchanalai. The fact that he composed the Traiphum in ‘exile’ 
and one important point of the text described the ideal characteristics of a monarch 
could be interpreted as a demonstration of Li-Thai’s view of his own qualifications and 
qualities to be king.
The Traiphum institutionalised the bond between Buddhism and kingship. The 
texts included three concepts explaining the ideal Buddhist monarch which are crucial 
for the understanding of traditional kingship in Thailand and therefore for this study of 
Thai nation and nationalism.
First, the concept of the ‘Great Elect’ which portrays the origin of the king. In 
Buddhism, the story goes that the world was in a chaotic state because the good deeds 
from a previous world cycle, the Golden Age, were lost. In order to put an end to crime 
and anarchy, the beings got together to select a king from among their ranks to rule over 
them and maintain order. He was named King Mahasammata [Maha-great; sammata- 
elect]. His election, however, was not just an appointment of a leader. Mahasammata 
was chosen because he was a virtuous man, an embodiment of dharma and destined to 
become Buddha {Phothisat). This process asserts that Buddhist kingship was based on 
the theory of a social contract. Li-Thai used this episode in the Traiphum to explain the 
origin of the king in relation to the origin of human beings. He described that deities 
came down to this world to eat fragrant earth. By losing their sacredness because of 
greed and passion, they turned into human beings with immoral behaviour who quarrel 
with each other:
“Because the people did not care to perform meritorious and virtuous deeds, or 
to behave and conduct themselves properly, the nutritive essence of the earth, that they 
had been eating regularly, sank down into the earth.”18
16 Swearer, Donald. “Centre and Periphery: Buddhism and Politics in Modern Thailand”, London 1999, 
p. 196.
17 Sombat Chanthonwong/Chai-anan Samudavanija, Khwamkhit thang kanmueang thai [Thai Political 
Thoughts], Bangkok 1980, p.59.
18 King Li-Thai, Traibhumikatha- The Story o f  the Three Planes o f Existence, Bangkok Reprint 1987, 
p.437. The ‘myth o f origin’ is discussed in Prakong Nimmanhemin. “Khwampenma khong phupokhrong:
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The human beings came together and consulted each other on how to establish 
order. From the following paragraph we can interpret that society must have a leader 
whose duty is to stop unrest:
“We are desolate...We ought to appoint a person to be our lord and leader. 
Whenever any of our acts are in question in any way, let such a man judge and 
determine and enforce what is wrong and what is right for us; let him divide up the land 
for us, and we will give him more fields than we ourselves have.”19
After this meeting, the human beings went to ask the Phothisat to be their
leader:
“The Phothisat King must be male. The people raise up such a man to be their 
lord because they see him to be more handsome than other people. He has more wisdom 
than other people; he is kinder than other people; he is more honest, more 
straightforward and more concerned with doing merit than other people.”20
The ‘Great Elect’ concept described not only the legitimation of the king as 
being chosen from the people but also the ideal characteristics of a king.
Second, the concept of the universal, wheel turning monarch (chakravathin) 
gives an example of a Great King. He is part of the Golden Age because his presence is 
instrumental in maintaining the state of paradise. The king rules with dharma and not 
with the sword. He advances the course of Buddhism and possesses five strengths: 
physical and mental strength, strength of officials, strength of nobility and strength of 
wisdom. As a result, poverty, ill-will, violence and wrong-doings are all absent from the 
kingdom. The Traiphum described the characteristics, qualities and activities of a 
Universal King in detail. In the centre were the personal qualities of a Universal King 
who had to build up enough merit over previous lives to be able to claim the position. 
This ensured on the one hand an unquestionable legitimation as soon as the king was on 
the throne; on the other hand it connected kingship inseparable with Buddhism:
“Those who have performed meritorious deeds in their previous lives...and 
those who follow the moral precepts, and practice the meditation on loving kindness, 
when they die, they are usually reborn in heaven. Sometimes, however, they are reborn 
as great lords and nobles of the human domain, with dignity and honour. They conquer 
the entire universe. When they speak words or utter commands they do it in accordance
Chak tamnan thai-tai thing traiphum phraruang [The Genesis o f Rulers: From Thai-Tai Myths to 
Traiphumphraruang]”, Warasanphasalaewannakhadithai, 2000, pp.63-77.
19 King Li-Thai, Reprint 1987, p.441.
20 King Li-Thai, Reprint 1987, p.443.
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with the dharma. Such a person is entitled to be called a Universal King, the 
Cakravartiraja [<chakravathin].”21
An important part of the activities of the Universal King was the ‘Grand 
Conquest’. The Universal King had the duty to take control over all lesser kingdoms in 
order to spread the reach of the dharma and to make the people happy. This part of the 
Traiphum added a political dimension to the Universal King who had to have political 
powers in addition of being a king full of dharma. It also legitimised an expansionist 
policy by a king and provided the justification for his demand of loyalty from other 
kings to his person. He was in a position to summon kings and chiefs who themselves 
had the duty to inform their peoples about the supremacy of the Universal King:
“Then the grand minister commanded the chiefs of all the small states to take the 
ceremonial gongs...and go among their people and deliver the message, thus, ‘...Our 
Lord is now the Mahaparamacakravatradhiraja, the great Universal King of Kings, the 
One Who Set the Wheel Turning, and who can conquer the Four Continents...’”22
Then the kings and chiefs followed the Universal King on his conquest through 
all continents and kingdoms. The greatness of the Universal King provided prosperity 
and peace in the land:
“As they journeyed through the sky, the Supreme Wheel went foremost. Next 
came the Universal King, and he was followed by his army and the populous. Along 
both sides of the way they took were trees, and all were laden with fruit and flowers 
[image of prosperity]. Who so wished to taste the fruit or pick the flowers could reach 
out and take what they pleased. If they wished for shade [image of stability and peace], 
they could be under a tree in an instant.”23
The power of the Universal King enabled him to conquer without the use of
arms:
“The many princes and lords...not one of them...could raise arms against the 
Universal King. They felt only the love towards him.. .They made their obeisance to the 
King and vowed their loyalty to him thus, “ .. .From this day on you are our overlord and 
we thy servants.. .Our land and our people are yours to do as you please.”24
The Universal King showed his graciousness and explained the duties of a 
righteous king which included the practising of the ten kingly virtues and an equal love 
for all subjects:
21 King Li-Thai, 1987, p.159.
22 King Li-Thai, 1987, p. 173.
23 King Li-Thai, 1987, p. 175.
24 King Li-Thai, 1987, pp.177-179.
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“...The Universal King is righteous and just. Be steadfast in the Ten Principles 
of Kingship. Love thy lords, thy ministers, thy people. Love all equally. Never favour 
one over the other...Be always mindful of goodness and merit, and be fearful and 
ashamed of evil.”25
The third important concept in the Traiphum is the connection between the 
dharma of the king and its effect on the land and the people. When the king practices 
dharma (for example by following the ten kingly virtues), then the land will progress 
and prosper and the people will feel happiness. However, when the king has no dharma, 
then the land will experience a crisis and the reign of the monarch will be short. Buddha 
supposedly said: “A righteous ruler is one who honours, reveres, esteems and relies only 
on righteousness. With righteousness as his standard, as his banner, as his power and 
sovereignty of governing, he righteously works for his political principles and policy... 
watching over and protecting the kingdom...he does so with regard to the scholars, the 
army, the businessmen, the householders, town and country folk, the beasts and birds 
alike.”26 For the righteous king, dharma as the basis of his rule includes love for all his 
people independent of their status. He must actively practice dharma to fulfil his duty 
and is rewarded with a long reign. A king without dharma, however, will not rule for 
long for his world will fall apart:
“By the grace and merit of that good lord, the riches and wealth of the land will 
become plentiful. The rain will fall in season and to the proper amount, neither too 
much nor too little... However, if any lord reigns not in righteousness, the celestial deva 
[deity] will cause such calamity to the seasons that the crops will be spoilt by drought 
and rainfall. Not even the sun and the wind or the rain and the moon or the stars will 
observe their proper courses, for the lord did not abide in the dharma”21
Following the concepts of the universal monarch and the connection between the 
dharma of the king and the fortune of the land, King Li-Thai practised the idea of 
dharmaracha (righteous king) after ascending the throne. He made this clear from the 
outset by adopting the official name King Maha [the Great] Dharmaracha Li-thai. 
Kobkua explained that the dharmaracha is an ideal king “who rules by the 
dharmalmQni or virtue in accordance with the described precepts of Buddhist kingship. 
As such, he is the chief patron and protector of the Buddhist faith.”28 Li-Thai followed 
this idea, for example, by ordaining as a monk and by composing Buddhist literature.
25 King Li-Thai, 1987, pp. 179-181.
26 Cited in Siddhi, Indr. “The King in Buddhist Tradition”, Bangkok 1981, p.47.
27 King Li-Thai, 1987, p. 189. See also Sombat/Chai-anan, 1980, pp.64 and 70.
28 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Kings, Country and Constitutions, London 2003, p.21.
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The concept of the dharmaracha became central for the Thai kingship. By 
connecting the condition of the kingdom with the morality of the ruler and the ruled, the 
monarch was, at least theoretically, directly connected with his subjects. It was 
advantageous for the king that Theravada Buddhism constructed kingship in the image 
of Buddhahood with power as the key denominator. Buddha himself was seen as the 
consecrator of the land. His physical presence, both with miraculous visits and material 
representations such as relics, transformed the country into a ‘holy land’. Accordingly, 
an enshrined relic of him in a stupa at the centre of the capital city functioned as a 
magical centre or axis mundi for the kingdom.29
The Traiphum did not only institutionalise the connection between Buddhism 
and the monarchy but also represented a milestone in the development of the Thai 
ethnie. The Traiphum demonstrated that there was, at least within the ruling elites, an 
awareness of ‘shared myths of origin, memories, a common public culture and common 
laws and customs’. How much of this awareness had the subjects in the kingdom of 
Sukhothai? Were they aware of a common culture, of the meaning of myths and 
symbols? How common was Thai as a language? Historical sources give not much 
information about the life and thoughts of commoners and any discussion must be based 
on assumptions. It is likely that a ‘Sukhothai’ identity was promoted and reinforced by 
constant warfare with neighbours such as Ayutthaya or the weakening Angkor empire. 
Economically, the use of Sukhothai’s very own currency (cowrie shells and bullet 
coins) helped to bring this identity to the awareness of the inhabitants, too.30 However, 
the most obvious identity markers must have been the transformation of the city of 
Sukhothai from a mere Khmer-controlled settlement to a distinctively Thai religio-royal 
centre, especially in regard to art and architecture.31 The original city plan was derived 
from the formal layout of Khmer cities of Angkor, an inner city surrounded by three 
concentric earth ramparts separated by moats. The Sukhothai Inscription No 2, written 
shortly before Sukhothai became an independent kingdom, reported that the ruler of the 
city decided to build stupas which showed his acceptance of Theravada Buddhism.32
29 Originally, temples were built on sacred sites like mountains. Swearer, Donald, The Buddhist World o f  
Southeast Asia, Albany 1995, pp.92-94 and Kulke, 2001, pp.286-287.
30 Wicks, Robert, Money, Markets, and Trade in Early Southeast Asia, Ithaca 1992, p. 182. Law texts in 
the 14th century calculated fines in cowries. Wicks commented: “The use o f the cowry as a measure of 
value and medium of exchange within Thailand was quite possibly a Thai innovation.” It should be noted 
that coins were extensively used in the Mon kingdoms since the 7th century.
31 See Swearer, 1995, p.88.
32 Inscription quoted in Suchit Wongthet, Krung sukhothai ma chak nai [Where Did Sukhothai Come 
From?], Bangkok 2005, p.75.
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This can be interpreted as an indicator of a distinguished ethnic awareness since the 
Khmer followed Mahayana Buddhism which does not know the practice of constructing 
stupas. Later on, the city centre, the manansilupatra, evolved from an altar, to a stepped 
pyramid where the king granted audiences and to a slender lotus bud tower enshrining a 
Buddha relic.33 It became the biggest temple, Wat Mahathat, with the stupa as the 
symbolic and ceremonial centre of the kingdom.34
Following the ideal of the Universal King, King Li-Thai attempted to expand the 
control of Sukhothai over other cities with the help of Buddhism. This included the 
construction of lotus shaped stupas in outlying centres as tangible signs of the spiritual 
links binding capital, province and vassal states. He also sought to unite the kingdom by 
distributing or discovering Buddha images, relics and Buddha footprints. His territorial 
rights were further legitimated when Li-Thai travelled in the country. He was 
‘accompanied’ by a giant wheel (chakra) and a Buddha image, similar to the Universal 
King in the Traiphum. This, stated Swearer, reinforced his claims over the network of 
states beyond the capital. Swearer commented that the king ‘created a ritual unity joined 
together by a cult of sacred relics, images, footprints and monks’.35 Religion was 
without doubt a unifying force.
The identity creating symbolism of all of these events, scripts, buildings etc. 
were embedded in a long process. Although an ethnic identity existed at the beginning 
of the kingdom, a distinguished ‘Thai’ cultural identity in a modem sense did not. This 
can be demonstrated by the religious beliefs which, as Lieberman argued, were at the 
beginning a mix of animism, folk brahmanism, court brahmanism, and Pali-language 
Buddhism with a rather heavy tilt towards animism.36 Under the guidance of the 
monarchs, however, Buddhism acquired the dominant position during the following 
century. It is noteworthy that Sukhothai developed a local tradition of the earlier 
Singhalese Buddhism, while one of its biggest Thai neighbours, Chiang Mai, kept the 
Singhalese traditions.37
33 The lotus flower is one of the most common symbols in Thai art. It is said that Buddha walked as soon 
as he was bom and that in his first seven footsteps a lotus flower appeared. The lotus is also a symbol o f  
wisdom. Pinkerton, Ashley. “Symbolism in Thai Religious Art”, Sawaddi, 1967, p.21.
34 The different styles o f stupas built in Sukhothai reflected the process o f a developing, distinctive 
culture, too. Subhatradis Diskul. “Buddhist Art in Thailand”, Bangkok 1957, p.30.
35 Swearer, 1995, p.88.
36 Liebermann, Victor, Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800-1830, Cambridge 
2003, p.259. Pali is the language of Buddhism. Until today, Buddhist scripts and chants are in Pali.
37 Grave, Peter. “Beyond the Mandala: Buddhist Landscapes and Upland-Lowland Interaction in 
Northwest-Thailand, AD 1200-1650”, World Archaeology, 1995, p.247.
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To sum up, this thesis suggests there are arguments for categorising the kingdom 
of Sukhothai as an ethnie in the period between the thirteenth and fourteenth century. It 
fulfilled Smith’s definition by having a named community of shared origin myths, 
memories, a common culture and a territory (albeit small). It was, however, not a pre- 
modem nation because of the lack of an historic territory. Despite the claims of its 
ruling elite regarding their far-reaching influence, Sukhothai had only a very limited 
reach beyond its close vicinity. Although alliances and a feeling of solidarity between 
the different Thai groups existed, it would be wrong to talk about a common Thai 
identity in the area of modern-day Thailand.38 The lack of a consistently connected 
territory resulted in a patchwork of Thai controlled towns (mueang) and regions. The 
land had to be shared with other ethnies such as the Mon and the Khmer.
The kingdom of Sukhothai is nevertheless important for its role as cultural core 
of the later Thai nation. The emerging distinctive culture became one of the most 
important sources of myths, symbols and traditions for later centuries. It laid the 
foundation for cultural patterns and behaviour which can be found throughout many 
periods of Thai history: the readily integration of others groups, selective adaptation of 
foreign culture and charismatic, benevolent father-like leadership. Furthermore, the role 
of the king became defined by following elements: the king is elected by the people, he 
is a Phothisat, he is a righteous and virtuous person who practices dharma 
(idharmaracha), he has the duty to provide stability, peace and prosperity. It is important 
to understand the role of both, the cultural patterns (thought, belief and behaviour) and 
the myths, symbols and traditions, as basis for future Thai societies and the nation. The 
period of Sukhothai is best summarised by a comment of Coedes: “At Sukhothai, 
between 1250 and 1350, the Siamese were able to develop their own characteristic 
civilisation, institutions and art.”39
2.3. The Second Cultural Core: The Early Kingdom o f Ayutthaya (14th-15th Century)
The Kingdom of Sukhothai was an outstanding political and cultural entity, 
however, it was not the only evolving kingdom of the Thais. Several power centres 
competed with each other and tried to gain the influence over weaker Thai and non-Thai
38 Constant rebellions against stronger kingdoms weakened the Thai altogether. See Griswold, A./Prasert 
NaNagara “A Fifteenth-Century Siamese Historical Poem”, Ithaca 1976, p. 131.
39 Coedds, 1968, p.222.
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chiefdoms.40 Cities such as Chiang Mai, Lopburi, and Ayutthaya developed their own 
political and cultural identity, representing a true system of ‘multiplicity of centres’. 
Sukhothai gradually lost its dominant position to Ayutthaya in the fourteenth century 
but existed on as a dependent state.41 The Kingdom of Ayutthaya became one of the 
most powerful kingdoms in South East Asia and managed to hold on to its position for 
more than four centuries. Its ‘secret’ lay mainly within two factors. First, it was a prime 
example of the ability of the Thais to adapt foreign elements for their benefit and 
develop it together with indigenous elements into a world-view which was easy to 
understand for the people and stabilised the system (especially in times of intensive 
infighting within the nobility). Second, it was economically propelled by a thriving 
trade with China right from its beginning in the fourteenth century.42
The picture of early Ayutthaya commonly painted in the academic literature is 
that of a kingdom culturally influenced predominantly by the Khmer despite being ruled 
by Thais. The ruling elite in early Ayutthaya borrowed heavily from the Angkor empire: 
its political organisation, many religious beliefs, the material civilisation, the system of 
writing and the arts.43 However, it would be wrong to interpret this ‘Khmer-ised’ society 
as a cultural colony of its neighbour.44 Rather through the process of selective 
adaptation, the early Kingdom of Ayutthaya was first and foremost an integral part in 
the evolution of the Thai ethnie and another cultural core for the Thai nation.
This point can be demonstrated in the case of its interpretation of kingship. It is 
commonly accepted that early Ayutthaya emphasised the concept of the god-king 
(thewaracha). According to Mabbett, the Hindu-inspired cult of the thewaracha 
originated in Angkor and resulted there in a sacred position of the king who was seen to 
be united with Shiva in the linga, the phallic symbol of the god. He was the ‘fixed 
image’ of the god on earth and the ‘lord of the earth’. The thewaracha was the bond at
40 See Griswold/Prasert, 1976, p.131. The authors emphasised that any change o f power was never a 
clear-cut succession like in the official historiography depicted.
41 See Srisak Wanliphodom, Sayamprathet phumlang khong prathet thai tangtae yuk duekdamban chon 
thueng samai krungsriayutthaya ratcha-anachaksayam [Siam: Thailand’s Historical Background from 
Prehistoric Times to Ayutthaya], Bangkok 1991, p.261.
42 About the trade see Ishii, Yoneo. “Some Aspects o f the 15th Century Ayudhyan Port-Polity As Seen 
From a Ryukyan Source”, South East Asia Research, 1994, p.57.
43 CoedSs, 1968, p.222, Subhatradis, 1957, p.34 and Condominas, Georges, From Lawa to Mon, From 
Saa’ to Thai, Canberra 1990, p.31 (FN 3).
44 Lieberman argued that the leaders o f Ayutthaya and Phnom Penh participated in a hybrid culture and 
regarded themselves as heirs to Angkor’s ‘classical brilliance’ in 1450. Vickery proposed that Ayutthaya 
represented right from the beginning a Khmer kingdom. Lieberman, 2003, pp.245-246 and Vickery, 
Michael. “The Constitution of Ayutthaya- An Interpretation into the Three Seals Code”, Bangkok 1996, 
p. 142.
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the centre of the kingdom.45 The Thai historian Chit Bhumisak emphasised the fact that 
another form of the thewaracha cult which worshiped Vishnu also existed. Angkor in 
the twelfth century saw an erection of a statue of Vishnu which was named after the 
king. After his death, the king’s bones were buried underneath and a ceremony was 
conducted to invite the soul of the king to rest inside the statue.46
It was this connection of the king with Vishnu which was accepted by the Thais 
regarding the concept of thewaracha. Together with this concept came the cultural 
system surrounding the cult which included rituals, ceremonies and sacred texts. This 
system aimed to lend sacredness to the king both as the person and the institution. 
However, the Thais did not just copy the Angkorian model but adapted it to indigenous 
ideas. Among the thewaracha elements used by the Thais such as the construction of 
the royal palace, the coronation ceremony, the royal language etc., the best example of 
selective adaptation by the Thais can be seen in the annual ceremony of the ‘oath of 
allegiance’ where officials swore loyalty to the king. During the ceremony, a poem, 
Ongkanchaengnam, written in the reign of King Ramathibodi (r. 1351-1369), was 
recited by a Brahmin. In the eulogy to the three Gods at the beginning of the poem, 
Vishnu, Shiva and Brahma were addressed by Thai names instead of their Sanskrit 
names. According to Chit, the vocabulary used in Ongkanchaengnam was mostly Old 
Thai which indicated that Ramathibodi only adjusted the pre-Ayutthayan curse in this 
Khmer style ceremony.47 One part of the poem describes how the great fire destroyed 
the universe and Brahma recreated the lost worlds. The fresh earth attracted deities to 
come down to eat. They finally became humans who elected the most powerful as ruler 
‘who is the beloved king of the people’ with the title of phrachaophaendin (lord of the 
land) and the name of sammatirachachao (‘appointed by the masses’, or ‘the Great 
Elect’).48 Like the Traiphum of Sukhothai, this poem was based on the same Buddhist 
text (<akkhanyasuth). The most obvious difference between Sukhothai and early 
Ayutthaya was the fact that the elected ruler was not a Phothisat but ‘the most 
powerful’, emphasising the importance of power in the understanding of kingship.
45 For a theoretical discussion of the thewaracha cult see Mabbett, I. “Devaraja”, Journal o f Southeast 
Asian History, 1969, pp.204-208; Nidhi Aeusrivongse. “The Devaraja Cult and Khmer Kingship at 
Angkor”, Ann Arbor 1976, pp. 107-140; Hocart, Arthur, Kingship, London 1927, p. 10 and Geertz, 
Clifford. “Introduction”, Yale 1983, p.2.
46 Chit Bhumisak, Ongkanchaengnam [Ongkanchaengnam], Bangkok 1981, p.12.
47 Chit, 1981, pp.36-40.
48 Ratchabanditthayasathan, Photchananukrom sap wannakhadithai samai ayutthaya lilit 
ongkanchaengnam [Dictionary of Thai Literature of the Ayutthaya Period -  Lilit Ongkanchaengnam], 
Bangkok 2002, pp.7-8.
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The concept of thewaracha was dominant in early Ayutthaya. This was 
expressed in the name of the first King: Ramathibodi. The name implied that he was 
Rama who was an incarnation of Vishnu. The official name of the city itself was also 
carefully chosen: Dvaravati Sri Ayutthaya- Dvaravati was the name of the city of 
Krishna and Ayutthaya the name of the city of Rama, both were incarnations of 
Vishnu.49 While the concept of the thewaracha is undisputed in the academic literature, 
one academic, Chit Bhumisak, proposed that a second concept also found its way from 
Angkor to Central Thailand in the fourteenth century and should be considered in an 
analysis of Thai kingship. This concept was the Buddha-king (phuttharacha). Chit 
argued that the phuttharacha cult was introduced in the thirteenth century by King 
Jayavarman VII of Angkor who not only converted from Hinduism to Mahayana 
Buddhism but also replaced the idea of the king as a god with the idea of the king as 
Buddha.50 This thesis accepts this proposal by Chit as many references to the king as 
Buddha can be found in Thai history.
The second cultural core of the Thai nation, the early Kingdom of Ayutthaya, 
was influenced by the concepts of thewaracha and phuttharacha. This core is 
significant as it introduced the elements of sacredness and power into the image of the 
monarchy. It also became a major source for ceremonies which in turn were crucial in 
creating identity for the Thai ethnie.
2.4. The Third Cultural Core: The Unified Kingdom o f Ayutthaya/Sukhothai (15th-16th 
Century)
The first century of the Ayutthaya kingdom was marked by internal power 
struggles between rivalling dynasties. The fifteenth century, however, saw a 
stabilisation of the kingdom with the ruling family of Suphanburi taking control of the 
throne. They regarded Sukhothai as a rival and succeeded in subduing it in 1438. In 
order to get the support and acceptance of Sukhothai, the Ayutthayan monarchs 
emphasised Buddhism to gain control. Buddhism, driven by political motifs, paved the 
way for fusing the first cultural core of Sukhothai with the second cultural core of the 
early Ayutthaya kingdom, thereby creating a new, third cultural core for the Thai nation. 
This ‘fusion’ happened mostly in the reign of King Borommatrailokanat, or shortly
49 Chit, 1981, pp. 12-15.
50 Chit, 1981, p. 12.
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called Trailok (r. 1448-1488) who can be seen as the third important king (after 
Ramkhamhaeng and Li-Thai) for the Thai ethnie. Being bom to a Sukhothai princess, 
Trailok was well aware of the cultural developments in that kingdom. To legitimise his 
claim over Sukhothai, Trailok followed the model of Li-Thai as dharmaracha without 
giving up the early Ayutthaya views on kingship. The result was a unique combination 
of the concepts of thewaracha and phuttharacha of early Ayutthaya with the concept of 
dharmaracha from Sukhothai.
This new approach to kingship was reflected in the official throne name of 
Trailok: Somdej Phrachao Ramathibodi Borommatrailokkanat Mahamongkutthepmanut 
Wisutthisuriyawong Ongkhaphutthangkun Borombophit Phraphutthachaoyuhua. This 
name was always followed with the small add-on of songthotsaphitratchatham.51 The 
interpretation of this name shows following elements: Somdej (honorific title for King) 
Phrachao (God) Ramathibodi (Rama the Superior) Borommatrailokkanat (The King 
Whom the Great Three Worlds Rely on) Mahamongkutthepmanut (The Great Crown 
who is a human being with the state of divinity) Wisutthisuriyawong (those who are in 
the family of the sun [Rama]) Ongkhaphutthangkun (the future Buddha) Borombophit 
Phraphutthachaoyuhua (the great King who is the Buddha over the head of the people). 
The add-on songthotsaphitratchatham meant ‘who maintains the ten kingly virtues’. 
The references to God and Rama mirrored the idea of thewaracha, the terms regarding 
Buddha reflected the phuttharacha and the addition showed that Trailok was a 
dharmaracha. Especially interesting was the term thepmanut (a human being with the 
state of divinity), clearly indicating the different idea of the thewaracha in contrast to 
the Khmer interpretation of the god-king.52
In order to present himself as dharmaracha like Li-Thai, Trailok diffused 
Buddhism by ordering the translation of the jataka of the last life of Buddha before 
Buddhahood into Thai {Mahachat). The jatakas are 547 Buddhist stories of the previous 
lives of the Buddha. The most popular of the jatakas are the last ten lives which reflect 
the ten perfections (barami), each of the ten associated with one particular perfection. 
The Mahachat, emphasising the perfection of giving (dana), became the most important 
jataka in Thailand. Sombat interpreted Trailok’s composition of Mahachat as his
51 Winai Pongsripian (ed) Kotmonthianban chabap chaloemphrakiat [Kotmonthianban- the Edition in 
Honour of His Majesty], Bangkok 2005, p.63.
52 See the discussion about thepmanut in Winai Pongsripian. “Khwamrurueang sathaban phramahakasat 
lae ‘kot monthianban’ [The Knowledge About the Monarchical Institution and the Kot Monthianban]", 
Bangkok 2005, pp.9-12.
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political tool for it emphasises that to be king, one has to have barami of former lives. 
The barami of Prince Vetsandon, the protagonist, is depicted through scenes such as 
trees and animals bowed to salute him wherever he went.53 This was similar to the 
account of fruit-laden trees in the Traiphum during the journeys of the Universal 
Monarch. Another trace of the phuttharacha found in the text was the use of Trailok’s 
name such as Phratrailokkanat or Phratrailokmuninat to refer to Prince Vetsandon or 
Buddha.
Trailok used Mahachat not only for his legitimation as dharmaracha but also to 
remind the people of their duty to be obedient to the king: ‘the people must accept the 
full right and power of the king over the kingdom and the people’.54 Trailok could also 
show that being king meant that he deserved to be in this position and that it was the 
duty of other lords to accept his superiority. This jataka was an ideal medium to 
disseminate the king’s claim to power and vision of kingship because it was widely 
used as a sermon by monks all over the kingdom and most likely people even in remote 
villages would have known the story.55
Being aware of the resentments of the people of Sukhothai against Ayutthayan 
rule, Trailok again sought to create loyalty to him through other elements of the 
dharmaracha concept. The Buddhist sangha was the key to success for merging the 
people in the countryside with the government for the monks were able to communicate 
into almost every village in the kingdom. Understanding the power of symbolism, 
Trailok won over the sangha in Sukhothai by adopting its religious traditions and 
customs for Ayutthaya. He also ordained as a monk in a mass ceremony together with 
2.348 other monks in Sukhothai in 1465. By making these monks his ‘colleagues’, he 
was able to get their support, especially when they returned to villages all over the 
country.56
While Mahachat and the ordination were important instruments to communicate 
with the masses, Trailok developed a medium to connect with the elites through the first 
sophisticated law code, the palace law {Kot Monthianban), to organise his court and
53 Sombat/Chai-anan, 1980, pp.122-123.
54 Sombat/Chai-anan, 1980, p.l 17.
55 Anuman Rajadhon, Phya, Thai Literature in Relation to the Diffusion o f  Her Cultures, Bangkok 1989, 
p .ll .
56 Chamvit Kasetsiri, Ayutthaya: prawattisat lae kanmueang [Ayutthaya: History and Politics], Bangkok 
1999, pp. 174-189.
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administration in 1458.57 It represented a complete legal code and was intended to bring 
order to the social world in order to fit in the cosmic world. O’Connor called the 
introduction of this traditional law a ‘historically unique birth of a Southeast Asian 
system of positive law’.58 The Kot Monthianban organised almost every imaginable 
aspect of royal life: the palace, royal speech, the honour and status of the monarch, the 
royal behaviour in different situations, the royal duties, ceremonies etc. The legal 
aspects covered the protection of the king, a ‘state of emergency’- law and palace law.59 
This law code became a central element for symbolically displaying a continuation 
between the different kingdoms over centuries. It was constantly revised and the later 
versions, for example under King Rama I (r. 1782-1809), were not fully identical with 
the earlier ones.60
Following the ideal of the Universal Monarch and the Great Elect who must 
have political power and bring order to society, Trailok started extensive reforms with 
the aim to centralise power in his hands. The most important one was the overhaul of 
the hierarchical sakdina system.61 The ‘Law of the Civil Hierarchy’ and the ‘Law of the 
Military and Provincial Hierarchy’ in effect ‘delineated an enormously complex 
hierarchical society in which the place and position of every individual was carefully 
specified’.62 As the instrument to show someone’s status, the amount of sakdina was 
related to the number of people someone controlled. The king himself possessed 
unlimited sakdina, reflecting his extraordinary position. A normal subject possessed 25 
units (na). One unit represented symbolically one rai, the Thai measurement for areas of
57 Quaritch Wales, H.G., Ancient Siamese Government and Administration, London 1934, p. 19. See also 
O’Connor, Richard. “Law As Indigenous Social Theory: A Siamese Thai Case”, American Ethnologist, 8, 
1981, pp.227-229. Based on the Mon idea of a separation between cosmic law and ordinary law, the Thais 
used the thammasat (natural law), which was derived from an Indian precedent, as the law core for their 
legal code and incorporated the edicts and decisions o f their kings to create a system o f positive law. The 
acts o f kings were therefore illustrations of the Eternal law, because he had the authority due to the fact 
that he embodied the cosmic law. Unlike in the West, stated O’Connor, the natural law did not replace the 
sacred law but was placed in it. The king was at the pivot o f the legal system but he could rule only by 
delegating his powers. This meant that the officials in provincial towns made regulations and 
administered justice within the king’s laws.
58 O’Connor, 1981,p.225.
59 Winai, 2005, p.29.
60 Winai, 2005, pp.28-29.
61 Girling, John, Thailand- Society and Politics, Ithaca 1987, p.21. See Prasert Na Nagara/Griswold, A., 
Epigraphic and Historical Studies, Bangkok 1992, p. 111, Siffin William, The Thai Bureaucracy: 
Institutional Change and Development, Honolulu 1966, p. 18 and Seksan Prasertkul, The Transformation 
of the Thai State and Economic Change (1855-1945), Cornell 1991, p .l.
62 Wyatt, 1984, p.62.
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0.16 ha.63 Although some Marxist writers compared the sakdina system with European 
feudalism, the two systems were too different to equate them with each other.64 The 
Thai peasants enjoyed a far higher grade of freedom than their European counterparts. 
Most important, the sakdina system was an important link between the population and 
the nobles who depended on the system for ‘manpower’ to produce goods for the royal 
monopoly of trade.65 An efficient system such as sakdina had presumably created a 
strong identity directly connected to the king.
We see the emergence of what became the third cultural core of the Thai nation 
through the efforts of King Trailok to unify the two kingdoms of Sukhothai and 
Ayutthaya. This period was an ongoing process which saw the introduction of many
i.L
elements of a pre-modem nation. However, what was lacking in Ayutthaya of the 15 
and early 16th century was a widespread awareness of a common culture or identity 
outside Buddhism. Just like in Sukhothai, the rulers of Ayutthaya (and other Thai 
kingdoms at that time) were only able to mobilize the population within a certain reach 
under their direct or -limited- indirect control. This restricted their ability to achieve a 
common identity beyond the geographic sphere of influence of each kingdom. The lack 
of a consistent homeland with a widespread common culture and, as a result, a lack of 
solidarity between the Thai groups weakened the kingdom. The 16th century saw 
multiple raids and attacks from the Burmese and the Khmer which resulted in serious 
losses and damages for the Thais. Ayutthaya itself fell into Burmese hands in 1S69.66
I propose to call this period of the kingdom of Ayutthaya another step in the 
development of the Thai ethnie, albeit with many characteristics of a pre-modem nation 
mostly created by the merger between elements of Sukhothai and Ayutthaya.
63 For a detailed list o f all grades see Kachom S. “The Free Man Status”, JSSR, 1976, p. 105. A  detailed 
study o f sakdina can be found in Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization o f  Thai Society in the Early 
Bangkok Period 1782-1873, Bangkok 1996.
64 For a Marxist interpretation see Chit Bhumisak’s famous study Choomnaa sakdina thai [The Face of 
Thai Sakdina] which was translated by Reynolds, Craig, Thai Radical Discourse, Ithaca 1987. For 
counter-arguments see Rosen, G., Peasant Society in a Changing Environment, Chicago 1975, p. 133 and 
Jacobs, Norman, Modernization Without Development, New York 1971, p. 112.
65 Wicks, 1992, p. 181.
66 Wyatt, 1984, p.97.
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2.5. The Pre-modern Thai Nation as the Fourth Cultural Core: The Later Period o f the 
Kingdom o f Ayutthaya (l()h-18fh Century)
In 1515, the Portuguese Tome Pires, one of the first Europeans to visit 
Ayutthaya, portrayed the kingdom as a rather diverse society. He claimed, for example, 
that the hairstyle and customs of the common people, and almost all the language, were 
like those of (Mon) Pegu. Lieberman interpreted this remark that many phrai (free 
commoners or freemen) still did not fully identify with the culture of the elite.67 The 
events of the sixteenth century seem to confirm Lieberman’s comment. Many freemen 
lacked an awareness of solidarity and common identity. Permanent warfare with Burma 
and Cambodia put a heavy burden on the shoulder of commoners.68 Every rampaging 
army demanded to be fed; constant military and labour services for the Thai king 
drained even more resources. The Thai chronicles complained that many freemen fled 
into the forest to be out of reach of the state. This indicated that some people were not 
willing to fight for the king.
The first fall of Ayutthaya to the Burmese was a political watershed and would 
help to form a pre-modem nation. War and occupation generally are an important 
catalyst for the development of self-awareness and a sense of solidarity of the affected 
population. After the fall, the kingdom was humiliated in war, plundered and partly 
depopulated. The Burmese king installed Maha Thammaracha, the governor of 
Phitsanulok, as the vassal king. It can be assumed that at least parts of the elite and of 
the population shared the feeling of powerlessness and alienation. All it took was a 
charismatic leader who was able to assemble a big military force to fight against the 
Burmese in order to restore the control of the country. This leader was ironically the son 
of Maha Thammaracha, King Naresuan (r. 1590-1605). His family was a scion of the 
earlier Sukhothai ruling house and his coronation in 1590 would symbolise the full 
return of the Sukhothai dynasty to the most powerful and prominent position in 
Thailand.69 Naresuan, growing up as a hostage in Burma, was a highly successful 
military leader on behalf of the Burmese until he turned against them and defeated them 
repeatedly during his reign. He appeared to conceive the unity of the country within a 
broader ethnic, cultural, and political framework. The fact that a ‘Sukhothai’ king would
67 Lieberman, 2003, p.324.
68 This argument is based on the data provided by Chamvit, 1999, pp.207-212.
69 The last king o f Sukhothai transferred his capital to Phitsanulok in the 1420s. Griswold/Prasert, 1976, 
p.132.
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opt to lead from Ayutthaya indicated a developing awareness of a unified kingdom, 
occupying the historical territory of the Thais (along the Chaophraya river).70 Besides 
that, Ayutthaya as a trading powerhouse offered far better economic possibilities than 
agrarian-orientated Sukhothai.
The political independence and growing identity awareness within the elite were 
good pre-conditions for the development of a pre-modem nation. The question, 
however, must also be: what was the attitude of the common people? While literature or 
laws were important in educated circles to develop a common identity, the mass most 
likely developed parts of their common identity through warfare. The effects on identity 
of the successful Naresuan campaign against the Burmese and his charismatic rule can 
be seen in western reports. Compared with Pires at the beginning of the 16th century, 
Ribadeneira gave a very much changed picture at the end of that century: “they love 
their country loyally, and would give anything to prove Siam is better than any other 
kingdom, or nation.” Van Vliet observed in the 1630s: “in general the Siamese are 
cowardly soldiers, but cruel towards their subdued enemy, or to those who are rejected 
by the King... Also they are proud and fancy that no other nation can be compared with 
them, and that their laws and customs are better than anywhere else on earth.” Gervaise 
mentioned in 1688 that ‘today they [Mon, Lao, and other war-captives] have merged so 
completely with the Siamese that it is quite difficult to tell them apart’.71 The German 
physician Engelbert Kaempfer reported in 1690 a distinctive identity: ‘the Kingdom of 
Siam is the most powerful, and its Court the most magnificent among all the black 
Nations of Asia...The natives call the kingdom Muan [mueang] Thai, which is as much 
to say, the Land Thai’.72 Both, identity and sentiments, were fostered by an elaborate 
system of festivities and ceremonies. Foreign observers, such as the French priest 
Gervaise, were impressed: ‘in the Indies there is no state that is more monarchical than 
Siam’ and ‘there has never been any court anywhere in the world more ritualistic than 
the court of the king of Siam’.73 It seems that the ceremonies fulfilled their function 
well- if Europeans were impressed, how much more impact they had on the Thai people 
who witnessed and understood the ‘sacredness’ of the rituals.
70 Wyatt, 1984, pp.88 and 105. Wolters called Naresuan’s loyalty to Ayutthaya ‘one of the momentous 
decisions in Thai history’. Wolters, O.W. ’’Ayudhya and the Rearward Part o f the World”, Journal o f  the 
Royal Asiatic Society, 1968, p. 166.
71 The reports of the travellers are cited in Lieberman, 2003, p.324.
72 Kaempfer, Engelbert, A Description o f  the Kingdom o f Siam, Bangkok Reprint 1998, pp.30,39 and 41.
73 Gervaise, Nicolas, The Natural and Political History o f  the Kingdom o f Siam, Bangkok Reprint 1989, 
pp. 67 and 221.
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Self-awareness and a kind of national sentiments must, have been common, at 
least in the elite, since Naresuan’s reign. The next important step in the development of 
the pre-modem nation happened in the mid-seventeenth century and was again 
connected to the reign of a monarch. King Narai (r. 1656-1688) undertook expensive 
military campaigns which forced him to open the country to more foreign trade in order 
to finance them. This resulted in an influx of foreigners who brought new knowledge 
and technologies into the kingdom. Narai, stated Wyatt, had ‘a desire to make his 
kingdom known and recognised abroad’ and sent embassies to the courts in Europe to 
build direct relations.74 This contact with the West led to a new, revolutionising view on 
history.
Traditionally, Thai historiography followed Buddhist convention where 
monarchs were described in connection with their promotion of Buddhism. Chamvit 
argued that history in this sense was not exclusively concerned with the past. The past 
was continuous with the present and the present was also part of the future. Events were 
understood to occur within one single unit and this unit was formed by the Buddhist 
tradition, not concepts such as race, territory or period. Narai, however, ordered the start 
of a dynastic history (phongsawadan). In 1680, the phraratchaphongsawadan krungsri 
ayutthaya chabap luang prasoet (The Luang Prasoet Chronicle of Ayutthaya) dealt with 
events in Ayutthaya between 1324 and 1604.75 Somchai argued that Narai’s main 
motivation for this chronicle was to provide historical information for Europeans and to 
send it to King Louis XIV of France.76 It represented for the first time a history of the 
state which began with the foundation of the kingdom and the activities of the kings. 
This indicates that history was used as evidence for a Thai identity and there was 
awareness of a historical territory.
The elite became not only conscious about history but also developed a view of 
the kingdom as a complex system consisting of elements of a pre-modem nation. The 
book Lakchai or Phrapichaisena, an undated guide for state officials, explained that in 
order to be sovereign, a state needs to house four spirits, namely Phrasuemueang 
(represents Buddhism), Phrasongmueang (represents a kingdom ruled by law), 
Phralakmueang (represents the protector/government) and Phrakanmueang (represents
74 Wyatt, 1984, pp.98-99.
75 Charnvit, 1976, pp.2-9.
76 Somchai Phirotthirarack, The Historical Writings o f Chao Phraya Thipakorawong, DeKalb 1983, pp. 16 
and 22. For more about traditional historiography see Wyatt, David. “Chronicle Traditions in Thai 
Historiography”, Ithaca 1976, pp. 107-122.
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the military and the people).77 The concept of the four spirits could be interpreted as an 
indigenous perception of a pre-modem nation.
The self-awareness of the elite as a pre-modem nation included the view that 
subjects were defined independently from their ethnic background. There was a shift 
from the earlier understanding of the Thai ethnie which had to live alongside other 
ethnies such as the Mon and the Khmer. In the pre-modem nation, the Thai incorporated 
members of such ethnies with the basic idea that as long as the individual was loyal to 
the monarchs and participated in the social system, he was regarded as belonging to the 
Thai society. Every freeman got a tattoo as registration for administrative purposes and 
was required to perform corvee labour. The abundance of land enabled people who were 
not willing to do that to move away and avoid any obligation. Kasian argued in this 
context that integration in Thai society was not determined by cultural assimilation but 
by political assimilation into Thai society.78 The monarchs distinguished their subjects 
from others not along ethnic lines but only if they were under his control or not. In the 
Long Song Prophecy written in the reign of Narai, the openness and hospitability of 
Ayutthaya to everybody was praised. It was also shown that all this was the result of the 
benevolent reign of the monarch:
“Twelve in tongue and wrung from every land,
Gladly come and stand, safe in this sire,
Of cities, whose men are freed of danger dire,
Of sin, desire, pain, sorrow and distress.”
“As for His Majesty, the King of Kings,
By rule he brings to all their happiness,
Through his decrees, his care and success,
He strives to bless us all- with joy we shine.”79
This trans-ethnic view of defining a member of society becomes more evident 
with a comparison between a poem and an edict. In the poem Khlong chaloem phra kiet 
somdetphranaraimaharat, written in 1658 during the reign of King Narai, the writer
77 Sombat/Chai-anan, 1980, pp. 149-152. The exact publication date of this book cannot be established 
and only fragments have survived. Sombat, however, is convinced that the book is genuine.
78 Kasian Tejapira. “Pigtail: A Pre-History of Chineseness in Siam”, Sojourn, 7, 1992, p. 107. See also 
Terwiel, Barend. “Tattooing in Thai History”, Bangkok Post, 9 October 1977, p.6.
79 Cushman, Richard (trans). “The Long Song Prophecy for Ayutthaya”, JSS, 2001, p.5.
60
praised the total destruction of the ‘Lao’ [of the North, not subjects] by the king.80 In an 
edict from 1763, however, the ‘Lao’ [under the control of the monarch] were put on an 
equal status like the Thais: ‘henceforth, Thai, Mon, and Lao are forbidden to have 
sexual intercourse in secret with Indians, French, English and Malays because they are 
heathens’.81 The edict, nonetheless, indicated that there were limits to the tolerance of 
the monarchs, related to Buddhism. Other religions than Buddhism were tolerated as 
long as they were not conceived as a danger to Buddhism and therefore indirectly to the 
monarchy.82
National sentiments of the general population seemed to have been widespread. 
Lieberman argued that warfare encouraged popular identification with the capital. It did 
this by generating anti-Burmese stereotypes, by mixing local units into royal armies, 
and by encouraging psychological dependence on the throne.83 An example of national 
sentiments can be seen in an incident in Tavoy where a popular rebellion chased British 
troops out of town.84 The trans-ethnic appeal of these national sentiments was 
demonstrated by thousands of Chinese volunteers fighting alongside the Thais in their 
wars against the Burmese in the 1760s.85 The Thai language as lingua franca enabled 
the direct and easy communication between the court and all subjects and the creation of 
a common identity within the different ethnic groups. This was helped by the fact that 
monastic education was almost universal for boys. The reign of King Narai saw the 
introduction of the first Thai language textbook (chindamani) which supported the 
spreading of literacy.86
Another aspect was the crucial role of the capital city Ayutthaya. In some 
European countries, the capital proved to be central for the development of a nation­
state. Hastings wrote about London: “The role of London in creating the nation-state 
can hardly be overemphasised. It was already the heart pumping the economy, but it 
was more than that. There was no other town of remotely comparable size, but
80 Wenk, Klaus, Studien zur Literatur der Thai, Band 1, Hamburg 1982, p.31.
81 Cited in Reynolds, 1987, p. 134.
82 Narai, for example, sponsored the construction of a mosque. But Catholics were limited in their 
activities in 1730: it was forbidden to write any book on Christianity either in Thai or Pali, to evangelise 
in Thai, to convert the Siamese, Laotians or Mons and to blame Buddhism. Ishii, Yoneo. “The Thai 
Muslims and the Royal Patronage o f Religion”, Paper Presented at the 13th IAHA-Conference, Hong 
Kong 1991, pp.3-4.
83 Lieberman, 2003, p. 318.
84 Kullada Kesboonchoo. “Kansueksa prawattisat thai nai dan kanmueang rawang prathet [The Study of 
Thai History in the Aspect o f International Relations]”, Sangkhomsat parithat, 1972, pp.100-103.
85 Wyatt, 2000, p.481.
86 Reid, Anthony, Southeast Asia in the Age o f  Commerce, 1450-1680, New Haven 1988, p.223.
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London’s national unifying role was so effective because it was neither a regional nor a 
royal one.”87 Ayutthaya played a similar role in Thailand except that its position was so 
powerful because it was the royal city, thus controlling all trade in and out of the 
kingdom. It was even for European standards a huge city with an estimated population 
of 150,000 in the early seventeenth century.88 Ayutthaya was indeed the dominant 
market place in the kingdom and one of the biggest in the whole of South East Asia. Its 
position was boosted in the seventeenth century by a trading boom, a period called by 
Dhiravat as ‘age of commerce in Thailand’.89 That century saw a surge in trade of five 
newly desired products (refined sugar, tobacco, tea, coffee, and opium), paving the way 
for a European-led proto-globalisation. Bayly called this an ‘archaic globalisation’ 
which helped to create a regional identity. Besides that, the economic development 
involved large sections of the whole society in trade and production.90 As a result, the 
distance between the human and the sacred world grew and the society moved towards a 
material world.91 This was an important pre-condition for rational and individual 
behaviour in a pre-modem nation.
It also meant that the kings had to make more efforts to create a bond between 
the monarchy and the people. Ceremonies became more public, displaying rituals, 
symbols and traditions. Buddhist ceremonies were especially suitable to make them 
visible to the masses.92 One example is the kathin (presenting the robes to monks) 
procession which was held for the first time on land and on the river in the early 
seventeenth century. The kathin ceremony itself was already conducted in the Sukhothai 
period but was transformed into a public spectacle in Ayutthaya. An European observer 
gave a description of such an event: “His Majesty has around him a great number of 
mandarins on foot who accompany him sedately and modestly, some of them carry his 
weapons; others his betel box and betel; and three of those who approach him nearest 
each hold a large parasol made of gold brocade having a handle of massive gold or 
silver. These parasols follow him everywhere and throughout the kingdom they are
87 Hastings, Adrian, The Construction o f Nationhood, Cambridge 1997, p.40.
88 Reid, Anthony. “Global and Local in Southeast Asian History”, International Journal o f  Asian Studies, 
2004, p.7.
89 Dhiravat na Pombejra. “Ayutthaya at the End of the Seventeenth Century: Was There A Shift to 
Isolation?”, Ithaca 1993, p.250.
90 Bayly, C. “’Archaic’ and ‘Modern’ Globalization in the Eurasian and African Arena, ca. 1750-1850”, 
New York 2002, pp.65-67.
91 Reid, Anthony, Southeast Asia in the Age o f Commerce, 1450-1680, Volume Two, New Haven 1993, 
p.329.
92 Ceremonies of other cultures were tolerated, for example, o f the Shi’ite Indian Muslims which attracted 
a big crowd but were not connected to the king. Reid, 2004, p.l 1.
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looked upon as symbols of the divinity of the king, to which, it is said, the people give 
the same honour on earth as they give to the gods who have already entered Nirvana.”93 
This display of insignia of rank and honour as a ritual contributed to the creation of a 
common identity. Public ceremonies and the appearance of the monarch were crucial 
because the normal life in court was totally reclusive.94
Another important element of a pre-modem nation was introduced in 1595. A 
revision of the existing law code focussed now on giving concrete case studies of 
decisions of kings for the use in legal processes. Lingat called this a ‘real code of law’ 
which was applied throughout the kingdom. Decisions of the king became permanent 
rules. Thailand had its first common law code separated from cosmological laws.95
Thai culture was now less and less influenced by Khmer culture. Examples were 
art and architecture where Sukhothai-style became dominant while the Lopburi-style 
(Khmer-style) lost importance.96 The design of Buddha statues, for example, reflected 
features from the Sukhothai period which were mixed with other elements. Similarly, 
the style of paintings developed slowly from a Khmer to a distinct Thai style which 
included polychrome with gold leafs applied to important figures and motifs. Last but 
not least, the architectural style changed from a Khmer to a Sukhothai- inspired style in 
the 16th century as well.97
To sum up, the kingdom of Ayutthaya began to develop into a pre-modem 
nation between the 16th and 18th century. Both the ruling elite and the general 
population were aware of their identity as members of the Ayutthayan kingdom. 
Although the people in Ayutthaya did not call themselves a ‘nation’ (the term in the 
modem sense was unknown to them), there was without doubt a wide range of elements 
of a pre-modem nation existent. These elements were enforced by the dominant role of 
Ayutthaya as capital city with an elaborate symbolism, a great variety of cultural 
activities, a deep ‘market’-economic penetration into the countryside, a highly 
developed and geographically widespread sangha-organisation under the control of a 
strong central administration, a sophisticated law code and continuous military 
campaigns. All these point to a cohesive political community with a common identity.
93 Cited in Kemp, Jeremy, Aspects o f Siamese Kingship in the Seventeenth Century, Bangkok 1969, p.23.
94 Phaulkon, a Greek working with the court, described the situation in 1689: “All what takes place in the 
interior o f the palace is an impenetrable secret to the officers on the outside.” Cited in Kemp, 1969, p.8.
95 Lingat, R. “Evolution o f the Conception o f Law in Burma and Siam”, JSS, 1950, pp.27-28.
96 Vilailekha Thavomthanasan. “The Role o f Lopburi During the Reign o f King Narai (A.D. 1656- 
1688)”, Honolulu 1986, p.134.
97 Subhatradis, 1957, pp.32-34.
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It is important to emphasise that the process of becoming a pre-modem nation 
cannot be narrowed down to the reign of one specific king. However, King Naresuan 
could be considered as the monarch who triggered the development through his warrior 
leadership. The process never stopped and went on for two centuries. During this time, 
the merging of the cultures of Sukhothai and early Ayutthaya became complete and 
together with the influences of other cultures, a new form of Thai culture was created. 
This became the fourth cultural core for the later Thai nation. The distinctively Thai 
culture was transferred into a common cultural identity of the Thais and could be 
compared to a pre-modem national identity. The readiness to fight against the Burmese 
indicated the existence of pre-modem national sentiments as well. However, it would be 
a mistake to equal the pre-modem nation in Ayutthaya with the modem perception of 
the Thai nation. Although the kingdom had far reaching influence, its power was 
limited.98 Ayutthaya represented in these two centuries very much a core area of the 
Thai nation and culture.
98 Wyatt, David, The Royal Chronicles o f Ayutthaya, Bangkok 2000, pp. 93 and 135. This does not mean 
that Ayutthaya did have no influence in far away areas at all. For example, Chinese ship captains reported 
to Japanese officials in 1692 that Ayutthaya sent an army to Pattani (which resulted in a defeat for the 
Malay kingdom in 1694). Report printed in Ishii, Yoneo (ed), The Junk Trade From Southeast Asia, 
Singapore 1998, pp.62-74.
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Chapter 3
The Dawn of the Modern Nation (1782-1851)
This chapter focuses on the third part in Smith’s three phases model, the 
beginning of the modem nation, and identifies two important elements of this 
process. First, it discusses why there was a transformation from a pre-modem to a 
modem nation. Second, it looks into the method on how the emerging modem 
nation was built with the help of the symbol-myth complex of the pre-modem 
nation. This resulted in a apparent similarity between the pre-modem and the 
modem nation, although they were not identical entities. Contrary to the view of 
the revisionist school, I propose that this process started before the influence of 
modem western political thinking and resulted in a Thai nation with distinctive 
indigenous features and a national consciousness analogous to some European 
nations.
3.1. The Transformation from the Pre-modem to the Modern Nation
I argue that Thailand is one of the earliest modem nations in South East 
Asia. The question is, therefore, why this happened in the Thai case earlier than for 
example in neighbouring Burma? The answer lies in the events of 1767 when the 
capital of Ayutthaya, known to Westerners as one of the greatest and wealthiest 
cities in South East Asia, was conquered for the second time by the Burmese army 
and totally destroyed. The royal family was killed or abducted, a fate shared by 
many people who were brought to Burma as prisoners of war.1 Ridden by chaos 
and warfare, the country fell into a period of ‘primitive power’2 which saw the 
reign of brutal force. General Taksin, governor of Tak province during the raid on 
Ayutthaya, was able to subdue rival leaders and establish a new kingdom in 
Thonburi (today part of Bangkok), which lasted for only fifteen years. In 1782, 
Taksin’s commander-in-chief, General Chakri, became the new ruler and moved 
the capital across the river to Bangkok, which developed into the political and
1 For the destruction o f Ayutthaya and its effects, see Wyatt, David “The ‘Subtle Revolution’ of 
King Rama I o f Siam”, New Haven 1982, p. 11.
2 Term coined by Pye, Lucian, Asian Power and Politics, Cambridge 1993, p.33.
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cultural heart for the revival of Thai society. The second fall of Ayutthaya meant 
the destruction of the pre-modem nation with its ‘outdated’ social organisation and 
worldviews, an event missing in Burma until the arrival of the Europeans. This 
major rupture in Thai history meant that when the modem Thai nation formed, it 
could not be viewed as ‘re-birth’ of the nation. The emerging nation represented a 
new entity which used extensively existing elements to promote loyalty and unity. 
This extraordinary process was only possible because warfare and displacement of 
large masses of people caused the destruction of local identities. Indirectly, it 
resulted in the strengthening of a common Thai identity and the rise of a new ruling 
elite whose need for legitimation would change the history of the Thai nation 
forever.
The Destruction o f Local Identity and the Strengthening o f Thai Identity
During the pre-modem nation in the kingdom of Ayutthaya, local identities 
were still strong. The reach of the central government and culture was limited to 
the core areas and smaller political units were able to maintain much of their local 
political and cultural freedom. However, the eighteenth century was a time of 
constant warfare and population movement in the whole of South East Asia.3 This 
not only had devastating effect on the living conditions of the people but also on 
the whole framework of their identity. If Wyatt’s conclusion is correct that 
probably only a few people lived in the early nineteenth century at the place where 
they were bom, a widespread destruction of local identities was highly likely for 
the Thai case.4 Crucial for the future development of a modem nation was the fact 
that these conditions were ideal for a total re-organisation of the society. With the 
weakening of local identities and the need for secure life after warfare and 
displacement, people were more responsive to new identities.
Being geographically uprooted, the people now lived closer together with 
other ethnic groups and were directly confronted with different traditions and
3 See in detail Liebermann, Victor. “Mainland-Archipelagic Parallels and Contrasts, c. 1750-1850”, 
London 1997, pp.27-30.
4 Wyatt, David “History and Directionality in the Early Nineteenth-Century Tai World”, London 
1997, pp.433-436. Not all places witnessed this destruction, especially where local identities were 
closely connected with religious ones. Best example is Pattani on the Malay peninsular that 
projected itself as a centre for reformist Islam and Malay culture. See Lieberman, Victor, Strange 
Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800-1830, Cambridge 2003, p.334.
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beliefs. The frequent contact between the groups also strengthened the ethnic 
awareness of the dominant Thais. For example, literary works of King Rama II 
(r. 1809-1824) described ethnic groups with characteristics like hairstyle and made 
negative remarks about the Chinese.5 The most famous writer of his time, Sunthon 
Phu, referred to the Chinese only with the derogative word jek  and called their pig 
tail a ‘rat tail’.6 In a poem of 1842, Niratphrapatham, Sunthon Phu clearly showed 
his national sentiments. The fact that he was a commoner may indicate that this 
feeling was widespread among the ethnic Thais:
“At the tax farmer’s shed with its loud gong
The important figure sits illuminated by candlelight.
He’s wearing his queue and displaying his fair-skinned 
Young wife,
A Chinese from somewhere else, another mueang [city or country].
He has no schooling and no learning, striving only to make 
Himself influential,
Knowledgeable only in [the trade of] big hog-legs.
Thinking about this, we Thai grow angry.
We do not operate the gambling akon [tax farm]. We starve.
How do we overcome this fate?”7
The tectonic shifts in the population landscape in the early Bangkok era 
were potentially dangerous for the stability and development of the kingdom. 
While there was an openness for a broader identity within many displaced groups, 
the only ethnic group capable of providing this identity, the dominant Thais, 
became more self-aware of their own ethnic identity. Considering the fact that the 
ethnic Thais (localised mainly in the central part around Bangkok and along the 
Chaophraya River) did not represent the majority of the population, the potential
5 Suvanna Kriengkraipetch. “Characters in Thai Literary Works- ‘U s’ and ‘The Others’”, Bangkok 
1995, pp. 13 8-140.
6 Wenk, Klaus, Texte und Interpretationen von und zu Sunthon Phu und seinem Kreis, Hamburg 
1985, p.l 8. Sunthon Phu mentioned other ethnic groups such as the Mon, Lao and Lawa but only in 
a servile, inferior function.
7 Cited in Reynolds, Craig, Thai Radical Discourse, Ithaca 1987, p. 141.
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for conflict was tremendous.8 Indeed, historical records showed that the decade of 
the 1840s, for example, saw some serious inter-ethnic problems.9
How did the Thai monarchy manage to solve this problem and ensure the 
loyalty of many different ethnic groups living together in the kingdom? This thesis 
proposes that the answer was a state policy based on the traditional trans-ethnic 
understanding that loyalty to the Thai king meant membership in the Thai kingdom. 
King Rama I (r. 1782-1809), for example, launched a large-scale program to house 
and feed a large group of Mons (30,000 people) who fled oppression in Burma in 
1814. To win their loyalty, the King (who himself had some Mon ancestry) 
awarded their leaders with royal titles and allowed the Mons to keep their language 
and their traditions. He also ordered to register, tattoo, enlist and enrol all Mons 
like any other subject of him.10 This case included two important elements on how 
the early Kingdom of Bangkok dealt with the problem of integration of diverse 
groups. First, by awarding royal titles to the chiefs of ethnic minorities and thus 
including them into Thai society, the king ‘de-captivated’ these groups and ensured 
their loyalty to him. Second, the Mons were administratively incorporated into the 
Thai state and society with their registration and tattooing. The awareness of being 
a subject of the Thai king was created with the help of the sakdina system which 
placed every individual at a specific place. These two elements could be called 
‘push’ factors in order to ensure control over the groups.
Maybe of even greater importance were the ‘puli’ factors. In the case of the 
Mons, the ethnic group itself was not forced to become culturally Thai in the 
emerging modem nation of the beginning nineteenth century. However, it was very 
attractive for the leaders of these groups to become ‘Thai’ with the help of royal 
titles which ensured access to high positions and business opportunities, as the 
report of a German missionary showed in 1831: “Within two or three generations
8 In the mid-19th century, Pallegoix gave a number o f 404,000 for the total population o f Bangkok, 
of which 120,000 were ethnic Thai. Crawfurd estimated the total population of the kingdom of 2.9 
million in 1821- about 1.2 million o f whom were Thai. Other main ethnic groups were Lao, Khmer, 
Malay and Chinese. Pallegoix, J., Description o f the Thai Kingdom or Siam, Bangkok Reprint 2000, 
p.29 and Crawfurd, J., Journal o f an Embassy to the Courts o f  Siam and Cochinchina, Kuala 
Lumpur Reprint 1967, p.452.
9 The Chinese suffered the biggest harassment by the Thais. In 1848, a rebellion by Chinese settlers 
in Chachoengsao province ended in a pogrom by both government troops and locals with thousands 
of victims. Westerners were also target o f anti-foreigner sentiments, albeit on a much smaller scale. 
Terwiel, Barend, Through Travellers’ Eyes: An Approach to Early Nineteenth Century Thai History, 
Bangkok 1989, p. 169 and p.220.
10 Terwiel, Barend. “Between Moulmein and Bangkok: The Mass Migration of Mons in the First 
Half o f the Nineteenth Century”, Leiden 2003, pp. 107-115.
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all the distinguishing marks of the Chinese character dwindle entirely away, and a 
nation which adheres so obstinately to its national customs becomes wholly 
changed to Siamese...To them nothing is so welcome as being presented by the 
King with an honorary title, from that moment they become slaves of the king.”11
How was the Thai identity strengthened? One factor was the ongoing war 
with Burma which had a tremendous unifying effect on the Thai people and caused 
national sentiments to arise. Even in the chronicles of the kingdoms of northern 
Thailand, normally emphasising their independence, the term ‘unity of the Thais’ 
started to appear.12 Another factor was the increasing awareness of other cultures 
within the kingdom and the integration of elite (political and business) ‘foreigners’ 
into the Thai society which did sharpen the profile of the ethnic Thai core of the 
nation. Traditionally the borders between this core and the surrounding ‘diaspora’ 
ethnies [Mon, Khmer, Lao etc] were rather blurred. Now the borders became more 
distinguished but not closed. With the weakening of local identities and the 
attractiveness of Thai identity, this core was expanding and able to incorporate 
more groups. However, the nation still lacked a cohesive ideology about identity. 
The emerging nation was ‘glued’ together by a strengthening Thai identity, the 
Thai language as lingua franca, and especially the Thai king who was via sakdina 
theoretically connected with every member of Thai society.
A New Ruling Elite
The transformation from a pre-modem to a modem nation would not have 
been possible without the ascent of the new ruling elite who sought legitimation for 
their rule.
The most important factor in this process was the fact that King Rama I was 
a member of the former nobility in Ayutthaya. Indeed, the founding of the Bangkok 
kingdom could be described as a takeover of power by four prominent noble 
families13 which changed the traditional relationship between ruler and nobility.
11 Printed in Farrington, Anthony (ed), Early Missionaries in Bangkok, Bangkok 2001, p.72. For the 
integration o f foreigners see Thawesak Phueaksom, Khonplaekna nanachat khong krung sayam 
[International Strangers of Siam], Bangkok 2003.
12 Lieberman, 2003, p.328.
13 It should be remarked that none of the four families were o f pure Thai origin. They were Persian, 
Indian, Mon and Chinese. Wyatt, David. “Family Politics in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century
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The monarchs in Ayutthaya, stated Ishii, kept control of the nobility by splitting 
functions in the bureaucracy into ‘administrators’ and ‘experts’. The ‘experts’ (i.e. 
Brahmins, jurists, the Chinese in charge of foreign trade and craftsmen) were 
mostly foreigners placed under the direct and exclusive control of the king and 
none of them were allowed to become ‘administrator’ (but were part of the 
nobility). The monopoly of these resources of expertise in the fields of state ritual, 
military technology, and overseas trade strengthened the political power of the 
monarch.14 This traditional limitation of the power of the nobility was ‘disturbed’ in 
Bangkok. The former royals were replaced by parts of the former nobility 
consisting of members of the ‘administrators’ and ‘specialists’. The new King 
Rama I could only claim the throne with the help of other noble families, making 
him dependent on their cooperation. He publicly stressed the duty of the nobles to 
assist and enable him to do his duty to take care of the people in the state.15
As a nobleman, Rama I had no blood connection to the monarchs in 
Ayutthaya and Thonburi and lacked therefore legitimation. One way to gain 
legitimation was to build a new relationship between the king and the people. 
Contrary to a monarch of Ayutthaya, Rama I saw the people in a more important 
role. He wrote in his version of the Ramakian epic: ‘the city [land] is like the body, 
the king is the soul who chairs the body’.16 The King went on to compare the 
people to the weapons in the body’s hands. For the time being, the ‘people’ were 
still excluded from the ‘body’ but acknowledged as an important tool for the 
monarchy to rule and maintain order. A second way to gain legitimation was to 
portray himself more as a dharmaracha than a thewaracha. Following the ideal of 
the Universal King, Rama I showed the duty of the king in his poem Nirat rop 
phama thi thadindaeng, written in 1786:
“The Burmese army is in hasty retreat.
Many of them lay dead on the ground
Because of the barami I have done.
Siam”, Paper Presented at the Eight Conference of the International Association o f Historians of  
Asia, Kuala Lumpur 1980, pp. 1-6.
14 Ishii, Yoneo. “Religious Patterns and Economic Change in Siam in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Century”, Ithaca 1993, p .l85.
15 Saichol Sattayanurak, Phuttasatsana kap naeokit tangkanmueang nai rajasamai 
phrabatsomdetphraputthajodfachulalok [Buddhism and Political Thought in the Reign o f Rama I], 
Bangkok 2003, p.254.
16 Phutthayotfachulalok, Phrabatsomdatphra, Ramakian Volume 1, Bangkok 1967, p.831.
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I was determined to support
and elevate Buddhism,
To defend the territory,
And to take good care of my people and ministers.”17
That Rama I stressed the victory as a result of his barami and placed 
Buddhism ahead of kingdom and people showed his aim to rule as a dharmaracha. 
As this resolution appeared in the poem describing a battle with the Burmese, it 
was Rama I’s political tool to prove his moral superiority over other Buddhist kings 
especially the rival Burmese ruler. As in the case of the Mons, Rama I granted 
them asylum and provided the necessary supplies not only to get more subjects (i.e. 
their labour) but also to prove his moral position.
To emphasise the goodness of Bangkok in contrast to the wickedness of the 
Burmese, King Rama I also ordered the rewriting of accounts of earlier wars. 
According to Saichol, early Bangkok had to depict itself as the superior Buddhist 
kingdom in order to attract the loyalty of political allies and vassal kings. Those 
rulers were assured that Bangkok did not intend to suppress them and that the 
‘royal tradition’ and the ten kingly virtues would always be maintained by the Thai 
king.18 Thai monarchs were under considerable pressure to comply with their 
announcements because in that period, it was still easy for a vassal king or for an 
individual farmer to switch loyalties to either another overlord or to ‘leave’ Thai 
society by moving to areas not under control of the Bangkok administration. By 
defining themselves as dharmaracha, the monarchs followed the Sukhothai ideal 
described in the Traiphum although they publicly emphasised the continuation of 
Ayutthaya.
The fact that Rama I and his associates were part of the nobility in 
Ayutthaya was important in another regard as well. The Ayutthayan nobility was 
actively involved in foreign trading and the new king was well aware of the 
chances foreign trade offered for Bangkok. Nidhi pointed out that the destruction of 
Ayutthaya and the years of turmoil afterwards seriously undermined the ability of 
the new administration to finance the state through the traditional system of control
17 Cited in Plueang Na Nagara, Prawat wannakhadi thai [History o f Thai Literature],Bangkok 2002, 
p.223.
18 Saichol, 2003b, p. 150.
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of the freemen (phrai). Rama I saw in trading a lucrative alternative which could 
offset the losses quickly. These trading activities were mostly conducted by the 
royal family/nobility and the Chinese merchants. Both groups were closely 
connected because some important Chinese were appointed to nobility or inter­
married with them.19 Trade, therefore, hold a prominent place in the activities of the 
nobility and helped them to understand and accept the ‘real’ world in contrast to a 
mystic world before. Nidhi proposed that this was reflected in the literature of the 
early Bangkok period. In the reign of Rama II, literature increasingly used real 
places and names, described products in detail and depicted urban life, all in all 
subjects not to be found in the Ayutthayan literature. Most importantly, prosperity 
of the nobility was seen as the result of work and labour and not any longer the 
result of bun (merit) as it was before.20
The trading activities and the ongoing reconstruction of the state required 
more and more skilled workers who had to be hired and paid in cash. The need for 
cash to pay for imports required by the state and the affluent nobility and merchant 
class increased.21 The introduction of a poll tax instead of corvee labour supported 
the spreading of the cash economy but also freed people from obligations away 
from home and enabled them to produce for the export economy.22 To cater the 
modernising economy and to standardise it, Rama III (r. 1824-1851) considered 
introducing modem, flat coins to replace the traditional bullet coins (pod duang). 
The modem nation was to have a common currency in 1835. The introduction 
failed, however, when the king declined the proposed design of the coins as not 
fitting.23
The strong promotion of economic development by trade-minded monarchs 
was very important for the growth of national awareness within both the ruling elite 
and the people. By becoming part of a countrywide trading network organised 
through royal monopolies, even distant villagers must have known not only about 
the central role of Bangkok but also about the existence of other countries.
19 Nidhi Aeusrivongse, Pakkai lae bairuea [The Quills and The Sails], Bangkok 1995, pp.136-142.
20 Nidhi, 1995, pp.220-225.
21 Nidhi, 1995, pp. 105-113.
22 Wenk, 1968, pp.32-35.
23 It was planned that the coins should have an elephant and a lotus flower on it. The coins also 
included the year o f production and the name of the country written in Thai: Mueang Tai [sic]. The 
king, however, interpreted the elephant as symbol of Sri Lanka. The lotus flower was already in use 
as the symbol for the port authority. Graham, Marc/Winkler, Manfred, Thai Coins, Bangkok 1992,
pp.110-111.
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Although some academics argued that the Thai economy only changed after the 
signing of the Bowring treaty with the United Kingdom in 1855, there is sufficient 
evidence that the Thai economy produced extensively for export decades before 
that date.24 An example was the development of the Thai sugar industry after 1810 
with sugar turning into the biggest export commodity of the country in the first half 
of the nineteenth century. King Rama III wrote in a letter in 1843: “Because sugar 
is an export crop, it brings revenue to the government.. .If more sugar was 
produced, even more ships would come, and government revenue from collecting 
shipping fees would be increased. This would benefit the people and the prestige 
and honour of the capital will rise. Therefore the governor, as the representative of 
the king, should encourage the Chinese, Lao, Khmer and the people of Nakhon 
Chaisri [province] to plant more extensively than before...If the holding was too 
large for the owner to manage, the governor should arrange for it to be cultivated 
with cane by others, and not left to be vacant.”25 This letter showed the active 
promotion of the economy in the agricultural areas by the monarch and 
demonstrated how Thais and other ethnic groups became part of the trading 
network. The Bangkok rulers used the traditional organisation of the trading sector 
to create a territory-wide economy. This structure was, however, updated and 
adapted as seen in the example of a re-organisation of the sugar trade with the help 
of a royal monopoly in 1842. An important pre-condition for this process was a 
sense of individualism that motivated people to enter the system of export 
production and cash economy. This individualism was supported by the Thai form 
of Buddhism and the tolerant attitude towards different cultures and religions 
shown by Thai monarchs.26
A similar combination added to the rise of a national awareness in the 
United Kingdom, where a strong sense of individualism was connected to liberty of
24 Authors arguing against an early economic development were for example Chattip Nartsupha. 
“The Village Economy in Pre-Capitalist Thailand”, Bangkok 1986, p. 158 and Ingram, J., Economic 
Change in Thailand, 1850-1970, Stanford 1971, p.34. For the counter-argument see mainly Terwiel, 
1991, pp.40-41 and the discussion in Sturm, Andreas, Die Handels- und Agrarpolitik Thailands von 
1767-1932, Passau 1997, chapter 4.
25 Cited in Hong, Lysa, Thailand in the Nineteenth Century, Singapore 1984, p.54.
26 The influence of Buddhism on attitudes to rational and economic behaviour is widely discussed in 
the literature. See for example Rosen, G., Peasant Society in a Changing Economy, Chicago 1975, 
p. 136; Phra Debvedi, Buddhist Economics, Bangkok 1992, p.39; Keyes, C. “Economic Action and 
Buddhist Morality in a Thai Village”, JAS, 1983, p.852 and p.865 and Cohen, P. “The Sovereignty 
of Dhamma and Economic Development: Buddhist Ethics in Rural Thailand”, JSS, 1984, pp. 197- 
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thought and religion by law. MacFarlane argued that this contributed to the early 
national awareness of the English which ‘led foreigners to think of the English as 
an arrogant and self-sufficient nation’.27 It is ironic that the British emissary John 
Crawfurd reported a similar attitude of Thais in 1822: “the extravagant national 
vanity of all classes, down even to the slave or peasant, is a part of their character 
not so easily accounted for, unless it maybe explained by their having been 
surrounded for ages by conquered or tributary states, and their practical ignorance 
of all national superiority. This appears to have been an attribute of the Siamese 
character in all ages.. .although capable of performing the most degrading or servile 
offices towards their superiors, yet no reasonable reward would induce them to 
perform any menial office for us [foreigners].”28 It can be assumed that Thai 
national awareness was therefore supported by the participation of the individual in 
the nation-wide trading network of the kings and the nobles.
The trade orientation of the king and the nobility also resulted in the 
appearance of a rational worldview. According to Smith, when secularisation and 
the reform of religion takes a foothold in society, it represents the arrival of 
rationalism and, in the long term, the dissolution of tradition and religion, which 
are ideal conditions for an early nationalism.29 In the Thai case, rationalism was a 
product of limited secularisation caused by the expansion of trade. This rationalism 
moved kingship from a superhuman into the ‘real’ world connected to a humanistic 
interpretation of Buddhism. Another result of the rational worldview was a 
different view on time. For Rama I, the new kingdom was a new beginning based 
on the old kingdom of Ayutthaya which was seen as something of the past. Just 
like in the French revolution a few years later, the new beginning was to be 
symbolised by a new time.30 In earlier times, the ‘past’ was perceived only in 
religious terms (a past life, for example). Under Rama I, the ‘past’ became part of 
the present, something which could teach a lesson and explain the changes in 
society. The downfall of Ayutthaya, for example, was understood to be a result of 
the failure of the last ruling dynasty and the moral bankruptcy of the old capital.
27 MacFarlane, Alan, The English Individualism, Oxford 1978, pp.165-166.
28 Crawfurd, 1967, pp. 143-144.
29 Smith, Anthony, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Oxford 1979, p.37.
30 See Gillis, John. “Memory and Identity: The History o f a Relationship”, Princeton 1994, p.7.
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This accusation can be found in a poem written by the viceroy of Rama I:
“Because they did not listen to the old legend,
that is why we lost, we lost the [royal] family,
We lost our rank, we lost our honour,
We lost our land, we lost our palace.”31
Rama I solely blamed the former dynasty for the moral decay of Ayutthaya. 
In the newly written chronicles, the last king’s death was depicted pitifully- a far 
cry from a heroic death suitable for a king: “The Holy Lord of the realm fled forth 
from the municipality, went on board a small boat with two pages, and went to hide 
in a grove of trees. The pages accordingly abandoned him...and His Holiness 
starved all by himself.”32 The moral decay of the old society and its destruction was 
described in traditional terms as the kaliyuk, the ‘age of destruction’.33 In the eyes 
of the new rulers, their task was, therefore, not only a physical but also a moral 
reconstruction of the old kingdom, a new ‘golden age’.
The intellectual changes caused by the rational worldview were not limited 
to the monarchical elite alone. They spread into other groups of the population as 
well. An example was the poet Sunthon Pu who was popular with people of all 
classes because his poems were written in klon (most simple Thai verse form). In 
the first period of his work, Sunthon Pu emphasised the rightfulness of the 
monarchy. When he fell out of favour at court (in the 1820s), he published a poem, 
Phra chaisuriya, describing the ruin of a fictive society caused by the misbehaviour 
of the nobles, immoral monks and a general moral decline.34 The fact that he dared 
to criticise the king (‘connected with a number of young girls’) of that fictive 
country clearly indicates a rational worldview where a monarch could be reduced 
to a normal human being.
Another example for the intellectual change at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century was the book Nangnopphamat,35 The unknown author presented
31Mahasurasinghanat, Somdetphrabawonraratchao. “Phlengyao rueng ti muengphama [The Long 
Song about the Battle against Burma]”, Bangkok 2002. p.27.
32 Wyatt, David (ed), The Royal Chronicles o f  Ayutthaya, Bangkok 2000, p.521.
33 Gesick, Lorraine. “The Rise and Fall of King Taksin: A Drama of Buddhist Kingship”, Yale 
1983, pp.87-97.
34 Sombat Chantomvong. “The Political World of Sunthonphu”, Bangkok 1985, pp.55-74.
35 Nidhi estimated that this work was written between 1817 and 1835. Nidhi Aeusriwong. “Lok 
khong nangnopphmat [The World o f Nangnopphamat]”, Bangkok 1996, pp.129,148 and 154. The
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a new worldview by refuting the Sukhothai-period Traiphum view of a mystic 
Mount Meru in the centre of the universe. Instead (s)he accepted a division of the 
world into many states which (s)he listed with the languages as far as they were 
known, although the author acknowledged that there were many more existing. A 
detailed description about border length revealed a sophisticated understanding of 
geography and the territorial dimension. This territorial understanding included the 
notion that a king who rules his territory rules all the people in it as well. It meant 
that vassal states should not be any longer under the rule of local kings but under 
the king of Bangkok. To smoothen his/her argument, the author explained that a 
state consists of people of many languages and races, hence differences are not 
important for living together. Accordingly, a king who does not care about race or 
language is to be praised. Besides that, a king should prefer diplomacy and not war. 
Such a king makes the country prosper and safe, with people praising the honour of 
him and asking to settle in the kingdom. Religion should flourish, too.36
The fact that Rama I was not of royal blood resulted in his need of 
legitimation. That he was a member of the trading nobility in Ayutthaya triggered 
the chain of events and developments which gave birth to a new worldview and 
national awareness of the ruling elite that spread to the broader population. It was 
this change that could be seen as an important element in the emergence of the 
modem nation.
The Expansion o f the State
The transformation to a modem nation would not have been possible 
without the aspiration of the Bangkok rulers to expand direct control. It must be 
emphasised that Rama I or his two successors did not intend to build a modem 
nation but were interested in the strengthening and legitimising of their rule. It 
could be said that the elements of the modem nation emerged more as a by-product 
of these efforts. Crucial in the early stage of the modem nation was the help of the 
state which ensured a fast dissemination of the symbols and ideas of this nation. 
Facing a situation where many areas were more or less independent after 1767, the
book is reprinted in Suchit Wongthet (ed). “Rueang nangnopphamat rue tamrap thaosrichulalak 
[The Story of Nangnopphamat or The Textbook o f Thao Srichulalak]”, Bangkok 1996.
36 Suchit (ed), 1996, pp.22-26.
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King pushed hard to increase the reach of his administration. His policy was so 
successful that only a few decades after the total collapse of a central government, 
Thailand had a ‘fine-meshed net’ administration.37 However, it would be a mistake 
to think of it only in modem bureaucratic terms of administration as Day argued 
that, in pre-modem South East Asia, the ‘ordering efficacy of ritual activity across 
the landscape’ is not to be neglected.38
Indeed, the royal administration in the old kingdom of Ayutthaya had been 
limited in its reach to the area surrounding the capital, still the city was able to 
maintain its supremacy in the region over four centuries. The reach of the ‘state’, 
however, changed dramatically in the Bangkok era, symbolised by a royal decree 
in 1803. It abolished the right of provincial governors to appoint their own town 
councils, legal officers, heads of customs posts and several other important 
officials.39 Using travelogues and diaries from that period, Terwiel was able to 
show that a strong bureaucracy was active down to the village level (mostly but not 
exclusively in the central part).40 The early kings of the Bangkok era developed an 
actual administration policy (rathaphibannayobai), which was implemented even 
in the far away North East.41
Rama I saw a close relationship with local elites as an efficient way to build 
up an administration and to extend the Thai core culture beyond Bangkok. He 
ensured that all officials stayed in close contact with his government with the help 
of public rituals and service rotas to the capital. Wilson proposed that the Bangkok 
administration was very skilled in the use of symbols and rituals. At court, for 
example, every tribute mission was treated to ceremonies designed to be as 
impressive as possible, the veiy visible display of Bangkok-Thai culture and 
custom. Members of the missions got personal gifts like garments and coins from 
the king. The effects on the recipients of these rituals and presents were
37 Wenk, 1968, p.28. This view is refuted by some academics. See for example Chattip Nartsupha. 
“Watthanatham tawantok kap phatthanakan sangkhom thai [Western Culture and the Development 
of Thai Society]”, Bangkok 2001, p.9 and Evers, Hans-Dieter. “The Bureaucratization o f Southeast 
Asia”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1987, p.669.
38 Day, Tony, Fluid Iron- State Formation in Southeast Asia, Honolulu 2002, p.179.
39 Terwiel, Barend “The Bowring Treaty: Imperialism and the Indigenous Perspective”, JSS, 1991, 
p.40.
40 Terwiel, 1989, p.238-239.
41 Kusuma Rakshamani. “Phuminam an pen mongkhon [Auspicious Place-names]”, Bangkok 1999, 
p.86. The main interest o f the Bangkok administration, however, was focussed on the central part.
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summarised by Wilson as ‘considerable’ and had a highly integrative character.42 
Lieberman argued similarly that the training of sons from influential families as 
court pages, and the trips of provincial officials with their entourages to the capital 
for festivals were crucial to maintain the ties. On their return, they transmitted 
cultural patterns of the capital in architecture, dress, poetry, ritual and speech to 
their home districts.43 Official contact between the central government and its civil 
servants or even the people was not limited to Bangkok only. Royal decrees were 
transmitted through the registry office to the provinces and municipalities, where 
the texts were read to the people who were called together by the sounding of a 
gong. Communication between the capital and distant villages was made easier by 
the fact that many men were literate (through spending time as Buddhist monks).
How efficient this system must have been becomes clear from observations 
by Christian missionaries in 1841. While the conclusion was related to missionaries, 
it can be assumed that it was valid for the reach of the central government as well: 
“The Siamese are almost... as much in the habit of coming several times a year to 
Bangkok, as the Jews were of going up to Jerusalem to worship.” The report went 
on: “Still it is certain that vast numbers [of government officials] do spend their 
three months yearly at Bangkok, in performing various kinds of government 
service... It well be doubted whether there is another country in the world, of equal 
magnitude with this, every part of which can be so easily and effectually reached 
by a missionary stationed at one point.”44
In 1805, Rama I commissioned a collection, compilation and revision of the 
old laws of Ayutthaya to achieve an administrative and legal standard. This law 
was later called the Three Seals Law (Kotmai trasamduang). Rama I gave as 
purpose of this revision that “for the secular world, the king who maintained the 
land has legislated the ancient law as a standard to give a just verdict to the people. 
Now all this has heavily deviated because of greedy and shameless people who 
adjusted the law according to their needs. This resulted in the loss of justice in the 
land. His Majesty, therefore, ordered....to make a revision of all the laws which
42 Wilson, Constance. “The Thai State in the Khorat Plateau and the Middle Mekong Valley, 1827- 
1892”, Paper Presented at the 14th IAHA-Conference, Bangkok 1996, pp.3 and 11. That the system 
was not always perfectly working can be seen in the example o f Chiang Mai, which hesitated to 
support Bangkok in its war against the Lao o f Vientiane in 1827. See Wyatt, David. “Palm-Leaf 
Manuscripts and History-Writing in Pre-modern Northern Thailand”, Paper Presented at the 6th 
International Conference on Thai Studies, Chiang Mai 1996, p.8.
43 Lieberman, 2003, p.317.
44 Cited in Lieberman, 2003, p.317.
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existed in the royal hall in order to be accurate and to classify them. He also 
adjusted some points to be just. So it will be useful for the kings to maintain the 
land in the future.”45 Rama I followed with this law the ideal of the ‘Great Elect’ 
duty of the king to maintain order. John Crawfurd’s comment from 1822 showed 
that the justice system was highly sophisticated: “There exist distinct courts for the 
administration of civil and criminal law...No capital execution can take place 
without a warrant of the court and in all cases there is an appeal to the chief judge. 
All evidence is taken upon oath and the law proceedings which are operose and 
tedious are invariably committed to writing. The Siamese laws themselves exist in 
the form of a written code.”46 The importance of this law code lay in the fact that it 
was an ‘update’ from the traditional law with additions the administration saw 
necessary for its period. The modem nation, therefore, was ruled with an 
indigenous legal code.
3.2. The Emergence o f the Modern Nation
Although the modem Thai nation started to emerge in the early Bangkok 
period (1782-1851), it is important to stress that it was an ongoing process. None of 
the members of the nobility, including the three monarchs of that period, possessed 
the idea of a fixed ideology of a modem nation which could have given the 
direction for the policies. Due to the limited contact to western ideas, the 
perception of a nation in the western sense was hardly on the mind of the 
monarchs.47 The Bangkok rulers aimed to create a unified kingdom which was 
partly motivated by the wish to strengthen the country against further Burmese 
attacks but also to expand their political and economical control as well as to 
maintain their rule. Lacking alternatives, they had no other choice than to design 
the kingdom on already existing indigenous material. Therefore, the main theme 
focussed around a moral recovery, a going back to the roots and an avoidance of 
the moral mistakes of late Ayutthaya. To achieve an emphasis on continuity while
45 Mahawitthayalai Thammasat (comp), Pramuan kotmai ratchakanthi I [Collection o f  Law of  
Rama I], Bangkok 1986, p.4.
46 Crawfurd, 1967, p. 125.
47 The British had only loose official contact with Bangkok since their occupation of Penang in 
1786 and did not have significant influence on the developments in Bangkok. Webster, Anthony, 
Gentlemen Capitalists- British Imperialism in South East Asia, 1770-1890, London 1998, p. 159.
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creating a new entity, the new ruling elite made extensive use of well-known 
symbols, myth and traditions with Buddhism as central element.
The Role o f  Buddhism
Just like King Trailok in the fifteenth century, the new King Rama I was 
confronted with the task of unifying his kingdom. To achieve this aim as fast as 
possible, he relied on a similar strategy: the promotion of Buddhism whose 
representatives and ideas were under the control of the central government. For this 
purpose, he ordered the writing and translation of Buddhist texts into Thai to 
ensure a broad dissemination into every village. Buddhist texts were usually 
written in the traditional language of Buddhism, Pali, which only educated monks 
were able to read. With the use of Thai, many more people had now access to 
Buddhism texts. Besides this unifying effect, the promotion of Buddhism also 
enabled Rama I to depict himself as protector and patron of the religion, an 
important traditional duty of the monarch. To achieve a standardisation of the 
Buddhist canon (tipitakaj and to control its content, Rama I organised a Buddhist 
‘council’ for its revision in 1788: “The Pali canon has heavily deviated from the 
Buddha’s teaching. Thus it is difficult for the monks to study and continue 
Buddhism. I have already invited all the senior monks to conduct the rehearsal of 
the Pali canon in order to ensure that the teachings were pristine and perfect...”48 
Along with the canon, the sangha itself was purged and ‘unworthy’ monks 
dismissed.49 The fact that Rama I was able to organise such a council to do 
revisions was seen as a proof of his greatness for only ‘Great Kings’ would be able 
to do so. This was an important legitimation of Rama I in comparison with other 
kings who had to acknowledge his superiority.
Corresponding to the more rational worldview in the Bangkok elite, the 
new Thai Buddhist canon reflected a more humanistic view of Buddhism as it 
claimed to follow strictly the teaching of Buddha. It was based on the idea that all 
human beings, independent of their status, would receive the same result for their 
deeds. A king and a slave, for example, were to be rewarded with the same amount 
of merit {bun) or demerit {bap) for the same deed. It implied that all people could
48 Mahawitthayalai Thammasat, 1986, p.2.
49 Wenk, 1968, p.39.
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have relationships without caring about the status of another person.50 The effects 
of such thinking on all aspects of society must have been tremendous. It dissolved 
any obligation to a specific class or clan and, with its emphasis on good behaviour, 
introduced a duty of every individual to all the people in the society. This approach 
created, theoretically at least, the condition for a unified people living together in 
equality. It was a central idea for the modem Thai nation which was based on the 
interpretation of Buddhism and differed from western ideas.
The rulers in Bangkok needed the unifying power of Buddhism urgently. 
After a long period of relatively lawlessness without a central authority, rebellions 
were common occurrences. These revolts under the leadership of wise men 
(phuwiset) or holy men (phumibun) were suppressed by the military. In the long 
term, however, Rama I had to win the loyalty of the people. Buddhist thoughts 
were the easiest way to reach out into the countryside in order -as one book from 
that era described it- ‘to reduce the problem that the people do not have 
solidarity’.51 With a humanistic version of Buddhism, the ruling elite tried to 
counterbalance the appeal of the phuwiset/phumibun and their use of supernatural 
beliefs.52 It was also helpful to integrate the large number of foreigners (mainly 
Chinese immigrants fleeing political turmoil at home) living in the kingdom 
because it made it easier for them to accept the official version of Buddhism.53 
Religion was, therefore, essential for the development of identity in the modem 
nation.
The Use o f Symbols, Myths and Traditions in Art and Culture
Rama I supported his political attempts to unify a rapidly expanding 
kingdom with a vast range of cultural measures. They were aimed to enhance his 
and the kingdoms legitimacy and to create a sense of unity within the people. The 
heavy use of symbols, myths and traditions gave the people the feeling of 
continuity and emotional assurance. For example, the king chose as name for his 
family dynasty the term ‘Chakri’ which was his own title as supreme commander 
of the armed forces under King Taksin. ‘Chakri’, explained Mattani, was
50 Saichol, 2003b, p.248.
51 Cited in Saichol, 2003b, p. 174.
52 Saichol, 2003b, pp. 174-177.
53 Saichol, 2003b, p. 178.
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symbolically associated with Vishnu, the bearer of the discus (chakra), which 
became the crest of the dynasty. The king was to personify Vishnu incarnate, the 
Great Preserver, who would save the Thai world from its evil enemies and who 
restored peace, harmony and prosperity to the land.54 It should also be noted that 
the (later introduced) common name for all Thai kings, Rama, was an incarnation 
of Vishnu. To project the symbol publicly, Rama I ordered the introduction of the 
official flag for the dynasty, a red flag with the chakra on it, in 1799.55
The fact that Rama I lacked a blood connection to the royal houses in 
Ayutthaya and Thonburi led him to look for a new relationship with the people. In 
a symbolic way, this was possible by emphasising that he was chosen by the people 
and therefore a ‘Great Elect’.56 To make him more human and accessible, he 
changed the procedure of the Oath of Allegiance in 1785. Officials were now 
supposed to worship Buddha images and no longer images representing former 
kings during the oath. This was not only a shift of the object for veneration but also 
a yielding up of the superior position to Buddha. The images of the former kings 
were representing thewaracha or ‘god-kings’, a cult discouraged by Rama I.57 He 
emphasised the principle of the righteous king (<dharmaracha) and his own 
behaviour was intended to be exemplary for his officials and subjects.
At the heart of his cultural efforts was a revision and new edition of the 
Ramakian (the Thai version of the Indian Ramayana) to restore the Thai culture of 
Ayutthaya.58 Srisurang called the revision a ‘nationalisation of a foreign epic’.59 
The new version included, for example, a coronation ceremony of Rama similar to 
that of a Thai king. Using the Ramakian to spread Thai culture (mostly with the 
help of performing arts like dances) was an efficient way because of its centuries- 
long tradition and popularity in Thailand. It was an attempt to build the new 
Bangkok kingdom on the historic core cultures of the Thai. It was also an important 
integrative element while the new kingdom with its sparsely populated and multi-
54 Mattani Rutnin, Dance, Drama, and Theatre in Thailand, Chiang Mai 1996, p.53.
55 Royal Decorations and Coin Division. “The Dynastic Marc”, Bangkok 1989, p.2.
56 Reynolds, Craig. “Religious Historical Writing and the Legitimation o f  the First Bangkok Reign”, 
Singapore 1982, pp.99-100.
57 Akin, 1996, pp.54-56. In a 1782 royal decree he ordered the destruction o f the lingas, symbols o f 
the cult o f thewaracha. See also Somboon Suksamran. “Buddhism, Political Authority, and 
Legitimacy in Thailand and Cambodia”, Singapore 1993, p. 120.
58 The Ramayana epic was known in Sukhothai period as the name of King Ramkhamhaeng 
indicates. The indigenisation to the Thai Ramakian happened during the Ayutthaya period.
59 Srisurang Poolthupya. “Thai Customs and Social Values in the Ramakien”, Munich 1983, p.99.
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ethnic society was in constant conflict with the Burmese. Rama in the Ramakian 
came to earth to bring order and harmony. It must have been reassuring for the 
readers and spectators of the Ramakian that their king was going to do the same.
The new rational thinking resulted in a new understanding of history. Rama 
I used that for his own goals. He ordered to revise all known chronicles of the 
Ayutthaya period, to start a collection of legends, and to translate Buddhist, Mon 
and Chinese manuscripts and inscriptions.60 Nidhi pointed out that the re-writing of 
chronicles included not only a change of style but also of the content ‘to put a new 
story in an old one and to change the old story’.61 By portraying the inability of the 
last king in Ayutthaya and crediting the downfall to his negligence to rule 
according to the ten kingly virtues, the chronicles legitimised the new ruler who 
followed the virtues. At the same time, it included a lesson for the reader about the 
value of solidarity and order under a strong government. Due to the new territorial 
dimension in thinking and the claim to govern all Thais, it was only logical that 
Rama I was interested not only in Ayutthayan chronicles. New editions of the 
‘Northern Chronicles’ with a focus on the period before Ayutthaya and the so- 
called ‘British Museum Chronicles’ followed. The latter presented a history of 
‘Siam’ (sayamprathet) from the time of Sukhothai until the reign of Rama I. The 
naming of the country differed from the traditional habit of calling a kingdom 
according to the name of the capital. The new edition of the chronicles showed that 
there was a Thai state before the Ayutthaya period and linked the different 
kingdoms together during the rule of King Phra Ruang of Sukhothai.
A historical connection with previous kingdoms and rulers was also drawn 
in literature called sangkhitiyawong (The Family Who Supports Buddhism). It was 
written during the Buddhist council in Bangkok in 1788.62 The content praised 
Rama I for organising that council, something only ‘Great Kings’ such as Asoka 
were able to do. The story included a list of all kings from Ayutthaya down to 
Rama I and called them the ‘Siam-Thai Family’ (sayamthaiwong). The kings, all 
from one line descending, ruled ‘The Kingdom of Siam’ (sayamratchaprathet).
60 The collection o f foreign stories and legends served a similar purpose. The main theme o f these 
stories, such as the “Three Kingdoms” from China, was about the rule and duty o f leaders.
61 Nidhi A., Prawattisat rattanakosin nai phraratchaphongsawadan krungsriayudhydi [History of 
Rattanakosin in the Ayutthaya Chronicle], Bangkok 1980, p.21. See also Thamsook Numnonda. 
“Kansueksa prawattisat nai prathet thai [The Study of History in Thailand]”, Phasa lae nangsue, 
1990, p. 16.
62 Somdetphrawannarat, Sankhitiyawong [The Family Who Supports Buddhism], Bangkok 1978.
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The author practically merged the various kingdoms into one big country. He also 
described ‘real’ countries such as Siam, Cambodia, Laos and Burma, departing 
from the mystic world of the Traiphum of the Sukhothai period.63
The efforts of the ruling elite and its intellectuals to create unity among the 
people were not limited to literature. Assmann argued that religious objects such as 
relics could be vital for the creation of identity.64 Rama I recognised this aspect as 
well. His outstanding tool to build a sense of identity within the population was the 
statue of the Emerald Buddha. This Buddha statue, captured from the Lao in 
Vientiane in 1778 by Rama I himself (when he was still a general), was housed in a 
specially erected temple (Wat Phra Kaew) on the grounds of the Grand Palace. 
Tambiah compared the meaning of this Buddha statue to the tooth relic in Sri 
Lanka.65 Since 1782, the Emerald Buddha became identified with the chakravathin 
himself. As a visible sign, the statue was imbued with full royal regalia. Reynolds 
argued that the king gained through the proper veneration of the statue the support 
of sovereign power in its most potent and beneficent form. The king’s connection 
imbued him with that power and thereby enabled him to exercise power, to 
establish order and to guarantee the prosperity and protection of the kingdom.66 
Rama II, for example, had to rely on the reputation of the statue when a cholera 
epidemic caused public uproar in the 1820s. He organised a variety of traditional 
ceremonies to get rid off the disease. Highlight of the activities was a procession 
with the Emerald Buddha to ward off evil spirits.67
To take advantage of the integrative power of the Emerald Buddha more 
regularly, a ceremony to change its outfit was introduced. First this ceremony was 
held twice a year but a third time was added under King Rama III. The temple 
housing the statue was itself full of symbolism. Its wall was decorated with mural 
paintings depicting scenes from the Ramakian. Praising the God Rama as the great 
hero, the visitors of the temple were supposed to realise the connection with the 
king who himself was understood to be Rama.68 The integrative power of the statue,
63 Somdetphrawannarat, 1978, pp.368-369.
64 Assmann, Jan, Das Kulturelle Gedachtnis, Munich 2000, p.63.
65 Tambiah, Stanley, World Conqueror and World Renouncer, Cambridge 1976, p.97.
66 Reynolds, Frank. “The Holy Emerald Jewel: Some Aspects of Buddhist Symbolism and Political 
Legitimation in Thailand and Laos”, Chambersburg 1978, pp. 183-184. See also Jory, Patrick. “The 
Vessantra Jataka, Barami, and the Bodhisatta-Kings”, Crossroads, 2002, p.46.
67 Terwiel, Barend. “Asiatic Cholera in Siam: Its First Occurrence and the 1820 Epidemic”, 
Singapore 1987, pp. 150-152.
68 Reynolds, 1978, p. 185.
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however, aimed not only on domestic use. Accepting the superiority of the owner 
of the sacred statue, other kings and lords swore their fealty to Bangkok.
The monarchical elite displayed continuity to the core culture of Ayutthaya. 
Similar to the case of the inscriptions, Rama I reinforced his claim to power with 
the help of relics from the first cultural core: the kingdom of Sukhothai. He ordered 
the transport of an eight-meter-high Buddha statue (casted in 1350) from Sukhothai 
to Bangkok, where it was received with a great ceremony and was installed in the 
temple Wat Suthat.69 By moving this statue to his capital, Rama I created a direct 
connection between the early kingdom of Sukhothai, the kingdom of Ayutthaya 
and his kingdom of Bangkok. Bangkok should be seen as being firmly rooted in a 
long, linear history.
Rama I attempted to make his vision of the kingdom more visible to the 
common people. His capital, Bangkok, played an important role in it. Following 
the traditional belief that the capital was the centre of the whole country, Rama I 
installed a city pillar (lak mueang)70 which was considered to be the sacred heart of 
the state in April 1782. The name of the city was chosen to be Krung Sri 
Rattanakosin (the Royal City of the Green Jewel) in reference to the Emerald 
Buddha.71 The layout of the palace and the whole city followed the layout of 
Ayutthaya. Newly constructed temples mirrored their Ayutthayan predecessors and 
even were named after them.72 Well aware of the importance of ceremonies, Rama 
I regularly organised festivities to celebrate progress in the construction of the city. 
With each building and its consecutive inauguration with a public festival, he 
included the people in the process of nation-building. They could literally witness 
the growth of the new nation rising out of the ‘ashes’ (bricks from the ruins of 
Ayutthaya were widely used) of the old kingdom of Ayutthaya. Each completed 
construction project contributed to the grandeur of the kingdom and increasingly of 
the dynasty. To prevent the people to forget the events, he made sure that the
69 Rama I collected more than 1,200 Buddha images from Sukhothai, Ayutthaya and elsewhere, and 
installed them in temples in Bangkok. This symbolised the city’s role as the capital o f the kingdom. 
Aasen, Clarence, Architecture o f Siam, Kuala Lumpur 1998, pp. 129-132.
70 City pillars were a custom that was unknown in Ayutthaya. Bangkok Post. “The Power of 
Pillars”, 13 January 2000. See also Pompan Kerdphol, Kanplianplaeng khatikhwamchuea rueang 
saolakmueang samai rattanakosin [The Changes in the Belief in the City Pillar in the Ratanakosin 
Period between 1782 and 1992], Bangkok 1999.
71 Aasen, 1998, p. 122.
72 Wenk, 1968, pp. 19-20.
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building process and the glorification of Bangkok as the new capital appeared, to 
use the word of Mattani, ‘purposefully’ in all major literary works of the time.73
Other public festivities on a grand scale were organised regularly. Rama I 
set up a commission to examine and collate old traditions so that full and lengthy 
ceremonies could be carried out. Every time a ceremony was revived, he issued a 
proclamation explaining its origin and meaning. Cremations of members of the 
royal family were especially popular and well organised.74 The king also liked to 
stage ceremonies with specific reference to King Borommakot (r. 1733-1758) of 
Ayutthaya, who was famous for his elaborate festivities.75 The emotional appeal of 
Rama Ps ideas and policies transmitted to his compatriots via such ceremonies 
cannot be estimated but must have been significant.
His successors followed a similar policy of disseminating symbols and 
ideas to create unity within the people. Rama II was a vivid artist who wrote many 
poems and supported theatre. Rama III, however, showed a rather limited 
encouragement of literature. Vella argued that his support was in reality more an 
expression of his interest in the preservation of heritage than a demonstration of his 
devotion to literature for its own sake.76 A devout Buddhist, Rama III focussed 
more on the construction of temples. In 1839, a massive renovation program started 
in Wat Pho. The King saw the temple as a medium to educate the people and 
transformed it into a centre of knowledge, preserving traditional secular and 
religious knowledge and science. Inscriptions and paintings depicted the Life of 
Buddha and his disciples, astronomy and astrology, geography and the races of 
men, mythology, poetry and medicine.77
In the end, the new rational worldview was also reflected in the art and 
culture of the emerging modem nation. The idea of realism resulted in the 
depiction of real persons in sculpture and paintings. ‘Real’ landscapes replaced 
mystic ones.78 This change happened before any western influence on significant 
scale arrived in the country in the mid of the nineteenth century and was an 
important part of the emerging indigenous nation.
73 Mattani, 1996, p.53.
74 Wenk, 1968, p.l 1. See Chula Chakrabongse, Lords o f Life, London 1967, pp.92-94.
75 Wyatt, 1982, p. 17.
76 Vella, Walter, Siam Under Rama III, Locust Valley 1957, p.54.
77 Aasen, 1998, p. 126.
78 See more in Chatri Prakitnonthakan, Kanmueang lae sangkhom nai sinlapa sathapattayakam 
sayam samai thai prayuk chatniyom [Politics and Society in Arts and Architecture in the Periods of  
Modern Siam, New Thailand, and Nationalism], Bangkok 2004, p.30.
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Following the ideal type definition of a modem nation of Smith, we can 
identify most of the required elements for the period of the early Bangkok 
kingdom.79 Firstly, the period saw the frequent use of myths, symbols and history 
by the intelligentsia. Based on the existing symbol-myth complex, these 
instruments to create a sense of being a nation must have been widely understood 
by the people. Secondly, a public culture did exist and was based on the ethnic core 
of the Thai. It was dominated by Buddhism and was partly transmitted with the 
help of the Central Thai language. This public culture was actively disseminated 
into the provinces via the state, culture and religion. Thirdly, local economies were 
connected and merged into a national economy. This was supported by a switch 
from corvee labour to individual taxation which was spreading the cash economy. 
Fourthly, the expansion of state bureaucracy resulted in the spreading of the 
common codes and law institutions. Fifthly, a sense of a historic territory existed, 
although it was not delimitated by fixed borders.
Was the population aware of being part of a modem nation? This question 
is difficult to answer but some indicators point towards a consciousness, at least in 
some groups. The term ‘nation’ itself was not unknown as foreigners such as 
Crawfurd used the term ‘nation’ in negotiations with government officials in the 
1820s.80 Only a short time afterwards, in the reign of Rama III, the term chat 
appeared in the meaning of ethnos and was later transformed into the modem 
meaning of nation.*' One important element of a modem nation was missing at this 
point in Thai history: citizenship. However, if we understand this indigenous form 
of a nation as an entity defined through the monarch, citizenship could at this early 
stage be replaced by the idea of a ‘subject people’. The emerging modem Thai 
nation was not a nation by the people but by the monarchy, a king’s nation.
To sum up, the early Bangkok period saw the emergence of many elements 
of a modem nation. As with the earlier stages of the Thai nation, this step in its 
development can only be understood as a process over a period of time. The 
ignition for this process was the exceptional circumstance of a total destruction of 
the old kingdom and a rational thinking ruling elite in the ascendant. They aimed to
79Smith, Anthony. “The Problem of National Identity: Ancient, Medieval and Modem?”, Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, 1994, p.381.
80 Crawfurd, 1967, pp.29 and 43.
81 Rosenberg, Klaus, Nation und Fortschritt- Der Publizist Thien Wan und die Modernisierung 
Thailands unter KonigChulalongkorn (>.1868-1910), Hamburg 1980, p.l 18.
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rebuild the glory of the former kingdom of Ayutthaya in Bangkok. Rama I himself, 
however, spoke of ‘restoration’ and not of a simple return to older days. To 
legitimise the new dynasty, the changes were masked behind continuity or, in the 
words of Terwiel, it was ‘innovation in the guise of orthodoxy’.82 Due to the fact 
that this transformation happened before the heydays of colonialism in mainland 
South East Asia, the rulers had to use indigenous concepts to create a bond of 
loyalty and solidarity between the people. It would be wrong, however, to think of 
the ideas of the Thai rulers as a ready-to-use ideology. The Thai nation at the point 
in time was just that: a nation. In the period of the next ruler, King Mongkut 
(r. 1851-1868), Thailand saw a considerable change. The nation was to be defined 
by an ideology: monarchical nationalism.
82 Terwiel, Barend, A History o f Modern Thailand, 1767-1942, St. Lucia 1983, p.70.
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Chapter 4
The Emergence of Monarchical Nationalism (1851-1868)
During the early period of the Kingdom of Bangkok, the new rational worldview 
led to reforms in some aspects of Thai society. One of the results was the emergence of 
an indigenous interpretation of a modem nation. An ideology, however, that would 
define this nation and point towards the future direction was lacking. This chapter deals 
with the birth of such an ideology, namely nationalism. The central argument is that the 
indigenous Thai nation generated on the initiation of the monarchs themselves a kind of 
nationalism which included distinctive indigenous elements as well. Contrary to the 
view of the revisionist school, I propose to see this new nationalism neither as a reaction 
against a popular movement nor an official nationalism.
4.1. King Mongkut and Nationalism
Anderson argued that the emergence of nationalism in Asia in the nineteenth 
century was a result of imperialism and its military power, capitalist penetration, 
industrial civilisation, administrative and educational modernisation. He added: “The 
historical timing of nationalism’s birth was tightly synchronised with the appearance of 
vernacular newspapers, job market education, industrial production and consumption, 
mass migration by railways, steamship, and motor vehicle, and the spread of clock time 
and Mercator space.”11 propose, however, that in the case of Thailand, these conditions 
were not the decisive factors for the emergence of nationalism.
I have argued in the previous chapter that a modem nation has already been 
emerging when King Mongkut (Rama IV, r. 1851-1868) ascended the throne in 1851. 
Nonetheless, there was no attempt to develop an ideology or movement which, in Smith 
terms, aimed ‘to maintain autonomy, unity and identity and could be called 
nationalism’.2 For nationalism to emerge, an awareness of the nation and the wish to 
bind the loyalty of the people to it was needed. The early kings of Bangkok could be
1 Anderson, Ben. “Nationalism”, Oxford 2001, p.576.
2 Smith, Anthony. “Nations in Decline? The Erosion and Persistence o f Modem National Identities”, 
London 2007 (forthcoming), p.3.
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called ‘old patriots’3 for they harboured national sentiments. Their aspirations, however, 
was to focus the loyalty of the population on their persons and the monarchical 
institution. In contrast to his predecessors, Mongkut saw himself in a different position. 
The king was no longer aloof and ‘the owner’ of the nation but became part of it and 
was its embodiment. Although Mongkut was without a fully developed and cohesive 
ideology of nationalism at the beginning, his policies and actions were aimed to 
promote nationalism through the loyalty to the monarch.
Why was King Mongkut interested in promoting nationalism? I suggest as 
reason that he himself was a nationalist. Mongkut received both traditional and modem 
education from the court scholars and western missionaries. He had a reputation of 
having a very thorough knowledge of western culture, history and international relations. 
Mongkut, therefore, was well aware of the term ‘nation’ in a western sense as it is 
documented that he asked the US missionary Bradley about the meaning of ‘a civilised 
and enlightened nation’ in 1851.4 It is also known that Mongkut consulted the 
Anthropological Review in search for an answer to this question.5 This awareness of the 
term nation was a necessary pre-condition of the transformation of the national 
sentiment for the indigenous nation into nationalism.
An example to demonstrate Mongkut’s nationalistic feelings was his attitude 
towards China. The King was unhappy about the increasing influence of Chinese 
culture on Thai architecture and religion during the reign of Rama III.6 Before, Thailand 
and China had a good relationship with a booming trade based on tribute missions from 
Thailand and many Chinese immigrants settling in the kingdom. In the 1840s, the 
opium wars and the Taiping rebellion brought this relationship to a halt. After Mongkut 
became king, he rejected the demand of the Chinese to restart the tribute relationship
3 Bayly used this term in his description of the precursors of Indian nationalism. For Bayly, ‘patriotism’ 
expresses the sense o f loyalty to place and institutions which bound some Indians, even in the immediate 
pre-colonial period, to their regional homelands. Bayly, C, Origins o f Nationality in South Asia, New 
Dehli 1998, p.vii.
4 Charnvit Kasetsiri. “Siam/Civilization- Thailand/Globalization: Things to Come?”, Thammasat Review, 
2000, p.120. The desire of the Thai elite for ‘civilisation’ is best described in Thongchai Winichakul. 
“The Quest for ‘Siwilai’: A Geographical Discourse of Civilization Thinking in the Late Nineteenth and 
Early Twentieth-Century Siam”, JAS, 2000.
5 Thawesak Phueaksom, Khonplaekna nanachat khong krung sayam [International Strangers of Siam], 
Bangkok 2003, p. 148.
6 The increased Chinese influence was the result o f a close relationship between the Chinese merchant 
class and the Thai nobility. The Chinese style became fashionable through Chinese craftsmen as can be 
seen in the architecture o f Wat Pho [temple]. Nidhi Aeusriwongse, Pakkai lae bairuea [The Quills and 
the Sails], Bangkok 1995, pp. 136-142 and Somchai Nimlek. “Ekkalak thang sathapattayakam nai samai 
somdetphranangklaochaoyuhua [The Architectural Identity in the Reign of King Rama III]”, Bangkok 
1982, p.412.
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and offered a trade relationship on the basis of equality instead. The sending of royal 
tribute missions was in his eyes a demotion of Thailand to a vassal state of China. He 
considered former Thai kings ‘stupid’ because they allowed the Chinese to take 
advantage of them.7 Mongkut started to curb the Chinese influence and ordered a return 
to the style and forms of the former kingdoms of Sukhothai and Ayutthaya in order to 
show the independence and long history of the kingdom. Most visible was this switch in 
architecture. Mongkut himself financed and supervised the restoration of the biggest 
stupa in Thailand in Nakhom Pathom province. He chose to revive a round form which 
he regarded as pure, being the form of stupas in Sri Lanka (Thai Buddhism was initiated 
from Buddhism in Sri Lanka). His going back to the Sukhothai and Ayutthaya style was, 
therefore, not only an aesthetic change but also a return to the roots, or in other words, a 
return to a pure Thai nation.8
The second reason for Mongkut wishing to promote nationalism was an intra­
elite power struggle between him and the nobility. As mentioned before, the restoration 
of Thai society and economy after the foundation of Bangkok was very much a result of 
a cooperation between the previous monarchs and the nobles. The close access to power 
and the possibility to participate in an expanding foreign trade prominently propelled 
one family into the top positions of government: the Bunnag. Its senior members were 
able to control the most precious assets, namely people who were their ‘manpower’ or 
labour (especially in and around Bangkok) and the military.9 After the death of King 
Rama III in 1851, the Bunnag used the lack of a hereditary system to their advantage 
and assumed the role of kingmakers. To make sure that the candidate would be easily 
controllable and not a threat to their power, the Bunnag rejected several princes as 
possible monarchs because they deemed them as too progressive.10 Their choice went to 
Prince Mongkut who at that time had been a monk for decades and thus had no power 
base for he controlled no people and had neither influence in the military nor wealth.
7 Subsaeng Pramboon, Sino-Thai Tributary Relations, 1282-1853, Madison 1971, pp.280-290.
8 Chatri Prakitnonthakan, Kanmueang lae sangkhom nai sinlapa sathapattayakam sayam samai thai 
prayuk chatniyom [Politics and Society in Arts and Architecture in the Periods o f Modem Siam, New  
Thailand, and Nationalism], Bangkok 2004, p.91.
9 Thoetpong Khongchan, Kanmueang rueang sathapana phrachomklao [Politics in the Enthronement of 
King Mongkut], Bangkok 2004, p.27. Bradley, who came to Thailand in 1835, was impressed by the 
sophistication o f the Bunnag. They were interested in modem technology and were even able to build 
ships based solely upon their observations o f European ships. See Somchai Phirotthirarack, The 
Historical Writings ofChao Phr aya Thipakorawong, DeKalb 1983.p.46.
10 Thoetpong, 2004, p.59.
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With his good knowledge of English, the Bunnag saw Mongkut as the ideal king to deal 
with the increasing contacts with the West.11
This episode shows that Mongkut was in a very weak position against the nobles 
right from the beginning. Mongkut himself revealed in a letter the limits of his influence: 
“But when the king orders someone influential to do something, when that someone 
does not do that something as the king requested, it is not a problem. That is because the 
king does not cause these people to fear or to be in awe. They can act as they please or 
follow their own destiny without fear because they believe that the king will not 
interfere. This must be tolerated.” 12 These words show that the Bunnag had been 
powerful long before and were not willing to give up their position easily.13 The King, 
therefore, had to find a power base for himself in order to be able to fend off the nobles 
and to strengthen his own family’s grip on power as the traditional power bases were 
out of reach for him. Mongkut chose to transform the people into citizens, being well 
aware about the development of nations in Europe and especially the increasing role of 
monarchical representation in Great Britain.14 This thesis proposes that the promotion of 
nationalism enabled him to get direct access to the people and bypass the nobles.
Mongkut’s attempt was nothing less than a break with the traditional concept of 
power. The King now regarded the nation as his power base. Mongkut considered a 
monarch the ‘leader of the land’ (;namphaendin) who must have the highest power to 
fulfil his duty to make the country prosper.15 His diligence and insistence to run the 
government business mostly on his own enabled him to expand his influence and to 
reduce his dependency on the nobility. This was so successful that one minister made 
the comment to Bradley: ‘We have now got no government...but now only one king’.16
Another factor contributed to Mongkut’s decision to promote nationalism: the 
increasing knowledge about western thought and concepts and the arrival of western
11 Thoetpong , 2004, pp.75-77.
12 Cited in Attachak Sattayanurak. “The Intellectual Aspects o f Strong Kingship in the Late Nineteenth 
Century (Part 2), JSS, 2001, p. 12.
13 The letter also confirmed that Wyatt’s argument that Mongkut gave almost unlimited power to the 
Bunnag is misleading. See Wyatt, David. “Family Politics in Nineteenth Century Thailand”, Cambridge 
1976, p.68.
14 Most likely, Mongkut got many of his ideas about the monarchy from the newspapers. Queen 
Victoria’s appearances in the public, for example the royal pomp at the opening ceremony o f the Great 
Exhibition in 1851, were well covered. See Tyrell, Alex/Ward, Yvonne. “’God Bless Her Little Majesty’. 
The Popularising of Monarchy in the 1840s”, National Identities, 2000, p. 109.
15 Attachak Sattayanurak, Kanplianplaeng lokkathat khong chonchan phunam thai tangtae ratchakan thi 
4 - pho so 2475 [The Change of Worldview of the Thai Leaders from the Reign of King Mongkut to 
1932], Bangkok 1995, pp.101 and 127.
16 Somchai, 1983, p.55. Bradley, however, remarked that Mongkut feared of being deposed by the cabinet.
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powers which had significant influence on trade and politics. Mongkut, for example, 
was very well aware that the West constituted a serious danger for the independence of 
the country and the rule of his own dynasty: ‘if any dispute should arise out of our 
refusal to allow entry to the British warships, the British might make a forced entry into 
the [Chaophraya] river, and whatever fortress they arrived at, they might make their 
way into it to spike and dismantle the guns in the manner similar to what they had done 
in China and elsewhere’. 17 Arrogant western behaviour also fuelled Mongkut’s 
resolution for nationalism.18
4.2. Elements o f Thai Nationalism under King Mongkut
To promote nationalism successfully, national identity had to be strengthened. 
According to Smith, national identity is ‘the continuous reproduction, reinterpretation 
and transmission of a pattern of symbols, values, myths and traditions that compose the 
distinctive heritage of a nation, and the identification of individuals with the cultural 
elements of that heritage’.19 In creating a Thai identity, Mongkut took as source for the 
required symbols, myths and tradition the core culture of the Thai and adapted it to the 
requirements of a national culture of an emerging modem nation. The King, however, 
made sure that the door ‘to join’ the national identity was not closed for other ethnic 
groups. As an open-minded person, he followed the traditional openness of the Thai 
monarchs: ‘be it hereby declared as follows to all servants of the crown of higher and 
lower rank and to all persons under Siamese flag, to Chinese, Annamites, Laos, 
Cambodians, Burmese [etc]’.20 The defining term was now ‘under the Siamese flag’ 
which symbolised the trans-ethnic Thai nation. This was also reflected in the Thai army. 
The majority of its members were ethnically not Thai, even the King’s Guards consisted
17 Cited in Riggs, Fred, Thailand- The Modernization o f  a Bureaucratic Polity, Honolulu 1966, p.32.
18 Mongkut was especially upset by a case in 1865. The French consulate granted a Chinese murderer 
asylum after he claimed to be French. Bradley, a close personal friend o f Mongkut and most likely 
mirroring his opinion, wrote in his newspaper that Thais and ‘everybody living under the shadow of the 
Thai flag’ who converted to Catholicism and regarded themselves as French to avoid paying taxes were 
not good because they split the country. The row was only resolved after Mongkut complained directly 
with Napoleon III. Krairoek Nana, King Mongkut yut yurop yuet sayam [King Mongkut Stopped Europe 
to Take Over Siam], Bangkok 2004, pp.36-37.
19 Smith, 2006, p.3.
20 Cited in Seni Pramoj/Kukrit Pramoj, A King o f  Siam Speaks, Bangkok 1987, p.42.
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mainly of Khmer and Lao soldiers.21 In a royal decree from the year 1867, Mongkut 
announced: “the word jin  (Chinese) means a person with a pigtail. If sons or grandsons 
wear a pigtail but are tattooed on their wrist and registered in a list, then they are 
Thais.”22 The nation was, therefore, made out of the cultural core of the Thais but open 
to people willing to adapt. Before, it was sufficient to be a subject of the king and to 
obey the law to be accepted (see for example the mentioned case of the Mon refugees), 
now with a sense of monarchical citizenship loyalty to the king meant loyalty to the 
nation.
How was this achieved? Mongkut attempted to redefine the monarchy as the 
embodiment of the nation and not any longer as the mediator between the supernatural 
and real world. To create a sense of belonging and a connection between the monarchy 
and the nation, Mongkut and the intellectual elite of his time pursued a wide range of 
programmes including the purification of Buddhism, the reinterpretation of history, the 
standardisation of language, the delimitation of land and naming the nation, the 
acceptance of common rights and duties and the revival and adaptation of ceremonies 
and festivals.
As a long-time monk, Mongkut was especially interested in religion and showed 
his nationalistic ambitions for a return to the ‘real’ Thai culture in his initiatives towards 
Buddhism. Mongkut started to reform the Buddhist sangha when he was ordained, 
finding the traditional monk hood unacceptable.23 Mongkut argued that a new Buddhism 
was necessary because the old teachings and sangha disappeared in 1767. The existing 
remnants were full of flaws and did not comply with what the Buddha taught. He 
especially rejected everything that claimed to be of supernatural origin. The King 
followed the example of Rama I by purging elements from the sangha and teachings he 
thought were not fitting with his ideas of a pure, Thai Buddhism. In the foundation of 
the new, ‘pure’ sect thammayut, Mongkut re-interpreted the teaching and added new 
contents. First, he emphasised in his preaching the importance of rational analysis and 
understanding of dharma before practicing it.24 Second, he reconstructed ‘original’ 
ceremonies from the time of Buddha and insisted on the exact recitation of Buddhist
21 Anderson, Benedict. “Studies of the Thai State: The State of Thai Studies”, Athens 1978, p.202. See 
also Terwiel, B., Through Travellers’ Eyes: An Approach to Early Nineteenth Century Thai History, 
Bangkok 1989, p.253.
22 Cited in Kasian Tejapira. “Pigtail: A Pre-History of Chineseness in Siam”, Sojourn, 1992, p.108.
23 Attachak Sattayanurak. “Kankoet naewkit natiponlamueang nai rat thai samai mai [The Birth of the 
Concept o f Civic Duty in the Modem Thai State]”, Ratthasatsan, 1988-89, pp.209-210.
24 Mettanando Bhikku, Kamnoet lae attalak khong thammayutikanikai [The Birth and Identity of the 
Thammayut Sect], Bangkok 2005, p.57.
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texts in Pali.25 Third, he stressed the capability of human beings as central to Buddhism. 
Fourth, he shifted the meaning of karma, stressing that past lives have less influence 
than the conduct in the present one. Reynolds argued in this context that the reform of 
Buddhism was an attempt to reconstitute the traditions so that it would be not in conflict 
with new ideas and institutions being absorbed from the West.26 Indeed, Mongkut’s 
efforts to ‘streamline’ Buddhism was important for nation-building. To bind Buddhism 
to the monarchy, he insisted on the traditional role of the king as protector and patron of 
Buddhism. Mongkut’s reforms had tremendous impact on the religion and were even 
compared by Keyes to the importance of Luther’s reformation.27 It must be noted, 
however, that although Mongkut had a clear conception about Buddhism and saw it as 
central for Thai identity, he granted the right of religious freedom by law in 1855.28
The second field that had high priority for Mongkut was history. The King 
hoped to achieve two objectives with the use of history and historiography. Firstly, it 
was one method to deal with the imperial powers. Secondly, he attempted to create a 
sense of national belonging.
Faced by European challenges, Mongkut saw history as a way to demonstrate 
the ancientness of the Thai civilisation. This was projected to provide the proof for the 
right for independence. One example was his writing of a concise chronicle of 
Cambodia as historical evidence of the rightfulness and legality of the Thai claim on 
Cambodia. This chronicle was sent to the French government in 1861.29 His main target 
group for the reinterpretation of history, however, were the Thai people. The King built 
his version of Thai history on the model of a ‘Golden Age’: the Kingdom of Sukhothai. 
Smith argued that a ‘Golden Age’ was a vital component of nationalist mythology: “The 
appeal of a ‘Golden Age’ is fundamental for locating and re-rooting the members of a 
community within a wider universe of communities by providing the community with a 
specific location and with definite roots. The myth reinforces the attachment of the
25 Mettanando Bhikku, 2005, pp.67-68.
26 Reynolds, Frank. “Dharma in Dispute: The Interactions o f Religion and Law in Thailand”, Law and 
Society Review, 1994, p.438.
27 Keyes, Charles. “Buddhism Fragmented: Thai Buddhism and Political Order since the 1970s”, Paper 
Presented at the 7th International Conference on Thai Studies, Amsterdam 1999, p.6.
28 Ishii, Yoneo. “The Thai Muslims and the Royal Patronage o f Religion”, Paper Presented at the 13th 
IAHA-Conference, Hong Kong 1991, p. 4.
29 Thamsook Numnonda. “Kan sueksa prawattisat nai prathet thai [The Study o f History in Thailand]”, 
Phasa lae nangsue, 1990, p. 16. See also Mongkut’s own account in Chomklaochaoyuhua, 
Phrabatsomdetphra, Chumnum phrabaromrachathibai lae prachumphraratchaniphon phakpakinnaka 
[Collections o f the Royal Essays and Miscellaneous Writings], Bangkok 2004, p. 184. Mongkut divided 
Cambodia into four parts and called the part West of the Tonle Sap ‘Khmer-Thai’.
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people to their land by turning territory into a national homeland. To create the 
conditions for a renaissance of the nation, it becomes necessary to re-root the 
community in its soil.”30 Mongkut’s version of the Golden Age of Sukhothai included 
the ideal for his kingship, namely the righteous monarch who practices the ten kingly 
virtues and is a father to his people. In return, he can expect the loyalty and love of his 
people. Mongkut based his idea on the already mentioned Ramkhamhaeng inscription 
from 1292 (see Chapter 2) which he discovered in Sukhothai province. The inscription 
described not only a huge area under control of the Thai king but also a sophisticated 
yet idyllic society. It depicted the kingly ideal of the wise, brave and compassionate 
father of the people.31 For Mongkut, the Sukhothai period was a Golden Age for all 
Thais under a just ruler. It was also the starting point of his version of Thai history 
which portrayed an uninterrupted continuity of Thai kings from Ramkhamhaeng right 
up to himself. Additionally, he revived the myth of the people’s king and chose as part 
of his official name the title ‘elected by all the people’ 
(Mahachonnikonsamosonsommot).32
Mongkut himself authored several volumes about Thai history. One of these 
books, ‘History of the Thai’ {prawattisat that) described the origin of the Thais until 
early Bangkok period. It centred on the idea that the king is the ‘maker’ of the state and 
responsible to maintain it in an orderly state until it prospers.33 Besides composing 
westem-style historiography, Mongkut revised Ayutthayan chronicles 
(phraratchapongsawadan chabapphraratchahatthalekha- The Royal Autograph 
Chronicle) and included his ideas about kingship in the new edition. For him, the 
activities of the king had to be beneficial for society. He gave more importance to the 
people or, to use the metaphor from the Ramakian, moved the people from being a 
weapon to be a part of the body. One episode added by Mongkut in the chronicles 
reflected this change. When the future King Taksin predicted the downfall of Ayutthaya 
and prepared to retake the capital in order to take care of the people, he was described as 
having asked his soldiers and the people about his plan to become king before they 
eagerly agreed.34 This story represented Mongkut’s idea of the Thai nation and
30 Smith, Anthony, Chosen People, Oxford 2003, pp. 190 and 215.
31 Girling, John, Thailand- Society and Politics, Ithaca 1987, p.21.
32 Skrobanek, Walter, Buddhistische Politik in Thailand: Mit besonderer Beriicksichtigung des 
heterodoxen Messianismus, Wiesbaden 1976, p.42.
33 Attachak, 1995, pp.54 and 65
34 Attachak, 1995, p.69.
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corresponded to the legend of the ‘Great Elect’: the king being legitimised by the people; 
his duty was to lead and to protect them.35
To connect the nation with the past, Mongkut wrote the first accounts of, in his 
view, three extraordinary kings (Ramathibodi, Naresuan, Narai) and their service to the 
kingdom.36 He also awarded the title ‘the Great’ to outstanding monarchs. These 
activities can be interpreted as an early concept of heroes, a sign for nationalist 
historiography. In another article, Mongkut merged the previous capitals and Bangkok 
together into one line and based the roots of the Bangkok dynasty firmly in the past.37 
Mongkut was moreover the first Thai ruler to institutionalise cultural heritage.38 The 
King financed the renovation of Buddhist sites like Phra Pathom Chedi in Nakhom 
Pathom province. This stupa was very old and could be used as further evidence for the 
long history of the Thais, adding a political purpose to the religious one. In addition, he 
founded a small museum with antiquities aiming at European visitors. These antiquities 
consisted of artefacts, indicating the culture, unity, continuity and legitimacy of the Thai 
state. Although this museum was not open to the public, it represented a step to an 
awareness of a ‘unique’ culture.
Another field for Mongkut’s activities to promote nationalism was the Thai 
language. Knowing several languages including Latin, the King was annoyed that the 
Thai language had no standard like English and every writer followed his own rule.39 
Mongkut aimed, therefore, to standardise the language based on the Central Thai dialect. 
After foreign missionaries started to research the Thai language and published a Thai 
grammar book in 1850, Mongkut produced long lists of verbs and co-occurring 
prepositions and systemised the future and past tenses. The king went on to propagate
35Mongkut used the myth o f the ‘Great Elect’ on several occasions. In his book Nanathammawicharin, he 
discussed the origin o f justice and based his explanations on the same Buddhist story o f the ‘Great Elect’. 
Mongkut emphasised that the elected king was full of knowledge, wisdom, justice and diligence and 
wanted that everybody be happy. Thanet Aphornsuvan. “Kamnoet kanmueang lae khwamyuttitham nai 
samai ton krungrattanakosin [The Birth of Politics and Justice in the Early Rattanakosin Period]”, 
Sinlapawatthanatham, 2001, p.l 10.
36 Attachak Sattayanurak. “The Intellectual Aspects o f Strong Kingship in the Late Nineteenth Century 
(Part 1)”, JSS, 2000, p.88. Thai art changed in Mongkut’s time. Earlier temple murals depicted the life of 
Buddha and jatakas, now they showed ‘real’ history such as a fighting King Naresuan on an elephant. 
Chatri, 2004, p.22.
37 Chomklaochaoyuhua, 2004, p.27.
38 Askew, Marc. “The Rise of Moradok and the Decline of Yam: Heritage and Cultural Construction in 
Urban Thailand”, Sojourn, 1996, p. 188. Mongkut protected cultural goods in monasteries by law in 1853. 
Prapat Trinarong. “Kotmai kiao kap sappayakon watthanatham phurai khut wat [Law about Cultural 
Materials Stolen by Criminals from Monasteries]”, Sinlapakon, 1989, p.89.
39 Chomklaochaoyuhua, 2004, pp.7-17.
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the ‘new’ language whenever he could and threatened penalties on those who violated 
the language rules.40
The next important field of Mongkuf s activities concerned the delimitation of 
land and the naming of the nation. One of the major problems in identifying a nation in 
a western sense in South East Asia was the lack of clearly demarcated borders until the 
arrival of the Europeans. Traditional Thai rulers were aware of a concept of borders but 
in their position as chakravatin (universal rulers) not interested in it.41 The control of 
people or ‘manpower’ in the sparsely populated areas of the region was far more 
important. Solomon pointed out that traditional South East Asian rulers used territory 
for diplomacy, depending on their own strength to gain or lose land. As long as the Thai 
rulers were able to expand into non-Thai areas, subsequent losses of the same territory 
were tolerable. It also confined destructive fighting to the enemies’ land or buffer 
zones.42 King Mongkut, however, was the first king to officially accept that the world 
was round and that there were many countries, some subordinate to others, around the 
world, giving up the cosmology of the Buddhist Traiphum from the Sukhothai period.43 
In 1854, he discussed the drawing up of boundaries with Burma. A few years later, 
Mongkut was worried about the progress of the French in Indochina, who seized Saigon 
in 1862 and established a protectorate over Cambodia in 1863.44 When the French asked 
him to recognize this protectorate, Mongkut ordered a survey of the Mekong-region in 
1866.45 The core of the Thai nation was expanding, with the result that many formerly 
independent political units had then to decide on which side of the border they wanted 
to live.
Mongkut connected the developing territorial dimension of the nation with the 
monarchy as well. He used consistently the phrase phaendin khong phramahakasat
40 Vandergeest, Peter. “Constructing Thailand: Regulation, Everyday Resistance, and Citizenship”, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1993, p. 144.
41 Wijevewardene, Gehan. “Ethnicity and Nation: The Tai in Burma, Thailand and China (Sipsongpanna 
and Dehong)”, Paper Presented at the 7th International Conference on Thai Studies, Amsterdam 1999, p.6 
and Somkiat Wanthana. “Rat thai: nammatham lae ruppatham [Thai State: Abstract and Concrete]”, 
1988-89, p.191. The first time a Thai king was made aware about European style borders was in the 
Burney treaty with Great Britain in 1826. Chula Chakrabongse, Lords o f Life, 1967, p. 158.
42 Solomon, Robert. “Boundary Concepts and Practices in Southeast Asia”, World Politics, 1970, p. 12.
43 Attachak, 2000, p.81.
44 Stuart-Fox, Martin. “Conflicting Conceptions of the State: Siam, France and Vietnam in the Late 
Nineteenth Century”, JSS, 1994, p. 138. In the same year, the Thai government fixed the borders to Burma 
with piles of stones and wood, displaying Thai and Mon letters. See Thiphakorawong, Chaophraya, The 
Dynastic Chronicles Bangkok Era: The Fourth Reign, Tokyo 1965, p.360.
45 Suarez, Thomas, Early Mapping o f  Southeast Asia, Hong Kong 1999, p.263.
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(territory of the king) instead of the term ‘country’.46 Another popular term of Mongkut 
was ekarat (a country unified under a king) for ‘sovereignty’. His signature was even 
more revealing: krung sayam (the Siamese country, also King of Siam). By calling 
himself ‘Siam’ he indicated that he embodied the nation but also that he saw Siam on 
the same level as countries such as Great Britain {krung angrit). On other occasions, 
Mongkut named himself ‘King of syam rath’ (State of Siam).47
Mongkut ensured that the new understanding of the nation and its name was 
disseminated in the country. In 1853, Mongkut ordered the introduction of paper money. 
The money was stamped with a red chakra and a Thai-style crown, symbolising the 
Chakri dynasty and Mongkut (= crown) himself. The denomination was written in 
twelve languages including Khmer, Laotian, Mon and Burmese to show the far-reaching 
size of his kingdom. A second set of paper money was in use between 1856-1860, 
displaying only a monogram in Latin letters: ‘S.P.P.M., Mongkut K.S.’ (H.M. King 
Mongkut, the Sovereign of the Siamese Kingdom). Similar, when the first set of flat 
coins was introduced, it had no name of the country but the royal seal {chakra with 
white Elephant) of Mongkut.48 The Thai chronicles commented: ‘The new coins were 
enthusiastically put into use by the people all over the kingdom’.49 The King himself 
helped to spread the money (and the money economy). On his trips upcountry, he gave 
money to people who brought him presents.50 Money was one of the most efficient ways 
to spread the symbols of the nation. Another means to promote the name of the nation 
was his designation of a protective spirit {Phra Sayam Thewathirat) for ‘Siam’.51 He 
explained that this spirit would protect Thailand whenever it is in danger of losing its 
sovereignty.52
A different field of Mongkut’s activities were the common rights and duties of 
people. Although those were already known in the early reigns of the Bangkok kingdom, 
Mongkut led them forward towards civil rights more commonly connected with a 
modem nation. The most important breakthrough in this direction was Mongkut’s
46 Attachak, 1995, p.73.
47 Sunait Chutintaranond. “The Image of the Burmese Enemy in Thai Perceptions and the Historical 
Writings”, JSS, 1992, p.94. Mongkut was the inventor o f the term ‘Syam Rath’, using it for the first time 
when he (as a monk) wrote a letter to the sangha in Sri Lanka in 1822. Somkiat, 1988, p. 192.
48 Bank of Thailand, Centenary o f Thai Banknote, 1902-2002, Bangkok 2002, pp. 14-16.
49 Thiphakorawong, 1965, p.259.
50 Thiphakorawong, 1965, p.342.
51 See Sulak Sivaraksa. “The Crisis of Siamese Identity”, Clayton 1991, p.14 and Stuart-Fox, 1994, p.141.
52 Rungarun Kunlathamrong. “Phrasayamthewathirat mahitthithep nai prathet thai [Phrasay am thewathirat: 
the Greatest Angel in Thailand]”, Nationsutsapda, 2004, p.78.
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acceptance of private ownership of land. It was traditionally understood that all land 
belonged to the king, as the Three Seals Law stated: ‘All the land of Ayutthaya 
territories belongs to the King and as such has been given to his people as his slaves. 
Thus it cannot belong to them’.53 Mongkut, however, argued in his proclamation that 
‘this law has become punitive and is not based on the principles of justice’. He decided 
therefore that the state had to pay for land at a fair market price.54 The acceptance of 
private land ownership had three important effects. First, it was a massive boost for the 
monetarisation of the economy. Second, individual rights to landownership motivated 
investors and farmers to transform swamp areas into cultivated land in order to produce 
rice for a booming and profitable export industry in the second half of the nineteenth 
century.55 Third, as Rosen argued, the booming trade further changed the old value 
system. Since the reign of Rama II, financial income from trade increasingly was met 
more with the same social acceptance than the income from the traditional control of 
‘manpower’.56 This sped up the dissolution of the old system which was the backbone of 
political power of the nobility. Nobles adapted to the new situation by increasingly 
transforming themselves into landowners and speculators, an activity many found 
pleasant as this letter from a nobleman revealed in 1899: “After the careful 
consideration and much experience in many kinds of trade, I can say that there has 
never been any business comparable to speculation in land which was the proper and 
secure business for Thai noblemen.”57
Mongkut’s acceptance of private ownership of land was a milestone on the route 
to citizen rights as was the already mentioned acceptance of religious freedom. Besides 
that, he strengthened individualism, an essential element in the future economic 
development and also provided the nobility with an alternative to their traditional source 
of income, the control of people. By depriving the nobility of this power base but 
offering lucrative profits from trade, Mongkut scored an important point in the intra­
elite struggle between the monarchy and the nobility. However, these processes were 
ongoing and remained unfinished in the reign of Mongkut.
53 Cited in Thai Khadi Institute, Persistence Within Change, Bangkok no date, p.53.
54 Printed in Chattip Nartsupha/Suthy Prasartset (eds), Socio-Economic Institutions and Cultural Change 
in Siam, 1851-1910, Bangkok 1981, pp.291-296.
55 See data for the rice exports in Feeney, D., The Political Economy o f Productivity, Vancouver 1982, 
p.127.
56 Rosen, G., Peasant Society in a Changing Environment, Chicago 1975, p. 134.
57 Cited in Sungsidh Piriyarangsan, Thai Bureaucratic Capitalism, 1932-1960, Vancouver 1983, p.48.
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The last and maybe most important program by Mongkut was the revival and 
adaptation of ceremonies and festivals. Thai culture relied traditionally on the 
transmission of the meaning of rituals and symbols during ceremonies. They provided a 
sense of belonging. Wilson commented that ‘the ceremonial life of the Thai was very 
rich, and the state ceremonies in which people from all levels of society took part, gave 
the Thai a sense of cultural and political unity and a strong national pride’.58
The power of rituals and symbolism to generate a sense of unity is well 
documented in the academic literature. Not much could be added to Walzer’s statement 
that “politics is an art of unification; from many it makes one. And symbolic activity is 
perhaps our most important means of bringing things together, both intellectually and 
emotionally, thus overcoming isolation and even individuality. The union of men can 
only be symbolised.”59 In a time without mass media or in the case of newspapers rather 
limited in their reach, rituals, ceremonies and festivities were the ideal means to 
disseminate nationalism in Thailand. These activities were firmly based on traditions, 
myth and symbols which the public could understand and ensured a broad participation 
of the people. These undertakings of the monarchy were not an invention of tradition in 
order to control the masses. The high attendance rates of the people at ceremonies 
showed the popularity of the king60 and reflected his function to give the people 
emotional reassurance in exchange for their loyalty. That was one of the main reasons 
for the success of Mongkut’s nationalism.
Mongkut did not revolutionise the ceremonial sector but his activities were a 
‘ritual involution’61 He himself planned and organised ceremonies, emphasising or 
adding Buddhist elements in the procedures. In the view of Tambiah, however, 
brahmanical features of rituals of kingship were not fully eliminated by Mongkut 
because he was fully aware that they were a part of the identity and majesty of his office. 
The King introduced new Buddhist festivals like the commemoration of the Birth, 
Enlightment, and Death of Buddha and adapted western ceremonial ideas to a Thai 
context (King’s Birthday or Coronation Anniversary celebrations).62 During the
58 Wilson, Constance, State and Society in the Reign o f  Mongkut, 1851-1868: Thailand on the Eve o f  
Modernization, Cornell 1970, p.259.
59 Walzer, Michael. “On the Role of Symbolism in Political Thought”, Political Science Quarterly, 1967, 
p.194.
60 For a comparison of the popularity o f the monarchy in the United Kingdom at that time see Martin, 
Kingsley, The Magic o f  Monarchy, London 1937, pp.25-30.
61 Tambiah, Stanley. “A Performative Approach to Ritual”, Proceedings o f the British Academy, 1979,
p. 160.
62 Tambiah, Stanley, World Conqueror and World Renouncer, Cambridge 1976, p.227.
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ceremonies and festivities, Mongkut took his part seriously, for example, by dressing up 
in traditional costumes. His son Chulalongkom commented later that ‘the purpose [of 
Mongkut] in riding on elephants in a grand procession was to engage anew in the 
customs and ceremonies as in the old days’. Chulalongkom also wrote that Mongkut 
sought examples of royal ceremonies in the Ayutthayan palace law in order ‘to combine 
with new customs and establish them, in condensed form, as models’.63 Mongkut 
himself continually adapted and revived myths, symbols or traditions. He expanded and 
elaborated the ceremonialism surrounding the kingship, making his position and power 
more visible for his subjects and, in his own words, ‘to add a human touch’.64
Mongkut’s awareness of symbolism became evident in another example, the 
‘Oath of Allegiance ceremony’ (see chapter 2).65 Mongkut ordered a statue made out of 
a stone he brought from a pilgrimage to the Buddha footprint in Saraburi province. The 
stone originated from a place next to the footprint which was well-known for housing a 
spirit. It was commonly believed that this spirit fulfilled wishes of worshippers. 
Mongkut invited the spirit to take residence in the statue and placed it next to the 
Emerald Buddha during the oath ceremony. Mongkut gave the ceremony a new 
dimension with the incorporation of the spirit. A civil servant now took the oath to be 
loyal to the king in front of the Emerald Buddha (symbolising the dynasty) and of a 
previous ‘provincial’ spirit which was elevated to a ‘national’ spirit. The spirit served as 
a guarantee for reward for the oath taker’s loyalty. Mongkut went with his 
modifications even further. He changed the Ayutthayan text of the ceremony which was 
full of references to ‘old’ spirits unknown to his contemporaries. By introducing a 
‘fashionable’ spirit, he was able to raise the interest of the participants of the ceremony 
and make it more binding. The people were reportedly afraid of ‘disappointing’ the 
spirit by not following their oath. Besides this direct spiritual sanction, it also enhanced 
the position of Mongkut. A king had to be very powerful to gain the ‘cooperation’ of an 
important spirit. Mongkut, therefore, successfully drew loyalty away from nobility and 
transferred it to himself and the nation.
Another change was equally important, as Mongkut became the first king to 
drink the water of allegiance himself. Not only did he confirm the ‘sacredness’ of the
63 Cited in Mattani, 1996, p.75.
64 Cited in Riggs, 1966, pp.97-105.
65 This paragraph is based on Sunait Chutintharanon. “Lilitongkanchaengnam lae phraratchaphithi 
thuenamphraphiphatsattaya [Lilitongkanchaengnam and the Royal Oath o f Allegiance Ceremony]”, 
Bangkok 1995, p. 17.
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water, he also demonstrated that he was a just and fair ruler by drinking it like 
everybody else. Mongkut argued that the king had to drink otherwise he would not be 
bound to keep any promises or to be loyal on his part. As a result, a sovereign might 
plan or commit harmful actions against his subjects. To stress the importance of the 
ceremony, Mongkut connected it with the past by visiting the ashes of his ancestors and 
asking them for protection.66 Sunait pointed out that Mongkut switched from a ‘forced’ 
ceremony to a ‘promise’ between the monarch and his civil servants. In the king’s own 
words, he intended ‘to declare that we are one group’ (prakat phuak diaw kan).67 The 
ceremony was indeed a manifestation of the nation as the king entered a kind of social 
contract with his people. He was no longer aloof but part of the nation which he 
embodied.
Another royal ceremony of note planned by Mongkut was the coronation 
anniversary. Quaritch Wales commented that this ceremony was ‘a demonstration of the 
desire of Mongkut to bring his country into line with those more advanced countries of 
the West, and to inspire the people with the spirit of patriotism’.68 Although this 
ceremony was new, it was not directly an invented tradition. Nearly all components of 
the ceremony were drawn on rites found in Thai religion and culture- the material that 
lay ready to hand and was most easily understood by the people.69 Pictures of the 
ceremony were produced and widely distributed so that even people not attending the 
festivities were aware of the event. As constant reminders, temple murals started to 
depict realistically twelve royal annual ceremonies from the Ayutthaya period but in 
Mongkut’s way to orchestrate and conduct the ceremonies.70
Mongkut was interested that ceremonies or other activities were either held in 
public or included a procession for the public to watch. He allowed the people to look at 
him which was traditionally strictly forbidden. For his 60th birthday, he held a grand 
celebration ‘like the kings of Europe and the Emperor of China’ [Mongkut].71 To 
achieve the participation of the people, he asked them to invite monks to chant and give 
sermons, all at the same time and throughout the kingdom. In the evening, the people 
lighted lanterns and raised them high on flag poles. The court chronicles reported that
66 Thiphakorawong, 1965, pp.413-415.
67 Sunait, 1995, p.20.
68 Quaritch Wales, H.G., Siamese State Ceremonies, London 1931, p.214.
69 Quaritch Wales, 1931, p.215.
70 Sutha Linawat. “Chittrakam nai samai phrabatsomdetphrachomklaochaoyuhua [Paintings in the Reign 
of King Mongkut]”, Bangkok 2005, p. 158.
71 Cited in Wilson, 1970, p.290.
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‘every household joined in. Even the poorest of people’. Mongkut drove up and down 
the river to look at the lights.72 With this simple method, the lighting of lanterns, 
Mongkut enabled the participation of the whole population all over the country and to 
share a common sense of belonging.
Other royal ceremonies were conducted to connect the monarchy to a nation 
with a long history as well. For example, cremation ceremonies for members of the 
royal family became a public event. In some of them, the urns with the ashes of the 
ancestors, the first three kings of the Chakri dynasty, were displayed.73 On other 
occasions, Mongkut staged mock battles with war elephants and traditional features for 
delegations of European ambassadors.74
4.3. Supportive Elements
An important aspect for the success of Mongkut’s nationalism was his barami 
(charisma) which attracted the loyalty of the people. This included the barami 
traditionally connected to the king and was reflected in stories about nature paying 
respect to him.75 However, his personal charisma contributed as well, for example, to 
gain many disciples and followers for his thammayut sect during his time as a monk.76 
In contrast to earlier kings who virtually never left the palace, personal contact with 
common people was important to Mongkut. He knew many parts of his kingdom from 
personal experience and was aware of a territorial dimension, calling the monarchy ‘the 
heart of the land’.77 With his journeys in the countryside, Mongkut claimed the land for 
his nation, or, in the words of Geertz, he marked the territory ‘like some wolf or tiger 
spreading his scent through his territory’. 78 Mongkut mixed with the people and 
appeared eager to hear of their troubles. Akin argued that the king was able to create a 
link between himself and the people against the nobility’s abuse of power. The king was,
72 Thiphakorawong, 1965, p.328.
73 Wilson, 1970, pp.291-295.
74 Battge, Noel, The Military, Government and Society in Siam, 1868-1910: Politics and Military Reform 
During the Reign o f King Chulalongkom, Cornell 1969, p.69.
75 So Plainoi, Phrabatsomdet phrachomklao phrachaokrungsayam [King Mongkut The King o f Siam], 
Bangkok 2001, pp.62-64.
76 Mettanando, 2005, p.57.
77 Atcharapon Kamutpitsamai, Udomkan chatniyom khongphunam thai [Nationalist Ideology o f the Thai 
Leaders], Bangkok 1982, p. 18. See Chula, 1967, p. 180. Mongkut even visited hill tribe people in the 
North. But not only the king alone, also a wider circle at the court started to travel in the country. Nidhi 
Aeusrivongse. “Utsahakam thongthiao kap phon krathop to watthanatham [The Tourist Industry and Its 
Effect on Culture]”, Bangkok 1995, p.74.
78 Geertz, Clifford, Local Knowledge, New York 2000, p. 124.
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therefore, the person to whom the people looked for redress of their wrongs. He became 
the protector of the people.79 The traditional belief of healing powers of monarchs 
supported Mongkut’s position even further. For example, when people in the royal 
camp fell ill during a trip to Kanchanaburi province, the king, as reported in the 
chronicles ‘gave all the sick persons sacred water blessed over Buddhist prayers and all 
those who felt ill recovered again without ever having been in danger’.80
Mongkut ensured that the people would be informed about his activities. In 1858, 
for example, he founded ‘The Royal Gazette’ to publish all his activities, orders, 
decisions and laws.81 Due to Mongkut’s openness to new technology, he embraced 
printing technology to disseminate ideas and symbols. He was supported by his friend 
Bradley, who re-published the first Thai primer, the Chindamani, in 1861. Based on an 
older version of Rama III, Bradley included lessons in Thai language and moral 
teachings, particularly on the subject of duty and loyalty to the throne and society.82 
Another way to spread Mongkut’s personal symbol and to connect it with beneficial 
royal activities, was the order to place his royal seal above the entrance doors of newly 
erected buildings open to the public.83
Mongkut believed that a king was responsible for the happiness and prosperity 
of the people. He wrote in an announcement in 1864 that ‘many through his [Mongkut’s] 
barami, power and goodness, have progressed and have found happiness for a long 
time’.84 Mongkut emphasised the active role of the king and because of his exalted 
position with the public, he was able to force the nobility into playing a more passive 
role and to create the charismatic leadership necessary for his nationalism.
An important factor in the success of King Mongkut’s nationalism was that 
although he was the key intellectual leader in its promotion, he also received support 
from a new generation of intellectuals in Bangkok who contributed to the expression of 
nationalism at that period.85
79 Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization o f  Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period 1782-1873, 
Bangkok 1996, p.62.
80 Thiphakorawong, 1965, p.341.
81 Bangkok Post. “1836: Birth of Thai Printing”, 30 June 1973, p.3.
82 Mattani Rutnin, Dance, Drama, and Theatre in Thailand, Chiang Mai 1996, p.73.
83 Chatri, 2004, p.94.
84 Cited in Attachak, 2000, p. 16.
85 For an excellent analysis o f the early intellectuals, see Rosenberg, Klaus. “Das Thema ‘Eintracht’ im 
thailSndischen Schriftum der Epoche KQnig Chulalongkom’s (r. 1868-1910), Hamburg 1978, pp.94-118.
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One of the most important intellectual contributions of Mongkut’s period was 
the book Kitchanukit which was written in his reign but published posthumously in 
1869. The book ‘attacked’ traditional Buddhist cosmography and demanded a ‘true 
Buddhism’ connected with modem science.86 The author, Chaophraya Thiphakorawong, 
was close to Mongkut and a significant contributor to the emerging nationalism. 
Together with Mongkut, Thiphakorawong was at the forefront of intellectual debate. 
His books were directed against the activities of Christian missionaries, who arrived in 
large numbers during the reign of Rama III. In one particularly interesting newspaper 
debate, some missionaries accused Mongkut of leading his people to a false God. Both, 
Mongkut and Thipakorawong, answered anonymously or under a pseudonym with 
articles concerning Buddhism and Christianity. Thipakorawong denied the claim that 
Buddhism was dragging down Thailand and was the reason of all misery. He dismissed 
the argument that once Thailand would embrace Christianity, the nation would become 
prosperous and gain the respect of other nations. Thipakorawong countered with the 
statement that the prosperity of these nations (esp. France, Great Britain and the USA) 
resulted solely from the intellectual achievements of their people. Religion, stated 
Thipakorawong, was not the main cause of progress, as there were many countries 
which had adopted Christianity but still remained poor.87
Thipakorawong’s argument reflected the main attitude of intellectuals during the 
mid-nineteenth century which sought to adopt only those western achievements that 
could be accommodated by Thai society. Mongkut himself remarked: “The science I 
receive, astronomy, geology, chemistry- these I accept; the Christian religion I do not 
receive, many of our countrymen do not receive it.”88 Thipakorawong also altered 
historical accounts to give a favourable image of Thai kings in the past. For example, 
Rama I was not depicted as a king with an elaborate lifestyle and cruel executions were 
omitted. Any hint that a Thai king was subject to the sovereignty of the Chinese 
emperor was eliminated as well.89 Mongkut’s son, King Chulalongkom, acknowledged 
the important influence of Thipakorawong by conferring to him an ‘Order of the White 
Elephant’ in recognition of his work, his loyalty and his patriotism [sic] in 1870.90
86 See Batson, Benjamin, Influences from the East etc., Bangkok no date, section 2, p .l. See also Day, 
Tony/Reynolds, Craig. “Cosmologies, Truth Regimes, and the State in Southeast Asia”, Modern Asian 
Studies, 2000, p.9.
87 The debate is discussed in Somchai, 1983, pp.83-87.
88 Cited in Somchai, 1983, p.88.
89 Somchai, 1983, p.206.
90 Somchai, 1983, p.69.
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Mongkut’s efforts to promote nationalism had a profound impact on the 
intellectuals. After his death, as proof of his success an eulogy (plengyaw 
chaloemphrakiat) appeared. The poet substituted the name of Thailand with phutthakhet 
(buddhist land) and the term ‘our country’, in the interpretation of Wenk, with the word 
nai trai chak (triple discus- the royal symbol).91 An indication that the nation was now 
firmly identified with the monarchy.
4.4. Royal or Monarchical Nationalism?
How could the nationalism of King Mongkut be categorised? I propose to see 
the nationalism under Mongkut as a distinctive non-European interpretation of the 
concept of nationalism. The main features of this form of nationalism were:
a merger between a traditional concept of ‘nation’ with an adapted 
western idea of nationalism.
a leadership role of the monarchy and the transfer of the paternalistic 
image of the king from the kingdom to the nation, 
non-secular, non-democratic. Nationalism was not a new secular 
religion and not a substitute for religion, 
a revival of cultural traditions as expression of national identity, 
a national identity, based on Thai culture, which was open for others 
to accept.
King Mongkut’s intellectual efforts were essential for the development of early 
Thai nationalism. He was one of the first ‘bridge builders’ between eastern and western 
concepts in South East Asia. Dahm argued that ‘bridge builders’ saw a cultural revival 
(reactivation of own traditions, included revitalising of Buddhism, cult of heroes etc) as 
a crucial reaction in the face of modernity or colonialism. They used ‘politically 
revitalised cultural traditions, which made the masses realise the new visions and aims 
in symbolic pictures’.92 Mongkut’s policies, ideas and activities such as the reform of
91 Wenk, Klaus, Studien zur Literatur der Thai, Band 3, Hamburg 1987, p.50.
92 Dahm, Bernhard. “Postkoloniale Staatenbildungen in Siidostasien”, Stuttgart 1992, pp.74 and 81. Dahm 
listed as examples Sukarno, Aung San and Ho Chi Minh. There is maybe no better manifestation of this 
attitude than the architectural style o f Mongkut’s summer palace in Phetchburi province. Located on top 
of a single mountain, it reflected the Hindu-Buddhist cosmology just like the royal palace in Bangkok and 
included a temple called Wat Phra Kaew. The palace itself, however, was built in a Mediterranean style. 
The whole complex combined the traditional worldview with a new, western one. For the palace, see
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Buddhism, his use of symbols and traditions but also his openness for western thought 
and technology, confirm his position as bridge builder. This was also reflected in his 
ideas about nationalism. Mongkut was not a democrat and had no intention of allowing 
direct participation in politics by the people. The nation could not mean a nation by the 
people in which ‘the people would worship themselves’.93 Attachak, calling the King a 
man with a mission, argued that Mongkut was determined to be the supreme intellectual 
leader of the kingdom and to make the monarchy stronger.94 The nation could, therefore, 
only be the king’s nation.
In academic debate, there have been several attempts to explain the role of the 
monarchy in nationalism in the middle of the nineteenth century. In the case of the 
British Empire, Cannadine used the term ‘royal empire’, which was ‘presided over and 
unified by a sovereign of global amplitude and semi-divine fullness, and suffused with 
the symbols and signifiers of kingship, which reinforced, legitimised, unified and 
completed the empire as a realm bound together by order, hierarchy, tradition and 
subordination’.95 Hobsbawm argued that ‘nationalism became a substitute for social 
cohesion through a national church, a royal family or other cohesive traditions, or 
collective group self-representations, a new secular religion’.96 The royal person became 
exploited “on elaborate ritual occasions with associated propagandist activities and a 
wide participation of the people, not least through the captive audiences available for 
official indoctrination in the educational system. Both made the ruler the focus of his 
people’s or peoples’ unity, the symbolic representative of the country’s greatness and 
glory, of its entire past and continuity with a changing present. Yet the innovations were 
perhaps more deliberate and systematic where, as in Britain, the revival of royal 
ritualism was seen as a necessary counterweight to the dangers of popular democracy.”97
Prudhisan Jumbala, “Phrabaromrachanusawari phrachomklao [The Monument o f King Mongkut]”, 
Bangkok 2003, p.4. Another example is Mongkut’s answer to western critics about his polygamous life­
style. He defended it as a cultural practice in line with Buddhism. Jeffrey, Leslie Ann. “Imperial Desire: 
Gender and National Identity in Nineteenth Century Siam”, Paper Presented at the 7th International 
Conference on Thai Studies, Amsterdam 1999, p.9.
93 Hutchinson, J., Modern Nationalism, London 1994, p.39.
94 Attachak. 2001, p. 15.
95 Cannadine, David, Ornamentalism- How the British Saw Their Empire, London 2001, p. 102.
96 Hobsbawm, Eric. “Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914”, Cambridge 1983, p.303.
97 Hobsbawm, 1983, p.282,
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Similar to Hobsbawm’s approach, Naim claimed about ‘royal nationalism’ that 
‘a personalised and totemic symbolism was needed to maintain the nation’.98 Arblaster 
stressed the point that ‘royal nationalism’ needed the ‘invention of tradition’. The 
monarchy required only ‘judicious touching up and energetic marketing in order to 
became the revered, untouchable symbols of a new, fundamentally fake but politically 
indispensable, version of national identity’.99 Another conception but with a similar 
result was offered by Breuilly.100 He argued that in a colonial state a nationalist 
movement had to reform society and to take over the state. In countries which escaped 
European colonialism, however, a nationalist movement had to transform the state 
institutions in order to be effective. This reform impulse originated within rather than 
outside the state itself. The difficulty began when reformers envisaged a total 
transformation, and critics of the existing state became more radical. The appeal to 
national identity provided a basis on which their criticism and eventual opposition could 
be justified. The ruling elites introduced as a consequence nationalism from above to 
tackle these critics. It expressed itself much more in political than in cultural terms 
compared with many anti-colonial movements. The focus was on military reform in 
order to combat direct threats from western powers.
Breuilly listed Japan as an example of such a ‘reform nationalism’. In the 
Japanese case, the nation was identified as a specific nation rather than an incomparable 
civilization such as China. The essence of this nation could be preserved through a 
period of major change as long as the loyalty to the emperor was central.101 In 1876, 
nevertheless, a Japanese intellectual came to the devastating judgement that ‘in Japan 
there is a government but no nation’.102 However, the cases of Japan and Thailand are 
not comparable. Before the Meiji reformation in 1868, Japan was without a central 
authority and was governed by the Tokugawa Shogunate which resulted in powerful 
regional lordships with their own armies, laws, administration, taxation or education. 
Religion was another important aspect because the change of government went along 
with a change of religion. While the Shogunate favoured Buddhism, the new central 
state introduced Shinto. As a result, Buddhists were persecuted and Buddhist statues
98 Naim, Tom, The Enchanted Glass, London 1988, p.l 1. The term ‘royal nationalism’ in connection with 
Thailand was first used by Thongchai Winichakul. See his article “A Short History o f the Long Memory 
of the Thai Nation”, Victoria 2003.
99 Arblaster, Anthony. “Taking Monarchy Seriously”, New Left Review, 1989, p.l 02.
100 Breuilly, John, Nationalism and the State, 2nd edition, Manchester 1993, pp.220-243.
101 Breuilly, 1993, p.243.
102 Cited in Doak, Kevin. “What is a Nation and Who Belongs? National Narratives and the Ethnic 
Imagination in Twentieth Century Japan”, The American Historical Review, 1997, p.286.
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removed.103 Kiyota pointed out that the majority of the people did not support the new 
religious policies and only the introduction of religious freedom solved the stalemate in 
1890.104
The situation in Thailand was different. The destruction of Ayutthaya required 
the rebuilding of Thai society in a new kingdom. The result was a centralised state, a 
modem nation and a religious structure which was to a certain degree under the control 
of the king. Buddhism had the full support of the people. These changes and adaptations 
happened before the West had any significant impact. Therefore, an important aspect of 
nationalism in Thailand was, contrary to Japan, not an ideology primarily to fend off the 
West but a vital tool in an intra-elite power struggle between the weak monarch and the 
mighty nobility.105 For Mongkut, there was no motivation to preserve the status quo with 
the help of nationalism. He attempted to regain the power of the monarch, and 
nationalism as a symbol of progress was an important tool for him. Mongkut saw the 
monarch as the leader in a quest to bring the Thai civilisation to a higher level. 
Consequently, his nationalism had to focus on an active monarch. I propose to call this 
form of nationalism ‘monarchical nationalism’.
This nationalism differs from the earlier mentioned ‘royal nationalism’. Naim’s 
term is suitable for the cases of Great Britain and Japan. In my understanding, royal 
nationalism is a kind of political nationalism which tries to achieve its goals using the 
symbolic power of the monarchy. It requires a passive but cooperative role for the 
monarchy. The unquestioned national leader is the ‘state’ (government or bureaucracy), 
legitimised and strengthened by the monarchy in its function as the symbol of the nation. 
A royal nation is, therefore, very much connected with the loss of real power for the 
monarchy. With a weakening monarchy, royal nationalism in the long term played an 
important part in democratisation and increasing secularisation. While the British ‘state’ 
took control of the nation and reduced the monarchy under Queen Victoria to its symbol, 
the Thai monarchs actively tried to create loyalty to the nation through the monarchy 
itself. It was they who used the state as a means to achieve this aim and not the opposite 
way. In my view, monarchical nationalism is a form of cultural nationalism under the 
leadership of the monarch himself. It calls for a charismatic monarch who is able to bind
103 Kawanami, Hiroko. “Japanese Nationalism and the Universal Dharma”, London 1999, p. 105.
104 Kiyota, Minosu. “Meiji Buddhism: Religion and Patriotism”, AS, 1966, p.51.
105 Breuilly’s argument that nationalist movements focussed on military reform in order to combat direct 
threats from Western powers is not valid in Thailand. Mongkut did not pay much attention to the military. 
The number o f soldiers guarding the capital was 700 in the 1850s and rose to only 1,000 in 1865. Battge, 
1974, p.70.
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the loyalty of the people to the nation. The monarch is less the symbol than an 
embodiment of the nation. In monarchical nationalism, the ‘state’ plays only a 
supportive role and a strong monarchy is required.
In the case of King Mongkut, he used the existing nation as basis and 
transformed it with the help of nationalism. Like ‘nation-building’ in earlier periods, 
Mongkut’s activities to aid the development of a monarchical nationalism should be 
seen as a process which was not finished at any certain point in time. Although his reign 
saw a modem Thai nation and nationalism, one important aspect was still missing. 
Thailand was not yet a modem nation-state. This would occur in the reign of Mongkut’s 
son, King Chulalongkom. Combined with the far-reaching possibilities of a nation-state, 
monarchical nationalism would eventually be on the peak of its influence.
i l l
Chapter 5
The Peak of the Monarchical Nation (1868-1910)
Hardly any country in South East Asia was better prepared for the 
challenges brought by nineteenth century imperialism than Thailand: a modem 
Thai nation was emerging and a loyalty binding ideology, namely monarchical 
nationalism, developing. However, the rapid changes in the political and 
economical environment required even more adaptations. The result was the 
introduction of the nation-state which gave the proponents of the monarchical 
nation and nationalism in the reign of King Chulalongkom (Rama V, r. 1868-1910) 
unheard possibilities to expand their power and ideology. Together with an 
exceptional personal charisma of the King, the new nation-state enabled the 
monarchical nationalism to reach its peak of influence and importance. Although 
European influence was important at this point in history, it was not the decisive 
factor as argued by the revisionist school.
5.1. King Chulalongkom and the Nation
King Chulalongkom faced during his reign three challenges which would 
effect his ideas and policies regarding nation and nationalism.
The first challenge was the power of the nobility. When King Mongkut died 
of malaria in 1868, his fifteen-year-old son Chulalongkom was chosen to succeed 
his father. However, the head of the Bunnag family, Chaophraya Suriyawong, 
became Regent until the young king turned 20. In a letter from 1894, 
Chulalongkom described his situation: “I was only 15 years....I had no mother and 
the relatives from my mother’s side were unreliable or...not in an important 
position...My relatives from my father’s side, all [members of the] royal family, 
were under the power of the Regent. They all had to protect themselves and their 
lives...Although I had some civil servants who loved me and were friends, most of 
them were still in a low rank. Those who were seniors had no power to support...I 
was only a child. I had no ability to know all the administrative work... Moreover, 
I was very ill that I almost died, nobody believed that I would survive. What was
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the most dangerous [event] was the death of my father at that moment. I was like 
the one who lost his head, they just put my body on the throne as a symbol of the 
king. My suffering was beyond words.. .The weight of the crown was too much for 
my neck to bear it...I had open enemies around me, both inside and outside the 
country...I considered that [coronation] day the most unfortunate day ever since I 
was bom.”1
The fact that Chulalongkom faced the same problem as his father at his 
accession to the throne showed that King Mongkut was not totally successful in 
lessening the influence of the nobility. Monarchical nationalism was not yet an 
institutionalised ideology and still depended on the personal charisma and power of 
the king. Young and weak, Chulalongkom had no other choice but to follow his 
father’s ideals of monarchical nationalism to build up his power base. This process 
was sped up by the death of his main opponents from the Bunnag family which 
gave him more freedom for his own decisions.2 Although he soon gained the upper 
hand in the intra-elite struggle, a new and even more dangerous threat made it 
necessary for Chulalongkom to maintain and adapt the monarchical nationalism.
The second challenge Chulalongkom faced was the increasing 
aggressiveness of the colonial powers in South East Asia. In 1885, the King was 
shocked when the British took full control over Burma.3 In the same year, China 
acknowledged the French protectorate in Indochina which increased the pressure 
on Thailand from the North and North East.4 The loss of sovereignty became 
almost a reality in 1893, when the French used gun-boat diplomacy in the so-called 
Paknam crisis to force Chulalongkom to concede a vast area of land east of the 
Mekong river. His inability to prevent the loss of land left Chulalongkom 
personally offended. He pointed out that in the past, the size of the country 
depended on the power of the king. Therefore, to gain or to lose territory meant for 
the ruler to gain or to lose honour: “That I lose territory means that I lose honour in
1 Letter printed in Chai-anan Samudavanija/Khattiya Kannasut (eds), Ekkasan kanmueang 
kanpokkhrong thai (pho so 2417-2477) [Documents on Thai Politics and Government (1874-1934)], 
Bangkok 1989, pp. 129-134.
2 The members o f the Bunnag family were successively replaced in their positions by 
Chulalongkom’s own relatives. See in detail Wyatt, David. “Family Politics in Nineteenth Century 
Thailand”, Cambridge 1976, pp.54-72.
3 Sumet Jumsai. “Prince Prisdang and the Proposal For the First Siamese Constitution”, 2004, p. 107.
4 In that area, Thai troops battled for years against rebelling Ho-Chinese who took control of several 
cities in the Mekong region. France recognised Thai suzerainty over the Lao kingdom in 1886, this 
agreement, however, was short-lived. Stuart-Fox, Martin. “Conflicting Conceptions o f the State: 
Siam, France and Vietnam in the Late Nineteenth Century”, JSS, 1994, pp. 139.
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a big way.”5 What seemed like a defiant stand by Chulalongkom revealed only his 
powerlessness against the bullying of the imperialists countries: “If I don’t have 
full power over an area, then it is better not to possess it.”6 The situation of 
Thailand had so deteriorated that the ‘vision’ of a British commentator in 1888 
seemed to become certainty: “It may be interesting to know that the ultimate 
delimitation of the British, Chinese and Siamese may perhaps leave British and 
French acquisitions in Indo-China separated by but a narrow strip of alien 
territory.”7 Chulalongkom realised the threat to his reign and the independence of 
Thailand and was convinced that only a modem, civilised nation would be safe 
from a colonial take-over.8
The third major challenge to Chulalongkom’s reign came from radical, 
young intellectuals demanding far-reaching reforms. In a petition addressed to the 
king in 1885, a group of princes demanded that Chulalongkom should introduce a 
system of parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy. They 
criticised the growing concentration of power in the hands of the king which would 
lead to negligence by an overworked monarch. In their view, this reform would 
strengthen Thailand against the West.9 The most important non-royal intellectual of 
his time was the journalist Thianwan (1842-1915), who was the first Thai outside 
the traditional elite to deal with ‘unity’ and ‘nation’. Thianwan connected the idea 
of the nation with the search for progress and civilisation. For him, only a national 
consciousness and patriotism could be the suitable fundament for the development 
of Thailand to become a strong, modem, westernised and democratic state. This, 
however, did not mean that Thianwan wanted to surrender to the West. On the 
contrary, he sought adoption of western means to safeguard the country’s 
independence.10
5 Cited in Attachak Sattayanurak, Kanplianplaeng lokkathat khong chonchan phunam thai tangtae 
ratchakan thi 4 -  pho so 2475 [The Change o f Worldview o f the Thai Leaders from the Reign of 
King Mongkut to 1932], Bangkok 1995, p.140.
6 Cited in Attachak, 1995, p. 142.
7 Yate, A. “The Shan States”, The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1888, p.321.
8 Sunait Chutintaranond. “The Image of the Burmese Enemy in Thai Perceptions and the Historical 
Writings”, JSS, 1992, p. 94.
9 Wyatt, David, Thailand- A Short History, Bangkok 1984, p. 184.
10 Rosenberg, Klaus, Nation und Fortschritt- Der Publizist Thien Wan und die Modernisierung 
Thailands unter Konig Chulalongkom (r. 1868-1910), Hamburg 1980, p.106. For Thianwan’s work 
see Thianwan, Ruam ngan khian khong tianwan [Collected Writings of Thianwan], Bangkok 2001. 
See also Batson, B., The End o f the Absolute Monarchy in Siam, Singapore 1984, p. 15 and 
Murashima, Eiji. “The Origin of Modem Official State Ideology in Thailand”, JSEAS, 1988, p.83.
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For Chulalongkom, the answer to these three challenges lay in the creation 
of a modem nation-state with the monarchy in full control of the state and the 
nation: ‘government reform is the key to success’.11 Indeed, the reign of King 
Chulalongkom saw a massive modernisation of the existing structure of the state 
bureaucracy and institutions into a regulated legal system. The King also 
transformed the fundamentals of society by abolishing for example slavery and 
corvee labour and replacing it with per capita tax. By reforming the administration 
of the country towards a modem bureaucracy, he created a ‘state’ in a Weberian 
sense.12 This new bureaucracy enabled Chulalongkom to disconnect the nobility 
from their traditional power bases and to replace them in many key positions by his 
own relatives. It was also a sign towards the colonial powers that Thailand was 
modernising and that there would be no need to colonise in order to ‘civilise’ the 
country. The King also silenced the radical reformers with these first steps towards 
a modem state which they could connect with the hope for a constitution and a 
parliament in a long term.
One part of this modem state is of special interest because it would lead to 
the rise of a competing elite group which would bring an end to the monarchical 
rule and nation in 1932: a professional army. Chulalongkom was very much 
interested in military affairs and disagreed with members of the government who 
favoured a ‘civilian’ attitude. This group argued that any military defence against 
the European armies would be useless and that the state should instead focus on 
government and the promotion of railways, irrigation and trade. Chulalongkom, 
however, was convinced that the only deterrent against the Europeans would be the 
prospect of a costly war with substantial losses. The task to build an army capable 
of being such a deterrent was formidable for Chulalongkom because the country 
had only a few thousand combat ready troops. At the time of his death in 1910, the 
army boasted 20,000 standing troops and was called by a French observer ‘a truly 
modem national army’. However, that army did not contribute significantly to the 
nationalisation of the masses because conscription was limited and not yet
11 Cited in Sumet, 2004, p.l 12.
12 See Somkiat Wanthana. “Rat thai: nammatham lae ruppatham [Thai State: Abstract and 
Concrete]”, Ratthasatsan, 1988-89, p.193. See for the discussion about the term ‘state’ Stuart-Fox, 
1994, p. 135 and, generally, Dahm, Bernhard, “Postkoloniale Staatenbildungen in Siidostasien”, 
Stuttgart 1992, p.92. For a theoretical discussion of the modernisation see Smith, Anthony, National 
Identity, London 1991, p. 101.
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organised in most parts of the country.13 The modernisation of the army was an 
efficient way to take control of another power base of the nobility. In addition, 
Chulalongkom realised that ‘militaristic’ issues did win him the approval of 
intellectuals such as Thianwan during the Paknam crisis in 1893. In his article 
‘France and Thailand’, Thianwan demanded patriotism which, according to 
Rosenberg, reflected the wish of many Thais to volunteer as soldiers against 
France.14 In one poem, Thianwan demanded that the Thai love the ‘king, country, 
nation and religion’:
“Children read this and aim to
Love the Thai nation and your elders,
Love your religion and the Buddha’s words,
Love your ancestry and fight all enemies.”15
While taking full control of the state was connected with administrative 
reforms, Chulalongkom had to develop an ideology to achieve the same with the 
nation. In this ideology, he put a strong emphasis on the central role of the 
monarchy. His aim was to strengthen the monarchical nation in order to modernise 
the country, reinforce the position of Thailand against the colonial powers and to 
ensure the prolongation of the rule of his family. In this regard, the monarchical 
nationalism of Chulalongkom was basically not different from the nationalism his 
father propagated. What was different, however, was the development of this 
monarchical nationalism into a well-organised and theoretically well-founded 
ideology of the Thai nation. This was the work of mainly two men, namely the 
King himself and his younger brother Prince Damrong who was the Minister for 
Interior and Education and holder of several other key positions. Their vision of the 
monarchical nation followed traditional elements but stressed three main aspects, 
namely the role of the king, the trans-ethnic understanding of Thai identity and last 
but not least the full acceptance of citizenship.
The king occupied the central position in this monarchical nation. He was to 
be the undisputed leader of the nation (termed ‘the one who does something’ or
13 Battge, Noel, The Military, Government and Society in Siam, 1868-1910: Politics and Military 
Reform During the Reign o f King Chulalongkom, New York 1974, pp.397-426 and pp.542-543.
14 Rosenberg, 1980, p.84.
15 Cited in Vella, Walter. “Thianwan of Siam: A Man Who Fought Giants”, Honolulu 1986, p.88.
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phukratam) .16 It was mostly this demand for active rule that differentiates the 
monarchical nation from other systems of monarchical rule. In 1887, 
Chulalongkom himself described a duty of the Thai king as to seek and manage 
change: “In other countries, the people demand change and the monarch follows. In 
our country, however, it is only the king who thinks what should be done to solve 
the problems and make the people happy.”17 Chulalongkom was convinced that 
only the ability to change would guarantee the survival of the country and the 
ruling family. This change, however, should never be allowed to upset the old 
system as can be seen in a speech in 1908: “The key to a ruler’s success lies in his 
ability to engage his own times. In his own time, there was a necessity for reforms 
but these had to be pursued with thoughtfulness so that changes would not upset 
the traditional customs and habits of the people.”18 Accordingly, he and Damrong 
did not revolutionise the role of the king but adapted the traditional concept of the 
king as dharmaracha to connect it with the nation.
In Chulalongkom’s eyes, love for the nation was inseparable from the love 
to the monarchy. In a letter to his brother after the Front Palace Crisis in 1874, 
Chulalongkom wrote: “I want to tell the ‘Young Siam’ [a group of his supporters] 
that what the viceroy has done [to visit a foreign ambassador] clearly showed that 
he should not be considered a citizen of the Siamese nation because he has no love 
for the country and no love for the [royal] family. He sought [help] from a foreign 
power to threaten to take control of the country.” 19 Love to the King was a 
necessity because unity (,samakkhi) could only be achieved under a king. This unity 
would then result in prosperity and success.20 Essential was the unity between the 
monarchical rulers and the populace which would create a sense of ‘being one and 
united nation’ {chat annueng andiao) regardless of ethnic and religious differences. 
A newspaper commented about this idea: “The spirit of unity, inspiring mutual 
confidence and help among all, from prince to peasant, is the ideal His Majesty sets
16 See more in Attachak, 1995, pp.91-94.
17 Document printed in Duangdao Yangsamat, Banlang phrapiya- botwikro phraratchahatthalekha 
suanphraong [The Throne o f King Chulalongkom: An Analysis o f his Private Letters], Bangkok 
1995, p.96.
18 Cited in Peleggi, Maurizio, Lord o f Things: The Fashioning o f  the Siamese Modern Image, 
Honolulu 2003a, p. 13 5.
19 Printed in Duangdao, 1995, p.42. Emphasis added. The Front Palace crisis was a conspiracy 
against Chulalongkom headed by the viceroy.
20 Reynolds, Craig. “State Versus Nation in Histories o f Nation-Building with Special Reference to 
Thailand”, Warasan thaikhadisueksa, 2004, p. 12.
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before the nation. It never has been realised anywhere but it is the end that every 
good ruler and patriot strives for.”21
An important image of the king in the monarchical nationalism created by 
Mongkut was that of a king working for the benefit of the people. Accordingly, 
Chulalongkom thought that a monarch could not solely legitimise his position with 
the kingly virtues but must have the willingness and power to be active. In a letter 
to Prince Damrong, the King wrote: “a monarch must earn the loyalty of the people. 
The relationship must be based on moral and benefit. A leader doesn’t have to rely 
on the royal virtues but must have power to act.”22 He saw his own work in line 
with this idea: “What I have successfully done, our people have gratefulness for 
that. The important themes of what I have successfully done are the loyalty of the 
people of ours and the belief that if there is any business I have to deal with I will 
do it for the prosperity, benefit and goodness of all the people.”23 The image of the 
monarchy was of special concern for Prince Damrong. He argued that whenever 
the country was in danger of losing its freedom, the Chakri dynasty always 
managed to maintain it. The King was the moral leader who would preserve the 
independence, maintain the freedom of the nation and prevent the country of 
becoming a slave. Following the ideal of dharmaracha, another image promoted by 
Damrong was that of a ruling monarchy aiming solely to solve problems for the 
people and to develop the country in all aspects. As a result, the land has honour 
and the people should be proud and love the country.24
In Damrong’s view, a king had to travel into the countryside, to look after 
the population and to know about the activities of the civil servants. He had to 
improve the lives of the people and make them happy. Damrong emphasised that 
the Thai kings used their power more wisely than in other countries.25 He called the 
monarch ‘King of/for the people’ (khongratsadon and phuearatsadon) which 
would be the reason behind the popularity of the king. He moved the image of the 
king away from being connected with royal power (phraratchaamnat) to an image
21 Cited in Peleggi, 2003a, p. 13 5.
22 Letter printed in Duangdao, 1995, p.98.
23 Cited in Attachak, 1995, pp. 156 and 159.
24 Saichol Sattayanurak, Somdetkromphrayadamrongrachanuphap kansang attalak mueangthai lae 
chan khong chaosayam [Prince Damrong and the Creation o f Thailand’s Identity and the Class of 
the Siamese], Bangkok 2003, pp.87 and 104.
25 Saichol, 2003, pp.l 15 and 157-158.
118
of a beloved king.26 This extended to religious affairs because the Thai king was to 
be open to all religions and was the protector of faith: “From time immemorial 
[Thais enjoyed] complete toleration of the freedom of religious thought. It is 
recognised that religions confer happiness on the people, and the king’s support of 
all the faiths is, in effect, the people.”27
The second important element of the monarchical nation under 
Chulalongkom was the maintenance of the traditional trans-ethnic nature of Thai 
identity in order to gain trust and access to all citizens even in areas rarely accessed 
by the Thai central state. Thai identity was to be kept open in order to enable all 
cultural groups residing in the country to feel being part of the nation. National 
identity in the monarchical nation consisted therefore of a cultural umbrella made 
up from the core culture of central Thailand under which sub-cultures such as the 
Lao or the Mon could exist. The main condition was, however, to accept the 
sovereignty of the Thai king as the highest authority. This ‘open system’- approach 
and umbrella model enabled Chulalongkom to interpret existing differences in 
culture as merely branches of a broader Thai culture: “The Land of Siam is 
composed of the people who are considered of the same nationality because they 
have the same king as ruler and they speak the same language. Although some 
speak Thai and some speak Lao, the languages are only slightly apart. It is not that 
they speak different languages.”28 In the case that the differences were too big to 
hide, the King emphasised the idea of citizenship within the monarchical nation: 
“the Chinese are not like foreigners but are our citizens.”29 Comparable was his 
protective stand regarding the Muslim population in the Southern provinces as 
mirrored in the ‘Bill for Governing Seven Vassal States, 1901’. The Muslim areas 
were given a high degree of cultural autonomy and Islam was recognised as 
religion and culture. Although he granted a high decree of freedom to the general 
Muslim population, the King was very strict with his civil servants who had to 
learn Thai language, Thai manners and to show a ‘Thai heart’.30
26 Saichol, 2003, pp. 141-142.
27 Cited in Saichol, 2003, p. 169.
28Chulachomklaochaoyuhua Phrabatsomdejphra. “Phraboromrachathibai waduai khwamsamakkhi 
[The Royal Explanation on Unity]”, Bangkok Reprint 1973, p.47.
29 Cited in Amara Pongsapich, Khwam laklai thang watthanatham [Cultural Varieties], Bangkok 
2002, p. 144.
30 Piyanart Bunnag. “Ethnic Problems and the Unitary State o f Thailand: A Case Study o f the 
Muslim Ethnic Group in the Southern Border Provinces (1892-1932)”, Baden-Baden 1999, pp. 136- 
138.
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The King himself made the trans-ethnic identity the guideline for his 
policies. For example, he insisted in a letter to a Thai negotiator who discussed a 
treaty with the British government on including the title ‘King of Siam, Lao, Malay, 
Karen, etc’ to show that these groups belonged to Thailand.31 This was also 
reflected in the design of bank notes in 1891. The bank notes included four regional 
languages namely Thai, Malay, Laotian and Khmer. In addition, English and 
Chinese were added.32
Understanding the Thai nation more as a cultural than a political entity, 
Chulalongkom was firmly rooted in the existing structures of the monarchical 
nation and did not replace it with a western form of nation. Saichol argued that 
Prince Damrong as Interior minister was one of the main proponents of this trans- 
ethnic approach as he dealt with all ethnic groups and was aware of potential 
conflicts. This caused him to avoid the image of a Thai nation consisting of only 
ethnic Thai people. In Damrong’s view, the Thai race were part of the Siamese 
people, who consisted of several groups and nationalities under the power of the 
Thai king and the Thais as the biggest group. For Damrong, Thai culture had a 
unique feature which resulted in its dominant position among all other cultures in 
Thailand: the love of national independence, toleration, and power of assimilation. 
Damrong warned explicitly against policies which would give other ethnic groups 
the feeling that they were forced to change into being Thai. Everybody should love 
the nation and that being a citizen should be the first preference. In his opinion, a 
citizen could be Malay or Thai: “That is not important. The target for the 
government must be happiness in all regions, independently which nationality or 
language.”33 The Thai king would care for every nationality, all are Siamese, all are 
under his cooling shade. In a poem written to King Chulalongkom, Damrong 
summarised the role of the monarch:
“The king is the force to protect
31 Letter printed in Duangdao, 1995, p.50. For the integration o f hill tribe people in the North in that 
period, see Renard, Ronald. “The Differential Integration o f Hill People into the Thai State”, 
London 2000, p.63.
32 The bank notes were never printed due to the high costs o f the conflict with France. Bank of 
Thailand, Centenary o f Thai Banknote, 1902-2002, Bangkok 2002, p.28.
33 Cited in Saichol, 2003, p.59 and 63-64 and Khanakammakanekkalakkhongchat, JJdomkan khong 
chat [National Ideology], Bangkok 1983, p.7. A census from 1904 did reflect this attitude. It listed 
ethnic sub-groups such as the Chinese, Malay, Khmer and Burmese. Only in 1919 this was changed 
to Thai as a general category. Grabowsky, Volker. “The Thai Census o f 1904: Translation and 
Analysis”, JSS, 1996, p.50.
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And to give shade for the people
So that the country achieves unity.”34
The third main element of Chulalongkom’s interpretation of the 
monarchical nation was the official acceptance of citizenship with the introduction 
of a modem legal code. The legal change was initiated by Prince Phichit 
Prichakom, a brother of the King, who called for a new interpretation of law in 
1885. He wanted the traditional ‘Lord of Life’ interpretation for the king abolished 
and replaced with a socially responsible position. The king should not only protect 
the kingdom but must provide for the welfare of the people as well.35 The king 
therefore should perform socially necessary tasks. His legislative powers were to 
be defined by the basic needs of the people. The system of law should arouse not 
from any sacred and mysterious source but from the nature and practice of men as 
social beings. Chulalongkom accepted this proposition and abandoned his ‘Lord of 
Life’ title. He also gave the people the right to choose their own representatives on 
a local level within the framework of his bureaucratic reform. Riggs’ statement that 
there were no citizens, only subjects under monarchical rule cannot be confirmed.36 
Engel commentated that ‘it was perhaps a paradox that, as the Thai monarchy 
reached its zenith of power under Chulalongkom, the rights of private citizens also 
attained an unprecedented and probably irreversible stage in their development’.37 
A modem Thai law code with a standardised judiciary was introduced and finally 
applied throughout the whole kingdom in 1902, when the Sharia law was replaced 
in the Muslim areas in the South.38 This modem law code, stating the common 
rights and duties of the individual, helped Chulalongkom to finish the process 
started in the early Bangkok period. With the nation-state in place, Thailand finally 
fulfilled the last missing element of the modem nation, namely citizen rights. It 
also meant that Thai citizens had now legally binding duties towards the monarchy 
and the nation.
34 Cited in Saichol, 2003, p.69.
35 Engel, David, Law and Kingship in Thailand During the Reign o f King Chulalongkom, Ann 
Arbor 1975, p.l 1.
36 Riggs, Fred. “The Malady o f Modernity: Some Remedies”, London 1999, p.9.
37 Engel, 1975, p.95.
38 Bin Wan Mahmood, Suria. “De-Radicalization o f Minority Dissent”, Quezon City 1999, p.123. 
Exemptions for the Muslims were family and inheritance cases.
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An important aspect of monarchical nationalism was the personal charisma 
of the ruler. King Chulalongkom was in this regard an exceptional monarch and 
was very popular with the people.39 His charm even won over foreign visitors, for 
example one German traveller described the King as a man of bezaubender 
Liebenswiirdigkeit [enchanting kindness] and called him the most handsome man 
in the country.40 Cecil Carter found a long list of praise for the King in his 
travelogue as well: “Siam owes much of her prosperity to her King’s energy and 
initiative...He works harder than most of his subjects, whose welfare he ever has at 
heart...Under his wise and beneficent rule the future prosperity of Siam is fully 
assured.”41 Chulalongkom was able to connect to the masses with his down to earth 
attitude especially when travelling upcountry.42 His popularity with Thais became 
most evident when he died in 1910 and ‘the whole kingdom was in shock, many 
wept openly and the dress and shaved heads of mourning were everywhere.’43
The peak of the dominance of the monarchical nationalism was a result of a 
combination of several elements, namely the introduction of the nation-state, a 
sophisticated ideology as guideline and the personal charisma of the king. With 
these elements in place, King Chulalongkom and his associates were able to 
disseminate the ideas within the population.
5.2. Means o f Dissemination o f Monarchical Nationalism
With a developed ideology available, Chulalongkom and the royal family 
had to find ways to disseminate their ideas and promote the love to the monarchy 
and nation. Although modem means of communication were much more readily 
available in Chulalongkom’s reign than in Mongkut’s, they were still limited.
Chulalongkom was well aware that one of the most common ways to instil 
loyalty to a nation is through education; however, the modem educational system
39 This does not imply that he had not his critics. One example was the poet Tim Sukayang who 
blamed the ‘Thai leaders’ in an anti-war poem (nirat) about a loss ridden army expedition to 
Nongkhai in 1875. See Wedel, Yuangrat, The Thai Radicals and the Communist Party, Singapore 
1983, p. 16. Another critic was the writer Kulap Kritsananon. See Reynolds, Craig. “The Case of  
KSR Kulap: A Challenge To Royal Historical Writing in Late Nineteenth Century Thailand”, JSS 
1973, pp.63-90.
40 Hossens, Carl, Durch Konig Tschulalongkorns Reich, Stuttgart 1912, p.5.
41 Carter, Cecil, The Kingdom o f  Siam, New York 1904, pp.3-4.
42 Chali Iamkrasin, Mueaphraphutthachaoluang niyomphrai [When King Chulalongkom ‘Went to 
the Forest’], Bangkok Reprint 1995, p.5.
43 Wyatt, 1984, p. 197.
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in Thailand was just at its beginning and for decades to remain rather 
underdeveloped. The first state primary school open for commoners was founded 
in Bangkok in 1884. The aim to instil patriotism was openly stated in the textbooks: 
“Don’t forget- we love our nation and our king more than we love ourselves.”44 The 
study of royal chronicles, regarded as an important tool to build up this loyalty, was 
put as a part of the curriculum. In 1901, the education ministry commented that the 
chronicles were significant books for the nation ‘because if we don’t know the 
royal chronicles, we don’t know ourselves and if we don’t know ourselves, how 
could we know other people?’45 While the patriotic education started in Bangkok, 
the government had a long way to go in the outer provinces to build up a nation­
wide school system.46 In Chulalongkom’s reign, the Thai government began to 
build up education as a pillar to promote nationalism but it was still too weak and 
limited in its reach to have a significant impact on the general population.47 The 
King had to find other means to communicate with a bigger part of the population. 
Chulalongkom followed his father in using symbols and festivals as a means to 
promote nationalism. However, what was due to his own initiation- and what this 
chapter will give special attention to- was his use of modem paintings and poetry 
as well as monuments as the means to disseminate the ideas of monarchical 
nationalism.
The Use o f Symbols and Festivals
In 1873, Chulalongkom introduced the Royal Coats-of-arms which 
symbolised the claim to power by the Chakri dynasty over a specific territory. Its 
main elements comprised a Thai style crown symbolising the Thai monarchy, a
44 Printed in Duangdao, 1995, p. 57.
45 Cited in Attachak, 1995, p. 184.
46 Reports from the 1880s showed that the use o f Lao was still common in temple schools in the 
North East and that the Thai script was limited to urban areas. This did not change considerably 
over time as a report from 1900 complained that only the administrative officials and their families 
could read and write Thai. It was not until 1921, in the reign of Chulalongkom’s son Vajiravudh, 
that basic education became compulsory for all children from the age o f 7 to 14. Even then only 
42% of all eligible pupils in the whole country were enrolled in a school. Paitoon Mikusol. 
“Education and Socio-Cultural Assimilation in Northeastern Thailand”, Asian Review, 1988, pp. 87- 
95 and 103.
47 This was officially acknowledged in a report from 1926: “We can see that a lot has already be 
done administratively to make them [people in the provinces] realise they are Thai people. If we do 
more to develop schools, and if communications with Bangkok in the future will become more 
convenient, these people will probably feel more and more that they are Thai.” Cited in Paitoon, 
1988, p.103.
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chakra (disk) and a tri (a trident) symbolising the Chakri dynasty, and a three­
headed elephant, symbolising the North, the Central and the South regions of 
Thailand. A white elephant represented the Lao territories and a kris (knife) 
represented the Malay territories were also included. Local symbols clearly 
reflected Chulalongkom’s emphasis of the trans-ethnic character of the Thai 
nation.48
Good examples of his use of festivities were the celebrations of his 
becoming the longest reigning king in Thai history. As he wanted to publicly 
demonstrate a line of succession of Thai kings since ancient times, the celebrations 
were designed on a historical theme with reference to the previous record holder, 
King Ramathibodi II (r. 1491-1529), and held in the former capital Ayutthaya. 
During the festival, eulogies to the Ayutthayan kings were presented and 
Chulalongkom was portrayed as the inheritor of their power and virtue. Following 
them, he saw it as his duty to give the country prosperity, stability and freedom. 
During the festivities, Chulalongkom launched the Archaeological Society to stress 
the importance of history for the Thai nation. He proposed starting the study of the 
several regional polities that had been powerful at one time or another in order to 
advance knowledge of the thousand years of Thai history. In this speech, he 
acknowledged the existence of parallel political units which eventually melted into 
the nation.49 This legitimised not only the claim of the monarchical nation over 
lesser kingdoms and other ethnic groups but also firmly rooted it back in the past.
The Use o f Paintings and Poetry
In using art and literature as means to present ‘national history’, 
Chulalongkom initiated an exhibition to decorate the royal pyres of his wife and 
three children at the Royal Plaza in Bangkok in 1887. This exhibition consisted of 
92 glass-framed paintings depicting scenes from Thai history. These paintings 
combined western techniques (perspective, shadows, realism) with a typical Thai 
content. Attached to these pictures were poems narrating the events shown. 
Chulalongkom published these poems in a booklet entitled Klong pap
48 Bank of Thailand, 2002, pp.34 and 44. The Coat-of-arms was later replaced by the garuda (a 
mystical man-bird which was a vehicle o f Vishnu) as state emblem because Chulalongkom thought 
it was too western.
49 Peleggi, 2003a, pp. 130-131.
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phraratchaphongsawadan (Poetry Depicting the Paintings from the Royal 
Chronicles) which was distributed to visitors.
The fact that this project was initiated by Chulalongkom and conducted 
under his supervision underlines the importance for the analysis of monarchical 
nationalism. The king did almost everything by himself, selecting the historical 
events from the Royal Chronicles to be painted, choosing the painters and the poets 
and last but not least composing nine poems himself. Stating in the booklet that the 
exhibition was targeting the masses, Chulalongkom could not have chosen a better 
opportunity to present the ‘national history’ to his people by combining this 
exhibition of paintings into the royal event which traditionally attracted the 
crowds.50 He intended this project to be a symbol of gratitude of all Thais to the 
former kings of Ayutthaya and Bangkok. It was clearly stated in the prologue that 
the nation was prospering because these kings did good things for it. They fought 
with the enemy to protect and expand the kingdom, developed the country until it 
became beautiful, introduced law codes to create peacefulness and practised 
dharma so that Buddhism flourished. Therefore, all of them deserved high praise.51 
The prologue displayed not only the connection between the monarch and the 
nation but also how the Thai kings practised their barami in a concrete way, 
following the concept of dharmaracha.
After the prologue came 92 poems describing 92 historical events painted in 
the pictures, starting with the construction of Ayutthaya to the signing of the 
Burney treaty in 1826.52 Thailand was outlined as a nation with a long, continuous 
history and an historic territory. The poems then revealed the important elements of 
the nation, namely the monarchy, the civil servants, the citizens and the sangha, 
together with their duties. The heroic deeds of people who sacrificed themselves 
for king and nation, including non-Thai ethnic groups were recalled and the 
‘national characteristics’ of the Thais were praised. The poetry also demanded 
sovereignty as a necessity for the surviving and developing of the nation. It is clear 
that the ultimate aim of the paintings and poems was to stir up nationalistic feelings.
50 Chulachomklaochaoyuhua, Phrabatsomdetphra, Klong phap phraratchaphongsawadan [Poetry 
Depicting the Paintings from the Royal Chronicles], Bangkok 1983, preface.
51 Chulachomklaochaoyuhua, 1983, p .l.
52 Chulalongkom used the Royal Chronicles as the blueprint for his historical narrative. This 
resulted in Ayutthaya as the starting point for the history because Sukhothai, having inscriptions 
instead, was not part o f the chronicle tradition.
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These 92 poems were composed in four or six four-line stanzas of the 
khlong style, a versification used since early Ayutthaya to describe historical events, 
heroes and in didactic poetry. Almost every poem followed the same structure. It 
described the event along the chronicle tradition, telling ‘who did what, when and 
where.’ The last stanza, however, ended with a comment or an opinion of the poet, 
an innovation from the chronicles which normally strictly reported on the event. 
Already in the very first poem, written by Chulalongkom himself, the framework 
for the whole project of a ‘national history’ becomes clear. After a description 
about the location of the new city and the ceremonies conducted, Chulalongkom 
ended his poem with the connection of the long-lasting power of Ayutthaya and the 
Siamese nation:
“This city lasted for 400 years,
He [Ramathibodi, the founder] is the first king who ruled Siam.”53
Chulalongkom implied in these two lines that every king since then was in 
direct line with the founder of Ayutthaya. As part of his duties, it was the king who 
‘created’ Siam as a nation. The use of the term ‘Siam’ instead of the historic 
correct name ‘Kingdom of Ayutthaya’ emphasised the roots of the modem Siamese 
[Thai] nation lay in the faraway past. Another important duty of a king as the 
protector and patron of Buddhism was shown in a poem describing the construction 
of the biggest standing Buddha-statue, ‘bigger than any neighbouring country ever 
had’, by King Ramathibodi II.54 Contrary to other poems, the poet of this one does 
not give a comment on the event for the very scene itself visibly reflected the glory 
of the king whose duty is to support Buddhism.
Well aware of the western imperialism of his time, Chulalongkom stressed 
another duty of a king, to maintain the independence of the nation. He allowed as 
many as 17 poems in praise of King Naresuan, the leader who brought freedom to 
the country. In one poem, Naresuan is shown to lead his soldiers to victory 
although the Thai troops were inferior in numbers.55 The message sent was that a 
good leader makes all the difference.
53 Chulachomklaochaoyuhua, 1983, p.6.
54 Chulachomklaochaoyuhua, 1983, p. 12.
55 Chulachomklaochaoyuhua, 1983, pp.36-37.
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For Chulalongkom, a king’s fulfilment of his duty was only one part of the 
legitimacy of kingship. Any king must also possess enough barami which he had 
practised both in former lives as well as the present. Poem No 4 told an event when 
the two sons of King Ramesuan (early Ayutthaya period) fought each other to 
succeed their deceased father to the throne and died in the battle. The poem 
explained the death of both princely contenders as a result of the lack of barami 
while the youngest brother who possessed enough barami was elected to be the 
new king. The myth of the ‘Great Elect’ was again referred to by the poet:
“[The nobility] invited the youngest prince Samphraya to rule the kingdom, 
to cover the head of all the people [to give protection to his people].”56
Though following traditional myth, Chulalongkom stated clearly that the 
barami a king practised in his present life was also very important. The best 
example can be seen in the poems about King Rama I, who was considered by 
Chulalongkom a ruler with exceptional barami. One poem written by 
Chulalongkom himself showed that though the barami of the king was always 
depicted in the form of miracles, the explanation for each miracle was very realistic 
and truthful. In contrast to other poems which all began with the title ‘In the reign 
of...’, this poem started with ‘When Thonburi was in chaos (<chalachon)\ It told 
the episode when General Chakri (the future Rama I) was with his troops in 
Cambodia and heard about the chaos after King Taksin had become insane. When 
he was about to mount his elephant to return to Thonburi, his body was radiating 
with golden rays and he looked ‘gracious beyond compare’. The troops instantly 
recognised the sign and all knelt down to pay respect to him. Chulalongkom 
commented in the last stanza:
“The barami of him now goes up to the white [royal] umbrella,
[For] he brings an end to the turmoil and cools the head of the people 
[protects the people].”57
The most revolutionary aspect of the monarchical nation was the inclusion 
of the people to a central position. One poem describes the filling of a river by the 
Burmese in order to move their troops to Ayutthaya ahead of their first conquest in
56 Chulachomklaochaoyuhua, 1983, p.9.
57 Chulachomklaochaoyuhua, 1983, pp.80-81.
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1596. With no mention of the king at all, the whole poem was a eulogy to the 
ordinary people who started to fight on their own to protect the city:
“The people who lived around the city,
shoot fire arrows,
to kill the Burmese,
many of them were lying dead.”58
In another poem, the style and rhyming of the words were carefully chosen 
to reflect the enthusiasm of ordinary soldiers to fight against the invading Khmer 
and win the decisive victory. The poem stirred up nationalistic feelings in the 
reader by using modem words so that the reader could identify themselves with the 
Thai soldiers of the past. This poem also depicted the Khmer (in a case of 
constructing ‘the Other’) as immoral and untrustworthy because they sneaked in 
and kidnapped the Thais. The Thais, in contrast, went to war for a just cause only.59 
These two poems were evidence of King Chulalongkom’s intention to set a role 
model for his people. He also expected them to love the nation. He included the 
incident when the ‘Siamese’ attacked Maha Thammaracha who was an ally of the 
Burmese and came to Ayutthaya for negotiation. Both the painting and the poem 
showed Maha Thammaracha fleeing with indignity and fear after the fierce attack. 
Calling the attackers ‘Siamese’ (chao sayam) and the traitor padet chat (the one 
who destroys the nation), the poem indicated a national identity. The words used 
by the poet together with the image of the fearful ‘traitor’ enhanced the message to 
be transmitted: the ordinary citizen must love his nation.60 To emphasis the duty of 
the citizens, another poem gave a stem warning to the reader that ‘even the 
elephants knew to love their country’.61
Chulalongkom’s vision of the monarchical nation included special national 
characteristics of the Thais. From the civil servants, he expected loyalty to king and 
nation. For the Thais themselves, he praised the fighting spirit. In a poem about a 
Thai boxer who defeated all Burmese boxers, the Burmese king lamented:
58 Chulachomklaochaoyuhua, 1983, p.25.
59 Chulachomklaochaoyuhua, 1983, p.8.
60 In the chronicles, this episode was only reported that Maha Thammaracha had to flee.
61 The painting and poem portrayed two white elephants being transferred to the Burmese in 
exchange for the release o f the Siamese crown prince. Both elephants refused to accept Burmese 
mahouts and misbehaved so violently that the Burmese king sent them back to Thailand. 
Chulachomklaochaoyuhua, 1983, p.20.
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“The Siamese people even in the time of disarray, 
having only bare hands, the enemy could not touch them.
This picture confirmed the old saying,
that had been said many times,
the Kingdom of Ayutthaya never lacked a good man,
this picture just confirmed it.”62
For this praise of ‘typical’ Thai traits, Chulalongkom did not forget the 
trans-ethnic character of his monarchical nationalism. Chinese troops under the 
command of King Taksin were glorified for their bravery and success.63 
Chulalongkom implied that even when somebody was not ethnic Thai, he still 
could be loyal to the Thai king and fight bravely for the king and the nation. A key 
to the success of a nation was solidarity which he emphasised in one poem written 
by himself: King Taksin and four soldiers were able to defeat 30 Burmese soldiers 
because they knew the meaning of solidarity.64 In another poem, a fire in the throne 
hall was extinguished by the solidarity of the royal family, the civil servants and 
the monks.65
In outlining his idea about the historical territory of the Siamese nation, 
Chulalongkom included poems describing wars with the Burmese, the Khmer and 
the northern Thai kingdom of Chiang Mai.66 With the western powers expanding on 
the borders of Thailand, Chulalongkom sought to remind at least the Thais about 
the importance of the country in the past. He chose to include the story of the visit 
of the Ayutthayan ambassador to the court of Louis XIV as an equal partner:
“The two cities (nakhon) from different continents and different directions, 
The two nations {chat) with different religions,
The two cities {mueang) had friendship to each other,
The two countries (prathet) had all the benefits they wanted to have.”67
62 Chulachomklaochaoyuhua, 1983, p.77.
63 Chulachomklaochaoyuhua, 1983, p. 72.
64 Chulachomklaochaoyuhua, 1983, p.70.
65 Chulachomklaochaoyuhua, 1983, p.91.
66 Chulachomklaochaoyuhua, 1983, pp.40;41 and 46. Tribute missions from Malay areas were also 
mentioned.
67 Chulachomklaochaoyuhua, 1983, p.51.
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The use of the four different terms (nakhon, chat, mueang and prathet) was 
an ingenious stroke by the poet. By equating the traditional and well-known 
concepts of the country with the rather new term of chat (nation), the writer was 
able to transmit the meaning of the latter one to the masses. He also connected the 
city (of Ayutthaya) with the whole nation by equating it to the modem nation. The 
history of Ayutthaya became now the history of all members of the Thai nation. 
This was an academic expansion of the core culture of Ayutthaya.
In the epilogue of the poetry, Chulalongkom offered a kind of ‘social 
contract’ to his people. As the sole leader of the nation, the monarch had to fulfil 
his duties to make the nation prosper and beautiful. In exchange, the civil servants 
and citizens gave loyalty to him and through him to the nation. This ‘contract’ 
could be seen as the declaration for the monarchical nation:
“Siam is beautiful and full of perfect things, 
full of knowledge of every kind.
All of this is because of the King 
And the bravery of soldiers in war.”
“So all the citizens in the whole country, 
should be grateful to the King, 
loyal and honest to him, 
and give your life under his feet.”68
The Khlongphap phraratchaphongsawadan project was an excellent means 
to transmit the idea of monarchical nationalism in a time without efficient mass 
media. The outstanding feature of the paintings and poetry was the mix between 
tradition and modernity. Battle scenes were depicted realistically but in a style that 
reminded the viewer of familiar battles from the Ramakian epic in temple murals. 
The modem viewers were therefore able to identify themselves with the struggles 
or heroic deeds shown. The poems had a similar aim to encourage identification. 
By choosing the klong style, Chulalongkom connected the visitors and readers of 
the booklet to a recognisable world of traditional literature while stirring up 
nationalistic feelings by the word-rhyming technique. The use of modem terms 
enabled the reader to connect with the described scenes which became not only
68 Chulachomklaochaoyuhua, 1983, pp. 102-103.
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alive but relevant. The exhibition also set up the framework for national history, a 
framework not much changed since.
With its function to transmit monarchical nationalism, this project could be 
considered the answer to the increasing power of western imperialism in South 
East Asia. As the exhibition was organised years before the 1893 Paknam incident 
(French gun-boat diplomacy) which was seen by academics of Thai nationalism as 
the starting point for nationalism in Thailand, it was more likely that 
Chulalongkom increased his efforts to promote nationalism after Burma fell to the 
United Kingdom in 1885.
This exhibition was also the answer to the demand for constitution and 
democracy. Through the paintings and poetry, Chulalongkom successfully 
demonstrated that the monarchy was not replaceable and had to be the centrepiece 
of the nation. His repeated emphasis that the kings are kings because they have 
barami added a sacred dimension to the monarchical nation. It not only legitimised 
the position of the king but also prevented any democratic leader from replacing 
him. Thailand as a nation was only prosperous and beautiful because of the kings. 
Chulalongkom, however, in his position as monarchical ruler who was well aware 
of anti-monarchical forces in Europe, offered a social contract. Although the king 
had enough barami to be in the position in power, he still had to fulfil his duties. 
He had to follow the ten kingly virtues (which more or less teach the monarch how 
to gain barami) and to make the land, the people and the religion prosperous. With 
the combination of the past and newly to be acquired barami, Chulalongkom hoped 
to set measurable targets for the monarchs themselves which then in turn would 
pre-empt any attempt to abolish the monarchy. By connecting the monarchy with 
the nation, he aimed to bind loyalty to the king and to the nation which he saw as 
being in danger from western imperialism. It was this very blending of the modem 
nation with the sacred dimension of kingship that made monarchical nationalism 
successful. It reassured the people that while the old traditions were still alive, the 
nation was on its way into the modem age led by the king.
It must be mentioned that after the exhibition and cremation, Chulalongkom 
ordered to re-use the wood of the pyre for the construction of a hospital. His 
practise of this dana barami was praised in the poetry as dhana phiset (special
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‘giving’) which earned the king great merit because he helped to save the life of the 
people, something ‘which never happened before’.69
The Use o f Monuments
Only a year before the exhibition and the construction of the hospital, the 
earliest nationalistic monument on public display appeared. Though it could not 
perfectly portray the idea of a monarchical nation, it was important as the first 
monument and the first one to be dedicated to the people. In 1886, King 
Chulalongkom erected the anusawari prah ho, the monument to commemorate the 
fallen soldiers of the campaign against the rebellious Ho Chinese who took control 
of several cities in the Mekong region between 1877 and 1886. Situated in the 
province of Nongkhai on the Mekong River, the monument was a traditional stupa 
blended with western design elements, with a pyramid in the centre and small 
transepts on all sides. Each of the four sides was decorated with a commemorative 
text in different languages: Thai, English, Chinese and Lao. Praising those who 
died as having loyalty, the text made the promise that ‘their name would be 
honoured forever’. It also emphasised that they died ‘with loyalty to the king, with 
bravery and without fear of death’.70
The king was clearly in the focus of this nationalism. The fallen soldiers 
became immortal first and foremost for their loyalty to the monarch and then 
through him to the nation. In addition, the use of commemorative text in four 
languages reveals the monument’s function as a border mark of Thai territory 
towards the French colony of Laos and it could also be interpreted as a symbol for 
the trans-ethnic nature of the monarchical nation. The written eulogy to fallen 
heroes in four languages invited readers of different ethnic backgrounds to become 
a subject/hero of the king as well. With the building of this monument, King 
Chulalongkom was quite up-to-date as Smith states that in Europe it was only at 
the end of the nineteenth century that the masses began to be ‘invited’ into the heart 
of the nation and religious symbols for common soldiers replaced the single hero.71
69 Chulachomklaochaoyuhua, 1983, pp.4-5.
70 Kromsinlapakon, Anusawari nai prathetthai [Monuments in Thailand], Bangkok 1998, pp. 125- 
129.
71 Smith, Anthony. “Will and Sacrifice: Images o f National Identity”, MJIS, 2001, p.580.
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In 1887, the construction of Siriraj Hospital from the left over wood of the 
royal pyres and the exhibition underlined Chulalongkom’s point that a king must 
acquire constantly new barami by doing beneficial deeds for the people. Named 
after his dead son, the hospital could be interpreted as a monument of the 
benevolent monarchy. It also became the blueprint for future monuments of the 
monarchical nation: a connection between the monarchy and their good deeds for 
the people.
One of the most important monuments during this period of the 
monarchical nation is the equestrian statue of King Chulalongkom 
{phraboromrachanusawari phrapiyamaharat) in Bangkok. The statue, the first 
public depiction of a human being in Thailand, was unveiled with a big ceremony 
in 1908.72 With the exception of the current incumbent King Bhumibol, King 
Chulalongkom was the most beloved Thai monarch. The feelings of the people 
towards their monarch were expressed by a large sum of money donated to build 
the monument and the surrounding plaza on the occasion to celebrate the longest 
reign- up to that time- in Thai history. In the speech of Crown Prince Vajiravudh, 
who spoke in the name of the people to present the monument as a gift to the King, 
he connected the monument with the idea of the monarchical nation: “[King 
Chulalongkom’s] reign is a record in the history of the Siamese nation that 
surpasses those by all previous sovereigns, from ancient Ayutthaya down to the 
present. The statue is a testimony for future generations of shared feelings which 
shall forever stand as a national monument of our heartfelt devotion to Your Royal 
Person.”73
Chulalongkom placed his statue at the centre of a new square which was 
designed to become the centre of Bangkok and therefore symbolically the centre of 
the kingdom/monarchical nation. The King, portrayed as an elegant and 
westernised horseman, was the embodiment of the nation. At its base, a long 
inscription praised the king which could be taken as perfect statement for the ideals 
of the monarchical nation: “His Majesty is endowed with all the greatest attributes
72 The first statue of a monarch in Thailand was produced in the reign o f King Mongkut. It was, 
however, not on public display. The first statue o f a ruler on public display was ironically a foreign 
ruler, Queen Victoria whose statue was placed in front of the British consulate in Chiang Mai. 
Hossens, 1912, p.299.
73 Cited in Peleggi, Maurizio. “Siam/Looking Back- Thailand/Looking Forward: King 
Chulalongkom in Thai Collective Memory”, Paper Presented at the Conference “King Rama 5: 
Siam and Southeast Asia”, Bangkok 2003b, p.4.
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of a wise ruler. He has devoted his whole heart to the care of his dominion, to 
preserve them in a state of national independence and to promote the unity and 
contentment of his people...He is highly gifted with a keen perception of all that is 
good and evil in the manners and customs of this country, and has always 
eliminated the bad and introduced nought but what is good and beneficial. He has 
always set himself as a meritorious example and guided his people in the path of 
progress and lasting benefits. He has succeeded by his high personal qualities in 
conferring happiness and contentment upon his people...He has been the true father 
of his people. His great qualities and exalted traits of character have brought the 
kingdom of Siam to the high state of prosperity and independence which she enjoys 
at the present time, and earned the undying love and gratitude of his people.”74
The statue became an object of veneration and its surrounding plaza was 
used for important state ceremonies as well as a place for relaxation for ordinary 
people which added another beneficial function to the monument.
Chulalongkom struck the right chord with his monarchical nationalism and 
was able to appeal to the masses with his use of traditional concepts. The 
monarchical nation was able to expand fast and met more or less no serious 
resistance which could have endangered the system. However, it was not a ‘perfect 
picture’ of a feverish mass of people crying out loud for nationalism in the 
Thailand of the early twentieth century.75 Obviously, the lack of a colonial 
government which provided an easy ignition for patriotic feelings as in other 
countries was an obstacle (from the point of view of nationalism). The Thai 
government under the king was generally not perceived as foreign or oppressive 
even in the outer parts of the now clearly delimitated nation-state. Otherwise, the 
number of millenarian resistance movements would have been far greater than the 
relatively small number of revolts that have occurred (independent from their local 
significance).76 Mostly, the people in the regions adapted themselves quickly to the 
expanding nation and nation state.77
74 Cited in Peleggi, 2003a, p. 198.
75 Breuilly pointed out that it was only after 1870 that the most developed states in Europe 
experienced the rise o f mass politics. Even then, stated Breuilly, this mass politics was more 
important in promoting national integration than explicit nationalism. Breuilly, John “The State”, 
San Diego 2001, p.784.
76 The big exception was the volatile situation in the southern-most region. Piyanart, 1999, pp. 138- 
142. For local rebellions see Ramsay, Ansil. “Modernization and Reactionary Rebellions in
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Chulalongkom’s nationalism appealed to the emotional side of many Thais. 
The ongoing strength of tradition in the general population in Thailand around the 
change of the century was Chulalongkom’s strongest asset that he maintained well. 
Warrington Smyth, who was the head of the Department of Mines for five years, 
wrote in 1898: “How blindly tradition is revered among the people. Tradition is as 
sacred as the King’s person. Like the King’s acts, it is never questioned. Custom is, 
without further ado, invested with a sanctity which commands the greatest respect 
and even devotion.”78 Smyth’s account gave an insight in the power of traditional 
thinking in Thailand even when the intellectual elite had already begun to adapt 
and modernise. Any attempt to establish nationalism as a tool for political ends had 
to face the gap between traditional and modem concepts of the nation. In addition, 
tradition in Thailand is until today very much connected with Buddhism. Any 
secular movement would face difficulties in winning the hearts and minds of the 
population unless it had recognised, for example, that Buddhism does not pay 
much attention to the creation of the world. Nationalistic approaches based on a 
common origin had to keep this fact in sight.
Theravada-Buddhism practised in Thailand focused on the individual and 
not on the society. A society is only the sum of its individuals, it can be good only 
if they are good human beings. This view supports individualism in every day life 
and makes it difficult to rally the masses behind a common goal.79 An important 
feature of nationalism is nostalgia for the past. Smith explained that people sought 
to overcome death and the futility with which death threatens mortals. By linking 
oneself to a ‘community of history and destiny’ the individual hopes to achieve a 
measure of immortality.80 In comparison with neighbouring Cambodia, Thais never 
built monuments for immortality like the huge temple complex of Angkor. There is 
no belief of immortality but only of a next life. Nostalgia has therefore its limits in
Northern Thailand”, JAS, 1979; Keyes, Charles. “Millenialism, Theravada Buddhism, and Thai 
Society”, JAS, 1977; Ishii, Yoneo. “A Note on Buddhistic Millenarian Revolts in Northeastern 
Siam”, JSEAS, 1975 and Chattip Nartsupha. “The Ideology o f ‘Holy Men’ Revolts in North East 
Thailand”, Osaka 1984.
77 Proof for this claim could be the acceptance o f new culture in cities such as Chiang Mai. Thanet 
reported that most Northerners readily wore the Bangkok-style ‘royal pattern shirt’ 
(suaratchapataen) which was introduced by Chulalongkom himself. Thanet Charoenmueang, Ma 
chaklanna [Coming from Lanna], Bangkok 1993, p.44.
78 Smyth, W., Five Years in Siam (1891-1896), Bangkok Reprint 1999, p.20.
79 Even much later, in the reign of Vajiravudh, jokes were made about the attempts to stir up 
patriotism. See Barm6, Scott, Woman, Man, Bangkok, Lanham 2002, p .l.
80 Smith, 1986, p. 175.
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Thailand. Last but not least, the means to spread nationalist ideas quickly were 
rather limited due to the just developing modem educational system and limited 
access to villages.81 Therefore, the success of monarchical nationalism lay in the 
application of traditional concepts adapted for the needs of the monarchical nation.
There could not be any doubt of Chulalongkom’s nationalism. Smith 
proposed that nationalism includes the rediscovery, reinterpretation and 
regeneration of the community. The rediscovery has to contain the quest for 
authentic communal ethno-history, the recording of memories and the collection of 
indigenous myth and traditions. The reinterpretation means the selection of myth 
and memories to locate the community in a significant context. The regeneration, 
finally, involves a summons of all the people.82 Chulalongkom and his monarchical 
nationalism met these requirements. His and Prince Damrong’s systematic search 
for historical events and places, myths, symbols and traditions of the Thai 
represented ‘rediscovery’. The exhibition of the paintings and the connected 
foundation of a national history were an example of reinterpretation. Finally, 
Chulalongkom’s concept of unity and the call for loyalty to the nation and 
monarchy provided the last part, the regeneration. It must be kept in mind that 
Chulalongkom did not think in terms of a modem political nation which in the long 
term would have required the participation of the masses. The King attempted to 
renew or reform indigenous Thai culture and traditions to meet the challenges of 
modernity.
Nevertheless, whatever the main reason behind Chulalongkom’s drive for a 
national identity was, it was not a drive with high speed. Rosenberg believed that 
Chulalongkom hesitated to play the nationalist card for he saw the danger of 
nationalism for the absolute monarchy because of its democratic and egalitarian 
elements.83
81 See Darling, Frank, The Westernization o f Asia, Boston 1979, p.296. The construction o f roads, 
for example, started only in the 1930s. Falcus, Malcolm. “The Economic History o f Thailand”, 
AEHR, 1991, p.65.
82 Smith, Anthony, Myth and Memories o f the Nation, Oxford 1999, pp.177-178.
83 Rosenberg, 1980, p.87.
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Chapter 6
The Decline of Monarchical Nationalism (1910-1932)
In the previous chapter I have proposed to see the reign of King Chulalongkom 
as being the peak of the monarchical nation and nationalism. After his death, the 
monarchical element weakened with the result that a competing view of the nation 
could establish itself within groups of a new bureaucratic elite. I will argue in this 
chapter that an increasing influence of the ideas of political nationalism in the 
monarchical nationalism itself, insufficient personal charisma by the monarchs, the 
strengthening of the state and its representatives and a difficult economic environment 
led to the end of the dominance of the monarchical nation. The main argument of the 
revisionist school that increasing pressure from below and the development of 
alternative views on the nation played a role is also included.
6.1. King Vajiravudh and Nationalism
In contrast to his predecessors, King Vajiravudh (r. 1910-1925) did not face a 
power struggle with the nobility when he ascended the throne. Although lacking this 
important motif for monarchical nationalism, his name is generally associated with Thai 
nationalism. What influenced King Vajiravudh, who is in my opinion wrongly seen by 
many academics as ‘the father of Thai nationalism” , to emphasise the concepts of 
nation and nationalism? Several factors can be identified. First, Vajiravudh was the first 
Thai monarch to be educated abroad (in the United Kingdom) where he witnessed the 
jingoistic and nationalistic euphoria in Europe at the turn of the century.2 Second, he
1 Vella, W., Chaiyo- King Vajiravudh and the Development o f  Thai Nationalism, Honolulu 1978, p.xiii. 
Those who share Vella’s view include, for example, Wilson, D., Politics in Thailand, Ithaca 1966, p. 109, 
Kershaw, R., The Changing Face o f Monarchy in Southeast Asia, Southeand-on-Sea 1979, p. 16, Darling, 
Frank, The Westernization o f Asia, Boston 1979, p.303, Ling, T., Buddhism, Imperialism and War, 
London 1979, p.91, Skinner, W., Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History, Ithaca 1962, p.159, 
Thirayuth B., Chatniyom lae lang chatniyom [Nationalism and Post-nationalism], Bangkok 2003, p.104, 
and Manit Nualla-or, Kanmueang thai yuk sanyalak rat thai [Thai Politics during the Symbolic Thai 
State], Bangkok 1997, p.96.
2 Patriotism was inflamed in Britain during the Boer Wars (1899-1902). See Attridge, S., Nationalism, 
Imperialism and Identity in Late Victorian Culture, Houndsmill 2003, p.9. An interesting insight into 
Vajiravudh’s thoughts was his final thesis at Oxford University. He wrote about the war of Polish 
succession and commented full o f contempt about the intention of King Augustus to divide the country 
between Austria, Russia and Prussia as ‘infamous’. Surely, he saw Thailand in a similar position and
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experienced as a prince the loss of substantial parts of Thailand to the imperial powers 
during the reign of his father.3 When he became King, nobody could know for sure 
whether the colonial danger for Thailand was over or not. Third, Chinese nationalism in 
South East Asia became more prominent after China’s defeat against Japan in 1885. In 
the case of Thailand, the first Chinese newspaper was published in 1906 and small 
revolutionary cells were organised after a visit by Sun Yat-Sen in 1908. Chinese schools 
were established soon afterwards. Skinner pointed out that the ties between the overseas 
Chinese and the homeland became stronger: “For the first time, they [the overseas 
Chinese] looked to a Chinese regime as their home government. The overseas 
community gained a new awareness of its Chinese character and nationality.” 4 
Vajiravudh, well aware of these events, was seriously worried when the October 1911 
revolt in China resulted in the abdication of the Quing dynasty and the appointment of 
Sun Yat-Sen as the leader of the republican government.5 The Chinese in Thailand 
reacted with an outburst of Chinese nationalism whose republican ideals represented a 
serious threat for the Thai monarchy.6 The fourth reason for Vajiravudh’s interest in 
strengthening nationalism was the discovery of a plot against his own government in 
March 1912, representing the first direct challenge to the power of the monarchy. I 
propose that these four reasons motivated Vajiravudh to strengthen Thai nationalism.
What did King Vajiravudh’s interpretation of nationalism look like? This thesis 
proposes that his reign represented a fundamental change in the concept of nationalism 
as it became a mix between monarchical and political nationalism. Vajiravudh
rejected any concessions. Crown Prince of Siam [Vajiravudh], The War o f the Polish Succession, Oxford 
1902, p.9.
3 Thailand lost ca. 90,000 square miles o f land to the colonial powers between 1850 and 1909. Solomon, 
Robert. “Boundary Concepts and Practices in Southeast Asia”, World Politics, 1970, p. 13.
4 Skinner, 1962, pp. 155-159.
5 Fairbank, J./Reischauer, E./Craig, A., East Asia- Tradition and Transformation, London 1973, pp.742- 
745. See also Godement, F., The New Asian Renaissance- From Colonialism to the Post Cold War, 
London 1997, p.45. Sun and Liang Chi-Chao were the main protagonists o f a new China. Sun developed 
earlier the concept o f the ‘Three Principles o f the People’: Nationalism, democracy and ‘people’s 
livelihood’. These principles were directed against the Manchu and were pro-republican. Liang was a 
‘pure’ nationalist, who demanded a switch of loyalty from the rulers to the nation. Both Sun and Liang 
were highly popular with the majority o f the Chinese and it is not difficult to imagine the fear of King 
Vajiravudh regarding a developing Chinese nationalism that demanded nothing else than the abolition of 
the absolute monarchy. The Chinese Nationality Law of 1909 supported the identification o f the overseas 
Chinese with the homeland. Following ju s sanguinis, all overseas Chinese were regarded as Chinese. See 
Reid, Anthony. “Entrepreneurial Minorities, Nationalism, and the State”, Seattle 1997, p.52. These events 
had an impact on Thai perceptions o f the Chinese. Skinner proposed that Vajiravudh was influenced by 
anti-Chinese bias o f  Europeans in Thailand. See Skinner, 1962, p. 15 5.
6 For example, Chinese cinemas in Bangkok showed Sun’s image and played the Chinese national anthem. 
Vajiravudh ordered the showing of his image and the playing o f the royal anthem. Dome 
Sukwong/Sawasdi Suwannapak, A Century o f Thai Cinema, Bangkok 2001, p.l 10.
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maintained some elements of monarchical nationalism such as the close connection 
between the nation and the monarch, the central role of the king and the trans-ethnic 
nature of Thai identity. However, the King also developed his own ideas and introduced 
concepts such as race, the maintenance of freedom of the nation, the need for purity of 
Thai culture and the highlighting of the importance of the nation.
The monarchical nationalism was mainly represented by his emphasis on the 
connection between the monarch and the Thai nation. Following the tradition of 
monarchical nationalism, Vajiravudh tied the happiness and prosperity of the nation to 
his own fate. In a speech to the people in December 1911, Vajiravudh said: “I realise 
deeply at the moment that I was given the big and most important burden: I have the 
happiness and Thainess of the nation in my hands. We [Vajiravudh] were bom as Thai 
and in the royal dynasty, and our ancestors helped each other to build the Thai nation 
and to preserve it. This demands sacrifice of blood and flesh from everybody to 
maintain the Thainess of the nation.”7 Vajiravudh called on every Thai to feel loyalty ‘to 
the one who protects the territory according to the legal traditions’ [the king], to love 
the nation and to believe in the religion. Only unity between the groups and the 
avoidance of conflict would create stability to make the nation free.8
This speech also was an example of Vajiravudh’s view that the role of the king 
was crucial. He called kings the creators of the Thai nation. Interestingly, the idiom 
used by him for ‘king’ (‘the one who protects the territory according to the legal 
traditions’) is unusual. Suitable for the developing nation-state, Vajiravudh included a 
territorial dimension. He also provided himself with legitimation, both in legal and 
historical terms. His role as ‘protector’ indicated an emotional dimension which would 
suit the picture of the king as the ‘father’ of his people who could feel safe under his 
leadership. The idiom used for ‘citizen’ was phraifakhaphaendin which literally meant 
‘commoner who serves the sky [king], servant o f the land’. This points to an 
interpretation of the monarchical nation which was non-democratic and non-secular, 
similar to earlier versions.
The third maintained element of monarchical nationalism was trans-ethnicity. 
Many studies focusing on his anti-Chinese sentiments concluded that he was a racist. 
Indeed, the King complained in countless articles and plays about the Chinese who
7 Khanakammakanmunnithiphraboromrachanuson phrabatsomdetphramongkutklaochaoyuhua (ed), 
Phraratchadamrat khong phrabatsomdetphramongkutklaochaoyuhua ruam 100 khrang [100 Royal 
Speeches o f King Vajiravudh], Bangkok 1986, p. 13.
8 Khanakammakanmunnithiphraboromrachanuson, 1986, p. 13.
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supposedly exploited Thailand. However, the description of racist for Vajiravudh falls 
short of the wider picture. I propose that Vajiravudh still continued the trans-ethnic 
approach to Thainess by presenting a very open concept of who is Thai and who is not. 
Just like his predecessors, Vajiravudh thought that loyalty to the king was the only 
criteria for being Thai. He communicated that clearly to minorities such as the Muslims 
in 1910: “Now the Muslims have seen the real policy of the Siamese kings in the past 
that they had an intention to support the people, no matter what race, language and 
religion who came to be under royal protection. They would support everyone equally. I, 
the Crown Prince, also have the same intention. I will give friendship to the Muslims, 
no different to other religious believers who come to live in Siam. Please believe that I 
will do my duty as your patron to my full strength so that you all will be happy like you 
used to be.”9 Vajiravudh defined the Thai nation trans-ethnically: “The word chat 
[nation] originally means ‘family’ or ‘types of people’. Chat literally means only ‘birth’. 
But we Thai used this word later to call a group of people who lived together as chat 
which actually is not wrong. Because the people of Thai nationality are those who are 
bom Thai, the ones who are bom among the people who call themselves Thai.” 10 
Confirming the traditional view of Thai kings, this definition enabled everybody to be 
Thai as long as he calls himself Thai or is bom in Thailand. This thought became even 
more pronounced in a statement by Vajiravudh in 1915: “The way to decide whether 
anyone belonged to which nation, is to consider whom he pays loyalty. If he pays 
loyalty to the King of Siam, he is a real Thai. However, if anyone proclaims that he is 
independent, pays loyalty to no one, we can consider him as a person without a 
nation.”11
Therefore, Vajiravudh’s anti-Chinese sentiments were directed only against 
China and the Chinese who lived in Thailand but did not integrate into Thai society. In a 
play written to promote the Wild Tiger Corps, he explicitly let a character warn of a 
military invasion if the Thai government would dare to disobey China.12 Internally, the 
King distinguished between two groups of Chinese in Thailand. One group, the kuli
9 Cited in Piyanart B., Nayobai kanpokkhrong khong ratthaban thai to chaothai mutsalim nai changwat 
chaidaen phaktai (pho so 2475-2516) [Administrative Policy o f the Thai Government Towards the Thai 
Muslims in the Southern Province (1902-1973)], Bangkok 1988, p.89.
10 Mongkutklaochaoyuhua, Phrabatsomdetphra, Plukchaisueapa lae khlontitlo [Encouraging the Wild 
Tigers and Clogs on Our Wheels], Bangkok Reprint 1951, p.56.
11 Asvabahu (pseu.), Khwampenchat thai doi thae ching lae maphraotuendok [To be the Real Thai Nation 
and Maphraotuendok], Bangkok Reprint 1977, p. 16.
12 Mongkutklaochaoyuhua, Phrabatsomdetphra, Huachai nakrop [The Heart o f a Fighter], Bangkok 
Reprint 1991, p.3 5.
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(coolie), would stay only temporary, while the other one, the merchants, would live 
permanently in the kingdom. The King explained that the first group had no roots and 
they would not learn the language. Even in that case, Vajiravudh argued that one could 
count them as Thai but only in a very distant way. However he emphasised that they 
were still under the law of Thailand. This would also be valid for other nationalities 
living in the country.13 Despite all his anti-Chinese propaganda, Vajiravudh did not issue 
anti-Chinese laws in his reign.14 Vajiravudh stressed that the Thais should be respectful 
to other nations. For example, in a speech to Thai students abroad in 1916, he said: “To 
love our nation is something good and suitable. But it is not necessary to show our 
patriotism by looking down on or hate other nations.”15
Vajiravudh’s introduction of the concept of race did not contradict the trans­
ethnic approach to Thai identity. It was an elaboration of Chulalongkom’s description
of a ‘fighting spirit’ as the national characteristic of the Thais. Based on the meaning of 
the name ‘Thai’, Vajiravudh linked this to the idea of race. To be ‘Thai’ [free] was 
meant to love freedom: “Our Thai nation originally did not have a nation or even a 
language. It was a group of people who had a brave heart and who were not willing to 
be enslaved. They tried to free themselves from suppression and founded their own 
group [kingdom]. They gave this group the name Thai because they achieved full 
freedom and were not the slave of anyone. Later the Thai nation gradually stabilised and 
prospered.”16 This quote showed that the King saw race not as a biological concept. This 
was also reflected in the poem ‘Love of Race and Fatherland’ (written in English), in 
which Vajiravudh appealed for love and unity within the nation:
“Having once been well-born.
Let us not forget our Race and our Faith;
Let us not be bom in vain 
Amongst a race that is Free!
13 Asvabahu (pseu.), 1977, p. 14.
14 There was one exception which could be interpreted as a forceful integration o f the Chinese into Thai 
society. In 1913, Vajiravudh attempted to replace Chinese clan names because he linked them with 
gangster solidarity, archaism, national division and political subordination. Kasian Tejapira, 
Commodifying Marxism- The Formation o f Modern Thai Radical Culture, 1927-1958, Kyoto 2001, p.34. 
See also Amara Pongsapich, Khwam laklai thang watthanatham [Cultural Varieties], Bangkok 2002, 
p. 144. Amara argued that Vajiravudh’s laws actually aimed to enable a better assimilation of the Chinese.
15 Cited in Prudhisan Jumbala. “Hak rak chat sat kasat chong chai det hai pen kun [If You Love Nation, 
Religion and King, Please Use the Power for Benefit], Matichon, 2004, p.7.
16 Cited in Chanida Phrompayak Phueaksom, Kanmueang nai prawattisat thongchat thai [Politics in the 
History o f Thai National Flag], Bangkok 2003, p.83
141
Therefore, comrades, let us be loyal to our King,
And be true to our nation and our Faith;
Let us lay down our lives without regret,
That we may preserve the Freedom of the Free!”17
The fact that race and freedom were based on a concept of the monarchical 
nationalism, distinguished them from European understandings. In practical terms, the 
trans-ethnic approach was maintained despite racist rhetoric. An example was the 
Nationality Act of 1913 which stated that citizenship was primarily related to being 
bom to a Thai father. In reality, however, citizenship was awarded to everyone bom on 
Thai soil18 and the monarchical nation still tolerated everybody who was loyal to the 
king. Nevertheless, it was Vajiravudh who gave the term race a place in Thai political 
thought and nationalism, a move that would lead to massive discrimination against the 
Chinese minority in Thailand in later periods.
The idea of race was also connected to the idea of a pure Thai culture. An 
example can be seen in Vajiravudh’s reaction to an announcement of his father shortly 
before his death: “I will let my son Vajiravudh give a gift to the people immediately 
when he ascends to the throne. I will let him give a parliament and constitution.”19 What 
Chulalongkom understood as the apex of the monarchical nation in order to incorporate 
oppositional forces, was seen by Vajiravudh as threat to the ‘real’ Thai culture. For him, 
a constitution was unthinkable because Thais were always led by a monarch. The King 
regarded Thai society as not yet ready for democracy because the people were not 
educated which would make them vulnerable to bribery by politicians.20 Although he 
agreed with his father that only a strong and civilised nation would be able to survive in 
a dangerous environment, Vajiravudh disagreed with him on how to build that nation. 
Chulalongkom adopted western elements, Vajiravudh, however, regarded Thai culture 
itself as the basis to develop a civilised society equal to other great cultures. He warned 
not to follow western ways too willingly: “Progress of the Europeans is something 
which killed already weak nations. It also makes strong nations weaker when they get
17 Printed in Samakhomnisitkaoaksonrasat chulalongkonmahawitthayalai (ed), Phraratchaniphon 
roikhrong roi rueang nai phrabatsomdetphramongkutklaochaoyuhua [100 Pieces of Poetry o f King 
Vajiravudh], Bangkok 1995, pp.30-31.
18 Renard, Ronald. “The Differential Integration o f Hill People into the Thai State”, London 2000, p.79.
19 Cited in Sukanya Tirawanit, Phrabatsomdetphramongkutklaochaoyuhua kap kannangsuephim [King 
Vajiravudh and the Press], Bangkok 1989, p.27.
20 See for this discussion Kanpirom Suwunnanonda, Phrabatsomdetphramongkutklaochaoyuhua kap 
kansang chat thai [King Vajiravudh and His Nation-building Programmes], Bangkok 1981, pp.53-54.
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too much siwilai [western civilisation]. We are more afraid of this illness siwilai than of 
any other illness.”21
It was ironic that Vajiravudh’s search for a pure Thai culture often followed 
western models. For example, he decreed that Thai women should wear traditional long 
skirts and blouses in order to look Tike a ma’am [madam]’. In another example, 
Vajiravudh identified ‘language’ as the key for a nation to work and to create the feeling 
of belonging to the nation. He coined new words to replace common English terms. 
However, he also attempted to reform the language by placing all vowels on the same 
singular line like in European languages [instead of the usual placing of vowels on top 
and under the consonants].22
An important alteration to monarchical nationalism was Vajiravudh’s upgrading 
of the importance of the nation in comparison with the monarchy. Before, the nation 
was embedded in the monarch but Vajiravudh emphasised the nation as an independent 
entity led by the King. This model was mirrored in his slogan ‘Nation-Religion-King’ 
where the nation and religion were of the same importance as the monarch. The motto, 
although in its form a copy from the United Kingdom, was in its basic idea an 
indigenous concept comprised of already existing elements. Vajiravudh visualised the 
slogan with the introduction of a new national flag in 1917. Its colours (red, white and 
blue) were chosen because they were the colours of the allies in the First World War 
(France, United Kingdom and the United States). Vajiravudh had entered the war on the 
side of the allies and demonstrated with his choice of colours the equal status of 
Thailand. In a poem, Vajiravudh explained the meaning of the tricolour differently. 
White symbolised purity and therefore the Buddhist dharma. Red stood for the blood 
the Thais sacrificed for the protection of the nation and Buddhism. Blue was 
Vajiravudh’s colour and represented the monarchy.23
With the nation on a prominent position, Vajiravudh had to stress even more the 
need for leadership of the monarchy. To support this claim, he sought legitimation by 
the Buddhist sangha. The Supreme Patriarch, himself a member of the royal family, 
complied but not without reminding the King of a central concept of the monarchical
21 Cited in Chatri Prakitnonthakan, Kanmueang lae sangkhom nai sinlapa sathapattayakam sayam samai 
thaiprayuk chatniyom [Politics and Society in Arts and Architecture in the Periods of Modem Siam, New  
Thailand, and Nationalism], Bangkok 2004, p.239.
22 Kanpirom, 1981, pp. 176 and 188.
23 Chanida, 2003, pp.68-69 and 78.
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nation, namely righteousness: “When a herd of cattle is fording a stream, if the leading 
ox leads straight, all the other oxen will follow straight. It is the same among men. If he 
whom the people call the highest is righteous, even so would the rest of the people 
follow his lead in the way of righteousness, then is the whole of his dominion happy.”24
This thesis proposes that the main reason for this switch in the interpretation of 
nationalism lay in the fact that Vajiravudh was western educated. His idea of 
nationalism was very much influenced by European versions of nationalism of his time 
which were dominated by political nationalism. Therefore, King Vajiravudh put less 
emphasis on traditional concepts such as barami but more on the importance of the 
greatness of the nation itself. Inevitably, this contributed to the demise of monarchical 
nationalism and in the long term to the end of monarchical rule. This process was even 
more hastened by an unlucky choice of means of dissemination.
6.2. Writing the Nation- King Vajiravudh and His Literature
King Vajiravudh could be considered the most prolific poet and playwright in 
Thai history.25 It was only logical that he used all genres of his writings as the main 
means to disseminate his ideas about the nation. In the preface of the play Khomdamdin, 
Vajiravudh stated clearly: “I didn’t write this play only for entertainment but I hope this 
play will remind the reader of the legend of the Thai nation and that the Thai nation is 
not a new bom nation. Our nation is an old one which has a legend and I hope this play 
will let the reader see that our ancestors raised up to be independent out of a state of 
being a slave of the Khmer who are the foreigners and who are a different race and 
language. We will try hard to preserve the Thainess of the nation which is very difficult 
to receive.”26 Many of the King’s plays explained the meaning and emphasised the 
importance of the three institutions ‘Nation, Religion and King’. He employed his
24 Vajiraflana, Prince. “Buddhist Attitude Towards National Defence”, Bangkok no date, p.l 1.
25 His body o f work consisted o f hundreds o f plays and poems and more then a thousand articles. See the 
list in Munnithiphraboromrachanuson phrabatsomdetphramongkutklaochaoyuhua, Saramkrom  
phrabatsomdetphramongkutklaochaoyuhua [Encyclopaedia o f King Vajiravudh], Bangkok 1997, pp.272- 
311.
26 Mongkutklaochaoyuhua, Phrabatsomdetphra, Botklon lakhon rueang khomdamdin botlakhonrong 
rueang phraruang botlakhonrong rueang phrakiattirot botlakhon rueang khunchangkhunphaen chut 
taeng-nganphrawai [Khomdamdin, Phraruang, Phrakiattirot, and Khunchangkhunphaen: Plays in Verse], 
Bangkok 1972, preface.
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literature to teach the duty of the citizen towards the three institutions and warned the 
people about the danger of their loss.27
Many of his writings were based on historical events and figures. By placing the 
stories back in time, Vajiravudh could connect the present with the past with access to 
characters already known to the people. Through these heroic figures, he created a 
model of an ideal Thai society with values he tried to promote. In his ‘Chao Taksin- An 
Opera in 3 Acts’, Vajiravudh used the fall of Ayutthaya in 1767 to present the effects of 
disunity and treason among the Thai. He depicted the last Ayutthayan king as unjust and 
the courtiers as envious. In the end, treason by the Thais themselves allowed the 
Burmese to take the city.28 Vajiravudh also repeated the basic theme of freedom as the 
utmost desire of Thais. When the war leader and future King Taksin entered the 
recaptured city of Ayutthaya, the people greeted him with shouts:
“Freedom, Freedom!
Now for us recovered.
Never again shall thou be 
From us severed- Never!”
One of the nobles then told Taksin:
“Sire, all our lives we offer.
What service thou desir’st,
We value nothing dearer 
Than freedom. Gracious King!”29
Vajiravudh reinforced the image of the monarchy as guarantor for the 
independence and freedom of the nation. What he expected from the people in return 
was gratitude, loyalty and the willingness to sacrifice their lives.
Vajiravudh also used legends as a source for his plays because he was convinced 
that they were based on historical reality. His favourite was the legend of King Phra 
Ruang which he took from the Northern Chronicles and used as plots for several 
versions of his drama. Vajiravudh praised Phra Ruang as a national hero because he led
27 His plays with these themes included Huachai nakrop [The Heart o f a Fighter], Siasala [Sacrifice], 
Coup d'Etat etc. For details o f his plays see Pin Malakul, Ngan lakhon khong phrabatsomdetphra 
ramathibodisrisintharamahawachirawut phramongkutklaochaophaendinsayam [Dramatic Works o f King 
Vajiravudh], Bangkok 1977.
28 Mongkutklaochaoyuhua, Phrabatsomdetphra, Chao taksin bot mahaupparakon phasa angkril 3 ong 
[Chao Taksin- An Opera in 3 Acts], Bangkok Reprint 1988, p.4.
29 Mongkutklaochaoyuhua, 1988, p. 14.
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the Thai to independence from the occupation by the Khmer. With a king as hero in the 
stories, Vajiravudh underlined the dominant position of the monarch as the leader of the 
nation. In his Thai-style opera Botlakhonrongrueang phraruang, the request of the 
people for the leadership of the king was strongly pronounced when Vajiravudh let the 
people sing:
“We Thai are loyal to the King,
We want to rely on you and to be your servant all the time.
We are willing and we volunteer to fight with the enemy.
We don’t regret our lives, our lives are given to you.
We are brave in protecting the nation and the religion,
If we really have to die, we will die embracing your feet.”30
Another version of this legend, the play in verse Botlakhonphutkhamklonrueang 
phraruang (written in 1917), told about how Phra Ruang outwitted the Khmer 
occupants in his hometown of Lopburi. He escaped arrest by fleeing to Sukhothai. 
There he again foiled an assassination attempt, defeating the Khmer troops on the 
battlefield, and thus independence was achieved. The people of Sukhothai then invited 
him to become their first king. The main theme of Phra Ruang was the love of freedom 
of the Thai race. The fact that Vajiravudh considered Phra Ruang as the first Thai king, 
showed that he wanted to demonstrate that Thais loved freedom from the very 
beginning. Right from the first stanza of the play, the character of Phra Ruang moaned: 
“Bom Thai [free] but enslaved is a dreadful fate,
Bowing our heads to the Khom [Khmer] masters’ will,
The mere thought of it nearly breaks the breast!
How to escape the demons’ clutch, and once 
Prove ourselves worthy of the name of Thai?”31
Vajiravudh also placed several desirable values for the Thai audience in the 
story. In the first act, for example, Thais were portrayed as loyal so long as they were 
well treated. They also welcome foreigners and treat them well. Their leader was the
30 Mongkutklaochaoyuhua, Phrabatsomdetphra, Botlakonphutkamklonrueang phraruang [Phraruang -  A 
Play in Verse], Bangkok Reprint 1977, pp.127-128.
31 King Vajiravudh, P'ra Ruang, Translated by Prem Purachatra, Bangkok 1979, p .l. See for an 
alternative analysis Vella, 1978, pp.209-211.
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king who was smart and ingenious.32 In the second act, Vajiravudh mentioned that Thais 
are happy when ‘our superiors are happy’ and that the Khmer ‘are more like demons 
than humans’.33 Vajiravudh repeatedly depicted the Thai king as gracious (did not kill 
enemies although they wanted to kill him first), praised his kingly virtues and ensured 
the audience that a Thai king loves his Thai kin ‘as if they were all children of his 
flesh’.34 The grand finale of the play was a speech of Phra Ruang to his people who just 
elected him to be King. The long monologue full of modem terms seemed rather odd in 
relation to the atmosphere of the story, so it was likely that Vajiravudh wanted to speak 
directly to his people through the character of Phra Ruang:
“Think least of your own selves, shun selfish lures,
Vie not to win favours with shameless greed.
By hurting your own kin in rivalry,
You bring certain destruction on yourselves!
Beware of rumours and foul calumnies,
That undermine the Safety of the State;
For a cunning foe, seeking to destroy,
Will sow their seeds of hate and suspicion.
Wherefore We pray you, who are Thai, to love 
And cherish, help and honour fellow Thai;
Unite in one free brotherhood, a rock that will not crack before the tide of 
war.
United we Thai may and must and shall 
Defend our land against the strongest foe.”35
The last sentences of the play are famous in Thailand for they were used as a 
lyric of a famous patriotic song in a later period. The above translation, however, did 
not fully represent the original version of the King but rather reflected the anti­
communist mood in 1979. For this reason, I use for the analysis of the following part 
my own translation based on the original:
32 King Vajiravudh, 1979, pp. 1-7.
33 King Vajiravudh, 1979, p.9.
34 King Vajiravudh, 1979, p.40.
35 King Vajiravudh, 1979, p.41.
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“One thing alone from you we ask,
Harm not those who are your relative,
Because we share the nation, we should share [unite] our heart as well.
Instead of Thais harming fellow Thais,
We should come together with both our souls and our strength 
To guard the country.
So that other countries will respect and praise our glory,
Until the name Thai resounds throughout the world.
We should support the nation and religion to live forever,
Let’s cheer for the Thai progress, Chaiyo!”36
In this version of Phra Ruang, Vajiravudh used a whole range of elements of 
nationalism to promote his vision of the Thai nation. First, he revived the myth of the 
Golden Age of Sukhothai with King Phra Ruang at its centre. Secondly, he painted a 
picture of the ‘Other’ (in this case the Khmer) as foreign enemies who could not be 
trusted. Thirdly, he praised a leader who was decisive and intelligent and depicted the 
Thais as happy when following him. Fourthly, he presented the role model of good 
people who trusted their king and supported him wholeheartedly. Fifth, Vajiravudh 
packed into the story values such as unity, solidarity and warned against new ideologies, 
conflict and selfishness. Lastly, the king was portrayed as ingenious, benevolent, 
forgiving and risk-taking because he loved the people like his own children.
As a writer, Vajiravudh saw literature as the ideal means to disseminate his ideas. 
He attempted to distribute his works to a wider circle, for example by giving his books 
for free to civil servants or to schools to be used as textbooks and even put them on sale 
in the markets. His articles were sent to newspapers and his plays performed for free or 
for charity, often with himself in a leading role.37 However, the efficiency of literature 
and drama to disseminate nationalism must be doubted. Despite his great effort to 
distribute his works, its reach was still limited to small circles such as courtiers,
36 Mongkutklaochaoyuhua, 1977, p.39. The text in the translation o f 1979:
One thing alone o f you We ask: Harm not
Those who are your brothers, shed no Thai blood,
But come together in fraternity,
Resolved to guard your fatherlandfrom harm.
Love race and creed, as in the days o f  yore,
And Thailand’s fame shall live for evermore!”
Vajiravudh, however, did not mention ‘race’ defined by blood.
37 Kanpirom, 1981, pp.208-209.
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newspaper readers and people attending the performances. In addition, Vajiravudh’s 
literary works were sophisticated and for the masses difficult to understand. This was 
reinforced by Vajiravudh’s use of foreign concepts without sufficiently adapting it to 
Thai culture. The best example was his work Chao Taksin which was written in English 
in a western style opera. While this perhaps was attractive in court circles, it was most 
likely not effective with the masses.
6.3. King Vajiravudh and Other Means to Promote Nationalism
Besides using literature to promote his ideas of the nation, Vajiravudh employed 
other means to communicate with his people as well. Therein, a rather inconsistent 
nationalist ideology with the combination of monarchical and political nationalism can 
be seen. In the tradition of monarchical nationalism, he drew on a broad range of 
symbols, myths and traditions. History was one favourite way to connect the modem 
Thai nation with a glorious past. In 1922, for example, he staged a historical show for 
the public to re-enact the offensive of Thai troops against the Burmese in Tavoy. The 
official publication stated the aim of the performance as ‘to show in the form of a play 
an example of the deeds accomplished by our ancestors for the love of their country, 
which are well worth remembering with gratitude’.38 During the lavish performance, the 
Burmese soldiers were depicted as aggressive fighters who in the end were defeated by 
King Rama I and his forces.39
Following his father’s lead, monuments with a beneficial function played a 
crucial role in Vajiravudh’s promotion of monarchical nationalism. The high degree of 
influence on Vajiravudh by his father is shown by the fact that most of the monuments 
stand in direct association with Chulalongkom. An example is the establishment of 
Chulalongkom University. In 1910, Vajiravudh used the remaining money left over 
from the equestrian statue to introduce new departments such as medicine and 
engineering to the School for Royal Servants. The name of the school was changed to 
Chulalongkom University in 1915 with an intention to make it a monument to King 
Chulalongkom. At the ceremony of laying the foundation stone for a new building in
38 Committee o f the Military Tournament For the Year B.E. 2465, Explanatory Notice On the Display o f  
Ancient Warfare, Bangkok 1922, p.l.
39 Committee, 1922, pp.3-5. Vajiravudh also rewrote and changed some chronicles. For example, he 
added details to a battle in 1767. See Reynolds, Craig. “State Versus Nation in Histories o f Nation- 
Building with Special Reference to Thailand”, Warasan thaikhadisueksa, 2004, p. 15.
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January 1915, Vajiravudh said: “According to the wish of my father who wanted to 
create a university for the Siamese but was not able to achieve his goal during his time, 
it is my duty as his son to make his wish come true. When it is finished it will be the 
royal monument to remember him. It is necessary to construct this big and permanent 
royal monument as it will be of benefit for the Thai nation eternally.”40
Following his view that Thai culture itself was a great civilisation on par with 
other civilisations, Vajiravudh supported the development of architecture which was 
orientated on traditional style in contrast to his father’s rule where western architectural 
design was favoured. The buildings of Chulalongkom University and the Suan Kularp 
School (opened in 1913) were excellent examples for this neo-traditionalism. Thai 
culture was no longer seen as inferior to western culture. At the foundation stone laying 
ceremony of one university building, Vajiravudh made clear that he saw architecture as 
an important means to promote Thainess: “It is necessary that we preserve Thai 
architectural art while we build this first university in Thailand. It should be heritage for 
our children for there is no better way than to have a model for the students to see and to 
know regularly.”41 Architecture was to present Thai identity to the world and at the 
same time represented the ideals of Vajiravudh’s political nationalism.
Other constructions, such as bridges and hospitals, were connected with the 
benevolence of the monarchy. In a speech at a bridge-opening ceremony in October 
1912, Vajiravudh reminded his people that not only that bridge-building was a favourite 
activity of Chulalongkom but also underlined the importance of bridges as monuments. 
The bridge was useful and popular with the people and represented an excellent kind of 
monument, too. The people who would cross this bridge would think everyday about 
the phradetphrakhun (graciousness/ force and favour) of Chulalongkom.42 Vajiravudh 
saw bridges as symbols for unity (‘bridges unite people’).43 At the opening ceremony of 
Chulalongkom Hospital in May 1914, Vajiravudh mentioned that his father emphasised 
things that had value and were beneficial for the citizens. The aim was to bring 
happiness to the people. In this sense, Vajiravudh wanted the hospital to be a royal 
monument.44
40 Chulalongkom Mahawitthayalai, Nangsue Mahawitthayalai [University Annual Book], Bangkok 1997, 
pp.347-348.
41 Chatri, 2004, p.225. Interestingly, the architect of this ‘Thai’ building was British.
42 Khanakammakanmunnithiphraboromrachanuson, 1986, p.28.
43 Ratana Tanadbanchee Tungasvadi, King Vajiravudh’s Moral Concepts fo r Citizenship, Philadelphia 
2004, p. 135.
44 Khanakammakanmunnithiphraboromrachanuson, 1986, p.57.
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Other ways to promote his idea of the monarchical nation were by travelling to 
the provinces and the use of symbols. To achieve his target, Vajiravudh counted on the 
effects of his presence: “Visiting any place, a large number of people come and wait to 
pay respect to me. Some of them bring one gifts...They keep looking at me. It seems 
that they would like to see me as much as they can. By seeing the king in person, the 
people feel more and more loyal to him. And in turn, this also makes them feel loyal to 
the government officials (who govern them) as they feel loyalty to the king.”45 In his 
speeches to the people he gave the listeners the feeling that they as an individual were 
important for the nation: “Even though a person is a very small part of the nation, when 
these parts work together, the nation can prosper.” 46 The power of symbols was 
prominent in Vajiravudh’s speeches and deeds. In every province he visited, he would 
give a sword to the governor with these or similar words: “Let the governor, 
government officials and citizens receive this royal sword with due respect. For the 
ruling officials, know that this sword is the symbol of the king’s power, shared with you 
to use honestly in order to make the people happy and peaceful and to subdue criminals 
who do harm to our people. The scale is the symbol for the officials to govern securely 
with justice, being as just as the scale. For the people, know that this sword is the 
symbol of peaceful living.”47
Central to all activities was the emphasis that loyalty to the king was loyalty to 
the nation. Just like his grandfather, King Mongkut, Vajiravudh argued that the King 
ruled the country for the sake of the people and acted for the benefit of the country: “Be 
loyal to the king who takes care of the people so that they are happy and peaceful.”48 For 
this benevolence, Vajiravudh expected the Thai people to correspond with gratitude: 
“The kings have been so kind to the Thai people in providing them with happiness and 
peace from the past to the present time. As a result, the Thais should feel gratitude and 
repay the king’s benevolence as preached by Lord Buddha.”49 However, he was aware 
that in the monarchical nation, the king had to play his part as well: “The King has the 
duty to develop the prosperity in the nation. He can be compared to the nation’s flag of 
history. The nation’s prosperity depends on the king who develops the country. At the 
same time, the nation and the religion are related to each other; if there is no nation,
45 Cited in Ratana, 2004, pp.45-46.
46 Cited in Ratana, 2004, p. 132.
47 Cited in Ratana, 2004, p. 132
48 Cited in Ratana, 2004, p.89.
49 Cited in Ratana, 2004, p. 153.
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then religion cannot survive.”S0 Buddhism was for Vajiravudh essential because as the 
source for morality, it enriched the nation helping it to become civilised. Without 
religion or morality, the nation would be destroyed.51Vajiravudh went one step further 
and connected himself personally with Buddha. In Nakhon Pathom province, the King 
added as a special feature to the famous stupa (which he called ‘one of the most sacred 
and visited shrines in all of Thailand’) a standing Buddha statue. Its head was originally 
attached to an image of the Sukhothai period. After his death, the ashes of Vajiravudh 
were deposited within its base. Reynolds interpreted this statue as being a representation 
of the continuation of the Buddha’s life and work in the life and work of the Thai kings, 
and the establishment and the maintenance of the Buddhist faith as a basic element in 
the civic religion of the Thai nation.52
In the economic field, Vajiravudh supported the use of Thai products. His aim 
was to preserve local handicrafts such as the weaving of silk in order to keep the 
currency inside Thailand and ensure self-reliance in times of crisis.53 He also introduced 
the first images on bank notes in 1923. Contrary to Europe, he did not choose his 
picture to be placed on but decided instead on the scenery of raek na lew an (first 
ploughing ceremony) which he regarded as an important part of Thai culture.54
6.4. Challenging Monarchical Nationalism
In the reign of Vajiravudh, the appeal of the monarchical nation and nationalism 
began to decline. This was not only a result of the mixing of monarchical and political 
nationalism but also of a variety of political, social and economical reasons. In addition, 
problems within the royal family contributed to this process.
On the political level, Vajiravudh’s decision not to allow a constitution or a 
parliament caused discontent with the developing middle class who were mostly a 
product of the expanding nation-state and flourishing trade. The first challenge to the 
monarchical nation was made in March 1912. In that month, a group of 92 soldiers and 
civilians were caught while planning a coup against Vajiravudh. The main reasons for
50 Cited in Ratana, 2004, p.90.
51 Ratana, 2004, p.20.
52 Reynolds, Frank. “Buddhism as Universal Religion and as Civic Religion: Some Observations on a 
Tour o f Buddhist Centres in Central Thailand”, JSS, 1975, pp.37-38.
53 Mongkutklaochaoyuhua, Phrabatsomdetphra, Phuak yiw haeng buraphatit lae mueangthai chong tuen 
thoet [The Jews o f the Orient and Wake Up Siam], Bangkok 1984, pp.56-57.
54 Bank o f Thailand, Centenary o f Thai Banknote, Bangkok 2002, p. 70. The first picture of a king on a 
Thai banknote appeared following a proposal by the European printing house in 1928.
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their revolt, stated Kanpirom, was their dissatisfaction with the privileges of the 
paramilitary Wild Tiger Corps, a pet project of the king, and the waste of money by the 
royal household. The conspirators rejected monarchical rule with the argument that it 
resulted in a fast decay of the nation. They demanded a system of ‘limited monarchy’ 
with a king under the law. The money spent by the king would be better invested in 
weapons in order to protect the nation in case of war.55 Kullada regarded this group as 
pioneers for Thai nationalism, calling them ‘liberal nationalists’.56 However, I propose 
to see them as pioneers for political nationalism in Thailand. Influenced by the writings 
of Thianwan and the events around the Young Turks, Iran and China, there was no 
shortage of references to the nation in their writings. Their slogan indicated that they 
interpreted the nation differently from the King as they aimed to preserve the nation 
against the King: ‘better to lose one’s life than the nation’.57 Although this group was 
nationalistic, they represented more a movement of disgruntled soldiers and not so 
much a wide-spread nationalist ideology. There were for example no demands for a 
broader participation of the masses or national education. Lenient in his punishment of 
the conspirators, Vajiravudh did not categorise the coup attempt as a struggle between 
two different visions of the nation but treated the conspirators more like misled people: 
“some people who considered themselves as ‘siwilai [civilised] and modem’ want to get 
rid of everything which is old to create a world that they want.”58 Nevertheless, he was 
reminded that he had to step up his nationalist campaign to bind nationalist forces to the 
monarchical nation. However, his public reaction was to appeal to unity and loyalty: 
“Peace is what is wanted in order to ensure the stability of the nation, and peace can 
only be obtained through unity. We must be one, not divided against ourselves. Be 
honest, be firm, but above all be united. Then shall we have the chance of remaining 
forever free as our name. Lastly, my friends, be loyal. Cling to loyalty, as to rock 
immobile and prominent, as our most valued possession. Loyalty, true patriotism, and 
Our Holy Faith guild our hearts towards the attainment of the highest goal of the United 
Nationhood and Prosperity.”59
A few years later, the subject of nationalism was back on the public agenda. 
However, it was not Thai but Chinese nationalism which was directed against the
55 Kanpirom, 1981, pp.86-103.
56 Kullada Kesboonchoo, The Rise and Decline o f Thai Absolutism, London 2000, p. 14.
57 Cited in Skrobanek, Walter, Buddhistische Politik in Thailand: Mit besonderer Beriicksichtigung des 
heterodoxen Messianismus, Wiesbaden 1976, p.55.
58 Cited in Sukanya, 1989, p.30.
59 Cited in Sukanya, 1989, p.l 13.
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Japanese. Boycotts of Japanese products were organised in 1919, 1926 and 1928.60 The 
Chinese increasingly organised themselves in unions and strikes were frequent in the 
late 1910s and 1920s. The most famous strike was the tramway strike for better 
payment and working conditions in 1923 in which different visions of the nation played 
a big role. The mouthpiece of the strikers was the newspaper kammakorn (Worker) 
which was founded by Thawat Rittidet. In one article, he argued that royal absolutism 
was both an affront to the dignity of the individual and an inefficient way to manage a 
modem nation.61 Interestingly with the boycotts in mind, the workers considered 
themselves as Thai and this labour conflict as an intra-Thai conflict. This indicated that 
a dual identity was prevalent among the Chinese labourers. Brown quoted a newspaper 
article in which the willingness of Thai officials to talk and compromise with the 
workers was praised: “The men had felt proud that Thais are fully united. The phuyai 
[superiors] show consideration towards the phunoi [little people, in this case the 
workers], whilst the phunoi is respectful of the phuyai. This is appropriate for 
prospering nations and shows that there is no disadvantage in being bom a member of 
the Thai nation.”62
The subject of nationalism was not only popular within the Chinese labour 
community but also increasingly within the Thai intelligentsia.63 This intelligentsia was 
a product of the ongoing reforms in the bureaucracy started by King Chulalongkom in 
1892. The number of civil servants had increased dramatically from around 12,000 in 
1892 to around 80,000 in 1918.64 Patriotism was proudly displayed in this circle and a 
lively debate in newspapers and publications about the nation developed. Many 
intellectuals proposed an alternative to the monarchical nation. A public discussion was 
possible because Vajiravudh himself actively took part by writing many articles under a 
pseudonym (Asvabahu). Other protagonists, stated Pasuk/Baker, were businessmen with 
their idea of an economic nationalism and dissident bureaucrats with a world-view of 
rationalist humanism. The latter argued on nationalist grounds that the royalist regime 
was bad for Thailand. It manifestly failed to provide Thailand with the economic and
60 Brown, Andrew, Labour, Politics and the State in Industrializing Thailand, London 2004, p.20.
61 Pasuk Phongpaichit/Baker, Chris, Thailand- Economy and Politics, Kuala Lumpur 1995, p. 180.
62 Cited in Brown, 2004, p.27.
63 One of the factors why race and nationalism became more important was a popular book written by 
William Dodd in 1923. Thais understood his argument that the Tai were not only the elderly brother of 
the Chinese but also the continuation o f a ‘pure’ Yun Thai dynasty since 1350 as confirmation of their 
own greatness. Dodd, William, The Tai Race- Elder Brother o f  the Chinese, Bangkok Reprint 1996, p.l 8.
64 Chaiyan R., The Rise and Fall o f  the Thai Absolute Monarchy, Bangkok 1994, p. 105.
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political strength required to survive and prosper in a competitive world.65 Phra Sarasas, 
for example, was an intellectual who perceived Japan as role model for Asia. He was 
against despotism by an absolute monarch which he regarded as an obstacle for the 
development of the nation. Phra Sarasas saw in democracy the only legitimate form for 
the nation because only the people could be the nation. A developed, healthy and wise 
people would be able to form that nation. For that reason, stated Phra Sarasas, Thailand 
was not yet a nation.66 Not all nationalist thinkers limited themselves to academic debate. 
Some founded a publishing group (khana yuwasan! Youth Journal Group) which 
distributed a series of books cheaply in the markets. The group was successful with 
titles about history and politics which aimed to instil patriotism into readers.67
This intellectual debate was only possible because King Vajiravudh actively 
encouraged the freedom of the press. He remarked that he was educated in the United 
Kingdom and therefore did not want to ‘to shut up the newspapers’.68 The King 
supported the newspaper sector (even owned some of them) with the result that the print 
media widely expanded: 63 publications existed in the period between 1910 and 1921 
(including eleven daily newspapers). This number went up to 81 publications (including 
eight daily newspapers) in the period from 1921 to 1925.69 This expansion and the 
possibility to openly criticise the monarchy paved the way for demands of democracy. 
Copeland’s conclusion that there is little to indicate that the court succeeded in 
dominating the course of the nation’s intellectual development is correct for the period 
of the 1920s and early 1930s.70 The emergence of alternative views of the nation meant 
that they became the competitors of monarchical nationalism. With a changing political 
environment, calls for a change in government became louder. With increasing criticism 
towards monarchical rule, the prominent position of the monarchical nation declined
65 Pasuk/Baker, 1995, p. 262.
66 Nakharin Mektrairat. “Phalang khong naewkit chat-chatniyom kap kanmueang thai nai samai raekroem 
khong ratphrachachat [The Concept o f Nation and Nationalism and Thai Politics in the Early Period of 
Nation-State]”, Ratthasatsan, 2000, pp.44-46. See also Batson, Benjamin. “Phra Sarasas: Rebel With 
Many Causes”, ISEAS, 1996, pp. 150-165.
67 Titles such as ‘Hitler’ (1934) and ‘Siam and the Next World War’ (1934) sold more than 5,000 copies 
which is a high number even for modern standards. Nakharin, 2000, p.43. See also Ivarsson, Soeren. 
“Making Laos ‘Our’ Space: Thai Discourse on History and Race, 1900-1941”, Copenhagen 2003, pp.239- 
264.
68 Cited in Kanpirom, 1981, p.229.
69 Nakharin, 2000, p.34 and Sukanya, 1989, p. 159.
70 Copeland, Matthew, Contested Nationalism and the 1932 Overthrow o f the Absolute Monarchy in 
Siam, Canberra 1993, p.210. The monarchical nationalists attempted to control the output o f nationalist 
writers when it was deemed as unsuitable. For example, Prince Damrong stopped the publication o f a 
book called ‘Memoirs From the Time When France Occupied Chantaburi’ in which it was described that 
the Thai king was forced at gunpoint by the French. Damrong worried about the effects on royal dignity 
by this book. Ivarsson, 2003, p.242.
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more and more. This slip in popularity was intensified by the lack of personal charisma 
of Vajiravudh (and later King Prajadhipok as well).71 An important factor in the ‘war of 
the pen’72 between Vajiravudh and his critics was that the King’s participation damaged 
the sacredness of the monarchy decisively. Vajiravudh himself saw the monarch more 
and more in the role of a Prime Minister: “The king can be compared to a Prime 
Minister. He takes responsibility for the nation...The king will use his power for the 
happiness and benefit of the people.”73 This political definition of the role of the king 
weakened the monarchy even more in the face of criticism.
Bad news was coming for Vajiravudh not only from the political but also from 
the economic front. The King did not show much interest in overall economic policies, 
leaving most development projects such as irrigation systems insufficiently funded. 
Newspapers were critical about Vajiravudh’s agrarian policy which lacked initiatives.74 
He was very keen, nevertheless, to seek a revision of the unfair trade treaties with other 
countries from the nineteenth century (which was finally achieved in 1925) in order to 
establish Thailand as equal partner on the world stage.75 His lack of interest for domestic 
agricultural problems, however, resulted in a catastrophe, especially when natural 
disasters caused hunger crises in 1917 and 1919. The government mismanaged the 
situations, causing outbreaks of personal criticism directed at the King.76 His 
unwillingness to cut the lavish expenditure of the court fuelled the dissatisfaction with 
the crown even further than the political woes already did.
Another important factor for the weakening of the monarchical nation was a 
conflict within the royal family itself. The King lost during his education in Europe the 
close contact with his family. When he ascended the throne, he did not rely on the 
experienced ministers and consultants of his father but replaced them with young men 
with no experience from outside the royal family. One of the ‘sacked’ ministers was his 
uncle, Prince Damrong, a key architect of the monarchical nation. Although Damrong
71 The German doctor Friedrich Schafer, who worked in Bangkok between 1909 and 1912, mentioned in 
his diary repeatedly the low popularity of the king with the people. Schafer, Friedrich, Siamesisches 
Tagebuch, Bonn Reprint 1991, p.232.
72 For detail o f ‘the war o f the pen’ see Sukanya, 1989, pp.67-76.
73 Cited in Kanpirom, 1981, p.49.
74 Vella, 1978, p. 169.
75 Oblas, P., Siam’s Efforts to Revise the Unequal Treaty System in the Sixth Reign (1910-1925), Ann 
Arbor 1974, p. 12.
76 Sunthari Asawai. “Wikrittakan khao lang songkhramlok khrangthinueng [The Rice Crisis After World 
War I]”, Warasan setthasat thammasat, 1988, p.157.
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kept several important positions outside the government, the monarchical nationalism 
had lost with Chulalongkom and Damrong the decisive driving forces.
6.5. King Prajadhipok and the End o f the Monarchical Nation
One of the characteristics of the monarchical nation is a charismatic and active 
monarch who is the intellectual leader with the help of monarchical nationalism. There 
could not be a starker contrast to this ideal than Vajiravudh’s brother, King Prajadhipok 
(r. 1925-1935), who took up his position amidst a financial crisis. The treasury was 
empty and the state burdened with a large sum of debt. The situation was so serious that 
it required the full attention of the King to manage the financial turmoil. Prajadhipok, 
generally perceived as a non-charismatic ruler, introduced a strict budget discipline and 
succeeded in improving the situation. The recovery, however, was only short lived 
because the outbreak of the world economic crisis affected Thailand as well. This crisis 
would turn out to be the catalyst for dissatisfaction with monarchical rule and would 
lead to a change of government.
The trouble for Thailand started with the withdrawal of the Austrian and 
German gold reserves from London in 1929. This move forced the British government 
to allow a drastic devaluation of the Pound by giving up the gold standard. The fall of 
the Pound had tremendous impact on the British colonies, the main trading partners of 
Thailand. It also affected the country’s foreign currency reserves that were mainly held 
in Pound. A 50% decrease in value limited the Thai money supply considerably with the 
result of income losses for consumers and the trading sector and drastically reduced tax 
revenues for the state.77 To add to the woes, the maintenance of the gold standard for the 
Thai currency (Baht) until May 1932 led to a strong rise in value which resulted in 
increasing prices of Thai exports such as rice and decreased demand. The export 
revenues decreased between 1927 and 1933 around 45%.78 To cope with the overall loss 
of income, the Thai government decided to follow an even stricter budget discipline in 
September 1930.
The effects of the world economic crisis on South East Asia were widely 
discussed in academic literature. In many countries, the economic troubles led to farmer
77 Vichitvong Na Pombhejra. “Thailand’s Monetary Development in the 1930’s”, Bangkok 1978, p.417.
78 See table in Fistic, Pierre, L ’Evolution de la Thailande Contemporaine, Paris 1967, p.l 12.
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revolts such as the Hsaya San rebellion in Burma.79 The highly commercialised farming 
sector in the colonies was especially sensitive to disruptions in world trade so that the 
crisis reinforced existing problems as the following comment about the situation in 
Burma showed: ‘the depression did not cause, it only accelerated an agrarian crisis that 
was under way decades before 193O’.80 Although some academics portrayed a similar 
picture of devastation in the Thai countryside, the economic data does not support such 
a claim.81 Farmers in some commercialised areas in Central Thailand did suffer from the 
decline of rice exports; the majority, however, reacted with a diversification of their 
farming activities to other products which decreased their dependency on the export 
industry. Thailand was therefore a unique case in that the world economic crisis did not 
cause farmer revolts but hit the urban middle class working in the expanding 
bureaucracy the most. Rising costs of living while the government scaled down on 
wages and salaries led to widespread dissatisfaction in the cities. In the end, it was a 
mix of political and economic discontent within the bureaucratic elite which led to the 
change of government. Together with a competing view of the nation, namely a state- 
dominated one, this was enough motivation to end the dominance of the monarchical 
nation.
King Prajadhipok was not able to stop the increasing number of oppositional 
forces using the ‘love to the nation’ as the basis of their criticism.82 The decreasing 
attractiveness of monarchical nationalism and the growing opposition to monarchical 
rule is reflected in an account written by a contemporary, Quaritch Wales, in 1931. He 
quoted an article of the newspaper ‘Bangkok Daily Mail’ from October 1930: “Owing 
to the failure of the public in general to give proper attention and due respect to His 
Majesty the King when the Siamese National Anthem is played after performances...the 
police have been instructed to remind the public when the tune is being played, and to 
take down the names of the offenders in the case of government officials and military 
men.”83 Quaritch Wales commented that the abolition of old customs was to blame for
79 See Hall, D., A History o f  South East Asia, London 1988, p.822.
80 Cited in Johnston, David. “Rice Cultivation in Thailand: The Development of an Export Economy by 
an Indigenous Capital and Labour”, Modern Asian Studies, 1981, p. 124.
81 See Sturm, Andreas, Die Handels- und Agrarpolitik Thailands von 1767-1932, Passau 1997, chapter 5.
82 Nationalist feelings became more widespread and could even be found in the provinces. For example, 
the Thai authorities quickly crushed a local rebellion in the province of Saraburi in 1925. What was 
unusual about this rebellion was the fact that its leader sent a message to the king complaining that 
foreigners, particularly the British and French, were oppressing the Thai people. He gave the King seven 
days to throw off the foreign domination, otherwise he would deal with the situation himself. Batson, B., 
The End o f the A bsolute Monarchy in Siam, Singapore 1984, Footnote 31, p. 183.
83 Cited in Quaritch Wales, H.G., Siamese State Ceremonies, London 1931, p.6.
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the behaviour of the people: “What was left in its place? Instead of a gradual 
modification, the schooling of the people in the new etiquette, they were, except for the 
immediate entourage of the king, left in complete ignorance as to what they should do 
in such circumstances...This opened the door for the ‘dark teachings of communism’.”84 
Quartich Wales clearly disliked the direction towards modernity Thailand was heading 
under King Prajadhipok, criticising the modem lightning effects and semi-European 
uniforms during the King’s coronation. His comments, however, gave insight to a 
development which in hindsight is highly interesting in regard to the dwindling 
attractiveness of monarchical nationalism which depended so much on charisma and 
emotional appeal: “The structure and appearance of the type of throne used, the lack of 
self-prostration, indeed the proceedings in general, made it difficult to connect the 
present spectacle with its prototype in ‘Old Siam’.”85
Prajadhipok, limited in his financial means, attempted to continue some 
traditions of the monarchical nation, for example the erection of monuments. In 1932, 
he ordered the construction of a bridge over the Chaophraya River to celebrate the 150th 
anniversary of Bangkok. At one end of the bridge, he built a monument of King Rama I. 
In the official notification for the memorial, monarchical nationalism was still alive: 
“His Majesty has decided that such a Memorial, if provided by himself alone, will not, 
from the private nature of the undertaking, be worthy of the Great King to whom Siam 
owes not only the establishment of the Dynasty and the Capital, but the very foundation 
of the present independent and prosperous position of the Country itself. It is fitting 
therefore that the Memorial should be provided, not by His Majesty only, but by King 
and people together, as a token of public gratitude to him to whose labours in peace and 
activity in war the country owes the beginning of the position in which she stands.”86 
Prajadhipok also issued an appeal for voluntary public subscription for the “national 
memorial”, again reflecting the monarchical nation: “the people of Siam, both Siamese 
nationals as well as those of other nationalities who reside and benefit in this country, 
may have an opportunity of showing their sympathy in this laudable undertaking by 
contributing towards its realisation, of their own will and without any obligation to do 
so whatever.”87
84 Quaritch Wales, 1931, p.6.
85 Quaritch Wales, 1931, p. 179.
86 Printed in Kromsinlapakon, Phraratchaphithi chalongpkranakhon khrop 150 p i [The Royal Ceremony 
o f Bangkok’s 150th Anniversary], Bangkok 1982, p.9.
87 Printed in Kromsinlapakon, 1982, p. 101.
159
When this bridge was opened, the King was already in a weak position. It could 
be seen as an irony of history that his last public speech before the revolution in June 
1932 was a kind of testimony of monarchical nationalism. He admonished Boy Scouts 
to love their country and their religion but never to the point of denigrating the race, 
country, or religion o f others. The King stressed that all of the great religions taught 
noble moral values, and urged the scouts to respect and admire the accomplishment of 
peoples of every race and creed.88
To sum up, with the end of the era of monarchical rule, the question arises as to 
why it was that the initially so successful monarchical nationalism was unable to 
prevent the loss of its supporting governmental system? The reasons for the change are 
complex and include a variety of political, social and economical elements. However, 
with a weakening of monarchical nationalism since the reign of King Vajiravudh, 
competing notions of the nation emerged which were partially responsible for the fall of 
the old regime. While following his father’s concept of the monarchical nation, King 
Vajiravudh unintentionally lessened the appeal of monarchical nationalism by including 
in it the elements of political nationalism such as the emphasis on the greatness of Thai 
race and civilisation. By giving utmost significance to the nation, symbolised by his 
slogan ‘Nation, Religion and King’, he lessened not only the ‘above all’ position of the 
monarchy but also undermined the sacredness of the monarchical institution. Together 
with the lack of personal charisma of the monarchs, it allowed oppositional groups to 
legitimise their demands for an abolition of the monarchical rule by claiming that a 
change of the system of government was necessary out of love for the nation. Indeed, 
Vajiravudh cannot be seen as the father of Thai nationalism but as a catalyst for the 
change from the dominance of monarchical nationalism to political nationalism. Only 
50 years later, monarchical nationalism would rise again under King Bhumibol who did 
not repeat the mistakes of his predecessors and adapted the idea of a monarchical nation 
to the requirement of a modem civil society.
88 Batson, 1984, p.61. Emphasis added.
160
Chapter 7
Dominance of the State: Statist Nationalism (1930s-1950s)
The monarchical orientation of the nation was first and foremost the work of 
the royal family. Although the monarchs themselves were very active in developing 
ideas and concepts, they would not have been able to disseminate the ideology to a 
broader audience in the whole country without the help of the bureaucracy headed by 
princes and nobles. The expanding bureaucracy of the nation-state era (since 1890s) 
proved to be a highly efficient instrument in promoting monarchical nationalism. 
However, this bureaucracy, both civil and military, increasingly became a source of 
dissatisfaction with monarchical rule itself. Many non-royal members of the 
bureaucracy received scholarships and were educated in Europe (mostly in the United 
Kingdom, France and Germany). Their contact with western ideas of democracy, 
equality and nationalism turned into frustration upon their return to Thailand where 
royals and nobles dominated the bureaucracy and occupied the leading positions. 
When the world economic crisis accelerated the economic and financial woes of the 
country, some members of the bureaucracy saw the necessity to ‘save the nation’ and 
to seek a change of government.
This chapter looks into the period between 1932 and 1957. It proposes that the 
vision of the nation promoted by a dominant fraction inside the new ruling group was 
very much influenced by western perceptions of the nation and the developments in 
Europe and Japan in the 1930s. The Thai nation was to be solely defined and led by 
the state. I propose to classify this nation as political nation and the corresponding 
nationalism as statist nationalism which is to be understood as a sub-category of 
political nationalism. As described in the first chapter, Hutchinson argued that 
political nationalists “perceive the nation in rationalist terms as a homogenous 
collectivity of educated citizens. They wish for a state representative of the nation 
which will break with tradition and raise the people to the level of the advanced 
‘scientific’ cultures. Although essentially modernist, they appeal to historic ethnic 
sentiments in an instrumental fashion in order to mobilize religious and rural support
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for their goal.”1 With the term statist nationalism, I emphasise the importance of the 
state in this vision of the nation. Similar to other systems of statism, the leaders of the 
Thai state in this period aimed ‘to control the economic and social affairs’.2 However, 
they understood the state not in a pure rational sense as expressed in Schiller’s famous 
comparison with a machine.3 Their idea of the state was much nearer to an 
‘emotional’ nature of a nation. Therefore, the term statist nationalism takes into 
consideration this altered form of statism.
The reign of King Vajiravudh saw the start of increasing influence of political 
nationalism although the weakening monarchical nationalism remained the dominant 
form. With the revolution of 1932 and the abolition of monarchical rule, the weight of 
monarchical nationalism decreased even more but was not immediately suspended.
7.1. A Period o f Transition (1932-1938)
After the revolution on 24 July 1932, members of the coup group lowered the 
royal flag over the Anantasamakhom Throne Hall and raised the national flag instead. 
This was to symbolise that the nation was to be more important than the monarchy.4 
The removal of the monarchical government was the common denominator all 
factions within the coup group (khana ratsadom or People’s Party) could agree on. 
As soon as this target was achieved, the members of the coup group broke their unity. 
Coherent policies to promote nationalism were almost impossible with factions 
favouring such contradictory directions as socialism, militarism and 
constitutionalism.5 Nakharin pointed out that the term nation came to the forefront 
just during the abdication of King Prajadhipok in 1935.6 However, this did not mean 
that the idea of nationalism was absent in the political elite as the example of the new
1 Hutchinson, John, The Dynamics o f  Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation o f the 
Irish Nation State, London 1985, p.426.
2 McLean, Iain (ed), The Concise Oxford Dictionary o f Politics, Oxford 1996, p.477.
3 See Kedourie, E., Nationalism, Oxford 2000, chapter 3
4 Chanida Phrompayak Phueaksom, Kanmueang nai prawattisat thongchat thai [Politics in the History 
of Thai National Flag], Bangkok 2003, p. 127.
5 See more about the different groups in Nakharin Mektrairat. “Phalang khong naewkit chat-chatniyom 
kap kanmueang thai nai samai raekroem khong ratphrachachat [The Concept o f Nation and 
Nationalism and Thai Politics in the Early Period o f Nation-State]”, Ratthasatsan, 2000, pp.59-63.
6 Nakharin Mektrairat, Kanpatiwat sayam phoso 2475 [The Siamese Revolution o f 1932], Bangkok 
1997, pp.304 and 309. For example, a Member o f Parliament felt sorry about the abdication o f the king 
but stressed that the nation was more important than one person.
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national anthem with its nationalistic spirit showed in 1933.7 A year later appeared a 
proposal to the cabinet to re-settle Buddhist Thais to Muslim areas via a programme 
called ‘Persuade’ (chungchai) aiming to encourage Thais to marry Muslims and bring 
them ‘to the same nation’ {chat diaokan) as the settlers. The project, however, was 
rejected.8 The government became more active in promoting nationalism when its 
popularity fell in many parts of the population in 1935. A new project to instill a love 
for the nation {khrongkan plukchai hai rakchat) which targeted young people was 
initiated with daily ceremonies in schools such as a flag-raising ritual in the morning. 
To reach the rest of population, the project called for the erection of monuments in 
every province. These monuments were to depict war heroes and heroines ‘who did 
good deeds for the nation and sacrificed themselves’.9 In 1937, the government again 
paid more attention to nationalism. Public holidays were regulated for the first time 
since the government take-over five years before. Until then, the old royal regulations 
(since 1925) were still valid. A National Day (24th of June, the day of the revolution) 
was introduced in January 1938 and celebrated with parades from the military and 
Boy Scouts. A proposed Nazi-style torch procession, however, was not approved.10
In the period of transition and internal government conflicts, there was no 
stringent ideological direction and the promotion of nationalism was not the 
government’s main priority. Therefore, aspects of monarchical nationalism remained 
in place. This period ended with the rise to power of Field Marshall Phibun 
Songkhram. With him, a new direction of Thai nationalism emerged: statist 
nationalism.11
7 For the original lyrics (later changed under Phibun) see Wilson, H. “Imperialism and Islam: The 
Impact o f ‘Modernisation’ on the Malay Muslims of South Thailand”, The Southeast Asian Review, 
1989, p.59.
8 Piyanart Bunnag, Nayobai kan pokk.hrong khong ratthaban thai to chaothai mutsalim nai changwat 
chaidaen phaktai (pho so 2475-2516) [Administrative Policy o f the Thai Government Towards the 
Thai Muslims in the Southern Province (1902-1973)], Bangkok 1988, p.98.
9 Nakharin, 2000, p.72.
10 Somsak Chiamthirasakun. “Prawattisat wanchat thai chak 24 mithuna-5 thanwa [The History o f Thai 
National Day from 24 June to 5 December]”, Fadiaokan 2004, pp.99-100.
11 Some academics argued that Thai nationalism itself started only under Phibun. See for example 
Anderson, B. “Studies of the Thai State: The State of Thai Studies”, Athens 1978, p.220, Wyatt, D., 
Thailand- A Short History, Bangkok 1984, p.230 and Terwiel, B. “The Development o f Consensus 
Nationalism in Thailand”, Clayton 1991, p. 134.
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7. 2. Statist Nationalism in Full Swing (1938-1944)
Phibun Songkhram’s appointment as Prime Minister not only represented a 
power shift inside the coup group towards the younger members but was also the 
beginning of nationalism as a prominent feature in state policies again. What were the 
reasons for this rather sudden surge in nationalistic rhetoric and actions? As during 
the monarchical rule, an intra-elite power struggle between factions of the coup 
promoters played a role. However, the use of nationalism as a tool in this power 
struggle was of less importance than other aspects. This thesis proposes that three 
main factors contributed to the lively nationalism of this period.
First, Phibun was part of a new breed of bureaucrats who were a result of the 
modernisation of the administration since the 1890s. Educated in France, Phibun was 
a professional soldier and strongly influenced by western political ideas. He came into 
the limelight as a hero of the new government after he led the suppression of a royalist 
revolt in 1933 and became the defence minister a year later. After presenting himself 
as a militarist during the first years of his political career, he increasingly combined 
militarism with nationalism. In a radio address in April 1937, he claimed that the 
country was ‘not long ago weak and trampled on’ and was still subject to bullying. He 
therefore called on the entire country to arm itself in self-defence because its security 
and independence were threatened.12 Second, the international environment in the 
1930s made ideologies such as militarism and nationalism fashionable for aspiring 
politicians such as Phibun. In 1938, the year he came to power, the world came nearer 
to a global conflict and the need for a strongman at the helm seemed to become urgent 
and natural. Events like the Anschlufi of Austria with the German Reich, the Munich 
crisis in September and the fall of Canton to the Japanese played into the hands of 
Phibun with his admiration for fascist states.13 Third, since the coup in 1932, the new 
ruling group sought to legitimise their control of government. An emphasis on the 
utmost importance of the nation (which was seen as being disconnected from the 
monarchy and closely bound to the state) automatically increased the legitimation of 
its leaders.
12 Stowe, Judith, Siam Becomes Thailand, Honolulu 1991, p.94.
13 Stowe, 1991, p. 112.
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Phibun’s Vision o f the Nation and the Shaping o f Statist Nationalism
Phibun and his chief ideologist, Luang Wichit Wathakan (Head of the Fine 
Arts Department since 1935), developed a clear vision of the nation. Phibun aimed to 
crceate a ‘new Siam’ and to place the country among the great civilisations of the 
world. To achieve this, he planned to turn the people into patriots with discipline and 
willingness to sacrifice themselves for the national unity.14 For Wichit, the ‘nation’ 
consisted of a group of people belonging to the same biological race with the same 
cultural life. Every individual should perform his duty and not interfere in the duties 
o f others. The nation could improve automatically if each individual improves 
himself. Wichit envisioned a system of individuals where power and strength 
emanates only from the group leader who makes all the important decisions. In his 
concept, freedom, equality and rights of the individual were inferior to that of the 
state.15 Drawing on western linguistic and ethnological studies, Wichit also developed 
a concept of race (chonchat) based on blood ties that included Tai-speaking people 
outside the borders of Thailand. Wichit’s view of Thainess had no place for regional 
cultures and every difference between the regions was erased to show that all people 
were part of one Thailand. He believed that the spirit of nationalism would make for a 
well developed nation, citing Japan as role model.16 For both Phibun and Wichit, the 
state was the undisputed leader of the nation which was to be a great power.
This view of the nation was reflected in the policies of statist nationalism. 
Interestingly, this nationalism had some similarities with the nationalism policies of 
King Vajiravudh who mixed monarchical with political nationalism. Phibun 
maintained elements of political nationalism but discontinued the elements of 
monarchical nationalism, most prominently the connection between the monarchy and 
the nation, the role of the king as leader and the trans-ethnic understanding of Thai 
identity.
To break with the monarchy and its past was Phibun’s first aim. After his 
appointment as Prime Minister, Phibun confiscated all the private possessions of the
14 Suchit Bunbongkam. “Political Power of Thai Military Leaders: A Comparative Study o f Field 
Marshal P. Phibulsongkram and Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat”, Social Science Review, 1977, p.193.
15 Saichol Sattayanurak, Khwamplianplaeng nai kansangchat thai lae khwampenthai doi Luang 
Wichitwatakan [The Change in the Construction of the Thai Nation and Thainess by Luang 
Wichitwatakarn], Bangkok 2002, p. 14.
16 Keyes, Charles. “Presidential Address: ‘The People of Asia’- Science and Politics in the 
Classification of Ethnic Groups in Thailand, China and Vietnam”, JAS, 2002, p.l 180.
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former King Prajadhipok17 (who abdicated in 1935 and lived in the United Kingdom) 
and arrested many royalists including the guardian of the new King Ananda Mahidol 
(r. 1935-1946), who lived in Switzerland. To ideologically support his crusade against 
the Chakri dynasty, Phibun declared the Ramakian epic as undesirable.18 In the 
explanation of Wichit, the hero, Rama (at the same time the official names of the 
Chakri kings), was a weak and indecisive character. To humiliate the Chakri dynasty 
further, he declared the former (non-Chakri) King Taksin as national hero.19 This 
showed that Phibun was not an anti-monarchist per se but he used monarchical 
elements for his own construction of a national past. He did not cut out the monarchy 
in the public perception but, on occasion, seemed to enjoy personally taking over its 
function. For example, Phibun was performing state rituals in the name of the absent 
King Ananda, alternatively designating them as state ceremonies (ratphiti) or royal 
ceremonies (ratchaphithi).20 Nakharin proposed that Phibun sought to destroy the 
general view of the monarchy as a guarantee of Thailand’s sovereignty.21 This was an 
attempt to sever the connection between the monarchy and the nation. In order to 
replace the monarch as the leader of the nation, Wichit and Phibun created a cult 
around the Prime Minister. Phibun’s photograph was everywhere, and his slogans 
‘were plastered on newspapers and billboards and repeated over the radio’.22 The 
public face of the monarchy was directly replaced by declaring Phibun’s birthday (14 
July) a national holiday, by playing his song (sadudiphibun, ‘In Praise of Phibun’) 
during his public appearances and by showing his picture and playing his song before 
films so that the people paid respect.23
Probably the biggest change was the abandonment of trans-ethnic views by 
Phibun and his government. The group hardest hit by this new direction was the 
Chinese. What motivated Phibun to turn against this big ethnic group? First, the
17 Phibun also ordered the removal o f all portraits o f Prajadipok, of the former Queen and o f the Prince 
of Nakhom Savan from public offices. The Times (London). “Telegrams in Brief’, 19 July 1939, p. 13.
18 Manas Chitakasem. “Nation Building and Thai Literary Discourse: The Legacy o f Phibun and Luang 
Wichit”, Bangkok 1995, p.38.
19 For an example o f the praise o f Taksin in the Phibun era see Prida Srichalalai. “Ngan sangchat thai 
khong somdetphrachaotaksinmaharat [The Nation Building of King Taksin]”, Bangkok 1941.
20 Gray, Christine. “Hegemonic Images: Language and Silence in the Royal Thai Polity”, Man, 1991, 
p.50.
21 Nakharin Mektrairat. “Rabop ratthaniyom chompon po pibunsongkhram: kankorup khong 
naewkhwamkit lae khwammai thang kanmueang [The Ratthaniyom of Field Marshal Phibun 
Songkram: the Emergence of the Concept and Political Meaning]”, Ratthasatsan, 1988-89, p.254.
22 Wyatt, 1984, p.244.
23 Pra-omrat Buranamart, Luang Wichit Wathakarn kap botlakon prawattisat [Luang Wichit Wathakan 
and Historical Plays], Bangkok 1985, p.67.
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Chinese were the easiest target to stir up nationalistic feelings because they dominated 
the trade sector and especially many unpopular professions such as money lenders and 
middlemen. Second, the verbal attacks of King Vajiravudh against the Chinese 
already created a basic ideology well-known to the population. Third, the Chinese 
themselves contributed to the rise of Thai nationalism by increasingly displaying 
Chinese-ness because of the political situation in their homeland (Japanese 
occupation): “The Chinese in Thailand reaffirmed their Chinese-ness and sovereignty 
of their community through the act of hoisting the Chinese flag. Flags emphasised the 
estrangement between them and the indigenous people. On the Thai side, the 
government considered such flag hoisting as an overt challenge.”24 Fuelling the anti- 
Chinese feelings was a boycott of Japanese products by the Chinese in Thailand. This 
included a stop of Thai rice exports to Japan which was seen as an attack on the Thai 
economy.25
Wichit started the attacks by calling the Chinese the ‘Jews of the East’. He 
claimed that the large sum of money remitted back home was damaging the Thai 
nation. Stowe pointed out that Wichit’s accusation caused a public reaction 
demanding that the Chinese cease exploiting the country. Counting on the popular 
dissatisfaction with the Chinese, Phibun issued laws specifically against the Chinese 
minority.26 Another field where Phibun’s nationalist policies were strictly anti- 
Chinese was the economy since he feared that the economic power of the Chinese 
could one day be transformed into a political one. He propagated a ‘Thai-ification’ of 
the commercial sector especially of the rice sector, which was traditionally dominated 
by the Chinese.27 In line with that policy, Phibun founded over 100 state enterprises 
between 1939 and 1957.28 However, Phibun was flexible enough to encourage the
24 Supang Chantavanich. “From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese-Thai: Political Conditions and Identity 
Shifts Among the Chinese in Thailand”, Madison 1997, p.247.
25 Stowe, 1991, p. 102.
26 Phibun directed his anti-Chinese laws not against the individual Chinese but against the loyalty the 
Chinese felt to China. He always stressed the fact that he himself had Chinese blood. Supang, 1997, 
p.240.
27 Ayal, Eliezier, Public Policies in Thailand Under the Constitutional Regime: A Case Study of an 
Underdeveloped Country, Cornell 1961, p.243. See for details o f his economic nationalism Vinita 
Krairiksh, The Politics of Phibul: The National Leader, 1932-1944, Washington 1975, p.259 and 
Thompson, Virginia. “Thailand Irredenta- Internal and External”, Far Eastern Survey, 1940, p.245. Not 
only Chinese companies were his targets, in 1939 he forced the international oil companies out o f the 
country in order to trade oil with the Japanese government. Stowe, 1991, p. 124.
28 Christensen, Scott/Ammar Siamwalla, Beyond Patronage: Task for the Thai State, Bangkok 1994, 
p.5. See also Ayal, Eliezier. “Thailand”, Ithaca 1969, p.300.
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Chinese in the country to assimilate, a ‘proposal’ he underlined by the closing down 
of Chinese schools and the targeting of new immigrants.29
Phibun’s policy was ‘instrumentalist’ in nature and included a cost-benefit 
analysis. As soon as a Chinese accepted Thai nationality and Thai culture, he was 
regarded as ‘integrated’. This clearly indicated that Phibun understood the nation as 
identical with the state and required proper documentation and citizenship to become 
a part of it. Anderson called the whole process of anti-Chinese repression more ‘a 
matter of extortion than of nationalism’. Otherwise the Thai government would have 
stopped the immigration of the ‘golden-egg-laying geese’ which only happened in
194? 30
Closely connected to the abandonment of trans-ethnicity was the concept of 
race which Phibun and Wichit took over from Vajiravudh. Wichit commented: “In the 
past, the Thais were attacked by the Chinese and escaped from the centre of China as 
evident in history. The real Thai (chonchat thai thae) in that period who loved the 
nation strongly have been mixed with the blood of other races until the Thai blood 
became diluted. This dilution of Thai blood makes the implementation of patriotism 
much more difficult. King Vajiravudh had the wisdom to see clearly that the Thai race 
is swallowed by cross-breeding (pasompan).”31 The identification and acceptance of 
the existence of ‘mixed blood’ made it easier to incorporate other ethnic groups into 
the Thai race which was defined in an open way. Contrary to fascist ideologists in 
Europe, a term like ‘Thai’ was for Phibun not strictly an ethnic term. All regional 
groupings should be called simply ‘Thai’ rather than using the previous particular 
names, including the non-Thai Muslims in the South.32
Politically, Phibun used his interpretation of race to promote this idea of Pan- 
Thaiism.33 He reinforced the claimed status as great power of Thailand by demanding 
the return of the ‘lost territories’ (seceded under Chulalongkom) when France was
29 Likhit summarised assimilation as ‘integration into the mainstream o f the new Thai nation, 
consisting of Bangkok dialect, Buddhism and the metropolitan culture of the capital’. Likhit 
Dhiravegin “Nationalism and the State in Thailand”, Boulder 1988, p.93. Supang explained why 
assimilation was so ‘easy’ for the Chinese. In her opinion, it is possible to be Thai and ethnic Chinese 
at the same time. Thais see their national identity in political and cultural terms, not in ethnicity or the 
origin. As long as someone is loyal to nation, religion and king, ethnic identity is no problem. Supang, 
1997, p.254.
30 Anderson, 1978, p.212.
31 Somsak, 2004, p.99.
32 Batson, Benjamin, Influences from the East etc., Bangkok no date, p. 15.
33 Crosby, Josiah. “Siamese Imperialism and the Pan-Thai Movement”, Forthnightly, 1943, p.304. 
Wichit wrote a book to justify the claim on ‘the lost territories’. See his views in Vichitr Vadakam, 
Luang, Thailand’s Case, Bangkok 1941.
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defeated in Europe. Phibun threatened the use of military force and organised 
demonstrations for his support. His anti-French rhetoric was such a success that 
donations for an anti-French campaign poured in and nearly 70,000 men volunteered 
for military service. In the forefront of the protest, a newly formed group khana luad 
thai (Thai Blood) organised boycotts of French products and complained about the 
Roman Catholic Church, whose bishop was French. Although the government did not 
allow attacks on western foreigners, it did adopt an anti-Catholic policy by banning all 
non-Buddhists (including Thai Muslims) from working in the government or serving 
in the military service.34 After a short armed-conflict with France at the end of 1940, 
the Thai government declared the result as heroic victory and reclaimed large parts of 
the former territories with the help of Japan.35
The idea of race led to the concept of the purity of the Thai culture which was 
another element Phibun maintained from the nationalism of Vajiravudh. Phibun 
aimed for a total re-design of Thai culture so that Thailand could appear ‘civilised’ to 
the outside world. To foster this new Thai culture, he introduced a cultural policy 
which described ‘Thai culture’ in detail. These cultural laws became known as 
ratthaniyom, the twelve cultural mandates in which the government prescribed how to 
behave or to eat.36 The mandates demanded, for example, a new dress code stating 
that Thais should wear European style clothes because traditional ones were not 
‘proper’ for a civilised society.37 An integral part of these orders was economic 
nationalism. Thais should use and consume only Thai products and become 
economically active for themselves.38 Phibun understood this new culture as nothing 
less than the restoration of true Thai culture. Like Vajiravudh, Phibun identified the 
Kingdom of Sukhothai as source for this culture. Prince Wan, Foreign Minister under 
Phibun, named the content of the Ramkhamhaeng inscription as model and
34 Stowe, 1991, pp. 157-158 and 200. On a Buddhist holiday on 11 February 1941 nearly a thousand 
people, most o f them Roman Catholics, publicly announced their conversion to Buddhism. Reynolds, 
Bruce. “Phibun Songkhram and Thai Nationalism in the Fascist Era”, European Journal O f East Asian 
Studies, 2004, p. 126. For ‘Thai Blood’ see also Manit Nualla-or, Kanmueang thaiyuksanyalak rat thai 
[Thai Politics during the Symbolic Thai State], Bangkok 1997, p. 101. Muslims generally were hard hit 
by Phibun’s policies. He forced the Muslim civil servants to attend Buddhist ceremonies. See Diller, A. 
“Islam and Southern Thai Ethnic Reference”, Gaya 1988, p. 159.
35 Christian, John. “Thailand Renascent”, London Reprint 2001, p. 187.
36 Six were introduced in 1939, three in 1940, two in 1941 and one in 1942. ThamsookN., Thailand 
and the Japanese Presence, 1941-45, Singapore 1977, p.23. See all the orders in Thak C., Thai 
Politics: Extracts and Documents, 1932-1957, Bangkok 1978, pp.244-254. See also Manit, 1997, p.92.
37 ‘Success’ was celebrated in the newspapers: “About 1,000 Thai Muslims in Angthong have given up 
their former style of dress in order to conform to the State Convention and the national culture.” Cited 
in Diller, 1988, p. 159.
38 Likhit, 1988, p.96.
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encouraged the government to strengthen ‘the Thai spirit which looks back for 
inspiration to the golden age of Ramkhamhaeng’.39 In a foreword to a book about the 
Kingdom of Sukhothai, Phibun called the period a reminder of a glorious Thai past 
and a ‘treasure of national value’.40 For Phibun, the reference to a well-known 
‘Golden Age’ made more sense than to appeal to a relatively unknown and especially 
uncertain ‘myth of origin’ commonly found in nationalisms.41
The cultural mandates echoed Phibun’s understanding of his new culture: 
“Only the culture of the Thai nation is the heart of our success. A Thai with a good 
culture must be a real Thai at heart. He must really love Thai, do everything for Thai 
and have hope into the Thai nation. This will result in the development of the nation 
onto the same level as other civilised countries.”42 A real Thai meant, for Phibun, 
those who accepted the new culture he wanted to build. In his opinion, Thai identity 
was not rooted in Buddhist cultural traditions, but in a ‘civic identity’ predicated on 
the cultural heritage all Thai shared.43 Phibun did not hesitate to eliminate old 
traditions and ceremonies, one example being the abolition of prostration and 
crawling in front of the royal family. He furthermore abolished titles bestowed by the 
king with an aim to cut off loyalty to the monarchy.
Phibun’s ratthaniyom-orders sought to create a unified Thai national culture. 
In the ‘National Culture Act B.E. 2485 (1942)’, culture was defined as ‘progress, 
order, unity and moral of the citizens’.44 Every individual had to observe the national 
culture and the government had the task ‘to regulate and seek ways and means to 
instil national culture as to create national habits’. Remarkably, traditions were not 
mentioned.45 Part of this national culture was a reformed Thai language which was 
one of Phibun’s pet projects during the war years. He explained the reform with the
39 Wan Waithayakom. “Thai Culture”, Bangkok Reprint 1991, p.37.
40 Peleggi, Maurizio, The Politics o f  Ruins and the Business o f  Nostalgia, Bangkok 2002, p.39. 
Between 1953 and 1955, funds o f the State Lottery Bureau were used to start the restoration of some of 
the ruins in the old capital.
41 See Smith, Anthony. “The Resurgence o f Nationalism? Myth and Memory in the Renewal of 
Nations”, BJS, 1996, p.590.
42 Cited in Manit, 1997, p. 109.
43 Phibun also reformed the Buddhist Sangha in 1941 by introducing democratic elements but at the 
same time put it under close regulation by the state. Yos S. “Buddhist Cultural Tradition and the 
Politics o f National Identity in Thailand”, Amsterdam 1998, pp.317-318.
44 Document printed in Office of the National Culture Commission, Organizational Structure o f  the 
Office o f  the National Culture Commission, Bangkok no date, p.23.
45 Chai-anan argued that the new national culture was a culture o f the bureaucrats: “It set a state 
identity apart from popular cultural identities especially at the local levels. Many popular traditions and 
cultures became ‘folk’ or ‘sub-cultures’. At state functions official versions o f cultural dances were 
performed and presented in genuine tradition of the Thai state.” Chai-anan S. “State Identity Creation, 
State Building and Civil Society, 1939-1989”, Clayton 1991, p.71.
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need to counter the pressure of the Japanese to introduce Japanese in Thai schools: 
“Some nations have lost their independence because they have failed to promote their 
language.”46 At the same time, his abolition of the royal language and the 
simplification of the writing system (without regards to Sanskrit or Pali roots) not 
only made him look like Ramkhamhaeng (who was considered by Thais as the 
‘inventor’ of the Thai language) but also lessened the importance of the monarchy by 
‘equalising’ the language.47
The main elements of statist nationalism were to be symbolised by the official 
renaming of the country from ‘Siam’ to ‘Thailand’ on 23 June 1939.48 First, it 
demonstrated that the country was that of a clearly defined race. In Phibun’s opinion, 
‘Siam’ lacked any ethnic connotation, whereas ‘Thailand’ would stress the 
importance of the ‘Thai’. Second, Phibun understood ‘Siam’ as being the synonym for 
monarchical rule while ‘Thailand’ (Land of the Free) was the synonym for his version 
of democracy. ‘Free’ meant free from the old system as well as free from foreign 
powers.49
The name change and the cultural policies indicated that Phibun interpreted 
the nation as a state-led and dominated entity which should dominate the political, 
social, cultural and economic spheres of Thai society. The dominance was so 
overwhelming that the nation was identified with the state. Phibun actively sought to 
disseminate this vision of the nation within the people. For example, he used the radio 
extensively as a means to spread his ideals.50 This thesis looks into another way to 
present Phibun’s vision of the nation: the construction of monuments.
46 Cited in Reynolds, Bruce. “Imperial Japan’s Cultural Program in Thailand”, 1991, p.101.
47 Sulak Sivaraksa. “The Crisis of Siamese Identity”, 1991, p.52.
48 Chamvit Kasetsiri. “Laying ‘Siam’ to Rest”, 2000, p.Cl. The name ‘Siam’ was reintroduced, but 
only in English, between 1945 and 1948. Two more discussions at government level where held 
regarding a re-naming in 1961 and 1975, both without success. For the pro-arguments regarding a 
name change to Thailand see Charnvit Kasetsiri. “From Siam to Thailand”, 2000, p.Cl.
49 Manit, 1997, p.91. Manit’s argument differed from most other academics who see an ideological 
reason for the name change rather than a political one. See also Stowe, 1991, p. 122.
50 One o f his innovations was the founding o f the Radio Station o f Thailand. Apart from propaganda 
programmes, the station also broadcast nationalistic songs such as ‘Following the Leader’, ‘In Praise of 
Phibun’ and ‘Wear a Thai Hat’. Chamvit Kasetsiri et al, Chompon Po Phibunsongkhram kap 
kanmueang thai samai mai [Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram and Modem Thai Politics], 2001, p.394.
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Monuments as a Means to Disseminate Statist Nationalism
The statist nationalism was mirrored in monuments erected by the Thai 
government in the 1930s and 1940s and served to disseminate its ideology. In 1936, 
the first public monument of the political nation, the Monument for the Protection of 
the Constitution (anusawari phitak ratthatammanun) was unveiled. Its function was 
to commemorate the victory of government forces against royalist rebels in 1933. The 
monument is in the shape of a bullet with the constitution lying on top of it. Its 
decoration includes images of a farmer’s family and the wheel of dharma, 
symbolising the willingness of the state to defend the constitution, the Thai people 
and Buddhism.51
The most famous landmarks of this period were the Democracy Monument 
(<anusawari prachathipatai) and the Victory Monument (anusawari chaisamoraphum) 
in Bangkok. While the first one was to celebrate the introduction of democracy in 
Thailand, the latter one was constructed after the outbreak of armed skirmishes with 
French troops in 1940 on the border to Indochina and the following re-gaining of 
territories. Heroic realism dominates this monument, centred by a huge obelisk. Five 
life-size bronze figures are at the base, displaying the activities of army, navy, air 
force, police, and civilians. The purpose of the monument was to evoke nationalist 
feelings against an outside enemy and to represent the new role of Thai citizens in 
contrast to their former role of subjects. At the opening ceremony in 1942, Phibun 
said: “This Victory Monument will eternally remind all Thais that this country 
successfully retrieved its honour by the hands of the Thai heroes of the five groups 
namely the army, the navy, the air force, the police and the civilians. This important 
monument, apart from being a memorial to the glory of the Thai heroes, it implants 
[the idea] in the next generation of Thais to have perseverance, patience and 
braveness and to be without fear of dying for retrieving the honour of the nation. It 
also implants the perfect love of the nation as well. Every time our fellow countrymen 
pass by this monument, they will remember all this goodness. The Victory Monument 
is the destination of the solidarity of all the Thai people to integrate and to preserve
51 Kromsinlapakon, Anusawari naiprathetthai [Monuments in Thailand], 1998, pp.191-193.
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the Thainess of Thailand forever.”52 From Phibun’s speech, the Victory Monument 
can be considered an excellent symbol of statist nationalism.
One monument which could have been the pinnacle of representation of the 
political nation if it would have been constructed, is the Thai Monument {anusawari 
thai). The monument was designed as a huge stupa with a base length of 100 meters 
on each side. It was to be surrounded by buildings which were intended to house an 
economic museum to showcase products, a restaurant and ballroom, a hotel and a 
conference centre. Foreign guests were supposed to feel, in the words of the project 
leader Wichit, ‘immediately how prosperous our country is’.53 This stupa was not 
supposed to have any religious function but was to create solely the feeling of love to 
the nation. It was the combination of a building in the style of a stupa, representing 
Thainess, and the modem amenities representing progress, that was revolutionary. 
Wichit commented in 1939: ’’When the Thai Monument is finished, it will not only be 
the most important and lasting piece in Thailand but could be one of the ‘wonders-of- 
the-world’ in terms of culture and art. We can show the world the history of Thai 
architecture in a way no one or no king could ever do. If we can build this monument 
in our period this will be a great and lasting honour for us. King Chulalongkom 
invested five million Baht to build the Anantasamakhom Throne Hall without benefit 
for the glory of the nation. This monument will be for the glory of the nation and of 
us.”54 However, because of budget restraints, the monument never came into 
existence.
Was statist nationalism a success and did it win the loyalty of the people for 
the political nation? I propose that this kind of nationalism under the leadership of 
Phibun and Wichit was a failure.
Due to the strong emphasis on the state, the form of this state was crucial in 
the effectiveness of statist nationalism. It is useful to set the Thai state policies of that 
period in context with the international political environment, especially fascism, to 
uncover some of the reasons for the failure of statist nationalism. Although Phibun
52 Cited in Chatri Prakitnonthakan, Khanaratsadon chalong ratthathammanun: prawattisat kanmueang 
lang 2475 pkan sathapattayakam 'amnat' [.Kanaratsadon Celebrating the Constitution: Political 
History after 1932 as Seen Through the Architecture o f ‘Power’], 2005, p.81.
53 Cited in Chatri Prakitnonthakan, Kanmueang lae sangkhom nai sinlapa sathapattayakam sayam 
samai thai prayuk chatniyom [Politics and Society in Arts and Architecture in the Periods of Modem 
Siam, New Thailand, and Nationalism], 2004, p.383.
54 Cited in Chatri, 2004, p.383.
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was an admirer of Mussolini, he cannot be categorised as a fascist. Gentile defined 
fascism as follows: “Fascism is a modem political phenomenon, which is nationalistic 
and revolutionary, anti-liberal and anti-Marxist, organised in the form of a militia 
party, with a totalitarian conception of politics and the State, with an ideology based 
on myth; virile and anti-hedonistic, it is sacralised in a political religion affirming the 
absolute primacy of the nation understood as an ethnically homogenous organic 
community, hierarchically organised into a corporative State, with a bellicose mission 
to achieve grandeur, power and conquest with the ultimate aim of creating a new 
order and a new civilisation.”55
The main weakness of Phibun’s concept was located in his attempt to disguise 
his version of political nationalism, namely statist nationalism, as ‘fashionable’ fascist 
pomp and ceremony. By not following the fascist model to the letter in practice, he 
ironically lessened the effectiveness of his nationalism. Phibun’s regime supports 
Breuilly’s argument that nationalism took a less radical form in states where politics 
continued to be based on more traditional kinds of authoritarianism.56 Phibun failed to 
sacralise politics or, in other words, to create a political religion. Gentile defined 
sacralisation of politics as the formation of a religious dimension in politics that is 
distinct from, and autonomous of, traditional religious institutions.57 Phibun did the 
opposite thing, he tried to politicise the traditional religion, namely Buddhism. To 
underline this point, it is useful to look at the construction of Wat Prachatipatai 
(Democracy Temple, nowadays called Wat Phrasrimahathat) in Bangkhen, near Don 
Mueang airport. It was designed to be the temple for the group of the People’s Party. 
Phibun tried but failed to convince both Buddhist sects, the Thammayuth and 
Mahanikai, to run the temple together. By making the temple the resting place for the 
remains of the most important persons of his version of the Thai nation, he copied the 
model of the Pantheon in Paris.58 Although the Pantheon is housed in a former church, 
it was deconsecrated beforehand. Phibun, however, built a fully functioning temple 
and did not attempt to use nationalism as Ersatz-religion.
55 Gentile, Emilio. “Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion: Definitions and Critical 
Reflections on Criticism of an Interpretation”, TMPR, 2004, p.329.
56 Breuilly, John. “The State”, San Diego 2001, p.786. Phibun can be categorised as a military dictator 
rather than a totalitarian dictator. For a discussion of these categories see Maniruzzaman, Talukder. 
“Military Rule”, London 2004, p.251.
57 Gentile, Emilio. “The Sacralisation o f Politics: Definitions, Interpretations and Reflections on the 
Question of Secular Religion and Totalitarianism”, TMPR, 2000, p.21
58 Chatri, 2005, pp.77-78.
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Phibun’s policy to hold on to Buddhism to gain legitimation crippled his 
efforts to promote statist nationalism because Buddhism was traditionally close to the 
monarchy and every move to support Buddhism automatically strengthened the 
monarchy as well. Smith proposed that “religious traditions, and especially beliefs 
about the sacred, underpin and suffuse to a greater or lesser degree the national 
identities of the populations of the constituent states. In fact, these beliefs and 
practices often shape and inspire the national identities and nationalisms of the 
modem world, lending them a power and depth which serves to ground the inter-state 
order in the ‘will-of-the-people’ in ways that democratic practices often fail to do.”59 
Monarchy in Thailand represented such a sacred dimension which was (and is) 
difficult to explain in a rational way. This sacred dimension of the monarchy was 
inseparably imbedded in the already existing monarchical nation. Phibun’s efforts 
became even more difficult by the fact that the earlier monarchical nation already 
‘occupied’ many symbols, myth and traditions, connecting them in the minds of the 
people with the king as active leader of the nation. The same difficulty appeared also 
with history as Chulalongkom and Damrong essentially fixed national history to the 
monarchy. Phibun’s failure to secularise and ‘republicanise’ the ‘available’ history, 
symbols etc, resulted in a reinforcement of the emotional bond between the people 
with the monarchy instead of cutting it.
Apart from the elements of the fascist role model, Phibun also failed to win 
the hearts and minds of the people by not allowing democracy. In 1936, Phibun said 
in private: ‘to rectify the weakness of the nation it is essential that discipline be 
maintained; to be quite blunt, one must employ the methods of dictatorship’.60 Though 
continuing to make public references to constitutional and democratic ideals, he never 
delivered this to the people. By promising democracy but not following up on his 
words, Phibun weakened his own position within the political elite and the people. He 
also tried to build a loyal following to his own person and viewed the nation’s course 
as a matter of personal destiny leading him to see his personal interest as the 
nation’s.61 With this connection between nation and political leader, he was in direct 
competition with the loyalty to the monarchy. An example to demonstrate how 
Phibun fell short in his effort to draw loyalty away from the monarchy, was an
59 Smith, Anthony. “The ‘Sacred’ Dimension of Nationalism”, MJIS, 2000, p.795.
60 Cited in Reynolds, 2004, pp. 104.
61 Reynolds, 2004, p. 133.
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incident which occurred in 1948. The exhibiting of statues of King Chulalongkom 
and Phibun in a government shop came under heavy criticism by visitors because both 
statues were of the same height and placed at the same level. The disapproval was so 
strong that the government had to publish an explanation in the newspapers that the 
display was not thought to represent the ‘real’ persons.62 Phibun underestimated the 
emotional appeal and sacred dimension of the monarchy and could therefore not 
convince the masses of his idea of the nation.
Statist nationalism as an ideology was dealt an additional blow when Phibun, a 
close ally of the Japanese, had to step down after the defeat of Japan became obvious 
in 1944. Although Phibun was able to return to power, the changed international 
situation and the failure of statist nationalism in its previous form required the 
adoption of a new approach.
7.3. A New Version o f Statist Nationalism (1950-1957)
Phibun, who became Prime Minister for a second time in 1947, had to 
acknowledge that his earlier version of statist nationalism failed and therefore decided 
to put more emphasis on the role of the monarchy. Phibun tried to re-interpret statist 
nationalism as royal nationalism. However, he failed again because of his lack of 
commitment to the monarchy and the lack of cooperation from King Bhumibol 
Aduljadej (r.1946-).
In his first term as Prime Minister, Phibun was powerful enough to promote 
the view of the nation as identical to the state and to reduce the people to mere 
followers of an autocratic regime. His second term of power, however, saw two 
significant problems. First, his position was jeopardised by internal power struggles 
within the ruling circles. Second, a short democratic spell between 1944 and 1947 
gave birth to oppositional forces which consisted mainly of intellectuals with socialist 
ideas.
To strengthen his own position both inside and outside the ruling elite, Phibun 
aimed to win the hearts and minds of the population by changing his strategy 
regarding nationalism. His target was to maintain his power, and the threat of
62 Chatri, 2005, p. 195. Similar, Sharp and Hanks reported from the field studies in a Thai village in the 
late 1940s that the villagers did not change their perceptions o f other races despite government 
propaganda. Sharp, Lauriston/Hanks, Lucien, Bang Chan- Social History o f A Rural Community in 
Thailand, Ithaca 1978, p. 184.
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communism offered him a unique chance to succeed. Anti-communism provided the 
image of an external threat that helped Phibun to gather support for his government. It 
also opened the door for massive US funds for development and modernisation of 
army and the countryside. Phibun found another use for anti-communism as well, 
namely as a formidable weapon in the fight against his political enemies and 
emerging regionalism.63 He portrayed the communists as a danger to the security of 
the Thai government, departing from the older ‘official’ perception (propagated since 
King Vajiravudh) that communism would destroy the monarchy and create chaos. He 
accused communists of having connections to Vietnam and Laos and called them 
‘enemies of the nation’ and ‘people who sell the nation’. Phibun did not hesitate to 
label his political opponents like the liberal Pridi Panomyong, an ex-Prime Minister of 
the democratic period, as communists.64
Phibun and the Monarchy
Phibun used anti-communism before western governments started to voice 
warnings about communism in South East Asia.65 The mind behind this decision was 
again Wichit, his chief ideologist. Wichit still preached that nationalism was good for 
smaller nations but his basic assumption had changed in the wake of a bipolar world. 
In contrast to his pre-war aversion to Buddhism and the monarchy, these two
63 The biggest opposition to Phibun came from a political movement based in the North East. Its root 
lay in the seri thai (Free Thai), the anti-Japanese and anti-Phibun resistance organisation during WWII. 
After the war seri thai members joined the samakkhitham (Solidarity) movement in the North East 
under the leadership o f Krong Chandavong, an associate o f the Socialist Front who was able to build 
up a strong peasant organisation with thousands of members. This was not a separatist movement with 
the aim of unification with Laos but had a strong regional identity. Phibun subsequently arrested and 
jailed its leaders. Some of them, like Krong, were executed. Haseman, J., The Thai Resistance 
Movement during the Second World War, DeKalb 1978, p. 152 and Somchai P. “Political Resistance in 
Isan”, Tai Culture, 2002, pp.l 17-121. Another hotbed was the Muslim area in the South. Phibun’s 
national culture was even more appalling for them. In order to get away from Thailand the Malay 
population hoped after WWII that the British would occupy the provinces. Jones, F./Peam, B., The Far 
East- 1942-1946, London 1955, p.240. See also Whittingham-Jones, B. “Patani Appeals to UNO”, 
Eastern World, 1948, p.4.
64 See Tamthai Dilokwityarat. “Phaplak khong kommiwnit nai kanmueang thai [Images of 
Communism in Thai Politics]”, Ratthasatsan, 2003, pp. 164-178.
65 The warnings in the West started in November 1948 when the Commissioner-General for the United 
Kingdom in South East Asia reminded London about the consequences o f a communist victory in 
China. Phibun’s strategy o f anti-communism, symbolised by his decision to ally himself with the USA 
in Korea in 1950, was endorsed when the US ambassador to Thailand warned him about communist 
subversion in 1951 before any real communist threat to South East Asia had emerged. Turnbull, C. 
“Regionalism and Nationalism”, Cambridge 1999, p.269. This prediction was the predecessor o f the 
Domino theory announced by President Eisenhower in April 1954. See also Saitip Sukatipan. 
“Thailand- The Evolution o f Legitimacy”, Stanford 1995, p.201.
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institutions were now highlighted as central in the fight against communism and 
Thainess was equated with anti-communism and modernisation. Wichit proved again 
to be influential in giving the definition of Thainess for some time to come.
Phibun translated Wichit’s theoretical approach into policies. In a report in 
1950, the British Foreign Office commented that Phibun had discovered the value of 
the monarchy for him. The report stated that Phibun did not intend to rebuild the real 
power of the monarchy, only its glory. Phibun started to whitewash the person of 
King Prajadhipok and arranged the transfer of his ashes from England with pomp and 
ceremony in 1949. In 1950, Phibun announced the return of King Bhumibol, who was 
then living in Switzerland, to Thailand and tried to establish himself as protector of 
the monarchy. The report went on: “Tremendous public interest and enthusiasm were 
aroused by the three ceremonies of the cremation of King Ananda’s remains, the 
Royal wedding of Bhumibol, and the Coronation, which took place in March, April 
and May, and which were carried through with the greatest solemnity and traditional 
pageantry.” Phibun’s ‘royalism’, however, concluded the report, was largely a matter 
of convenience and he ‘might be tempted to engineer dynastic changes if his support 
of the King would not yield better dividends’.66
With mounting pressure from political opponents and the rise of nationalist 
feelings outside the ruling elite67, Phibun realised that the monarchy was useful for 
him to maintain his position. However, his ability to generate benefits from the 
monarchy for himself was hampered by his poor relationship with the Chakri family. 
The new and young King Bhumibol turned out to be not the push over Phibun had 
hoped for. Bhumibol, bom in the USA, ascended to the throne unprepared, shy and 
rather unfamiliar with Thailand after his elder brother, King Ananda, was found shot 
dead in his bed in Bangkok in 1946.68 Contemporary observers commented rather
66 British Foreign Office FO371/92952/FS1011/1.
67 This movement was mainly influenced by the Stockholm Peace Appeal in March 1950. An article 
appearing in the weekly magazine Kanmueang [Politics] branded the USA as a threat to the peace in 
Asia and a cause o f hardship for Thai people in May 1950. When a follow up signature campaign 
against the government was able to collect 150,000 signatures, Phibun realised that the mobilisation of 
Thai troops for Korea was unpopular with Thais and an attractive subject for intellectuals. Katsuyuki, 
Takahashi. “The Peace Movement in Thailand after the Second World War: The Cases in Sakhon 
Nakhon and Sisaket”, Bangkok 2002, pp. 110-140. In addition there were other opposition groups: 
Khana Ku Chat (left wing military), CPT and the Workers Movement. See Suthachai, 1991, pp.282- 
311.
68 For the ‘mysterious death’ see Suphot Dantrakun, Khothet ching kia kap karani sawannakot [The 
Fact about the Death o f the King], Bangkok 2001 and The Times (London), “King Ananda’s 
Mysterious Death in Bangkok”, 11 March 1949, p.5. Bhumibol wrote a letter to his dead brother, 
showing his unpreparedness: “I can’t stop thinking about you, Brother. I thought, I will never be far
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pessimistically about his future. Thompson/Adloff saw the prolonged residence of 
two successive Thai monarchs in Europe (Bhumibol stayed in Switzerland to finish 
his studies until 1951) as a reason for diluted allegiance of the Thai people to the 
Chakri dynasty.69 The British Foreign Office commented in its annual review for 
1952: “King Bhumibol has shown no disposition to take any part in affairs, or even to 
appear in public more than is required by the strictest demands of duty...the 
monarchy does not play in Thailand the role it could.”70 The British ambassador in 
Bangkok wrote in 1953: “The King has made but few public appearances and the 
gravity and reserve of his manner (in contrast to the charm of Queen Sirikit’s 
personality) make it unlikely that he will ever command a strong personal following 
as distinct from the respect traditionally accorded to monarchy in this country.”71 
However, the King was able to gain immense popularity with the people. For 
example, his decision to ordain as a Buddhist monk in Wat Bowonnivet for two 
weeks in 1956 dramatically increased his charisma in the eyes of the public.72 
Bhumibol’s position was strengthened by field trips in the North East in 1955. 
Contrary to what observers had predicted, his enthusiastic welcome by the population 
showed that the charisma of traditional kingship in Thailand had not suffered from the 
revolution and its following policy of statist nationalism or from the lengthy absence 
of a king. Phibun seemed to be envious about the success of Bhumibol on these trips 
as he refused to finance any further excursions.73
As history has shown, Bhumibol’s limited public appearances had nothing to 
do with inability but much more with his distrust of Phibun. Bhumibol said in 1950 in 
a public speech with a clear hint on Phibun: “However, I want to tell you that there 
are several who tried to quote ‘loyalty’ for their own private and personal interest.”74 
The truth of the death of his brother was never satisfactorily discovered (at least in 
public) and his life could have been in danger as well. Phibun’s numerous decisions
away from you, Brother, my whole life, but it’s karma. I never thought that I will be the King, I only 
thought I will be the little brother o f you.” Cited in Suphot, 2001, p. 15.
69 Thompson, Virginia/ Adloff, Richard. “Southeast Asia Follows the Leader”, Far Eastern Survey, 
1949, p.254.
70 British Foreign Office FO 371/106882/FS1011/1.
71 British Foreign Office FO 371/112261/DS1011/1.
72 Skrobanek, Walter, Buddhistische Politik in Thailand: Mit besonderer Beriicksichtigung des 
heterodoxen Messianismus, Wiesbaden 1976, p.224.
73 Gray, Christine. “Royal Words and Their Unroyal Consequences”, Cultural Anthropology, 1992, 
p.449.
74 Cited in Skrobanek, 1976, p.223. Another reason for the rather low profile o f Bhumibol was his lack 
of money, making it difficult to sponsor festivities. See Gray, 1991, p.51.
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against the interests of the Chakri family were not forgotten. Kobkua argued that in
1951 when Phibun conducted a coup against his own government, his main target was 
the royal family. Phibun reversed the trend in the previous constitutions of 1947 
(provisional) and 1949 (permanent) which gave the King such rights as veto power 
over legislation and the right to appoint senate members. The new constitution in
1952 limited the role of Bhumibol again and reduced him to being a symbol of the 
unified Thai nation whose main functions consisted of performing religious and 
traditional ceremonies. Bhumibol’s reaction to his new limits was a restriction of his 
participation in public affairs. The only concession Phibun made to the King was that 
he was allowed to look after his own domain, a decision central to King Bhumibol’s 
strong economic basis today.75
The Dissemination o f  the New Version o f Statist Nationalism
As in his first term in power, Phibun ensured that his interpretation of the 
nation was disseminated throughout the population. It is noteworthy that Phibun 
changed his image from the ‘leader’ to ‘father’ of the nation just like King 
Ramkhamhaeng.76 Part of this image was his effort to present himself as patron of 
Buddhism, a role traditionally played by the kings. A visual sign of this role was 
Phibun’s order to restore 1,239 temples all over the country in 1956. A high-profile 
opportunity to show the dominance of the state over the monarchy was the festival 
regarding the 25th centennial celebration of Buddhism in 1957. Phibun paid only lip 
service to the King and depicted the government as official sponsor of the ‘national 
religion’: “The Thai nation has believed in the Buddhist religion since time 
immemorial and has received great benefits from its faith in Buddhism. Governments 
of the country in all ages, have respected Buddhism as the national religion. On this 
august occasion, the government plans to hold a special celebration so the people can 
take part in the festivities.”77 As the King played no important part in the activities,
75 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian. “Thailand’s Constitutional Monarchy, A Study of Concepts and 
Meanings of the Constitution, 1932-1957”, Paper Presented at the 14th IAHA-Conference, Bangkok 
1996, pp.6-11. The coup was staged when Bhumibol was on the last leg o f his journey home- he was 
only two days away from Bangkok. British Foreign Ministry FO 371/101164/FS1011/1.
76 Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics o f  Despotic Paternalism, Bangkok 1979, pp.96-97. 
Phibun’s fascination with Ramkhamhaeng survived from his first term in power to the second one. He 
founded a political party with the name ‘Phakmanangkhasila’ ( ‘Party o f  the Throne of 
Ramkhamhaeng’). Sulak, 1991, p.53.
77 Cited in Thak, 1979, p.98.
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Bhumibol decided to stay away from most ceremonies. This boycott made Phibun’s 
effort to shine as the patron of Buddhism more or less useless. Another example was 
his visit to Ayutthaya together with the Burmese Prime Minister U Nu. Thak argued 
that the people saw the prerogative for righting an ancient conflict as of the king and 
not of a commoner like Phibun. Rumours spread that during the visit, the city was 
covered with darkness and ghostly wailing was heard indicating the displeasure of the 
ancestors.78
Another means to disseminate the statist nationalism in Phibun’s second term 
in power was the use of culture and entertainment. Phibun argued that ‘our culture is 
as old as our nation’ and was of utmost importance. However, this culture was under 
communist danger and had to be strengthened again. He criticised the political left for 
not respecting the culture of their grandparents: ‘they do not respect their parents, 
their teachers, the elders, Buddhism, dharma and sangha\ The absence of the 
monarchy in this quote was not surprising because Phibun went on to lash out against 
the right wing, e.g. royalists, as well by accusing them of living in the past. He argued 
that they aimed to destroy the culture of liberal democracy and to just ‘plough the 
field’ [a reference to the Royal First Ploughing of the Field Ceremony]. Therefore, 
stated Phibun, he founded the Ministry of Culture (1952) in order to improve the 
national culture.79 The Ministry of Culture had the task of spreading Phibun’s and 
mostly Wichit’s idea of culture to the regions. Officials were sent into the villages 
who promoted the national culture with drama troupes, films, mobile libraries and 
health units. The declared aim was to get the people in the countryside interested in 
the national culture with the help of entertainment.80
Wichit himself wrote several historical plays. All of them focussed on the 
creation of the Thai kingdom which had been the result of blood, life and sacrifice of 
the ancestors. Wichit emphasised in the plays that it was the duty of the people to 
protect the Thai kingdom and sovereignty against communist intrusion. In the play 
‘The Power of Phokhun Ramkhamhaeng’ (onuphap phokhunramkhamhaeng), for 
example, Wichit depicted the king as sacrificing his own interests for the benefit of 
the kingdom. One of the characters declared:
78 Thak, 1979, p.99.
79 Phibun Songkhram, Chompon Po Phibunsongkhram [Field Marshal P. Phibun Songkhram], 
Bangkok no date, pp.303-306.
80 Pra-omart, 1985, p. 124.
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“Our Brothers and Sisters, in our life there is nothing more important than
Thainess. Let all of us think of Thainess, restore Thainess and preserve
Thainess and our beloved Thai nation.”81
Wichit followed the example of King Vajiravudh in his use of dramas to 
disseminate statist nationalism. He, however, did not put importance on the artistic 
value but stressed that in order to reach the masses any play had to be easy to 
understand. Most significant in this context were nationalistic songs which were part 
of the plays and achieved the longest lasting impact on the audience. An example was 
the song Tontrakunthai (The Thai Ancestors) which was originally part of the play 
‘The Power of Phokhun Ramkhamhaeng’ and was taught in schools.82
The choice of content and means to disseminate statist nationalism in Phibun’s 
second term in power contributed to its repeated failure. Although Phibun had 
dropped the fascist disguise of statist nationalism, he did not change the basic 
characteristics of it. Despite their aim to replace the monarchy with the state as the 
leader of the nation, Phibun and Wichit re-used many elements of monarchical 
nationalism. As a result, they unintentionally strengthened the monarchy instead of 
weakening it. This could be demonstrated in the case of their support for Buddhism, 
an institution closely linked to the monarchy. Phibun’s aim to be the patron of 
Buddhism turned out to be a mistake because people connected this function with a 
monarch and were displeased by his obvious attempt to sideline the king. History was 
another subject which added to the woes of statist nationalism. Both Phibun and 
Wichit intensively created and promoted their version of a history of the nation. 
However, their constant use of monarchs as heroes of the nation (for example, 
Ramkhamhaeng and Taksin) reinforced the images known from monarchical 
nationalism instead of replacing them with non-royal alternatives.
It could be said that Phibun’s efforts to lessen the importance of the monarchy 
resulted in a decline of his own popularity and a boost for the popularity of King 
Bhumibol. This was supported by the reaction of the King who increasingly sought 
direct contact with the people and avoided cooperation with the government. It could
81 Cited in Pra-ornart, 1985, 129.
82 Pra-ornart, 1985, p.261. This song proved to be so popular that it is still broadcast daily by the army- 
controlled TV stations.
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be taken as early signs that King Bhumibol was not interested to act as a mere symbol 
of the nation but sought to actively shape Thai society. It is therefore an irony of 
history that in the Thai case statist nationalism with its anti-monarchic elements 
indirectly helped monarchical nationalism to celebrate a comeback a few decades 
later. Moreover, statist nationalism could neither prevent the ousting of Phibun and 
his departure into a life-long exile in Japan in 1957 nor the rise of a competing 
nationalism, namely royal nationalism, inside the ruling bureaucratic group.
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Chapter 8
The Rise and Decline of Royal Nationalism (1950s-1980)
In the 1950s, it became evident that the nationalist ideology of the ruling group 
around Prime Minister Phibun was unable to bind the loyalty of the people to the state 
and its vision of the nation. Competing views of the nation emerged both inside and 
outside of the ruling elites. The focus of this chapter is on a new group inside the 
bureaucratic elite who re-directed Thai nationalism away from statist nationalism 
towards royal nationalism. As described in chapter four, I understand royal nationalism 
as being a kind of political nationalism which tries to achieve its goals with the help of 
the symbolic power of the monarchy. Royal nationalism requires a passive but 
cooperative role from the monarchy. During the 1950s and 1960s, royal nationalism 
flourished as all participants played along. However, a growing dissatisfaction with 
military rule amongst the population resulted in a loss of appeal of this version of royal 
nationalism. As Thai politics and nationalism headed for a crisis in the 1970s, King 
Bhumibol started to develop and offer an alternative view of the nation in order to heal 
the rift in society. An active role of the King automatically spelt the end of dominance 
for Thai political nationalism, both statist and royal. This development counters the 
argument of the revisionist school that King Bhumibol remained a passive and willing 
collaborator with the ruling military elites.
8.1. The Dominant Era o f Royal Nationalism (1950s-1960s)
In the mid-1950s, Phibun increasingly lost his grip on power. After a visit to 
Europe and the United States in 1955, Phibun ‘discovered’ and promoted the ideal of 
democracy in an attempt to bolster his position. However, more freedom of expression 
led to a wave of criticism and protest against his government. The fact that these 
protests were mostly motivated by a new, anti-western political awareness in 
oppositional forces1 showed that Phibun’s interpretation of statist nationalism as an anti­
communist ideology was not reaching some parts of the population. It also meant that
1 British Foreign Office FO 371/129609/DS 1011/1. See also Ockey, Jim. “Civil Society and Street 
Politics: Lessons from the Fifties”, Paper Presented at the 7th International Conference on Thai Studies, 
Amsterdam 1999, p. 1.
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the state was faced with different views on the nation which were no longer under its 
control.
The biggest threat to Phibun’s power, however, came from a rival faction within 
the bureaucratic elite which used the political situation to establish itself as an 
alternative to the Prime Minister. This group was under the leadership o f General Sarit 
Thanarat, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, who had a different 
understanding of the Thai nation and politics. Sarit himself did not feel at home in the 
nation propagated by Phibun. In a newspaper interview in 1959, Sarit admitted that he 
was unhappy with the 24th of June [date of the revolution in 1932] as National Day 
because that day “creates the feeling that it is the day of ‘them’ [People’s Party].”2 This 
statement showed that the failure of statist nationalism gave space to a competing view 
of the nation. This competing view was heavily influenced by the personal background 
of people like Sarit who was educated in Thailand, spoke little English, harboured no 
resentment against the monarchy and continuously emphasised his upbringing in the 
countryside. This was in stark contrast to the international background of the 1932 coup 
promoters who were strongly influenced by western ideas.
The official split between Phibun and Sarit occurred in 1957. Sarit left the 
cabinet in protest against Phibun’s Interior Minister Phao Sriyanond, who had allegedly 
suggested that the King should be taken into ‘protective custody’.3 This move earned 
Sarit immense popularity within the population.4 On 16 September 1957, Sarit staged a 
coup against the Phibun government and forced the Prime Minister to flee abroad. 
Kobkua proposed that this coup was conducted ‘first and foremost to bring an end to the 
Phibun-Phao clique and to ensure the political survival of Sarit’s faction’.5 The ideal 
tool to legitimise the coup was to present an alternative view of the nation which saw 
the monarchy in a central role. There were reports that Sarit won the approval of the 
King for the coup in advance because he claimed that Phibun had committed acts of 
ldse-majeste.6 After the takeover, Sarit received official blessing with a royal decree
2 Cited in Somsak Chiamthirasakun. “Prawattisat wanchat thai chak 24 mithuna-5 thanwa [The History of 
Thai National Day from 24 June to 5 December]”, Fadiaokan, 2004, p. 116. In 1960, it was decided that 
the birthday o f King Bhumibol (5 December) should be National Day.
3 Phao commented on another occasion that he was not the real target: “The King does not like him 
[Phibun] and wishes for a change in the Premiership.” British Colonial Office CO 1022/37.
4 British Foreign Office FO 371/136020/DS 1011/1 and The Times (London). “Political Crisis in Siam”, 3 
September 1957, p.8.
5 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Kings, Country and Constitutions, London 2003, p. 10.
6 Anonymus. “National Socialism in Thailand”, Eastern World, 1958, p .ll .  For more details about the 
reasons for the coup see Likhit Dhiravegin, Demi-Democracy- The Evolution o f  the Thai Political System, 
Singapore 1992, pp. 156-158.
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declaring martial law and by being appointed as the military custodian of Bangkok, 
including the right to countersign any royal decrees and proclamations.7 However, Sarit 
could not assume the position of Prime Minister for medical reasons. The close 
connection of Sarit to the King was mirrored in rumours that the favourite for the 
position was Phraya Siwisanwacha, an advisor of the King and a member of the Privy 
Council.8 In the end, Sarit installed his associate General Thanom Kitikachom in the 
position after the election in December 1957. Sarit took up the position of Prime 
Minister himself in 1958, a move resulting in a major ideological change in Thai 
nationalism. Sarit’s campaign to defend the monarchy could be seen as the beginning of 
royal nationalism in Thailand. The cooperation of the monarchy with the state was 
ensured because Sarit ‘managed to earn his monarch’s trust and clearly became the 
favoured Prime Minister of the King’.9
Royal nationalism served not only as legitimation for Sarit’s government but 
was needed to strengthen the position of the Thai government in an intensifying volatile 
international environment. Sarit’s time in power was marked by an increasing 
importance of world events for Thai politics. The political development in Indochina 
and the presence of the USA in the region had helped to alter the course of Thai 
nationalism. With funds from the US government, a huge programme for the 
development of the countryside began. 10 Large infrastructure projects, like the 
‘Friendship Highway’ into the North East, were constructed not only for military 
purposes but also for the expansion of the central bureaucracy to increase control over 
an area populated by ethnic Lao.11 The situation dramatically changed with the 
surprising coup of Colonel Kong Le (with an anti-Thai and anti-US stance) against the 
Laotian government in August I960.12 Sarit and King Bhumibol were convinced that a
7 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian. “Thailand’s Constitutional Monarchy, A Study of Concepts and Meanings 
of the Constitution, 1932-1957”, Paper Presented at the 14th IAHA-Conference, Bangkok 1996, p.14.
8 The Times (London). “Marshal Phibul in Phnom Penh’, 20 September 1957, p.8.
9 Kobkua, 2003, p. 15.
10 Not only the USA but also the UK pushed the government to nationalism. In a report to Prime Minister 
Macmillan, Lord Selkirk (then Commissioner General for South East Asia) stressed the need to support 
nationalism in the region: “We must clearly do everything to promote nationalism as a counter to 
communism and avoid policies which may lead nationalists and communists to join forces against us.” 
British Prime Minister’s Office, PREM 11/3737.
11 Even in the 1960s, observers reported that in villages in the North East, the photographs o f  the Lao king 
were displayed rather than the photographs of the Thai king. See Sanders, S., A Sense o f  Asia, 1969, p.46.
12 Kanala Eksaengsri, Political Change and Modernization: Northeast Thailand’s Quest fo r Identity and 
Its Potential Threat to National Security, Binghampton 1977, p.460.
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communist take-over in Vientiane would have catastrophic consequences for Thailand.13 
When the USA failed to give support to the old Lao government to restore its position, 
Sarit announced that Thailand ‘must look after itself.14 The feeling of standing alone 
without reliable friends was reinforced in 1962, when the World Court ruled in favour 
of Cambodia in a long running legal dispute regarding the ownership of a Khmer temple 
which stood directly on the border of the two countries.15 Interior Minister Prapas 
announced in a speech on 5 September 1962 a policy of ‘Thai-ism’, which included a 
‘disengagement from the closeness of the US embrace’.16
The combination of elements such as the emergence of a new ruling group out 
of an intra-elite power struggle, the social background of Sarit, the willingness of the 
King to cooperate and the external threat in Indochina, resulted in an era of dominance 
of royal nationalism. This nationalism was based in an indigenous interpretation of the 
nation which differed from monarchical nationalism in one decisive factor: the state and 
not the monarchy was the leader.
Sarit’s Notion o f the Nation
Sarit’s ideas about the Thai nation were reflected in his policies. First, he 
regarded the Thai nation as a family: “A nation is like one big family. The ruler is none 
other than the head of the family who must regard all the people as his own 
children...He must be kind, compassionate and very mindful...I myself have made 
efforts to reach that level. I always try to be close to the people and take care of them as 
if they were my own family.” 17 To comply with this image of the nation, Sarit 
developed his phokhun-sty\c [father lord-style] of paternalistic rule modelled on the 
style of government during the Sukhothai period. Central was his role as a father who 
had to keep his children happy. For example, as a gesture of kindness and compassion, 
Sarit reduced train fares, school fees and the price of electricity. But he also insisted on
13 See King Bhumibol’s statement in a private meeting with the British ambassador Sir Richard 
Whittington, 12 May 1961. British Prime Minister’s Office, PREM 11/3531.
14 British Foreign Office FO 371/160069/DS 1011/1.
15 Anti-Cambodian feelings ran high in Thailand and the British Foreign Office excluded not even King 
Bhumibol from them. British Foreign Office FO 371/ 144293/DS 1011/1. See for the Phra Viham dispute 
British Foreign Office FO 371/170016/DS 1011/1 and Singh, L. “The Thai-Cambodian Temple Dispute”, 
AS, 1962, pp.23-25.
16 British Foreign Office, FO 371/170016/DS 1011/1. ‘Thai-ism’ in Praphat’s understanding was a ‘policy 
based on Thai history, Thai culture and Thai interests’. Cited in Wilson, David. “Thailand: Old Leaders 
and New Directions”, AS, 1963, p.86.
17 Cited in Kobkua, 2003, p. 12.
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keeping law and order by banning negative influences on Thai cultural values such as 
Rock and Roll music and dance.18
Sarit saw this style of government as suitable for Thailand as it was rooted in 
Thai culture, social and traditional values together with Buddhist teachings. 19 
Democracy, like all foreign ideologies, was categorised as not fitting for the Thai 
people.20 The Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, gave an insight into the thinking of the 
ruling group when asked about the lack of democratisation: “The fundamental 
cause... lies in the sudden transplantation of alien institutions on to our own soil without 
careful preparation and particularly without proper regard to the nature and 
characteristics of our own people, in a word the genius of our race. My own view is that 
it is preferable to fall back on ourselves, to withdraw into our shells and think, think 
hard, and forget about those institutions for a while.”21 Applied to their understanding of 
the nation, this meant that it had to be based on state-defined Thai cultural elements and 
not on models from the West.
Second, this indigenised view of the nation resulted in a major difference in the 
interpretation of the role of the monarchy compared to the Phibun era. While Phibun 
attempted to lessen the importance of the monarchy, Sarit called it ‘the palladium of the 
nation’22 and the guarantee for its survival: “the Thai nation has survived up until today 
because we have a monarch who has been the pillar of unity and spiritual sanctuary who 
sacrifices his life and blood for the country. Therefore the name of His Majesty is the 
most sacred thing for the Thai nation; it serves as a unifier of the Thai people, 
inseparable by any means.” 23 This connection served as legitimation for his coup 
because he claimed that under the previous government the Thai king became separated 
from the Thai nation which was unacceptable.24 Therefore, he called his new 
government ‘revolutionary’ because it would give full protection to the King and would 
do everything to keep the King and the royal family in utmost veneration. However, 
Sarit policies were not fully altruistic. He used the monarchy to gain support for his
18 Likhit, 1992, pp.161-163.
19 Kobkua, 2003, p .l 1.
20 Chalermkiet Phiu-Nual, Khwamkhit thang kanmueang khong thahan thai 2519-2535 [Political Thought 
o f the Thai Army (1976-1992)], Bangkok 1992, pp.47-48.
21 Cited in British Cabinet Office CAB 21/4640/14/31/228.
22 Kobkua, 2003, p. 14.
23 Cited in Suchit Bunbongkam. “Political Power o f Thai Military Leaders: A Comparative Study o f Field 
Marshal P. Phibulsongkram and Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat”, Social Science Review, 1977, p.200.
24 Sarit Thanarat. “Prakat khong khana patiwat 20 tulakhom 2501 [The Declaration of the Revolutionary 
Group 20 October 1958]”, Bangkok Reprint 1983, pp.597-598. Sarit involved for the first time the royal 
family, which traditionally played no significant role.
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government. For all his cooperation with the King, Sarit did not intend to accept an 
inferior role, on the contrary, he saw himself as leading partner.25 Sarit attempted to 
restore the glory of the monarchy without giving away his own political power. The 
monarchy was of great importance to Sarit as he was unable to make use of the 
Buddhist sangha in the same way he did the monarchy. Ishi argued that internal discord 
of the sangha and its inability to rectify this situation was intolerable for Sarit. He 
issued a high-handed statement in 1960 that the government was ready to intervene in 
its [the sangha's] affairs.26 The Buddhist Order Act of 1962 finally brought the sangha 
under the control of the government.27 The sangha was centralised under a Supreme 
Patriarch with strong authority and it received the task of helping with national 
integration. However, at that time, Sarit had already successfully established the 
monarchy as the mainstay of his legitimation.
Third, Sarit opposed Phibun’s attempt to ‘Thai-isise’ all people in all regions 
with a one-fits-all approach of a new Thai culture based on modernisation and 
civilisation and revived for himself a more trans-ethnic view on membership of the 
nation. Sarit regarded Phibun’s policies as the cause for the emergence of regionalism 
which together with communist subversion was responsible for the crisis. Sarit adopted 
a hard-line against the communist threat which he linked to an external threat to the 
nation, religion and monarchy.28 He argued that the struggle between the government 
and the communists was a struggle between patriots (phurakchat) and traitors 
(phuthorayottoprathetthai) .29 Sarit’s approach to integration was to link the anti­
communist struggle with the preservation of Thainess and not with the preservation of
25 British Foreign Office FO 371/144293/DS 1011/1.
26 Ishii, Yoneo. “Church and State in Thailand”, AS, 1968, p. 869.
27 Keyes, Charles. “Buddhism Fragmented: Thai Buddhism and Political Order since the 1970s”, Paper 
Presented at the 7th International Conference on Thai Studies, Amsterdam 1999, p .l l .  Sarit also 
secularised Islamic religious schools and placed them under government control. See Bin Wan Mahmood, 
Suria. “De-Radicalization o f Minority Dissent”, Quezon City 1999, p. 135.
28 Although the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) existed since 1941, it was not until the adoption of 
Maoist strategies in 1962 that activities started on a larger scale. Sarit, however, ordered mass arrests and 
executions for communist suspects since 1958. Chai-anan Samudavanija et al., From Armed Suppression 
to Political Offensive: Attitudinal Transformation o f Thai Military Officers since 1976, Bangkok 1990, 
p.50. See also Ladd, Thomas. “Communist Insurgency in Thailand: Factors Contributing to its Decline”, 
Asian Affairs, 1986, p. 17.
29 Tamthai Dilokwityarat. “Phaplak khong kommiwnit nai kanmueang thai [Images of Communism in 
Thae against the regionalist Krong Chandawong, who was accused o f planning toi Politics]”, 
Ratthasatsan, 2003, pp. 185-188. This approach automatically excluded any communist from being 
‘Thai’. An example was the cas break away the North Eastern provinces and join Laos. Krong was found 
guilty o f betrayal o f the three pillars of the nation. See Marks, Thomas, Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam, 
London 1996, p.32. Marks called the execution of Krong on the 31st o f May 1961 a key incident for the 
CPT to recruit many new members.
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the Thai government and its leader as under Phibun. Drawing on the traditional trans­
ethnic approach of the monarchy, Sarit opened Thai society to everybody as long as 
they assimilated and became Thai. However, he closed that opportunity for anybody 
who was a communist because in his opinion, a real Thai could not be a communist. In 
practical terms, Sarit stopped the governmental harassment of the Chinese and 
discontinued Phibun’s uniform approach to Thai culture.30 He propagated a new ‘Thai 
national culture’, allowing regional and religious identities to emerge officially (the 
Muslim South, however, remained a problematic topic).31 Bom in the North East, Sarit 
was sensitive about regionalism and feared a potential communist revolt.32 For him, the 
underlying problems were economic deprivation and the adaptation of foreign ideology. 
Sarit intended to change these causes of unrest with economic progress in the 
countryside and his ‘traditional’ paternalistic leadership. He wanted to win the hearts 
and minds of the people by way of modernisation and development with a Thai face.
The fourth part of Sarit’s view on the nation was the important role old 
traditions and customs were supposed to play despite modernisation and development. 
He vowed to protect them, as he aimed, in Sarit’s own words, a ‘Thai-isation’ of Thai 
politics and society. He sought a ‘new order’ based on ‘moral unity’ (,samakkhitham) 
and ‘discipline’ (khwammirabiap) and discussed his vision of a ‘re-generated Thailand’ 
with experts from all fields in order to find ways to disseminate it.33
30 This decision was made easier by a change o f politics in China. Chou En-lai announced in the mid 
1950s that China was willing to accept the assimilation o f Chinese in South East Asian countries. See 
Fessen, Helmut. “Auslandschinesen in SUdostasien”, Deutsche Aussenpolitik, 1978, p.97.
31 Surichai Wungaew. “The Making o f Thai National Culture”, Singapore 1996, p.236.
32 It seems that Sarit was more aware o f his native region than other parts o f Thailand. Even he started 
many projects in the South, especially in the educational sector, he managed to alienate many Muslims by 
insensitivity on his side. For example, he ordered that Friday must be a normal working day in every 
Muslim province. Another point was his decision to encourage many people from the North East to 
migrate into the southernmost provinces and to allocate land to them. For details see Piyanart Bunnag, 
Nayobai kan pokkhrong khong ratthaban thai to chao thai mutsalim nai changwat chaidaen phak tai (pho 
so 2475-2516) [Administrative Policies of Thai Governments Towards Muslims in the Southern Border 
Provinces (1892-1973)], Bangkok 1987, pp. 124-126.
33 British Foreign Office FO 371/144293/DS 1011/1.
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Sarit’s Dissemination o f Royal Nationalism
Sarit’s understanding of nationalism could be categorised as royal nationalism, 
therefore, the King was moved into the centre and was called the ‘supreme head of 
Thailand and the Thai nation’.34
The result of this approach was seen in many areas. Firstly, and the most 
obvious, was the changing role of the King. Anderson pointed out that Sarit began a 
systematic campaign to restore the monarchy. Part of these efforts was a World Tour of 
the royal couple which caused a wave of popularity in the USA and Europe. Sarit used 
the proud atmosphere back home to organise a hero’s welcome in January 1961. Aware 
of the symbolic power, he arranged that the King and Queen drove directly from the 
airport to the Grand Palace to pay homage to the Emerald Buddha. To disseminate the 
news, Radio Thailand announced their safe arrival and monks chanted prayers while 
bells pealed throughout the land. The following day, Sarit said: “the people know well 
that the trip was not just a sightseeing tour for your personal enjoyment. It was a task to 
bring Thailand into the good understanding of the world, to strengthen friendly 
relations, and to increase the country’s prestige. It was realised that Your Majesties 
were carrying a great burden. In all State Visits...official reception does not always 
guarantee popularity; it needs charm and wit judiciously expended. It is fortunate for 
our country to have such a marvellous monarch.”35
Sarit also encouraged the royal couple to travel in the countryside in order to 
make contact with the people and to strengthen their loyalty.36 Concerned about the 
situation in South Thailand, Sarit also arranged an audience with the King for a large 
delegation of Thai Muslims in 1961.37 In a speech to the King after his return from a 
visit to 71 provinces, Sarit stated: “It is clear to all both within the country and abroad 
that Your Majesty has followed the guidelines of thotsaphitratchatham [ten kingly 
virtues] in national affairs and has been the most exalted leader of the nation. Your 
visits to the countryside have swayed the hearts of your people towards unity within the
34 Wacharin Mascharoen, Baeprian sangkhom sueksa kap kan klomklao thang kanmueang nai samai 
chomphon sarit: sueksa karani khwammankhong khong sathaban chat satsana phramahakasat [Social 
Studies Textbooks and Political Socialization during Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat’s Regime: A Case 
Study o f the Security o f the Nation, Religion, Monarchy], Bangkok 1990, p. 139.
35 Cited in National Identity Board, 2000, pp.390-391.
36 Anderson, Benedict, The Spectre o f Comparisons- Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World, London 
1998, p. 164.
37 Thak Chaloemtiarana. “The Evolution o f the Monarchy and Government: Institutional Conflicts and 
Change”, Asia, 1976, p.51.
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nation. Regardless of race or creed, your subjects are happy with your interest, which 
has reduced divisive thoughts and unified the country. Your activities are comparable to 
those of King Chulalongkom.”38 In comparing Bhumibol with King Chulalongkom, 
who was perceived as one of the greatest Thai monarchs ever, Sarit exalted the King’s 
position and increased his own legitimation tremendously. King Bhumibol profited 
from his rising popularity as well. He was able to attract vast sums of donations for 
charity such as the Red Cross Society (headed by Queen Sirikit) and started a series of 
royal projects for education and agriculture which raised his profile even more.39
The core of royal nationalism, namely Bhumibol’s symbolic role as unifier of 
the nation, was strengthened by a series of revived of royal ceremonies. Tambiah, for 
example, called the ceremonies around the Emerald Buddha (when the King bathed and 
changed the clothes of the statue three times a year) a ‘vital cult’.40 It represented for 
Thailand not only part of the regalia of kingship but, more importantly, national 
sovereignty itself combined with the protection and practice of Buddhism. In 1960 the 
Royal River Kathin [monksrobe] ceremony was revived. The government refurbished 
the royal barges in which King Bhumibol in grand style was escorted down the river to 
Wat Arun [Temple of Dawn]. The fact that the King’s barge was not accompanied by 
vessels of the royal family but by the barges of the police, the military and government 
ministries is worth noting. Gray interpreted this event as a demonstration for the 
renewed importance of the three pillars- nation, religion and king.41 State ceremonies 
were also directed towards involving King Bhumibol in order to bring the monarchy 
closer to the nation. For example, the government introduced the King's New Year 
Address as a part of an official marking of the occasion in 1961 or marked the Army’s 
Say with a spectacular Trooping o f the Colours ceremony.42
An example from a monument of this period was the statue of the war hero King 
Naresuan who restored the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Ayutthaya which had been 
lost to the Burmese in the sixteenth century. His monument (phraboromrachanusawari 
somdetphranaresuanmaharat), unveiled in Suphanburi province in 1959, is located on 
the battlefield between this Ayutthayan king and the Crown prince of Burma. Naresuan 
was depicted as riding on a war elephant in an attacking pose with the weapon ready to
38 Cited in Thak, 1976, p.50.
39 Thak, 1976, pp.52-53.
40 Tambiah, Stanley, World Conqueror and World Renouncer, Cambridge 1976, p.501.
41 Gray, Christine, Thailand- The Soteriological State in the 1970s, Chicago 1986, p.443.
42 Kobkua, 2003, p. 157.
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strike. The statue faces the Burmese border in the West.43 In the anti-communist 
atmosphere of the late 1950s, the message of this monument was that the Thai kings 
would always defend the country and so guarantee the freedom of the Thai. It also 
aimed to inflame patriotism against an outer enemy, using a royal hero to remind Thais 
of their obligation to the ancestors to fight for the nation.
Another aspect that was different in Sarit’s nationalism in comparison with his 
predecessor was the abandonment of economic nationalism and the opening of the 
country to foreign investment. This included the abolition of the Investment Act of 
1954, which was seen as a major obstacle for foreign engagement, and the introduction 
of the Promotion of Industrial Investment Act (I960).44 The turn in the economic policy 
resulted in rapid economic expansion in the 1960s with annual growth rates of 7-8%. 
This generated massive enticement for people in the countryside to come to work in 
Bangkok. The majority of these migrant workers were from the North East and together 
with people from other parts of the country, they rapidly populated the capital. Many 
were for the first time confronted with different regional identities that created a sense 
of regional identity within the migrants themselves.45 However, Anderson pointed out 
that the ‘royal revival’ coincided with the start of this economic boom which ‘confirmed 
the legitimacy of the throne and the throne gave moral lustre to the development’.46 In 
other words, King Bhumibol’s support for modernisation and development of the 
country enabled the government to push ahead because it meant that to be Thai was to 
embrace progress.
Although Sarit seemed to have considerable success with the propagation of 
royal nationalism, his vision of the Thai nation was to be challenged soon after his 
death. There were several factors responsible for the short life span of his achievements. 
First, Sarit’s vision of the nation had no plan to integrate the masses into the political 
process or to politicise the masses. Thak argued that Sarit’s policy and programs were 
aimed at maintaining the boundaries between hierarchical sectors while promoting
43 Kromsinlapakon, Anusawari m ipra thet thai [Monuments in Thailand], Bangkok 1998, pp.25-29
44 Ayal, Eliezier. “Thailand”, Ithaca 1969, pp.333-334. For an overview see Hussey, Anthonia. “Rapid 
Industrialization in Thailand, 1986-1991”, The Geographical Review, 1993, pp.14-15.
45 Tambiah, 1976, p. 511. To give an idea about the size o f the temporary migration to Bangkok during 
the dry season, the Far Eastern Economic Review estimated a number o f around one million migrant 
workers in the early 1990s. Far Eastern Economic Review. “Separate and Unequal”, 14 April 1994, p.22.
46 Anderson, 1998, p. 164.
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economic development.47 Second, as a result of development projects, the bureaucratic 
state interfered, in many areas for the first time, directly in the life of the majority of the 
population. Rapid modernisation led “to a sense of ‘homelessness’ including the 
rejection of state authority.” 48 This situation, stated Smith, can cause anarchic 
terrorism/insurgency or an anti-bureaucratic nationalism. Both would occur in Thailand 
later on. Third, a new generation of intelligentsia emerged. Economic growth helped to 
create a considerable number of well-to-do citizens (mostly of Chinese origin) in urban 
areas. These entrepreneurs were content that the government stopped their anti-Chinese 
policies. The generation of their children, however, had different expectations. The 
modernisation of state and economy required a huge number of professionals, opening 
up new educational opportunities for them. This generation of intelligentsia demanded 
participation in politics.
8.2. Times o f turmoil: Royal Nationalism in Crisis (1963-1979)
The Thanom Government (1963-1973)
After Sarit died in 1963, General Thanom Kittikachom as Prime Minister and 
his close associate Interior Minister Prapas Charusathian were in charge of the 
government until 1973. Several factors would contribute to the weakening of royal 
nationalism.
First, Sarit’s personal power, vision and close relationship with King Bhumibol 
were crucial for the image of royal nationalism. His successor(s) tried to follow his 
policies but neither developed their own distinctive vision of the nation nor did they 
have the same good relationship with the king as he was increasingly unwilling to 
cooperate with the military dictators.
The era of Sarit marked an important development for King Bhumibol himself. 
He displayed rising self-confidence and independence of mind.49 This translated into 
more political involvement as the appointment of his personal candidate Thanom 
showed.50 In 1965, the British Foreign Office commented that the King became the 
fixed point of the population: “He and his elegant consort [the Queen] are meticulous in
47 Thak, 1979, p.xxvi.
48 Smith, Anthony, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Oxford 1979, pp. 173-176.
49 British Foreign Office FO 371/175346/DS 1011/1.
50 See Nuechterlein, Donald. “Thailand After Sarit”, AS, 1964, p.845.
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the performance of their duties, religious and secular, and it is the King for whom the 
average Thai, whether in Bangkok or in the provinces, reserves such allegiances as he 
possesses.”51 The new confidence of King Bhumibol could be seen in activities which 
went beyond his royal projects started under Sarit. The bigger role of the King also 
changed the face of royal nationalism. While the state was still perceived to be in the 
driver seat, the independence of Bhumibol rose. Although it is impossible to say 
whether this was intended or not, the higher profile and active leadership of the King 
did strengthen the competing monarchical nationalism. For example, King Bhumibol 
and those who were ‘royalist’ started to disseminate nationalistic songs. The majority of 
these songs focussed on the monarchy as the centre of the Thai nation. Interestingly, the 
lyrics and music of most of these songs originated in the palace with the support of the 
King.52
Second, the state bureaucracy lost the trust of many people when it interfered in 
the everyday life of those people whose living conditions deteriorated through economic 
hardship. Sarit’s strategy of modernisation and development aimed to ensure the 
security of the country but the rapid changes created problems in many areas of the 
country and Thanom had to confront them. The central bureaucracy expanded in all 
comers of the country with an apparatus whose sheer size was impressive. Mulder 
reported that in 1928 the ratio between one civil servant and citizen was 1:147, in 1961 
1:115 and in 1975 1:48 (excluding 400,000 employees of the state enterprises and the 
armed forces).53 New institutions and laws alienated people in the villages, whose 
traditional mechanisms to solve conflicts were overtaken by the state. This was 
aggregated even further by arrogant behaviour of civil servants from Bangkok, who 
looked down on villagers as uneducated people. The rapid modernisation was centrally 
planned and left no room for local opinions. Local cultures were disrespected and 
resistance crushed with military force.54 The observing British Ministry of Defence 
judged the result in a devastating way: ‘little if any implementation anywhere of the
51 British Foreign Office FO 371/186150/DS 1011/1.
52 Sirinthorn Kiratibutr, Phlengplukchai thai (pho so 2475-2525): kanwikhro thang kanmueang [Thai 
Nationalistic Songs (1932-1982): A Political Analysis], Bangkok 1985, pp.78-79 and 155.
53 Mulder, N . “Structure and Process, Ideas and Change: Dynamics and Conflicting Values in the Modern 
Thai Order”, Journal o f  Social Science Review, 1978, p.24.
54 There are many examples where ignorance by central bureaucrats caused massive unrest. See Tugby, E. 
“Inter-Cultural Mediation in South Thailand”, Canberra 1973, p.281 and 285 and Thaxton, R. 
“Modernization and Counter-revolution in Thailand”, BCAS, 1977, p. 35. For the army strategy see Chai- 
anan et al., 1990, pp.56-59.
195
feeling that the Thai government is the benevolent protector to whom loyalty is due’.55 
The political discontent was reinforced by the closure of the ‘land frontier’ in this 
period. For the first time in Thai history, the population growth outweighed the 
available land. An increase in the number of land tenants was also met with a 
corresponding increase in social problems caused by money lending and high rents. 
Consequently, this led to an economic situation which worsened with the global oil 
crisis at the beginning of the 1970s.56
Third, the international situation put more pressure on the Thai government. In 
1965, Thailand deployed soldiers to South Vietnam.57 However, the decision to provide 
the US with military bases (mostly in the North-East) had more influence on Thailand 
itself. The country became both home to 50,000 US-troops with their western way of 
living and home for a massive extension of infrastructure.58 The US government 
financed new highways not only to gain easier access to its bases but also to enable the 
Thai government to develop the countryside even faster. Rural development together 
with military strength was seen as the key strategy to fight communist rebels. The 
involvement in Vietnam and the close connection with the USA created the 
environment for protests against the government.
Fourth, these protests marked a shift in the political environment. A new, 
competing nationalism from ‘below’ attempted to fill a vacuum left by a declining royal 
nationalism. When the economy plunged into troubles in 1971, the protests grew 
louder.59 However, the focus was in the beginning mainly on the disapproval of the 
Japanese and the USA, making nationalism an important aspect.60 On the forefront of 
the protest were students.61 The strong presence of the students on the political scene 
was a result of Sarit’s decision to expand the university sector. The number of students
55 British Ministry o f Defence, 19/03/1965, DEFE 11/590.
56 The population density grew from 34 people per km2 in 1947 to 67 people per km2 in 1970. Falcus, 
Malcolm. “The Economic History o f Thailand”, AEHR, 1991, p.63.
57 This decision was defended by Thanom with the argument that it is better to fight communism in 
Vietnam before communism has a chance to come to Thailand. Somphop Chantharaprapha, Chiwit lae 
ngan khong chomphon Thanom Kittikachorn [Life and Work of Field Marshall Thanom Kittikachom], 
Bangkok 1972, p.232 and see also p.234.
58 Reinhard observed ‘an astonishing presence of the Americans in the North East’. Soldiers, peace corps 
volunteers, engineers etc had contact with locals in practically every town and most villages. See 
Reinhard, Christian. “Programme gegen die Subversion in Nordost-Thailand”, Aussenpolitik, 1967, 
p.123.
59 Allman, T.D. “No Rocking the Boat”, FEER, 10 July 1971, p. 13.
60 Chalirm Vudhikosit. “Thailand and the Balance o f Trade Problem”, Pacific Community, 1971, p.388. 
For an analysis o f the anti-Japanese feelings in Thailand see Yano, Torn. “Behind Southeast Asia’s Anti- 
Japanese Sentiment”, Honolulu 1975, pp.2-7.
61 The Nation, 30 Years o f  the Nation, 2001, p.27 and Prizzia, Ross/Narong Sinsawasdi, Thailand: 
Student Activism and Political Change, Bangkok 1974, p.33.
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grew rapidly in the 1960s: from 15,000 at five universities in 1961 up to 100,000 
students at 17 universities in 1971.62 The students used their position in the limelight to 
challenge the government with the help of their vision of the nation. This nation was 
seen as being independent from the influence from the USA.63 Anti-Americanism was 
not limited to the left leaning opposition but could be found in conservative circles as 
well. In 1967, Kukrit Pramoj, a member of the royal family, gave vent to an outburst of 
anti-Americanism in his daily column in the highly influential newspaper ‘Siam Rath’.64 
For the time being, anti-Americanism was connected to a strong display of nationalism 
on both sides of the political spectrum.
The weakening of royal nationalism happened faster by the fact that Thanom 
lacked a clear vision of the nation. Thanom stressed the word ‘unity’ as the most 
important prerogative for development in his speeches. Sources of conflict had to be 
eliminated and the government would do everything to achieve this. His main target 
was the war against communism.65 In 1968, he said: “This kind of [guerrilla] war 
destroys not only Thai sovereignty but also the life and soul of all Thais throughout the 
whole nation.”66 It should be noted that Thanom did not refer to the slogan ‘nation, 
religion and king’. This difference with Sarit can also be found in his anti-communist 
book Rao pen thai (We are Thai/free) from 1966, where he defined Thai patriotism as
62 Anderson, 1998, p. 149.
63 Anderson argued that a group called ‘Progressive Students’ was crucial in the expansion o f demands. 
They published the book ‘The White Danger” in 1971, introducing the new feature o f anti-Americanism 
into the Thai opposition. However, the communists started to disseminate their anti-Americanism since 
1968 when they accused the USA of neo-colonialism. Anderson, 1998, p. 168 and Alpem, Stephen. 
“Insurgency in Northeast Thailand: A New Cause for Alarm”, AS, 1975, p.687. For the relationship 
between the students and the communists see Pompirom I. “The Student-Led Democratic Movement 
After the 14 October 1973 Incident and Its Relations With the Communist Party o f Thailand”, Asian 
Review, 1987, pp.9-11.
64 Kukrit Pramoj. “Daily Problem Column”, Siam Rath, 1967. Just like in the 1950s, Kukrit’s work gave 
an insight into the mood o f the elites at the time. In 1970, he wrote in length about the crisis o f Thai 
culture: “It must be admitted that the Thai culture today is in a state o f utter contusion and probably it has 
reached the highest degree o f confusion ever known in our history.” The reason for this situation was in 
Kukrit’s view the influx o f foreign, especially western culture, partly caused by a western educational 
system. He proposed a new kind of education and culture ‘which inspires the consciousness o f being 
Thai, which determines our Thai way o f living, which makes us appreciative of Thai values, draws its 
strength from our ancestors, from the environment we live in, from our fellow countrymen in all walks of 
life’. It represented a clear statement against the policies o f the military and an early indicator for the 
return of monarchical nationalism ten years later. Kukrit Pramoj. “Education and Culture”, Bangkok 
1970, pp.38 and 52. Negative for the image of the USA were comments by US president Nixon who 
called the governance o f the two dictators Thanom and Praphat an ‘ideal model for an Asian country.” 
Opponents almost automatically became anti-American. Allman, T.D. “The Liabilities That Kintner 
Faces”, Bangkok Post, 20 January 1974, p.13.
65 Chulla Ngonrot, Kamnoet lae khwampenma khong latthichatniyom nai prathetthai [The Origin and 
Development o f Nationalism in Thailand], Bangkok 1970, p.106.
66 Cited in Chulla, 1970, p. 108.
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‘to love every Thai because we are brothers and sisters’.67 An important intellectual in 
the Thai military, General Saiyut Kerdphol, the head of the Thai counter-insurgency 
campaign (since 1966), used a similar approach to the nation. He argued that only with 
unity between the citizens, police and military the danger could be averted. Saiyut 
warned the Thais not to believe in “the mask of self-declared ‘nationalists’ who want to 
liberate the people.” The first thing to do for every Thai was to conserve the nation in 
being ‘Thai’.68 Like Thanom, Saiyuth placed in his publications no special emphasis on 
the role of the king. It could be that both, as members of the military, had a rather 
technocratic attitude to nationalism as a tool against communism. In any case, it showed 
that the vacuum of nationalism was becoming even bigger with a lack of promotion by 
the state representatives.
The Breakdown o f Royal Nationalism (1973-1980)
After the effectiveness of royal nationalism to procure the loyalty of the people 
was weakened during the Thanom government, the period between 1973 and 1980 
witnessed the final breakdown.
This thesis proposes that the most important underlying factor for this 
breakdown was a reaction of society against the policy of rapid modernisation and 
development, together with the increasing contact with foreigners and the failure of the 
state to meet these processes with adequate political and social policies. Dahm argued in 
this context that societies in South East Asia answered sudden confrontations, for 
example with modernity, with a mobilisation of the defensive parts of the cultural 
tradition, a cultural revival.691 argue that in the case of Thailand in the 1960s and 1970s 
this meant a loss of confidence in the state with its government and at the same time an 
increasing veneration for the King. This was empirically recorded in one survey, 
conducted in the North East in 1966, when 87.9% of the questioned persons denied that 
Thailand could survive without the King. In another survey in 1971, 74.31% of students 
showed their displeasure with the political and government institutions. However, 
93.66% of the students answered that they were very proud of the monarchical
67 Chulla, 1970, p. 117.
68 Saiyut Kerdphol, Anakot khong thai [The Future o f Thailand], Bangkok 1975, pp.204, 210 and 214.
69 Dahm, Bernhard. “Kulturelle Identitat und Modemisierung in Stidostasien”, Tubingen 1993, pp.34-38.
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institutions, another number of students [2.96%] were fairly proud.70 This confidence of 
the masses in the monarchy became a problem for Thanom when King Bhumibol began 
to withdraw his support for his government. He also criticised the Prime Minister 
several times in public.71
A decisive moment in the modem history of Thai nationalism occurred on 14 
October 1973. On that day, students asked King Bhumibol to help to remove the 
military dictators. When the King intervened and Thanom had to leave his position, it 
meant that the passive role of the monarchy was transformed into an active one. It had a 
tremendous impact on the influence and popularity of the King who in the words of 
Allman, became a personal hero to the majority of his people.72 For example, the student 
movement, underlining their loyalty to the nation, praised the monarch by displaying 
the picture of the King during demonstrations. Yuk argued that the students were 
‘motivated by love to the nation’.73 Some Thai academics called this the birth of a new 
nationalism.74 It was a proof of the emergence of a nationalism from below which could 
also legitimise its love for the nation with its love for the monarchy.
This alternative nationalism was soon to be challenged by a ‘counter­
nationalism’ which sought to prevent the increasing left-leaning student and democracy 
movement from taking control of the country. The conservatives mobilised mass 
organizations, all supported by leading members of the military and police, with a 
powerful nationalistic message to save the monarchy, Buddhism and the nation. The 
three main groups, the Navapon (New Force), the Krathing Daeng (Red Gaurs) and the 
Luksua Chaoban (Village Scouts) claimed a membership in the millions at the end of 
1975.75 For example, Navapon found most of its members among low-level government
70 Marks, Thomas. “The Status o f the Monarchy in Thailand”, Issues and Studies, 1977, p.53 and Thinpan 
Nakata. “Political Legitimacy in Thailand: Problems and Prospects”, JSSR, 1976, pp. 103-105.
71 See Darling, Frank. “Thailand: Stability and Escalation”, AS, 1968, p.121 and The Times (London). 
“Thai Revolt Warning by King”, 18 March 1969, p.7.
72 Allman, T. “King Who is Hero to the Rebels”, The Guardian, 5 December 1973, p.3. Bhumibol 
appointed a National Convention consisting o f people from all walks of life to elect the new National 
Assembly, which was opened by him in December 1973. Morell, David/ Chai-anan Samudavanija. 
“Thailand since October 1973: Dissolution o f a Revolution”, Pacific Community, 1975, p.587.
73 Yuk Sri-ariya. “Awasan ratchat kap wikrit arayatham thai [The End o f Nation-state and the Crisis of 
the Thai Civilisation]”, Bangkok 1997, p.90. See more in detail Nidhi Aeusrivongse. “Chatniyom nai 
khabuankan prachatipatai [Nationalism in the Democratic Movement]”, Bangkok 1992, pp. 182-189.
74 For example Suthachai Yimprasert, “Latthi chatniyom kap kan totan chakkraphatniyom amerika nai 
samai 14 tulakhom poso 2516 thueng 6 tulakhom poso 2519 [Nationalism and Anti-American 
Imperialism from 14 October 1973 to 6 October 1976]”, Bangkok 2000, p.58 and 68.
75 Bradley et al., Thailand- Domino by Default?, Athens 1978, pp. 10-13.
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functionaries, urban middle-class and rural village headmen.76 One of its most important 
leaders was the Buddhist monk Kittivuddho, who joined the group after the events in 
Indochina in April 1975.77 He saw a threat to Buddhism and monarchy if the communist 
would succeed in Thailand and went on to develop a form of militant Buddhism for the 
first time. In July 1976, he said: “I would like to point out that it is understood that this 
Navapon is not a political party. Navapon is the principle of nationalism. It is only a 
name of a philosophy whereby we take the middle way of Buddhism as the way to act 
in order to solve all the problems of government, economics and society.” For him, 
Navapon was the only ideology which a true Thai nationalist (who also must be a 
Buddhist) could take. Anyone who opposed Navapon was therefore an enemy of the 
nation, the religion and the monarchy. Such an enemy was in his view not a complete 
person, and for that reason, stated Kittivuddho, it would be not de-meritorious to kill a 
communist.
The political situation and the stand off between the two ideological groups was 
further complicated by a series of weak coalition-govemments which were unable to 
curb political violence, a steady guerrilla warfare from communist rebels and a sluggish 
economy. In addition, the year 1975 witnessed a situation that can be best described as a 
nightmare for Thai conservatives. The international circumstances turned for them from 
bad to worse. The Americans failed not only to win the war but also to implement the 
terms of the Paris agreement. The swift collapse of the Thieu regime in South Vietnam 
and the success of the communist movements in Cambodia and Laos frightened many 
Thais.78 The unexpected diplomatic ‘opening’ to Communist China even further 
aggregated this fear and caused the feeling of abandonment and loneliness in the people 
while facing communist armies at their borders.
The political violence of right-wing groups increased dramatically in the years 
1975 and 1976. Together with the activities of the communists and the inability of Thai 
politicians to form a long lasting cabinet, Thais got the impression of an unstable 
country.79 Worried about their safety, many Thais were now willing to stop the 
democratic experiment and blamed the political left for its failure, which was reflected
76 Keyes, Charles. “Political Crisis and Militant Buddhism in Contemporary Thailand”, Chambersburg 
1978, p .151.
77 This part about Kittivuddho is based on Keyes, 1978, pp.153-158.
78 Trager, F./Scully, W. “Domestic Instability in Southeast Asia”, ORBIS, 1975, pp.973-979. King 
Bhumibol was shocked by the abolishment o f the Lao monarchy.
79 There is a long list o f incidents. One of the most dramatic is a wave o f assassinations of peasant leaders 
in 1975 and 1976. See for details Bradley et al., 1978, p. 13.
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in the election in April 1976 when leftist parties suffered a humiliating defeat.80 The end 
of the democratic period came in 1976 when the students increasingly adopted strategies 
of the Chinese communists. For example by shouting the slogan ‘Bum all classical 
literature’ they became even more alienated from the conservatives, who saw this as an 
attack on Thai culture and the monarchy.81 Public unrest was caused by the return of the 
former Prime Minster Thanom to Bangkok and his ordination as a monk at Wat 
Bowonniwet (near Thammasat University). When the King openly showed his support 
for Thanom, the students organised new rallies.82 The chance for right wing groups and 
the police to crush the student movement came with a demonstration at Thammasat 
University on 6th October.83 The reason given was an alleged mock hanging of the 
crown prince by student actors. A group of navy officers used the events as pretext to 
stage a coup d’etat. This time, the King did not interfere on the side of the students like 
in 1973 but showed public support for wounded or killed policemen.84
Bhumibol, however, was neither a close ally of the military nor did he support 
the ideas of Navapon’s militant Buddhism as the future direction for the country. He 
himself handpicked the new Prime Minister Thanin Kraivichian, a Supreme Court judge 
who was an outsider in the political arena but was renowned for his honesty and strong 
anti-communist stand.85 Thanin supported the idea of a strong state and his policies 
reflected the style of Sarit. However, the social and political environment had changed 
and most Thais were not willing to accept another dictator.86 Several thousand students 
joined the CPT in the forests.87 Thanin’s campaigns against corruption resulted in 
widespread dissatisfaction within the bureaucracy and the crackdowns on press and 
other political freedoms within the population.
80 Chai-anan Samudavanija. “Thailand: A Stable Semi-Democracy”, Boulder 1989a, p.315. The two 
socialist parties dropped from 25 seats to three seats in the new parliament.
81 Cited in Chai-anan Samudavanija, Watthanatham kap kansang sangkhom kanmueang prachathipatai 
[Culture and the Building of a Democratic Society], Bangkok 1994, p.12.
82 Thongchai Winichakul. “Remembering/Silencing the Traumatic Past: The Ambivalence Narratives of 
the October 1976 Massacre in Bangkok”, Paper Presented at the 6th International Conference on Thai 
Studies, Chiang Mai 1996, p.4.
83 For a detailed account see Puey U. “Violence and the Military Coup in Thailand”, BCAS, 1977, pp.4- 
12.
84 Bhumibol said in an interview with the BBC regarding this incident later: “If you don’t defuse a bomb 
and it will blow up, if it will blow up, it will be a very good fire work, but for the one who looks afar.” 
BBC Written Archives, Soul o f A Nation, LCA T854K, 7 January 1980, p.33.
85 Anderson, 1998, p. 187.
86 Likhit D. “The Emergence o f a New Political Conscious Middle Class”, Thailand Business, 1985, p.45.
87 Kershaw, Roger. “Students and the Revolution: Thoughts on the Return of a Thai Son”, 1982, p.56 and 
Chantima O. “The Communist Party of Thailand”, Singapore 1982, p.362.
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Thanin’s ideas about the Thai nation can be found in his book entitled Latthi lae 
withikan khong khommionit (Doctrine and Way of Communism) which was published 
in 1973 and later widely used in schools. Aiming at explaining communism for 
schoolchildren, he dealt at length with the communist ideology. Thanin explicitly 
warned of the danger for religion and monarchy and emphasised that the Thai nation 
was always independent. Central to this nation was the monarchy: “In terms of the king, 
the Thais are very fortunate that we have the King who is the precious tiered umbrella to 
cover our head. The King maintains the ten royal virtues and he is the refuge of all Thai 
people. The Thai king stays not only in the royal palace but he travels all over Thailand 
in order to be the soul of his people.”88 Thanin employed a doomsday scenario for the 
case of a communist take over: ‘the age that demons rule the country (yuk asun krong 
mueang)\%9 Thanin also tried to revive the ‘ageing’ royal nationalism. Critics and 
protesters were being accused as being a group ‘who are not Thai and who want to 
destroy the monarchy’.90 For Thanin, the king represented the head of the nation, the 
symbol of Thainess and goodness and his most important task was to protect the 
monarchy.
Despite Thanin’s efforts to govern with a strong hand and with steady support 
from the King, the situation in Thailand worsened. The CPT became bigger and more 
active in many parts of the nation.91 It also became more aggressive in its attitude 
against the monarchy and Bhumibol himself, who was now vigorously attacked in the 
propaganda. The CPT argued that Bhumibol was responsible for the October 1976 
massacre and that he was afraid of his own people. Marks interpreted this move as an 
attempt to drive a wedge between the monarchy and its base of support, the Thai people 
themselves.92 In any case, the CIA station Chief in Bangkok must have been concerned 
because he predicted in early 1977 that Thailand would be the next domino to fall.93 The 
‘old’ concept of nationalism of the state increasingly lost its appeal to especially those 
people, who thought of themselves as living on the fringes of Thai society. A competing 
nationalism from below promised a fair society for all while the connection with the 
dictatorship lowered the attractiveness of the old vision of a nation. Thanin’s political
88 Thanin Kraiwichian, Latthi lae withikan khong khommionit [Doctrine and Way o f Communism], 
Bangkok 1977, p. 83.
89 Thanin, 1977, p.85.
90 Chalermkiet, 1992, p.66.
91 See Chai-anan et al., 1990, p.63.
92 Marks, 1977, p.51. The CPT openly denounced the monarchy in 1978. Tarr, Shane. “The Nature of 
Military Intervention in the Countryside of Surat Thani, Southern Thailand”, BCAS, 1991, p.38.
93 Anderson, 1998, p.290.
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fate was sealed when he announced a ten-year plan to return to democracy.94 The same 
naval officers who conducted the coup in October 1976 repeated it in October 1977 
being worried about the potential consequences of a prolonged period without 
democracy. Keyes speculated that without the coup Thailand ‘could well have plunged 
into bloody civil war’.95 The coup, however, was done without the knowledge and 
approval of the King and worsened the relationship between him and the military even 
further.96 Marks commented that this was an important split in the political history of 
Thailand.97 Indeed, this split could be seen as the end of royal nationalism because the 
monarch was no longer willing to cooperate. On the contrary, the monarchy offered 
now not only a viable but basically the only alternative towards which to dedicate the 
loyalty for Thailand for those who were not willing to support the CPT or the military- 
dominated political framework. Bhumibol himself made his vision of future politics 
clear in a speech in June 1977: “An idea exists among certain groups of people that it is 
necessary to destroy and uproot existing things before progress or prosperity can be 
accomplished. This idea must be scrutinised to find out whether it is correct and worth 
thinking about or implementing. Existing things constitute foundations and models, 
whose strength and weaknesses should be studied to eliminate the weaknesses and 
achieve more developed new things. Already existing things are thus essential factors 
contributing to proper advancement. How can progress be made, if the foundation for it 
is destroyed.”98 However, in 1977 the time was not right for Bhumibol to lead the 
intelligentsia with his vision of a monarchical nation. The rift between the ruling 
military elite and the King was still too wide and the Thai people were still too much 
fragmented because of the political turmoil.99
The Dissemination o f Royal Nationalism (1960s-70s)
The Thai governments of the 1960s and 1970s kept on disseminating royal 
nationalism in order to legitimise the state in the fight against communism. One of the 
most common means was the use of banknotes.
94 Chai-anan, 1989, p.316.
95 Keyes, 1999, p. 16.
96 The Times (London). “Thai King Kept in Dark on Coup”, 22 October 1977, p.4.
97 Marks, 1977, p.70.
98 Cited in Marks, 1977, p.69.
99 Bhumibol and the members o f the royal families were even personally targeted by assassins. The Times 
(London). “Royal Escape”, 23 September 1977, p.8 and The Times (London). “King’s Ivory Stolen”, 10 
July 1976, p.5.
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A banknote series issued in 1969 showed on the front a portrait of King 
Bhumibol in full regalia. To give the banknotes a Thai character, the designers added 
traditional elements and symbols. On the back, examples of architecture and works of 
art were displayed in the centre of the note. This included the Temple of the Emerald 
Buddha, the Royal Barge and the ordination hall of the Marble temple.100 This series 
echoed the idea of royal nationalism where the monarchy functioned as a symbol of the 
Thai nation and Thainess. The next series of banknotes was designed in the late 1970s. 
Although the banknotes emphasised the monarchy more, its role was portrayed as to be 
the leader of the nation in times of crisis. The banknotes depicted King Bhumibol no 
longer wearing a royal uniform but the uniform of the Supreme Commander of the 
Armed Forces. The backside of the notes changed totally. Under the topic ‘Great 
Kings’, monuments of the Kings Chulalongkom, Taksin and Naresuan were shown.101 
Especially the last two statues mirrored the spirit of the time as they depicted the 
monarchs as warriors fighting against the invading enemies. It was an analogy of the 
fight against the communists.
Another means was official ceremonies with a good example being the 
celebration for the 25th throne anniversary in 1971. At the Democracy Monument, the 
government organised the biggest military parade ever. King Bhumibol attended the 
show wearing a Marshall uniform, clearly signalling that he supported the state in its 
war against internal and external threats. The parade was watched by a huge crowd 
which remained otherwise passive. Interestingly, the only elements of ancient pageantry 
during the show were the King’s four personal bodyguards dressed in silk pantaloons 
and gold embroidered gold caps.102 The whole ceremony was a display of loyalty from 
the state or the military to the monarchy which in return legitimated the state by the 
king’s attending the parade and wearing the military uniform.
However, using the monarchy to promote royal nationalism can have the side 
effect of strengthening the monarchy when a competing view such as monarchical 
nationalism exists. This can be shown in the ‘Consecration of the Colours of Military 
units’-ceremony (phraratchaphithi tmengmut thongchaichaloemphon samrap 
phraratchatan nuaithahan). The monarch transforms flags of military units (colours) 
into sacred objects ‘to show his trust in their [the soldiers] honesty and bravery, it is the
100 Bank o f Thailand, Centenary o f  Thai Banknotes, Bangkok 2002, p.242.
101 Bank o f Thailand, 2002, p. 258.
102 Foreign Correspondent Club of Thailand, The King o f  Thailand in World Focus, Bangkok 1988, p.55.
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honour and the centre of their soul when they go to war’. This ceremony was first 
introduced by King Chulalongkom and was continued in the political nation. While 
statist and royal nationalisms sought legitimation for the state as leader, they also, 
unintentionally, supported the monarchical nation. During the ceremony, the monarch 
places some of his hair and a Buddha image into a small box on the flag 
(thongchutathuchathipatai). In addition, the King marks every flag post with 15 golden 
tacks. The top tack shows the map image of Thailand, the second is an image of the 
wheel of dharma (symbol of Buddhism), the third are his royal initials, the fourth the 
image of the constitution, followed by military symbols. After that, the flags are 
sprinkled with holy water and presented to the troops.103 The representatives of the 
political nation did not recognise that this ceremony strengthened the connection 
between the nation and the monarchy rather than only legitimising the state and its 
troops. It was the King who gives the flag, it was the King for whom the soldiers go to 
war and it was the King who added a sacred dimension with the use of his hair. The 
‘nation’ represented by the flag is reduced to a symbol of the King and is sacred only 
because of the King. The design of the flags changed over time according to the initials 
of the Kings.
Monuments continued to play a role in the dissemination of the idea of royal 
nationalism. One of the most unusual monuments in Thailand was erected in Singburi 
province in 1976, the Monument o f the Bangrachan Heroes (anusawari 
wirachonkhaibangrachan). Depicting a group of villagers with water buffalo and all 
kinds of homemade weapons screaming and attacking the Burmese, this monument was 
to commemorate the heroic struggle of villagers during the Burmese invasion in 1767.104 
It is a national myth that the villagers, although only very small in numbers, fought the 
foreigners to the last man. The aim of the monument was to re-create the spirit of the 
battle of Bangrachan and to motivate the Thai population to help the government to 
fight against the ‘intruder’ instead of joining the communists.
One memorial for the war dead in the northern province of Nan was another 
striking example in the struggle against foreign invaders. The Monument for the Heroic 
Deeds o f Civilians, Policemen and Soldiers (anusawari wirakamphonlaruen tamruat
103 Kromsinlapakon, Phraratchaphithi nai ratchakan phrabatsomdetphra paramintaramaha 
phumiphonadunyadet sayamintharathirat borommanatbophit [Royal Ceremonies during the Reign of 
King Bhumibol], Bangkok 2000, pp. 247-248. For the symbolism of hair see Firth, Raymond, Symbols- 
Public and Private, London 1973, p.294.
104 Kromsinlapakon, 1998, pp.424-429.
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tahari), unveiled in 1976 as well, was located in one of the most embattled areas 
between communist and government forces and depicts one soldier, one policeman and 
one civilian erecting a flagpole with the Thai national flag on it.105 The government 
aimed to show that the province was Thai territory and all Thais were working together 
to defend the land even if they have to sacrifice their lives. The monument was intended 
to propagate that communism was un-Thai, an idea originating from the reign of King 
Vajiravudh but was especially emphasised under Phibun.
Other monuments of this period represented quite frequently the brother of King 
Rama I, Prince Mahasurasinghanat, a famous General who was crucial in the defeat of 
the Burmese and the unification of the country in the reign of King Taksin (r. ca.1767- 
1782). The main statue was erected at Mahathat temple, facing the royal plaza in 
Bangkok in 1979. The statue (phrabowonrachanusawari somdetphrabowonraratchao 
mahasurasinghanat) depicted the General standing with folded hands while offering his 
sword.106 This could be interpreted that he swears to protect Buddhism or, in this 
context, the land of Buddhism, while his direction to the royal plaza indicates a 
dedication to the monarchy and nation. Its erection was executed on the initiative of 
Admiral Sa-ngad Chaloryu who led two coup d’etats in 1976 and 1977 and could be 
seen as a personal justification for his actions and also to prove his loyalty to the King. 
This monument aimed to re-kindle the spirit of the fighting ancestors which was now so 
desperately needed in the fight against the communists.
The period of royal nationalism ended in the late 1970s. The elite group in the 
military and bureaucracy representing this form of nationalism was discredited. Before a 
new interpretation of the nation could emerge, a new ruling elite group had to establish 
itself first. This group rose to power in 1979 and followed in their interpretation of the 
nation one man- King Bhumibol.
105 Kromsinlapakon, 1998, pp.419-423.
106 Kromsinlapakon, 1998, pp.291-294.
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Chapter 9
The Revival of Monarchical Nationalism since 1980
The political, social and economical events of the 1960s and 1970s resulted in a 
breakdown of the dominance of the old interpretation of the nation. A new reform- 
orientated military power group took control of the state and was willing to provide a 
new vision of the nation. This thesis proposes that this vision was based on the ideas of 
King Bhumibol (r.1946-) who adapted the concept of the monarchical nation to the 
system of constitutional monarchy. The King, unlike his predecessors freed from the 
political elements and constraints of the state, envisioned a monarchical nation with 
three main dimensions: a trans-ethnic community, a self-sufficient community and a 
moral community. Firmly based on the traditional concept of kingship in Thai culture, 
the King sees his own duty as monarch to practice dharma and to ensure happiness and 
prosperity to the people in the monarchical nation. For that, the King has to provide the 
basic requirements (i.e. materially, theoretically, religiously, ceremonially and 
emotionally) to the functioning of this monarchical nation under his leadership (in 
intellectual terms and as a role model). King Bhumibol is actively disseminating and 
promoting his view of the nation with the help of ceremonies, symbols, legends and 
traditions. In contrast to the view of the revisionist school, I propose to see this period 
of Thai history clearly distinguished from the period of royal nationalism.
This chapter consists of three main parts. The first part deals with the factors 
causing the revival of monarchical nationalism, namely the crisis of Thai society in the 
late 1970s, a government providing a platform for the King to develop his monarchical 
nationalism and the collapse of the Thai economy in 1997. The second part looks into 
the activities of the King himself. The focus is on his vision of the nation and the means 
to disseminate his ideas, namely via royal projects, ceremonies, literature and 
monuments. The third part analyses the influence of King Bhumibol’s monarchical 
nationalism on state and society. This includes state policies, the promotion of 
monarchical nationalism by the state, art and literature and how the general population 
responds to monarchical nationalism.
207
9.1. The Reasons for the Revival o f Monarchical Nationalism
The Nation in Crisis
This thesis argues that the revival of monarchical nationalism in the 1980s was 
made possible by the fact that Thai society was experiencing a serious identity crisis 
combined with political and economical troubles.
The political crisis was caused by both internal and external factors. 
Domestically, the turmoil in the 1970s resulted in a country rife with conflicts. First, 
there was a ideological standoff between left and right wing-groups within the 
population. Second, the military was split between different factions representing 
conservative and progressive ideas. Third, the relationship between the King and the 
military was problematic with the monarch rather unwilling to cooperate. Fourth, the 
fight between government troops and the Communist Party (CPT) became fiercer and 
caused panic among many Thais. For example, a big battle raged in Petchabun province 
in 1980/81. The Thai army, deploying thousands of troops, struggled to win control 
over the mountainous area and sustained a high casualty rate.1 In 1981, a commentator 
portrayed a situation of panic: “All Thais independent of their age or wealth asked 
themselves: ‘When will we be communists?’”2 The fear was increased by the external 
situation in Indochina. Vietnam maintained a significant military presence in Laos and 
Cambodia and armed border clashes between Thai and Vietnamese troops became a 
daily occurrence. The Thai government perceived the Vietnamese idea of an 
‘Indochinese special relationship’ as a threat to the North Eastern part of Thailand.3 
Widespread fear among the political elites as well as ordinary Thais was described as 
‘obsessive’.4 A flood of refugees from Indochina into Thailand worsened the situation.5
1 McBeth, John. “The Bulldozer Invasion”, FEER, 8 Mai 1981, pp.26-28.
2 Thak Chaloemtiarana. “Ko o. ro mo no. botkhwam phuea klom phi commionit hai lap [Ko o. ro mo no 
An Article to Lull the Communist Ghosts]”, Warasan thammasat, 1981, pp.l07-109.
3 See Khien Theeravit. “The Conflict in Indochina- A Thai Perspective”, Tokyo 1988, pp.l 16-136. 
Another security hotspot was the South. See Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study 
of the Malay-Muslims o f Southern Thailand, Bangkok 1985, pp.223-251.
4 Girling, John. “Southeast Asia and the Great Powers”, PC, 1978, p.200 and Suntaree Komin, 
Psychology o f  the Thai People, Bangkok 1990, p. 140.
5 Warren, William, Prem Tinsulanonda: Soldier and Statesman, Bangkok 1997, p. 127. See also Funston, 
J. “Indochina Refugees: The Malaysian and Thai Response”, Asian Thought and Society, 1980, pp.221- 
223. A destabilising factor for the Thai state was not only the huge number o f refugees (an estimated 
number of 550,000 between 1975 and 1979) but also 200,000 displaced Thais in the border region.
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It is easy to imagine that the wish for stability and emotional assurance must have been 
high on the agenda of many Thais.
On the economic front, the Thai economy was performing poorly. The wide 
income gap between the rural and urban areas and a high inflation rate of 15-20% put a 
significant burden on all Thais.6 The economic situation continued to worsen when low 
foreign investment and a high account deficit caused the Thai government to ask the 
World Bank for aid packages in the early 1980s.7 The old system of state dominance of 
the economic sector was clearly failing and reform demands accelerated the need for a 
new approach to economic policy by the state.
What turned this into an identity crisis was the fact that it coincided with an 
expansion of the urban middle class with a strong consumption-orientation. In this 
context, Mulder proposed that when people are united by the market, they have little to 
identify with and appear cynical and non-committal about political affairs.8 The 
elections in April 1979 confirmed this view when 80% of the voters in Bangkok 
abstained from the election.9 It was a result of unattractive political alternatives: 
opposition intellectuals were discredited by their ultra-left leaning tendencies since the 
mid 1970s, no ‘centrist’ movement existed and the ruling military elite was still too 
closely connected with dictatorship.10 The political frustration of the urban population 
which consisted largely of ethnic Chinese was reinforced by a recurring racial 
discrimination against this ethnic group. The 1978 constitution and the April 1979 
election, seen as undemocratic and discriminatory against Thais with alien parents, 
required from ethnic Chinese citizens a document-proof for their service in the armed 
forces in order to be entitled to vote or to run for parliament.11 These election laws were 
later abolished but not before causing a crisis of Thai national identity among the 
people. A good example can be seen in a presentation in 1980 entitled “How shall we
6 Scalapino, Robert, “Asia at the End of the 1970s“, Foreign Affairs, 1980, p.727.
7 Bowie, Alasdair/Unger, Danny, The Politics o f Open Economies, Cambridge 1997, p. 142 and Ho Kwon 
Ping. “Thailand Faces A Hard Choice”, FEER, 13 February 1981, p.40.
8 Mulder, Niels. “The Rise and Wane o f (the Ideas of) Nationalism and Citizenship in Southeast Asia. An 
Essay in Cultural History”, Mtlnster 1994, p.27. See also Turton, Andrew. “Limits o f Ideological 
Domination and the Formation o f Social Consciousness”, Osaka 1984, p.40.
9 Kershaw, Roger. “Thailand’s Return to Limited Democracy”, Asian Affairs, 1979, p.310.
10 See about the political views of the middle class in Hong, Lysa. “Twenty Years of Sinlapa 
Watthanatham: Cultural Politics in Thailand in the 1980s and 1990s”, JSEAS, 2000, pp.29-30.
11 Kramol commented that this discrimination was caused by the disapproval o f native Thais to the rise to 
political power of some uneducated and wealthy Thais of Chinese origin following the 1975 and 1976 
elections. Kramol Tongdhamachart. “The April 1979 Elections and Post-Election Politics in Thailand”, 
Singapore 1979, pp.213-215. See also Prizzia, Ross. “Thailand: Elections 1979 and the ‘New’ 
Constitutions”, Asia Quarterly, 1980, pp. 111 -113.
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love Thailand?”. Unable to describe what this love would be, the speaker thought that it 
was not enough to just sing patriotic songs but she would need the feeling of being the 
owner of the country. Her wish to leave the citizenry [sic] when being angry with the 
government was caused by love and not hate.12 As can be seen in this example, most of 
the frustration was connected with the political system which neither allowed real 
political participation nor provided an ‘emotional’ home.
What enhanced the crisis further was the failure of the traditional Buddhist order 
{sangha) to provide spiritual guidance to the emerging middle class. Keyes proposed 
that after the trauma of the political crisis of the mid-1970s, Buddhism fragmented into 
a diverse number of forms and this undermined the position of the established Buddhist 
church as the sole embodiment of religion as a pillar of the Thai nation.13 A series of 
scandals in the traditional sangha and increasing commercialisation of Buddhism 
(phutthaphanity4 contributed to, at least temporary, emotional insecurity of many 
Thais.15
Not only the religious sphere but also the nation needed new interpretations. The 
long dominant visions of Thailand as a political nation could not offer a coherent 
ideology or provide satisfying answers about identity or loyalty. The numerous conflicts 
in Thai society, the identity crisis in many parts of the population and the lack of 
solutions motivated King Bhumibol to get involved by offering emotional reassurance 
and moral leadership to his people. This led to his efforts to revive monarchical 
nationalism at the beginning of the 1980s.
12 Chintana Yotsunthom. “Rao cha rak mueangthai kan yangrai [How Shall We Love Thailand?]”, 
Warasanwatthanathamthai, 1980, p. 10.
13 Keyes, Charles. “Buddhism- Fragmented: Thai Buddhism and Political Order since the 1970s”, Paper 
Presented at the 7th International Conference on Thai Studies, Amsterdam 1999, p .l.
14 This term was coined by Jackson. Jackson, Peter. “Thailand’s Culture War: Economic Crisis, 
Resurgent Doctrinarism and Critiques of Religious o f Prosperity”, Paper Presented at the 7th International 
Conference on Thai Studies, Amsterdam 1999, p.l.
15 In the religious sphere, this disenchantment with the sangha increased the popularity o f  alternative 
interpretations o f Buddhism. Most prominent was Buddhadasa, a popular monk from the South, and ‘his 
doctrine o f faith in the ethical teachings o f the Buddha as well as in science, reason, modernity and 
democracy which has been profoundly attractive to many educated Thais and his view o f Buddhism has 
become the dominant view among the Thai intelligentsia’. Not only Buddhadasa but also other Buddhist 
movements attracted followers in the hundreds o f thousands. This showed a clear need for spiritual 
guidance which was no longer being provided by the sangha. Jackson, 1999, p. 16.
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Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda- Catalyst for Change
The influence of a king in a constitutional monarchy depends very much on the 
space given by the state and its representatives. Any vision of a society developed by a 
king would be useless unless the leaders of the state allowed him a voice, adopted his 
ideas and helped to disseminate them within the population. In the Thai case, the 
facilitating leader was General Prem Tinsulanonda who became Prime Minister in early 
1980 (until 1988). He was central in the realignment of the Thai nation and nationalism 
away from royal towards monarchical nationalism. In the end, this move was successful 
because he managed to connect the desire of the majority of the people for emotional 
assurance, intellectual leadership and political participation with the visions of King 
Bhumibol. In contrast to his predecessors, Prem acknowledged the diversity of the Thai 
nation and the need for a new approach: “We have to accept and consider the fact that 
Thailand is a vast country. The people are not the same, they differ in geographical 
conditions, development stages, custom, economy and social conditions.”16 Prem 
created during his time in government the bureaucratic and legal framework necessary 
for the realisation of King Bhumibol’s vision of the monarchical nation.
The Backgroundfor Prem’s Policies
Prem recognised several threats which needed an urgent answer: the existing 
identity crisis, the threat from radical forces on both sides of the political spectrum17, the 
strength of the CPT and a lack of state ideology. He saw the solution in ideas of a new 
generation of soldiers who questioned the role of the military after the events of 1976. 
The two most important groups were the khana thahan num (Young Turks) and the 
thahan prachatipatai (Democratic Soldiers).18
The members of the Young Turks were mostly experienced frontline 
commanders stationed in the provinces. In their opinion, change would only occur when 
the state accepts and understands the existence of the problems of the people and starts
16 Sunprasankanpatthanahaengchat. “Rabop borihan kanpatthana chonnabot naew mai: hetphon lae 
khwamchampen [The New Administrative System o f Rural Development: Reason and Necessity]”, 
Bangkok 1982, pp.l 1-12.
17 Prem attempted to incorporate right-wing leaders into his administration, for example the leader o f the 
Red Gaur-movement, Sudsai Hasdin, who was partly responsible for the massacre in October 1976. 
Jenkins, David. “The Three Faces o f Sudsai”, FEER, 9 January 1981, p .31.
18 For details o f both groups see Chalermkiet Phiu-Nual, Khwamkhitthangkanmueang khong thahan thai 
2519-2535 [Political Thought of the Thai Army (1976-1992)], Bangkok 1992, pp.73-83.
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to tackle the unfairness in social and economic areas.19 The second group was the 
Democratic Soldiers whose members consisted of military men in strategic and 
command positions.20 They strongly disapproved Thanin’s policies, which, in their 
view, nurtured the communist movement. Political extremism, whether represented by 
communism or dictatorship, meant danger for the national security. They proposed a 
democratic revolution (patiwat prachatipatai) which aimed to rebuild democracy and to 
create a new approach to cultural policy. The Democratic Soldiers envisioned an active 
role for the monarchy and not the passive role as symbol. They also saw a close 
connection between the cultural and the social-economic crises. If cultural problems 
could be solved, social and economic difficulties would be easier to tackle. Existing 
‘bad’ foreign culture should be removed and any new foreign elements should only be 
accepted if there was no contradiction with Thai culture. The Democratic Soldiers 
demanded respect and support for Thai culture because of its status as a long existing 
high culture. In order to fully develop this, democracy would be needed as a base. This 
would include ‘support for the freedom of the minorities to develop their own way of 
life.’21 The basic ideas of the Democratic Soldiers supported monarchical nationalism, 
an important aspect in the revival of the latter.
Prime Minister Prem, a loyal supporter of King Bhumibol, chose to break with 
the hard-line military solutions to tackle the problems of the country. He followed the 
ideas of the progressive officers because he was not only close to their group but also 
because of his own experience on the battlefield. During his time as Commander-in- 
Chief of the Second Army Region in the North East (1973-79), he emphasised the need 
for a political solution to the problems of the local population. In a speech in 1995, 
Prem gave insight into his motivation to break with the old approach: “On my second 
day in command, I lost 23 soldiers. I was plunged in the depths of sadness- lost for an 
answer.”22 He recognised that communist infiltration was deep-rooted in the local 
population, making it impossible to distinguish friends from foes. Originally, Prem 
perceived the CPT as an invading enemy from outside and could not understand the 
local mistrust against the state authorities. Later, however, he realised that the villagers
19 Pasuk Phongpaichit /Baker, Chris, Thailand- Economy and Politics, Kuala Lumpur 1995, p.326.
20 This part is based on Chalermkiet, 1992, pp.230-246.
21 Chalermkiet, 1992, p.245.
22 Prem Tinsulanonda. “Thai Experience in Combating Insurgency”, 
http://www.eeneralprem.com/Speech4.html (accessed 16 February 2004), p .l.
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felt harassed and exploited by the officials.23 Prem decided that the first step was to win 
the trust of the people: “These are Thais. We can meet without fighting because we are 
all Thais.”24 As next step, Prem envisioned the elimination of poverty by helping the 
villagers to help themselves. The state had the duty to support development with a good 
infrastructure.25 When Prem joined the cabinet as Defence Minister in 1979, he 
attempted to expand this political approach nationwide. Together with two leading 
members of the Democratic Soldiers, Chavalit Yongchaiyuth and Ham Leenanond, he 
outlined a strategy to attack the communists by political means. After he became Prime 
Minister, this strategy was made government policy in April 1980. The success of the 
so-called Order 66/2523 was astonishing. Over the next few years, 26,000 members of 
the CPT defected and contributed heavily to its dissolution in the latter half of the 
1980s.26 This order was just the beginning as Prem’s government provided a platform 
for the development of monarchical nationalism and supported its revival. Prem’s 
policies basically continued during the following governments, especially under the 
Prime Ministers Chatichai Choonhavan (1988-1991) and Chuan Likpai (1992-1995 and 
1997-2000). Both were former ministers in the Prem government and loyal to the 
monarchy.
An interesting aspect in the analysis of King Bhumibol’s role in this period is 
that his position in the political sphere was much stronger than in the first half of his 
reign despite being limited by a constitution which defined a passive position of the 
monarchy. Political crises in 1973 and later in 1992 transformed the King into the 
ultimate authority of the country when he helped to solve political stalemates. Although 
he was restricted by the constitution, he was able to interfere in political events after he 
was asked ‘by the people’ to do so. However, his biggest influence on state and society 
occurred during and after the financial crisis of 1997, an incident outside the political 
restrictions of the constitutions. As a reaction to the variety of problems caused by the 
financial meltdown of the Thai economy, the King became active on his own and 
proposed ideas of solutions. In a famous speech in December 1997, he said: “Being an 
[economic] tiger is not important. What is important is to have enough to eat and to live; 
and to have an economy which provides enough to eat and live...We have to move
23 Prem, 1995, p.2.
24 Cited in Mongkol Umpompisit. “General Prem and National Security”, Bangkok 1998, p.36.
25 Prem, 1995, pp.2-3.
26 Sawang Wongsuwanlert, Phon-ek Prem Tinsulanon: Ratthaburut khu phaendin [General Prem 
Tinsulanonda: the Statesman of the Land], Bangkok 2002, p.l 15.
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backwards in order to move forwards.”27 His advice was readily accepted by a insecure 
population wondering which path the nation should follow to a brighter future. The 
post-crisis period until 2001 could be considered as the peak of monarchical nationalism 
under King Bhumibol.28
9.2. King Bhumibol’s Vision o f the Nation
During his coronation in 1950, King Bhumibol made an oath of accession that is 
commonly translated into English as: “We shall reign with righteousness for the benefit 
and happiness of the Siamese people.”29 While this translation is correct, it does not 
reflect the whole depth of the meaning of this vow. By using the term dharma 
(righteousness) King Bhumibol invoked the traditional concept of kingship. This part of 
the chapter will show how the King has re-interpreted the monarchical nation with the 
help of this concept since the 1980s. In his monarchical nation, the monarch has the 
duty to practice dharma which will bring happiness, stability and prosperity to the 
people. The oath also showed that King Bhumibol intended to follow the ten kingly 
virtues which implies an active role for the monarch beyond a pure symbolical role 
normally reserved for a constitutional monarch. What were the causes for such an 
unusual attitude towards his role?
Formative Influences
I will suggest four factors as decisive in forming King Bhumibol’s world-view, 
his interpretation of the Thai nation and his approach to nationalism.
First, his personal background resulted in a unpretentious mind-set. His father, 
Prince Mahidol, dropped out of a navy career to become a doctor. After studying in the 
USA, United Kingdom and Germany, he worked in a hospital in Chiang Mai. His non­
royal mother was trained as a midwife. After the early death of Bhumibol’s father, she 
provided a rather ‘normal’ environment for Bhumibol to grow up in Switzerland. This
27 Cited in Pasuk Phongpaichit/Baker, Chris, Thailand’s Crisis, Chiang Mai 2000, p. 193.
28 The election o f Thaksin Shinawatra as Prime M inister in 2001 lessened the influence of the King on the 
state significantly. Thaksin was seen a progressive and charismatic leader who could deal with the IMF 
on an equal basis and who promised to strengthen Thailand. Pasuk/Baker called his rise to power ‘a gift 
from the Asian financial crisis’ because the people were yearning for strong political leadership. Pasuk 
Phongpaichit/Baker, Chris, Thailand's Thaksin: New Populism or Old Cronyism?, Bangkok 2001, p.6.
29 National Identity Board, King Bhumibol- Strength o f  the Land, Bangkok 2000, preface.
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included attending a regular school without any privileges and the learning of several 
languages. The influence of his parents on King Bhumibol cannot be overestimated. His 
father’s favourite slogan that ‘the benefit of fellow human beings comes first, the 
benefit of our own comes second’ had a tremendous impact on the King.30 The result 
was a down-to-earth attitude which enables him to communicate directly with the 
people and connect with them on an emotional level. For example, he once joined a hill 
tribe village head in his bamboo hut for a glass of moonshine liquor.31 Connected with 
this attitude was his practical orientation. Since childhood he was interested in science 
and enjoyed practical work which resulted in the construction of ship models and later 
on of sailing boats. The King emphasised in this context a Buddhist teaching which was 
a guideline for him: ‘happiness goes to those who do things for themselves’.32 He 
showed this practical side in his work as well. For example, during a long period of 
flooding in Bangkok, the King went on an inspection tour and ‘waded over one 
kilometre through floodwater to observe the pumping operations, much to the surprise 
of the residents.’331 propose that this attitude was the result of the fact that he was never 
supposed to be King. Bhumibol was not trained in court matters and had to study for 
himself the court traditions and traditional concepts of kingship. He did this not only 
thoroughly but also interpreted the role of the monarch and therefore the duties and 
responsibilities of kingship in a practical way.
Second, the disregard of the ruling political elite led by Phibun towards the 
monarchy showed that Bhumibol had to carve out a niche for himself (“I became King 
when I was quite young. I was 18, and very suddenly, I learned that politics is a filthy 
business”).34 In an interview in 1982, he used the palace building as a metaphor for the 
dreadful condition of the monarchy caused by the neglect of the state: “The palace was 
crumbling down. It was just after the war and nobody had taken care of things. I had to 
reconstruct. I don’t demolish. I put things together piece by piece.”35 The renovation of 
the palace became a symbol for the reconstruction of the monarchy itself. While the 
political establishment showed him the cold shoulder, Bhumibol received early on a 
very positive response from the people who not only gave a warm welcome to him but
30 National Identity Board, 2000, pp. 19-23 and Thongto Kluaimai na Ayutthaya, Yen sira phro phra 
boriban [Under the Cooling Shade o f His Majesty’s Protection], Bangkok 2002, p.68.
31 Bangkok Post. “Light Moments with His Majesty the King”, Outlook, 4 December 2003, p. 1.
32 Thongto, 2002, p.71.
33 National Identity Board, 2000, p.267.
34 Cited in Foreign Correspondent Club of Thailand (hereafter FCCT), The King o f  Thailand in World 
Focus, Bangkok 1988, p.53.
35 Printed in FCCT, 1988, p. 132.
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also expressed their hope for a functioning and protective monarchy. In May 1946, he 
had his first encounter with an enthusiastic crowd when he visited Chinatown as a 
Prince together with his brother shortly before he died. King Ananda sought close 
contact with the people through royal visits. Bhumibol commented on the influence of 
his brother on his own style of work in 1982: “The eighth reign, my brother [Ananda], 
had no time to do many things. But he set up, perhaps without knowing, the new 
kingship. The people had somebody to look on as a symbol.”36 A well-known anecdote 
from 1946 left a long lasting impression on Bhumibol that the people were in clear need 
of the emotional reassurance provided by the monarchy. After the sudden death of his 
brother, Bhumibol flew back to Switzerland in order to finish his studies. On his way to 
the airport one man was screaming: “Don’t forsake the people, Your Majesty!” King 
Bhumibol answered: “If the people do not forsake me, how can I forsake them?”37 This 
dialogue is not only proof for the desire of the people to be protected by the monarchy 
but also a plea by the King himself that the people should not stop to support the 
monarchy. He saw the relationship between the monarchy and the people as symbiotic 
in the face of a dominant state.
Third, King Bhumibol strongly believed in the importance of the monarchy for 
Thailand. He saw himself in line with former monarchs who played in his eyes the 
central role in nation-building. To emphasise this point, the King regularly conducted 
ceremonies to pay respect to his ancestors. An example was a ceremony at the 
beginning of the bicentennial celebration of Bangkok on the 2nd April 1982. In this 
ceremony, Buddha-statues belonging to the royal ancestors were positioned on the 
barge-like throne underneath the nine-tired Great White Umbrella of State. The urns 
containing the ashes of the royal ancestors (the eight kings of the Chakri dynasty, five 
queens and other princes such as his father) were placed on the Royal Throne. During 
the ceremony, the King kneeled down and prayed to his ancestors.38 With this ritual, 
King Bhumibol connected his rule with the past reigns. He reminded the living to be 
grateful to the efforts of the ancestors who he saw as role models. His conviction of the 
legitimacy of monarchy also motivated him to study traditional concepts of kingship 
which he aimed to uphold according to suitability. Therefore, it was logical that King 
Bhumibol was a staunch anti-communist in the period between the 1960s and 1980s. He
36 Cited in National Identity Board, 2000, p.53.
37 Cited in National Identity Board, 2000, p.39.
38 Office of His Majesty’s Principal Private Secretary, Royal Ceremonies fo r the Rattanakosin 
Bicentennial, Bangkok 1982, p.2.
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was convinced that ‘the enemy invades with an intention to destroy everything we have, 
including the Thai nation’.39 Despite different opinions on how to deal with the 
insurgency, he supported the military in its fight against the CPT by visiting troops in 
the battlefield and wounded soldiers in hospitals. He presided over and sponsored the 
cremations of fallen soldiers and policemen, mostly wearing an army uniform.40
Fourth, King Bhumibol believed in the value of culture and saw traditions as the 
source of strength of the Thai nation. He was, however, aware that a strict upholding of 
traditions could have a negative effect on the people. In order to maximise the benefit 
for his vision of the monarchical nation, he did adapt them to modem requirements: “I 
think that the Thai people understand the use of tradition. Traditional doesn’t mean old- 
fashioned. Even the most modem people have tradition... Slowly. Evolution- looking at 
the good things of the past. Traditions perpetuated and transformed. That is the lesson: 
We take old traditions and reconstruct them to be used in the present time and in the 
future.”41 With this background, King Bhumibol increasingly disapproved of the 
development strategy of successive Thai governments favouring rapid modernisation. 
An example was his statement in 1976 that a strategic road without any other benefits 
would be a waste of time and money. In his opinion, military objects had to be 
combined with social, economic and political programmes. Only that would result in a 
permanent solution to the communist threat to the nation.42 The King also saw the 
development strategy as the cause for an increasing decay of values in Thai society. 
After the communist threat eased in the 1980s, his focus shifted to the dangers of 
becoming dependent through unsuitable development: “The publicised danger is 
communism. But the greed of our own people is more dangerous. If we clash too much 
among ourselves it will destroy us and we will become the slaves of what I call the ‘new 
imperialism’, be it communist or dictatorship or whatever.”43
These four factors constituted the frame for King Bhumibol’s way of thinking. 
He adapted the traditional duty of the monarch to modem times. This can be seen in an 
interview from 1980, where all traditional elements of the duty of a king are mentioned. 
It could be seen as a blueprint for his vision of a nation: “The first thing is security, that 
is the security of the people, the Thai people have to fight for their freedom, for their
39 Samnakngan khanakammakan watthanatham haeng chat, Phraratchadamrat nueangnai okat 
wankhuenpimai [The Royal Speeches on the New Year Occasion], Bangkok 1995, p.2.
40 The Nation. “Majesties Preside Over Cremation Ceremony”, 26 March 1982, p. 1.
41 Cited in FCCT, 1988, pp.131-132.
42 The Nation. “Communist Incursions and Govt’s Counter Strategy”, 4 February 1982, p.5.
43 Cited in FCCT, 1988, p. 108.
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independence, so the main thing is to be a good general, and then after that, when the 
country is more settled is to have law and order, law and administration, and after that 
we must have enough food to eat, enough facilities to have a good home, to have 
shelter. And then we must have the social order and more things of the heart, that means 
we must be good people, so that we won’t have disorder because people who are good 
don’t create much trouble. So we must have religion. But the king is the leader of the 
religion also.”44 The fight against communism was clearly at the focus of his interest at 
that time. However, after this conflict was over, the next step was to expand the 
administration and rule of law to all comers of the country (e.g. in areas controlled by 
the CPT) and development could begin in earnest to create prosperity. The last step was 
to create a moral community which would ensure a peaceful and stable society.
The ‘official’ beginning of the revival of the monarchical nationalism can be 
dated to 31 December 1981 when the King held his New Year speech: “Eveiy Thai 
should think of how our ancestors have founded the country which is now Thailand. 
Facing difficulties and great dangers for many periods, they have accumulated progress 
and goodness and maintained it until today. That the Thai have been able to keep our 
freedom and stability until today, because we have a strong conscience that we are of 
the same race and the same country and we enjoyed freedom throughout history. This 
resulted in the strong unity to fight for the freedom and Thainess...If we want to 
maintain the country and this progress for the future, we must have the same mind as 
our ancestors. We have to be aware of our nation and Thai race first and then set up a 
righteous and strong mind to think only of the benefit of the country.. .Anyone who has 
duties must hurry to fulfil them with responsibility until achieving success. We must 
preserve the stability of the Thai [society] by cooperating like relatives who mean good 
to each other. When the Thai people can do all this in unison, the work of everyone will 
combine successfully to produce the enduring progress of the country that we wish.”45 
The elements of this speech became the guideline for many government policies and 
were reflected in many official declarations and speeches. The best proof for the revival 
of monarchical nationalism, however, was the number of royal projects which 
skyrocketed after 1980. While in the period between the 1950s and late 1970s only
44 BBC Written Archives, 5 January 1980, p.18.
45 Samnakngan khanakammakan watthanatham haeng chat, 1995, pp.29-30.
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around 100 royal projects were started, the number of projects reached the 3,000 mark 
in 2000, a clear indicator that the state actively promoted King Bhumibol’s ideals.46
An analysis of his activities and speeches showed that King Bhumibol 
interpreted the monarchical nation within three main dimensions which ensure that the 
nation is stable, peaceful, happy and prosperous: the nation as a trans-ethnic, self- 
sufficient and moral community.
The Monarchical Nation as a Trans-ethnic Community
The proponents of the political nation and the state associates citizenship with 
legal documents such as birth certificates and membership in the nation with the 
acceptance of the dominant Thai culture. However, the advocates of the monarchical 
nation historically interpreted Thai identity in a trans-ethnic way which meant that 
Thainess was not seen as a closed cultural system but open to minority cultures as well. 
King Bhumibol, well studied in history, took up this concept for his interpretation of the 
monarchical nation in order to propagate unity within the nation-state and therefore to 
stabilise Thai society as a whole. Thailand as nation-state is home to several ethnic 
groups, however, King Bhumibol’s ideas are most evident in his attitude towards two 
ethnic groups which are generally regarded as living on the fringes of Thai society: the 
hill tribes of the North and the Malay-Muslims in the far South.
Until the 1950s, hill tribes lived in virtually non-administered areas where there 
was no taxation, conscription, education, registration or even a definition of their legal 
status.47 However, visits of King Mongkut and Chulalongkom to some villages 
demonstrated that the monarchical nation did include them although the nation-state 
could not reach most of them. This ‘white area’ of the nation-state was filled when the 
government banned opium production and enforced this policy at the end of the 1950s. 
This inclusion was solely motivated to counter problems the hill tribe people ‘created’ 
for the nation-state. This resulted in a negative attitude to the hill tribes by the state, a 
feeling shared by many ordinary Thais.48
46 The projects fall in to following categories: education, environment, public health and welfare, soil, 
water resources and irrigation. National Identity Board, 2000, p. 198.
47 Manndorf, Hans, The Hill Tribe Program o f the Public Welfare Department, Bangkok 1965, pp.2-5.
48 See for example the comments o f Interior Minister Prapas Charusathien in 1966. Prapas portrayed the 
mountainous area as a dangerous zone and called the government ‘tolerant’ as long as the hill tribes 
would be loyal to the King and law abiding. Prapas Charusathien, Thailand’s Hill Tribes, Bangkok 1966, 
pp.3-8. See also Renard, Ronald. “The Monk, the Hmong, the Forest, the Cabbage, Fire and Water:
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Contrary to the government, King Bhumibol accepted the hill tribe people as his 
subjects and thus they became member of the monarchical nation: “The hill tribe 
maintains its own standard of behaviour and culture which is not less refined than 
ours... Our findings confirm those of distinguished anthropologists and sociologists that 
the hill tribe villagers had been found perfectly human, that as a result, they are 
subjected to covetousness, anger and ignorance no less than we are.” The King went on 
to give his ultimate approval to the hill tribes: “These qualifications are enough for us to 
accept them and for them to contribute- or to be allowed to contribute- to the 
improvement of the community.”49
The King visited the hill tribe areas and started royal projects just like he did in 
other parts of the country. For example, he proposed not an immediate destruction of 
poppy fields in the fight against opium but a gradual one to ensure the survival of the 
hill tribes. King Bhumibol also opposed the use of force against villagers. In a speech in 
1969, he criticised the government openly and made it indirectly responsible for the 
strength of the communists: “We do not wish to have communist terrorists in Thailand. 
But we are creating them when we point at self-governing villagers who are orderly and 
democratic, charging them with having trespassed on reserved forestland and driving 
them out. How should they know that those areas are in a conservation category, since 
there have been no governmental officials in the area to tell them so?”50 The King and 
his family chose to go a different way in dealing with the hill tribes. Since the mid- 
1960s, Royal Projects in that area were financed by the King’s own funds. Keyes called 
the royal family the ‘patrons of the hill tribes’ because they visited many villages, 
opened schools, sponsored rice banks and gave assistance to people in need.51
Besides being successful in reducing opium production, the King was praised in 
the media in the 1970s ‘for his efforts to overcome discrimination they [the hill tribes] 
face from many Thais’.52 The development efforts of King Bhumibol were aimed not 
only at the economic livelihood of the hill tribes but also to give them a sense of 
belonging.
Incongruities in Northern Thailand Opium Replacement”, Law and Society Review, 28, 1994, pp. 662- 
663.
49 Cited in Bangkok Post. “In Honour o f His Majesty the King’s Accession to the Throne, June 9 1946”, 
Supplement, 9 June 1971, p. 14.
50 Cited in Morell, David/Chai-anan Samudavanija, Political Conflict in Thailand, Cambridge 1981, p.68.
51 Keyes, Charles. “Cultural Diversity and National Identity in Thailand”, Cambridge 1997, p.219.
52 The Nation. “King’s Role Paramount in Reducing Opium Crop”, 2 March 1974, p .l.
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Even after decades of royal patronage and a generally improved image of the hill 
tribes, the competing views of the nation still affect their standing in Thai society. It is 
mainly the state bureaucracy which has problems in accepting the idea of a transethnic 
Thai identity. In 2000, state officials sanctioned the destruction of hill tribe plantations 
by lowlanders arguing that forests were under threat from hill tribe people. A local Thai 
leader did not count the hill tribes as Thais: “This land is ours. We were here before. 
Hill people are not our people. If they would be Thai they would live down here in the 
lowlands.”53 Despite these problems, the royal family continues to protect the hill tribes 
and clearly shows a different understanding of membership of the Thai nation than 
political nationalists. A recent case involved a Karen [hill tribe] man who was arrested 
as a suspect in connection with a deadly attack on a school bus in 2002. After one and a 
half years in prison, he was acquitted but still faced deportation to Burma because he 
had no documents to prove that he was bom in Thailand as he claimed. His serious 
illness while in prison prompted Queen Sirikit to take him under Royal patronage and to 
pay for his medical treatment. The immigration authorities then offered him a 
registration as alien worker. He refused the offer until witnesses finally certified his 
birth in Thailand.54
As for the Muslims, although the recent (since 2004) upsurge of violence in the 
southern provinces falls outside the timeframe of this thesis, it shows the importance of 
monarchical nationalism for the stability of the country. When the influence of the 
monarchical nation is lessened (as happened under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra), 
divisions in Thai society can begin to show themselves. In the monarchical nation, the 
monarch has the duty to act as patron of all religions not only Buddhism. King 
Bhumibol followed in this regard the examples of King Mongkut and King 
Chulalongkom and aimed to gain the trust of the Muslims over time. Besides visiting 
many mosques and talking to community leaders, he asked the Education Ministry to 
include Islamic Studies in the curriculum, supported translations and interpretations of 
his speeches into the local language when in the South and encouraged his children to 
learn Malay. One Member of Parliament of that region described the trust to the King as 
follows: “50 years ago, the people had the pictures of [Malay] sultans at home because 
they regarded Thailand as a foreign country. This changed through the barami of the
Chang Noi. “Peoples, Trees and Nationalism”, 18 September 2000, 
http://www.geocities.com/changnoi2/chanthong.htm (accessed 29 June 2003).
54 Sanitsuda Ekachai. “Waiting for Another Miracle”, Bangkok Post, Outlook, 11 August 2004, p.l and 8.
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King, especially after the construction of the [Southern] palace in 1973 and the yearly 
visits of the royal family. Attitudes of the people changed and the pictures of sultans 
were replaced by pictures of the King. They felt it was ‘their King’.”55 The personal 
interpreter of the royal family in the South, Dilok Siriwanlop, explained that the King 
emphasised that when one works with people, the first thing is to understand them, the 
second thing is to reach them and the last thing is to develop them. It also would take 
time to build a good relationship and trust between each other.56
This approach differs from the government as can be seen from this statement of 
the then Defence minister Thammarak Israngura who was angry about the refusal of 
Muslim leaders to cooperate in 2004: “Are they in Thailand, or not? Did they separate 
from the country already, or not? If it is not separated yet, they are still Thais. When 
they refuse to corporate then we have to bring them to cooperate with us. Vice-Premier 
Chaovalit [Yongchaiyuth] went there already and spoke pleasantly. I am good in 
suppressing but not good in communicating with them.”57 It can be stated that King 
Bhumibol is able to reach and integrate ethnic minorities better then proponents of the 
political nation who prefer a uniform culture. In February 2004, Thai Muslim leaders 
urged all Muslims to uphold the monarchy as the highest institution in the Kingdom. 
The highest Islamic representative criticised Prime Minister Thaksin for threatening 
punishment on Islamic schools for not flying the Thai flag and therefore committing 
treason and went on: “Our nation has more than 63 million people with different 
languages and different cultures. There is no need to talk about separatism because of 
these differences...His Majesty the King should be the centre of our heart and 
soul...[he] wanted to be close to us, his Muslim brothers and sisters.”58 It is obvious that 
the Muslim representative pledged loyalty to the King and not to the government. 
Muslims do feel they are members of the monarchical nation but decline, at least partly, 
membership in the Thai political nation.
These case studies confirm the trans-ethnic nature of the monarchical nation. In 
a speech in April 1987, the King emphasised the ability of integration and tolerance as 
the strength of the Thai nation: “In the past 40-50 years the whole world pointed out
55 Chumsak Nararatwong, Saifon nuea paknam bangnara [Rainfall over the Mouth o f the Bangnara 
River], Bangkok 2003, pp.29-30 and 159.
56 Matichon. “Khon chaidaentai ‘rak nailuang-ratchini’ [The People o f the Southern Border Region Love 
the King and Queen] ”, 4 January 2006, p.33.
57 Cited in Sorakon Adunlayanon. “Thaksin Shinawatra bin baeb yiao thi phaktai input phitphlat output 
bitbiao [Thaksin Shinawatra Going to the South, Wrong Input and Deviated Output]”, Matichonsutsapda, 
2004, p. 12.
58 The Nation. “Muslims Pledge Loyalty to the King”, 17 February 2004, p.l and 4.
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that Thailand shouldn’t be able to survive. Thailand is in a dangerous place and weak. I 
have told the foreigners that Thailand will be fine, mostly because of our spirit of 
generosity. No matter in what occupation or status, the Thais have the spirit of 
generosity which is the quality of the land. When talking about Thais it means Thais. 
The people who come to live in this land which is Thailand, no matter where they are 
from, Middle East, America, Europe, China or India, when they come to Thailand, they 
become Thais. This [generosity of the Thais to accept foreigners] is what we call the 
quality or the wealth of the land which enable us to survive.”59 The monarchical nation 
is a trans-ethnic community where ethnicity has no meaning because it is the individual 
and not group who does his duty and contributes to the prosperity and stability of the 
nation.
The Monarchical Nation as a Self-sufficient Community
The economic sector generally plays a significant role in nationalism. Nakano 
gave as reason that not only the state as political system but also the nation as a cultural 
phenomenon influences the modes of the economic system. He went on to argue that 
economic nationalists prefer to mobilise the resources of the nation as a whole and 
spread the benefits beyond the boundaries of class. In other words, they avoid economic 
policies which would undermine the unity of the nation. The goal is not autarky but 
national unity, autonomy and the augmentation of national power. Special attention is 
paid to the agricultural sector because technological progress itself is not seen as the 
ultimate goal of economic nationalism.60
From this perspective King Bhumibol is an economic nationalist. He sees the 
monarchical nation as a self-sufficient community. In the centre of this self-sufficient 
community is the agricultural sector with the farmer, in King Bhumibol words, as ‘the 
backbone of Thailand’.61 If the backbone is in crisis, the whole country will be affected. 
This would result in instability, conflict and unhappiness for the people. To avoid this 
situation, the King has continuously worked to improve the livelihood of the rural 
population. There is no better description of King Bhumibol’s economic nationalism
59 Bhumibol Adulyadej, Phrabatsomdetphraparamintharamaha, Pramuan phraratchadamrat lae 
phraboromrachowat thi phraratchathan nai okat thong thang p i pho so 2530 [Collections o f Royal 
Speeches Given on Several Occasions in 1987], Bangkok 1988, p. 149.
60 Nakano, Takeshi. “Theorising Economic Nationalism”, Nations and Nationalism, 2004, pp. 220-226.
61 Cited in National Identity Board, 2000, p. 104.
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than Smith’s observation that ‘nationalism is a philosophy of collective self-help for 
those who share the same history, and its critique of society is a critique of social and 
political dependence’.62 The King does not favour industrial development because this 
would increase Thailand’s dependence from the outside world and would affect the 
moral character of the people. He also offers self-sufficiency as the suitable direction for 
the Thai economy63: “Producers should emphasise continuous agricultural production 
and should not engage in large industrial business, because a business at this scale 
usually depends on imported materials and technology from aboard to use in 
production. Instead we should consider using what we have in our country first. This 
way, we do not have to rely on foreign countries like at present. Achieving a self- 
sufficient economy will help to reduce the import of raw materials and parts, and the 
practice of dependency that has grown for almost 20 years and been ignored by the 
people. This external influence has implanted the impression of materialism in Thai 
people, who absorb foreign products so unconsciously and rapidly that it has become a 
stimulus for the Thai economic downturn.”64
Self-sufficiency, therefore, would make Thai society less vulnerable to world 
market developments and stabilise the country: “What others may say does not matter, 
whether they say that Thailand is old-fashioned or that we are outdated. Anyhow, we 
have enough to live on and to live for, and this should be the wish and determination of 
all of us to see self-sufficiency in this country...Other countries are in turmoil because 
they are looking for the most power, the most progress in economy, industry or 
ideology.”65
It is the strong belief of King Bhumibol that Thailand can progress and make its 
people happy because of its inner strength and knowledge which would provide the 
necessary foundation for self-sufficiency to succeed. He warns against the tendency of 
state officials to regard traditional know-how of the people as inferior against modem, 
western technology: “It is the people who have knowledge. They have done it for many 
generations and they did it well. They have intelligence. They know in what place they
62 Smith, Anthony, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Oxford 1979, p.29.
63 The King acknowledged that his economic ideas are not entirely suitable for modern times but aims to 
transform a quarter of the Thai economy into a self-sufficient one. Nidhi Watiwutthipong. 
“Phrabatsomdetphrachaoyuhua kap setthtakit thai [The King and the Thai Economy]”, Bangkok 2002, 
p. 138.
64 Cited in Munnithichaipattana. “Self-Sufficient Economy”, 1999, p.58.
65 Sompom Thepsittha, Kandoen tam roiphrayukonlabat setthakitpopiang chuay kae panha 
khwamyakchon lae kanthucharit [Following the Royal Footsteps: Sufficiency Economy Helps to Solve 
the Problems o f Poverty and Corruption], Bangkok 2003, p.27.
224
should practice agriculture and in what areas they should preserve. What is lost is due to 
those who have no knowledge and no experience in this field. Then they forget that, life 
is possible by practicing agriculture in the correct way.”66 In a speech in 1986, the King 
emphasised the important role of Thai culture as source for inner strength: “We should 
continue to help ourselves with our own strength and our own wealth. For a long time, 
we Thais have helped create stability and progress in every aspect by our own strength 
therefore we should continue to help ourselves with our own strength and our own 
wealth because nowadays Thailand is still full of resources, both natural and human 
which is very useful for the prosperity and stability of the country.”67
Following the ideal that the monarch in the self-sufficient nation is leader, 
teacher and advisor to his people, King Bhumibol emphasises that he only shows a way 
to solve problems and provides the basic requirements but that the people themselves 
must work to make change real: “Better give them a rod and teach them how to fish but 
don’t give them fish...You must give them the minimum which includes water to drink 
and water to irrigate the fields. These basics are still lacking in the villages and that is 
why we must give them.”68 His approach to development is therefore twofold. First, he 
initiated a vast network of royal projects which aim to provide basic needs such as 
knowledge or water in order to develop the rural society on a local level. Second, he 
developed an agrarian theory of self-sufficiency, called ‘New Theory’, to be applied by 
the individual farmer.69
Dahm argued that the mobilisation of the masses is not achieved by concepts 
imported from outside but by a revival of norms and values, which people considered as 
a part of their identity in particular times of crisis.70 Accordingly, King Bhumibol was 
successful in motivating the people to accept his projects and to feel as members of the 
monarchical nation because he allowed the participation of the people in the process of
66 Cited in Samnakngan khanakammakan kansueksahaengchat, Naewthang songsoem phumpanyathai rxai 
kanchatkansueksa [Guidelines for the Promotion o f Thai Wisdom in Education], Bangkok 1999, p .l.
67 Bhumibol Adulyadej, Phrabatsomdetphraparamintharamaha, Pramuan phraratchadamrat lae 
phraboromrachowat thi phraratchathan nai okat thang thang p i pho so 2529 [Collections o f Royal 
Speeches Given on Several Occasions in 1986], Bangkok 1987, p.475.
68 Cited in Davies, Derek. “A Right Royal Example”, FEER, 23 January 1986, p.23.
69 In 1995, King Bhumibol formulated the New Theory and was based on his opinion that conventional 
farming o f the Green Revolution was not only unsustainable but also caused environmental degradation. 
The reason was that conventional agriculture was developed in the West taking into account western 
resources and infrastructure availability. The King saw the New Theory as a detailed guideline for 
sustainable agriculture for small plot holders in a Thai environment. National Identity Board, 2000, 
pp.333-352. For the application o f the New Theory in practice see Jitpol Sittipraneed. “The New Theory 
at Wat Mongkol Chaipattana: Illustration of the Thai Path”, Munithichaipattana, 2003, pp.25-31
70 Dahm, Bernhard. “Cultural Traditions and the Struggle for Nationhood in Asia”, Kota Kinabalu 2001, 
p.9.
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decision making and implementation of activities. The King acknowledged the need to 
understand differences and to respect local cultures. He reckoned that “development 
must take account of the local environment in terms of the physical environment, the 
sociological environment and the cultural environment. By the sociological 
environment, we mean certain characteristics and ways of thinking which we cannot 
force people to change. We can only suggest.”71 The King, believing in the inner 
strength of Thai culture, argued that “all people, whether city folk or rural folk, with 
much or little education have a free will. Their thoughts and satisfaction are their own. 
People do not like to be forced. In addition, they have their own ways and customs and 
act in their own unique way.” He saw himself therefore in the role of an advisor who 
presents his ideas to the villagers: “If they like it they will do it, but if not then never 
mind.”72 King Bhumibol wanted development to follow his slogan ‘explosion from 
within’. Public hearings on a local level have to discuss proposals and only when a 
unanimous agreement of all people concerned (village and state agencies) is reached, 
then the King acts and implements the project.73
Why does the King choose such a local approach? In 1972, he said: “When local 
areas prosper, the country will thrive and progress as everybody works together and 
helps each other. When opinions are voiced, they are listened to with reason, which is 
the way to live together as a nation.”74 In 1991, he combined his motivation in the 
slogan ‘Our Loss is Our Gain’: “We are willing to put money and effort which may 
seem useless, but in the end we may be able to reap the fruits directly or indirectly. This 
is the very duty of the government. If we want the people to be prosperous, we have to 
invest in development projects, which will involve budgets of hundreds or many 
thousand of millions. This means a loss of money; however, if the project is a good one, 
the people will very soon gain benefit from it.”75
The following example shows that an investment into a royal project on 
grassroots level does not only benefit the local people but also pays dividends in 
political terms for contributing to the stability of the nation: a village in the North East 
was under communist control since 1965 when a series of development projects, 
including a royal project for food processing, were started in 1981. The life of the
71 Cited in National Identity Board, 2000, p.201.
72 Cited in Royal Development Projects Board, Concepts and Theories o f His Majesty the King on 
Development, Bangkok 1997, pp.253-254.
73 Cited in Royal Development Projects Board 1997, p.34.
74 Cited in Royal Development Projects Board, 1997, p.90.
75 Cited in National Identity Board, 2000, p. 191.
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villagers began to improve because a can factory provided double income by buying 
vegetables and fruits from the farmers. Phongsatom stated that the behaviour of officials 
also changed, especially the ones connected to the royal projects which gave the 
villagers a feeling of belonging. The improvement was seen immediately when in the 
election of 1983 98 % of the villagers decided to vote and express therefore their 
acceptance of the Thai state.76
The Monarchical Nation as a Moral Community
King Bhumibol repeatedly stressed the importance of moral aspects of being a 
nation as for example in this speech from 1987: “ ...all that you have done for this 
special occasion [his 60th birthday celebration], not only show your good intention to 
create beneficial things for the country and the people as a whole but also shows that the 
Thai still have a full unity which is one of the important moral principles (khunatham) 
that the people who live together must practice constantly...All Thais should understand 
the real meaning and value of unity and have a strong intention to do their duty in 
cooperation with others with honesty, diligence and sincerity, so that every success that 
each of you has created will combine into the progress, stability, happiness and 
prosperity of our country.”77 The key word in this passage is khunatham or moral 
principle. It is important to point out that moral principles or moral has to be understood 
in its Thai context. Accordingly, this chapter understands moral as a direct translation of 
khunatham. This term consists of the word khun (good, virtue, benefit) and tham 
(dharma, righteousness). A moral community is therefore to be understood as a 
community which has dharma resulting in benefits. For the individual, King Bhumibol 
adapted this definition accordingly to different kind of professions and situations. For 
example, everybody should follow five elements during work: ‘five moral attitudes 
which help you to succeed in work: belief, perseverance, consciousness, determination 
and wisdom’.78 The emphasis on perseverance in the context of work is important 
because it is one of the key aspects of self-sufficiency. King Bhumibol does not only
76 Phongsatorn Satchachonlapan. “Muban sidaeng nai adit yuk khamsang samnaknayokratthamontri thi 
66/2523 [A Former Red Village in the 66/2523 Era: Political Trust and Political Efficacy?]”, 
Warasansangkhomsat, 1987, pp.91-101.
77 Cited in Khanakammakan amnuaikan chatngan chalemphrakiat phrabatsomdetphrachaoyuhua, 1989, 
p.(9).
8 Cited in Kanok Wongtra-ngan, Naeo phraratchadamri dan kanmueang kanpokkhrong khong 
phrabatsomdetphrachaoyuhua [King Bhumibol’s Concept of Politics and Government], Bangkok 1988, 
p.234-235.
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connect his ideas to create a coherent vision of the nation but also stresses the 
responsibility of the individual to follow the ideals in order to create a moral community 
as a whole.
9.3. The Dissemination o f Monarchical Nationalism
Even as late as 2003, an official report showed the obvious limitations of print 
media as disseminators of nationalistic views. Only 61.2% of the population read books 
while 66% read newspapers. However, these figures were misleading because an 
analysis of the occupations reveals that parts of the population, namely farmers and 
labourer did not read regularly (65.6% of male farmers, 70.7% of female farmers and 
57.9% of labourers).79 Therefore the attempt to use print media to reach large parts of 
the population and to disseminate ideas of nationalism could not be very successful. 
King Bhumibol followed his ancestors in employing ceremonies, literature and 
monuments for their richness of symbolism and his use of tradition appealed to the 
emotions and beliefs while connecting the present with the past. One pre-eminent 
means, however, was the use of royal projects.
Royal Projects
From his personal contact with the people during his frequent visits to the 
countryside, the King initiated royal development projects which were not only his way 
of directly helping the people but also an effective means to spread his concept of the 
monarchical nation.
The royal family supported the development of a moral community directly. For 
example, any village visit of King Bhumibol or Queen Sirikit included a trip to the local 
temple where they donated medicines and books about dharma. One project in the 
Northern province of Chiang Mai is especially worth mentioning. This project, started 
by the Queen in 1982, aimed to promote values and to develop that community in 
material and moral terms. The Queen donated temple murals that depicted a moral 
lifestyle according to dharma. When the murals were finished, she visited the temple 
and invited the whole community to the temple to pray with her. She set as targets for
79 Samnakngansathitihaengchat, Rai-ngan kansamruat kanannangsue khong prachakon PhoSo 2546 
[Survey Report On Reading Habits Of the Population, 2003], Bangkok 2003, pp. 5-7.
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this project that the villagers should live their lives ethically, should live together in 
peace, should strengthen Buddhism and should serve as role models for the 
development of the nation. The values propagated were unity, patience, diligence, order, 
prudence, sufficiency-mindedness, to know what one should do and what not and to 
know what is right and what is wrong. Transferred to a national level, this would result 
in a ‘nation having a people full of morality, benevolence, diligence and unity’.80 The 
King himself set up another ‘moral’ royal project, namely the Phra Dabot School, in 
1975. This school accepted crippled war veterans and poor students who could not 
afford to attend occupational schools. The name Phra Dabot referred to a legendary 
hermit who taught people skills to earn a living. Students had to repay the lessons by 
looking after the teacher. King Bhumibol intended to use this concept to create morally 
sound human beings: “The main aim of this project is not only to provide an education 
but also to prevent the poor from becoming hooligans by learning morality from their 
teacher at the same time.”81
A good example of the nation as self-sufficient community could be found in 
one of Bhumibol’s earliest royal projects. The Thai-Israel Rural Development Project 
started in Phetchaburi province in 1964. It comprised of a land development project in 
which 120 families were given a plot of land each with a cooperative owning the land 
jointly. King Bhumibol’s idea was to establish a self-help philosophy that would be 
undisturbed should individuals be forced into selling the land. Therefore, farmers could 
not sell the land but were allowed to pass it to their children. The King commented: ‘it 
is highly important to encourage and help people in earning their living and supporting 
themselves by adequate means, because those who are gainfully employed and self- 
supporting are capable of contributing positively towards higher levels of 
development’.82
Royal projects representing the ideal of a trans-ethnic community had started 
already in 1952. In the beginning, projects such as the opium-replacement scheme and 
the introduction of schools in distant villages concerned mostly the hill tribe people in 
the North and aimed ‘to provide a permanent and sustainable lifestyle for the hill 
tribes’.83 Later on, royal projects also included Muslim communities in the South.
80 Samnakngansoemsangekalakkhongchat, Chak fa...su  din [From Sky..To Earth], Bangkok 1983, 
pp.171-177.
81 Cited in Thongto, 2002, pp. 109-110.
82 Cited in National Identity Board, 2000, pp. 132-134.
83 Cited in National Identity Board, 2000, pp. 139 and 208.
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It is interesting to note that King Bhumibol repeatedly emphasised the role of the 
individual and his part to ensure the functioning of the nation as a moral, trans-ethnic 
and self-sufficient community.
Ceremonies and Festivities
King Bhumibol was well aware of the effects of ceremonies on the general 
population. In an interview in 1967, he stressed his seriousness about ceremonies and 
indicated that he would not hesitate to adapt traditional ceremonies to spread his ideas: 
“If I am bored at any time with ceremonies and ritualistic functions, then it is my fault. I 
want to do the things which are good for Thailand, to build within the people the will to 
study and work for Thailand. Now, about eight years ago [1959], I decided to do 
something about our Buddhist customs. Three times a year, I go to the temple of the 
Emerald Buddha, and I bathe the Buddha and change his raiment. I used to take the 
water and sprinkle it on the officials who accompanied me to the temple- it becomes 
holy water. It was an honour for those officials. Then I decided that the people outside, 
the ordinary people, would believe that the water would bring them goodness, and they 
would look upon the ceremony as more than an honour. For if you believe the water 
will do good for you, it will do good.”84
Another example for his adaptation of ceremonies is the revival of 
Phraratchaphiti charotphranangkhan raeknakhwan (the First Ploughing Ceremony). 
First recorded in the Sukhothai period, this ceremony aimed to ask for a good harvest 
and to predict it. It was abolished in 1935 and reintroduced partly in 1940 but limited to 
Buddhist chanting while the ploughing ritual itself was not included. In the ceremony, 
fully revived by King Bhumibol in 1960, a ‘ploughing lord’ appointed by the monarch 
ploughed the field and sowed rice seeds blessed by the Buddhist chanting. After the 
ceremony, people were allowed entry to the field to collect the seeds which are believed 
to guarantee a good harvest. Apart from presiding at the ceremony himself, the King 
added a new element in 1962 when the rice seeds used were produced on his 
experimental farm at the palace. With the help of this ceremony, he was able to 
distribute new varieties of rice (for example high yielding varieties) to farmers without 
having to fear resistance to new technology. To ensure a broad distribution, he went on
84 FCCT, 1988, p.52.
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to send this rice to every province where the governor supplied his farmers with the 
King’s rice ‘to bring happiness and welfare to them’.85 With the help of this traditional 
ceremony, King Bhumibol was able to reassure the farmers with a good harvest86 and 
spread new technology at the same time. By receiving the rice, every farmer from all 
comers of the country was directly connected with the monarchy and all other farmers 
in the realm. They become part of the monarchical nation under the leadership of the 
King.
The Use o f Literature
Literature was employed to disseminate monarchical nationalism. King 
Bhumibol wrote several books in order to propagate moral values. In 1994, he published 
a translation of A Man Called Intrepid by William Stevenson, a spy book set in the 
Second World War. He gave as reason for his choice of the book that it ‘shows the 
power of unity and the self-sacrifice of individuals to create that unity’.87 Another 
famous book was The Story o f  Thongdaeng where he demonstrated the value of 
gratitude and loyalty on the example of his own dog. Probably the most important work 
of the King was The Story o f Mahajanaka.
Based on a Buddhist story, The Story o f Mahajanaka was translated from Pali 
into English first and later published in the form of a Thai-English book in 1996. The 
first, hardcover edition with a selling price of 50,000 Baht (ca 1,250 US-Dollar) per 
copy was targeted at the more affluent people in the kingdom. A paperback edition in 
1997 still failed to reach the masses because, in the King’s own words, it was ‘difficult 
to read due to the sophisticated language used and the surreal illustrations led to various 
interpretations’. It also had a rather high selling price of 250 Baht. The King decided to 
publish in 1999 an easy-to-read and economically priced cartoon version which ‘a nine- 
year-old said that this version could be understood’. The King stressed his intention in 
the preface that ‘everybody should be able to own a copy’.88 Indeed, the book sold
Kromsinlapakon, Phraratchaphithi nai ratchakan phrabatsomdetphra- 
paramintaramahaphumiphonadunyadet sayamintharathirat borommanatbophit [Royal Ceremonies 
during the Reign o f King Bhumibol], Bangkok 2000, p.31.
86 About the importance of the ceremony for farmers see Van Esterik, Penelope. “Royal Style in Village 
Context”, Leiden 1980, pp. 104-105.
87 Cited in National Identity Board, 2000, p.64.
88 King Bhumibol Adulyadej, The Story o f  Mahajanaka- Cartoon Edition, Bangkok 1999, p.(4).
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600,000 copies in a few weeks, an unparalleled success in a country where most books 
achieve only a few thousand copies per edition.89
The Story o f  Mahajanaka is based on one of the jatakas, the 547 stories about 
the previous incarnations of Buddha. As a traditional form of Buddhist literature used 
by monks to teach religion, the jataka was diffused both through written and oral 
tradition and thus flexible to be adapted to suit different situations and times. The most 
important of the jatakas are the last ten incarnations before Buddhahood which reflect 
the ten perfections (barami), each of the ten associated with one particular perfection. 
The Mahajanaka jataka is the second of the ten and focuses on the perfection of 
perseverance.90
The fact that King Bhumibol had chosen this jataka is interesting in several 
aspects. First, King Bhumibol fulfilled the traditional role of a king to support 
Buddhism through literature. Almost all monarchs of the Chakri dynasty wrote by 
themselves or ordered court poets to compose Buddhist texts and jatakas. Second, with 
his aim ‘to help everybody to have an idea for a noble way of life’91, King Bhumibol 
used the jataka in a didactic function and so followed the traditional way of teachings 
by monks. The openness to interpretation of the jatakas allowed him to adapt them to 
his needs. Although King Bhumibol was telling a modem story, he put much effort in 
disguising it as traditional. Even in the English translation (made by himself), he tried to 
keep the traditional spirit of a jataka by mixing old and new language. This can be 
interpreted that he wanted to keep the sacredness of the literary form.92 Third, the choice 
of this specific jataka was unusual. The most popular jataka in Thailand is Vetsandon 
jataka which depicts the last life before Buddhahood and is therefore regarded as the 
most important jataka of all.93 The topic of perseverance must personally be of utmost 
importance to King Bhumibol. The analysis of this story can give an explanation to this 
importance.
The story of Mahajanaka goes as follow: Mahajanaka is the only son of King 
Aritthajanaka whose younger brother, Polajanaka, is viceroy. One day, a courtier
89 Asiaweek. “A Very Special Monarch”, 3 December 1999, pp.44-53.
90 Santikaro Bhikku. “Retelling ‘The Mahajanaka Jataka’ for a Society in Crisis: His Majesty the King’s 
Creative Adaptation o f a Traditional Buddhist Form”, Thoughts, 1999, pp.46-49.
91 King Bhumibol Adulyadej, 1999, p.(4).
92 Bhumibol succeeded in this goal, as can be seen in the comment of a newspaper that the King gives 
dharma to the people. Thai Rath, “Phramahajanaka [Prince Mahajanaka]”, 8 June 1996, p.7.
93 This does not imply that the Mahajanaka jataka  is unknown in Thailand. Kingshill reported a sermon 
on ‘perseverance’ in a village near Chiang Mai in 1953. Kingshill, Konrad, Kudaeng, Bangkok 1960, 
pp.251-252.
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convinces the king that his brother is plotting against him. Polajanaka is imprisoned but 
the chains fall from his hands and feet to confirm his innocence. His popularity allows 
him to raise an army against the king and to seize the throne for himself.94 After the king 
dies, his queen, pregnant with the protagonist, flees. When Mahajanaka turns 16, he 
aims to regain the throne for himself and goes on a trading trip to Suwamaphum to 
finance his coup. When his ship capsizes in a storm, Mahajanaka is the only passenger 
to survive because he prepares for the disaster while other passengers just pray to the 
gods for help. Swimming in the water for seven days without seeing a coastline, the 
goddess Mani Mekhala who is impressed by his perseverance, rescues him and brings 
him to the capital of his native kingdom where in the meantime King Polajanaka is 
dying. He ordered that the throne should be given to the one who can please his 
daughter, solve several riddles, string the heaviest bow and discover the Sixteen Great 
Treasures. Unable to find a candidate to meet these requirements, the courtiers send out 
the Grand Chariot which only a king can ride on. The chariot finds Mahajanaka who can 
ride it immediately and passes all other tests. Mahajanaka is crowned and marries the 
princess. From that time on he follows the ten kingly virtues and reigns with 
righteousness for 7,000 years.95
King Bhumibol composed The Story o f  Mahajanaka strictly along the plot of 
Mahajanaka jataka but he made slight adjustments to some characters, dialogues and 
episodes to suit his aim to promote a monarchical nation as a moral community with the 
king as leader. For the King, the theme of ‘perseverance’ is not only a Buddhist and 
kingly virtue but also an essential foundation for the progress of the individual and the 
nation as a whole: “when anybody practises perseverance physically or morally, with 
the aim that he wants to go there, he wants to learn this and that, these actions are sure 
to be crowned with success; it follows that the practice of pure perseverance is an 
absolute necessity.”96
In the scene where the goddess Mani Mekhala notices Mahajanaka in the midst 
of the ocean and wonders why he keeps on swimming for so long, he explained his 
struggle for survival with the concept of perseverance. Perseverance would make the 
individual strong and independent: ‘any individual who practices perseverance, even in
94 King Bhumibol Adulyadej, The Story o f  Mahajanaka, 2nd edition, Bangkok 1997, pp.6-15.
95 King Bhumibol Adulyadej, 1997, pp.70-117.
96 King Bhumibol Adulyadej, 1997, p.90.
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the face of death, will not be in any debt to relatives or gods or father or mother’.97 The 
reward for such an individual ‘who does his duty like a man’ would be ‘the Ultimate 
Peace in the future’.98 The explanation goes on: “anyone who knows for sure that his 
activities will not meet with success, will be doomed; i f  that one desists from  
perseverance in that way, he will surely receive the consequence o f his indolence [the 
emphasised part is an addition to the original by King Bhumibol]. Some people in this 
world strive to get results for their endeavours even if they don’t succeed. You do see 
clearly the results of actions, don’t you? All the others have drowned in the ocean, we 
alone, are still swimming and have seen you hovering near us. As for us, we are going 
to endeavour further to the utmost of our ability; we are going to strive like a man 
should to reach the shores of the ocean.”99 In this scene, perseverance as one of the 
moral principles is presented as the basis for progress. Everybody has to do his duty to 
the fullest though unable to see an immediate result because in the long term he 
individually will be rewarded and the community will benefit from it as well.
King Bhumipol’s idea of a moral nation is further revealed in his comments on 
King Mahajanaka’s trip to the royal park. At the entrance, Mahajanaka sees two mango 
trees. One is fruitless while another is fully loaded with extremely sweet fruits. After 
tasting the fruits, the king planned to take some home on his way back. However, when 
he leaves the tree, people come and pick all the fruits: “The others, from the viceroy to 
the elephant mahouts and the horse handlers, seeing that the King had already eaten the 
tasty fruit, all picked some and had their fill. Still others who came later, used sticks to 
break down branches; the tree was stripped of leaves; the tree was uprooted.”100 On his 
return, Mahajanaka is very sad about what happened. While the original jataka ends 
with Mahajanaka’s decision to leave his throne in search of nirvama, King Bhumibol let 
the king realise that ‘he had to fulfil his worldly duties first to be able to achieve 
supreme tranquillity more readily’.101 King Bhumibol commented: “Mahajanaka should 
not leave the city on a quest for supreme tranquillity as in the original version... 
Mithila’s [the city] prosperity had not yet reached an appropriate peak, because 
everyone ‘from the Viceroy down to the elephant mahouts ...all live in the state of 
ignorance. They lack wisdom as well as knowledge in technology; they do not see the
97 King Bhumibol Adulyadej, 1997, p.70.
98 King Bhumibol Adulyadej, 1997, p.80.
99 King Bhumibol Adulyadej, 1997, p.89.
100 King Bhumibol Adulyadej, 1997, p. 125.
101 King Bhumibol Adulyadej, 1997, p.(10).
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essence of what is beneficial, even for their own good. Therefore, an institution of 
universal learning must be established.’”102 King Bhumibol ends his altered story with 
the establishment of that institute.103
Some observations should be made on King Bumibol’s version of The Story o f  
Mahajanaka. First, there are parallels between Mahajanaka and King Bhumibol himself. 
The name Mahajanaka can be translated as ‘Great Father’. This ‘name’ together with 
his story mirror the ideal role of a Thai king as seen by King Bhumibol himself. The 
monarch as father has to fulfil his duty to work for the benefit of his people to be a 
Great King in this life before he can realise nirvana. Further, Mahajanaka was bom 
outside his kingdom and a son of a widow, both situations King Bhumibol knew well 
from his own life.
Second, King Bhumibol made many detailed changes in order to help the reader 
of this Buddhist legend identify the protagonist and the setting with real persons and 
environment. For example, the King drew a map of the sea journey Mahajanaka 
undertakes.104 His destination, Snwarnaphum [Golden Land] is located on the place of 
Thailand. Its capital was named by King Bhumibol as Devamarajanagara which 
translates into the Thai name for Bangkok: Krung Thep or City of Angels. Another 
example is the name of the institute for learning which King Bhumibol named it 
Bodhiyalqya.]0S This is a reference to Wat Pho temple in Bangkok which is regarded 
since the period of King Rama III as ‘the home’ of Thai knowledge and wisdom. By 
keeping the original Buddhist locations and original sounding names but transferring 
them to Thailand, King Bhumibol achieved a sense of authenticity of the story without 
losing the possibility for the reader to connect the story with modem Thailand.
Third, a rather odd scene was added by King Bhumibol in order to warn against 
the incautious use of modem technology. In this scene, the owner of a new automatic 
fruit harvester apologises to Mahajanaka for accidentally uprooting the tree. 
Mahajanaka is not angry but teaches nine methods to revive the tree instead. What 
followed is a detailed description of these methods.106 King Bhumibol not only made 
this episode as a warning against the belief that modem machines are always the best 
thing but also used the lesson of Mahajanaka as a way to disseminate agricultural
102 King Bhumibol Adulyadej, 1997, p.(10).
103 King Bhumibol Adulyadej, 1997, p. 141.
104 Printed in King Bhumibol Adulyadej, 1997, p.54.
105 King Bhumibol Adulyadej, 1997, p. 141.
106 King Bhumibol Adulyadej, 1997, p.133.
235
knowledge to the readers and to teach them about sustainable economy and the 
preservation of natural resources.
In The Story o f  Mahajanaka, King Bhumibol acknowledged a strong sense of 
Thai individualism which is rooted in Theravadda Buddhism. It teaches that everybody 
has to strive for himself to achieve nirvama. In regard to nationalism, this individualism 
results in a very loose sense of belonging to a political mass nation. As the King is 
interested in the development of a stable and sustainable nation, he appeals to 
everybody to fulfil his duty individually in order to help the nation. In doing so, he did 
not directly bind the individuals together in a mass nation. His idea promoted in The 
Story o f Mahajanaka is that of a moral community which consists of the sum of all 
individuals but one which is not horizontally but vertically connected. This gives the 
king utmost importance because his duty is to safeguard and provide the basic 
conditions for this moral community. His efficiency and ability to fulfil this duty 
depends on his barami. However, he also depends on the individual to do their duty as 
well. If the individual fails to do so, the king himself is also not able to maintain the 
moral community. Therefore, there is a symbiotic relationship between the monarch and 
the individual. This moral community is not imagined but is emotionally felt through 
the effects of the barami and physically embodied by the king.
In reference to Mahajanaka’s explanation of perseverance, it could be proposed 
that each person to fulfil the duty to the nation must realise his individual duty. Only 
then can the nation prevail and persist eternally, analogous to the Ultimate Peace of the 
individual in the Buddhist context. King Bhumibol also pays tribute to individualism in 
the economic sphere as well. As in the moral community, the King considers the 
economically sustainable community as the sum of self-sufficient people. King 
Bhumibol provides all necessary basic requirements for the individual to become self- 
sufficient. Besides his theoretical guideline of the ‘New Theory’ and his practical help 
through the Royal Projects, he also fulfils his duty religiously and ceremonially 
(Raeknakwan, for example).
Monarchical Nationalism As Reflected in Monuments
Since the 1990s, the biggest change came with the revival of monuments 
directly connected with the image of the monarchy as a benevolent father who cares for 
the well-being of his children.
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One of the most outstanding examples of the modem monarchical monuments is 
the King Rama VIII Bridge (saphan phraram 8) over the Chaophraya River in 
Bangkok. The bridge was opened with a state ceremony in presence of the King himself 
on Chulalongkom Day [23 October] in 2002.107 The whole idea of the bridge and its 
design mirrored the direction of national identity towards the monarchical nation. In 
1993, King Bhumibol initiated the construction of a new bridge to tackle the city’s 
notorious traffic problems. He set out not only the routing but also named the bridge 
after his elder brother, King Ananda Mahidol. It was decided in the initial design 
concept that the whole project was to be a ‘royal memorial’ and a ‘royal gift’, thus 
resulted in a technical feat with a span of 300 metres and became a showcase for Thai 
art. The theme of the bridge was taken from the royal seal of King Ananda, symbolising 
his name. In this seal, Phra Phothisat [a future Buddha] sits on a lotus blossom with the 
right foot on a small lotus blossom (symbolising ‘land’) and the left hand holding an 
unopened lotus flower. The crystal palace in the background symbolises radiating light. 
The lotus flower in the seal is presented in a glass observation deck with metal frames 
in the shape of an ornamental closed lotus. The 165 meter high pylon has its shape 
based upon the crystal palace of Phra Phothisat. The anchor span for the stay cables is 
decorated in the lotus blossom motif using four different materials to stand for the unity 
of the populace from all four regions of Thailand.
Further design features are traditional bai sri ceremonial trays at the foot of the 
bridge as a symbol of the high reverence for the monarchical institution. Part of the 
bridge project is also a park and museums, one to commemorate the King and one for 
regional arts and crafts.108 The bridge can be interpreted as a symbol of the King’s ideal 
of Thai national identity, representing the monarchy and Thai culture in a modem 
world. On the occasion of the opening of the bridge, the Thai Post Office issued a 
special series of stamps featuring four ‘royal’ bridges. This ensured that the meaning of 
the bridge as a monarchical monument was disseminated all over the country.109
Very popular as monuments of the monarchical nation are public parks. One 
example is ‘The Princess Mother Memorial Park’ (Uthayan Chaloemphrakiat 
Somdechphrasrinakarintharaboromratchonnani) located on the other side of the
107 Sayamrat, 26 September 2001, p. 12.
108 Manas Kowanich, Saphan phraram 8 - a n  nueng ma chak phraratchadamri [Rama VIII Bridge under 
the Royal Initiatives], Bangkok 2002, pp.47-118.
109 “Maihet stamp thai [Remarks on Thai Stamps]”, Warasan Trapraisaniyakon, 2004, p.21.
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Chaophraya River in Thonburi.110 It was built on King BhumiboPs initiative in 1993 to 
restore an old building in the area where his mother lived in her childhood. The park is 
in the middle of a densely populated area and aims to give the visitor a respite from the 
heat and noise of the surrounding city. Besides being a recreational zone, the park also 
functions as a place for carrying out rituals and activities.111
The park was opened to the public a few years ago and includes two exhibition 
halls. The first one is about the life of the Princess Mother and shows the history of the 
local community which is depicted by the official brochure as a ‘multi-racial and multi­
religious society living together in perfect harmony’.112 The second hall focuses on the 
Princess Mother’s activities and conduct. Further, a full-scale model house of the 
Princess Mother, very simply furnished, gives the visitor the impression that she was a 
modest person living like an ordinary Thai. Central in this park, however, are two 
elements that elevated the whole area to become an important monument of 
monarchical nationalism. A big bas-relief in sandstone portrays on one side the 
development and welfare activities of the Princess Mother, including her ‘flying-doctor’ 
service to remote parts of the country. On the other side, the relief shows a traditional 
procession of Northern people to celebrate and honour the Princess Mother. The second 
element is a central plaza, regularly used for concerts with free admission, overlooked 
by an octagonal pavilion with a life-size statue of the Princess Mother. The statue shows 
the Princess Mother in a benevolent pose, looking at the people whom she gave this 
park to enjoy and relax. In return, almost every visitor pays respect to her statue. 
Generally, the park management organizes activities which are aimed to provide useful 
knowledge, including occupational training and cultural and traditional handicraft.113 
The royal Chaipattana foundation commented: “This park should be considered a 
historical park, so that future generations will be able to reminisce about the ‘Princess 
Mother of the Thai people’ who performed her activities for the benefit of the people. It 
will also be a symbol of His Majesty the King’s most devoted kindness to provide a 
place where everyone can come and relax.”114
110 A similar project but on a much larger scale was finalised recently in the east of Bangkok: ‘The Royal 
Park o f King Rama IX’ (Suan Luang Ro 9).
111 Munnithichaipattana. “The Park in Commemoration of Her Royal Highness the Princess Mother”, 
Munnithichaipattana, 1996, p.57.
112 The Princess Mother Memorial Park, Bangkok no date, p.6.
113 The Princess Mother Memorial Park, no date, p.14.
114 Munnithichaipattana, 1996, p.61.
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King Bhumibol’s use of monuments to promote monarchical nationalism 
followed the example of his royal ancestors such as King Chulalongkom who built 
hospitals and King Vajiravudh who founded a university.
9.4. Influences o f  the Monarchical Nationalism on State and Society
This monarchical nationalism was highly successful in penetrating not only the 
Thai state but also the society. The following part will have a look into state policies, art 
and literature in order to demonstrate the position of the bureaucracy and the 
intelligentsia towards monarchical nationalism. At the end, proof for the popularity of 
monarchical nationalism within the general population will be presented.
Monarchical Nationalism As Reflected in State Policies
The acceptance of the ideals of King Bhumibol’s interpretation of monarchical 
nationalism by the state was best reflected in these three examples: The phaendintham/ 
phaendinthong national development guideline from 1985, the National Education Plan 
from 1999 and the Ninth National Economic and Social Development Plan (2002- 
2006).
A declaration regarding the guiding ideology for Thai politics was issued on 5 
May 1985 and could be seen as Prime Minister Prem’s description of the revived 
monarchical nationalism: “The fact that Thailand has a king ‘who rules the land with 
dharma’ is indeed the bun (merit) of the people because your barami has protected our 
heads so that the Thai people can live with happiness...For 39 years, Your Majesty 
[King Bhumibol] always followed your oath [at the coronation], your ideology is a 
valuable ideal; it is like a light that leads the way to develop the country to prosperity. 
Therefore, the government asks for your permission to make your oath as an ideology to 
create Thailand as land of dharma, the Golden land. We are confident this will be an 
excellent way to follow because we have you as the leader of our nation who has led us 
the way already.”n 5 Prem declared the country as phaendintham (the land of people who 
have dharma and good culture) and phaendinthong (a land full of resources and
" 5 Khanakammakan chatphim nangsue pramuan sunthoraphot (eds), Pramuan sunthoraphot phanathan 
phon-ek prem tinsulanon nayokratthamontri 2528 [Collected Speeches o f Prime Minister General Prem
Tinsulanonda, 1985], Bangkok 1986, pp. 18-19.
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economically prosperous). Combined, stated Prem, it meant this land of Thai was a land 
of moral, social and economic prosperity.116
The National Identity Board (NIB) published extensively about this new 
‘national ideal: the royal intention’. In its explanation, the NIB argued that Bhumibol’s 
oath was most important. The King intended to build Thailand into a happy and 
prosperous country, to make Thailand the ‘Land of Dharma’ and the ‘Golden Land’ for 
the Thai people. The King was also a role model and intellectual leader whom all Thais 
should follow. Accordingly, the government introduced the program ‘Ideal of Land of 
Dharma and Golden Land’ in order to develop the people, the villages, communities and 
nation. This program aimed to create the ‘Land of Dharma and Golden Land’ as a 
present to King Bhumibol for his two celebrations, the first one being the anniversary of 
40 years on the throne (1986) and the second one his 60th birthday (1987). This ideal 
land would only be possible when the people develop not only materially but also 
spiritually, especially regarding morality, happiness, peacefulness, order, and economic 
security. In order to achieve this, the people must follow the ideals of King Bhumibol: 
honesty, discipline, thrift and diligence. In addition, the people should know how to 
sacrifice themselves for others, to have a sense of unity, responsibility, be aware of 
health issues and be open minded for development.117
The other two plans regarding education and self-sufficiency express and 
directly refer to King Bhumibol’s stress on traditional values and their reflection in a 
self-sufficient economy. Central to the two plans is the emphasis on ‘local wisdom’ 
(phumpanya) which is defined as ‘knowledge, ability and skill of the Thai which comes 
out of their experience in the process of selecting, learning adjusting and teaching in 
order to use it to solve problems and develop the way of life of the Thai to be in balance 
with the environment and suitable to each period of time’.118 Local wisdom is the ‘root 
of original knowledge of the region and Thai society and therefore is the foundation for 
the development of necessary knowledge to make Thai society international with 
dignity’.119
The Ninth National Economic and Social Development Plan was most explicit 
in reflecting the ideas of King Bhumibol who was directly involved in the writing of the
116 Khanakammakan chatphim nangsue pramuan sunthoraphot, 1986, p. 18.
117 Khanakammakanekkalakkhongchat, “Udomkan sangsan phaendin thai hai klaipen phaendintham 
phaendinthong [The Ideology to Transform Thailand into the Land o f Dharma and the Golden Land]”, 
Bangkok Bangkok 1987, pp.30-33.
118 Samnakngan khanakammakan kansueksahaengchat, 1999, p. 19.
119 Samnakngan khanakammakan kansueksahaengchat, 1999, p.3.
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plan and granted royal approval. The plan stated: “The 9th Plan adopts the philosophy of 
economic sufficiency bestowed by His Majesty the King to his subjects as the guiding 
principle of national development and management.”120 It included a strong nationalistic 
message: “At the national level, the philosophy is consistent with a balanced 
development strategy that would reduce the vulnerability of the nation to shocks and 
excesses that may arise as a result of globalisation. ‘Sufficiency’ means moderation and 
due consideration in all modes of conduct, and incorporates the need for sufficient 
protection from internal and external shocks.” The values propagated by the 
monarchical nation were directly implanted: “It is essential to strengthen the moral fibre 
of the nation so that everyone, particularly public officials, academics, business people, 
and financiers adhere first and foremost to the principles of honesty and integrity. A 
balanced approach combining patience, perseverance, diligence, wisdom, and prudence 
is indispensable to cope appropriately with critical challenges arising from extensive 
and rapid socio-economic, environmental, and cultural change occurring as a result of 
globalisation.” The plan also criticises the current behaviour of many Thais who ‘have 
not been sufficiently selective and prudent about adopting or adapting to foreign 
cultures’.121 This led to ‘cultural domination by western countries’ and ‘the adoption of 
superficial and materialistic lifestyles which caused a decline in morality and other 
social problems’.122 However, with the return to the inner strength of Thai society and 
the acceptance of a sufficient economy, Thai society will be “developed, economically, 
socially and politically, based on self-support and self-reliance: highly resilient even 
when exposed to the forces and risks of globalisation. Society will be caring and united, 
and proud of its cultural heritage.”123
These examples of state plans show that the era between 1980 and 2000 was- at 
least ideologically- the era of monarchical nationalism. King Bhumibol was the 
intellectual leader and the state cooperated by implementing some ideas of the monarch 
in its policies. An example for a direct impact of the King’s concept on state policy was 
the royally initiated development projects. Contrary to the royal projects, these projects 
were only proposed by the King but financed and implemented by the state bureaucracy. 
In 1981, the Royal Development Projects Board (RDPB) was introduced by Prem. This
120 National Economic and Social Development Board (hereafter NESDB), The Ninth National Economic 
and Social Development Plan (2002-2006), Bangkok 2001, p.i.
121 NESDB, 2001, p.i.
122 NESDB, 2001, p. 10.
123 NESDB, 2001, p.iv.
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department in the Prime Minister’s office was directly responsible for work concerning 
royal development projects which were coordinated from design to completion. 
Thousands of these projects were implemented and dealt mostly with agriculture, 
animal husbandry, irrigation, soil management, fishery, occupational training to rice 
banks and buffalo banks.124 The King emphasised that these projects were the result of 
co-operation between him and the state: “To solve many problems, for example the 
traffic problem, I thought about it myself but the others helped thinking and 
implemented it. In other words, I think 10%, the others think 90%.”125 An example for 
such a royal initiated project was the ‘Waste Water Treatment Project’ in Sakonnakhon 
province where the King proposed to treat waste water by natural processes with 
inexpensive technology. This project was implemented by the RDPB using the King’s 
ideas as a guideline.126 Even Prime Minister Thaksin whose version of the Thai nation 
was different from the King adopted some ideas of Bhumibol for his own government. 
For example, Thaksin started a ‘War on Drugs’ in 2003 after the King called for a drug- 
free nation.127
The Promotion o f  Monarchical Nationalism by the State
Ceremonies and Festivals
With the full revival of monarchical nationalism in the 1980s, state-orientated 
ceremonies lost their importance while celebrations focussing on the monarchy became 
larger. Activities connected to royal events were conducted across the whole country. 
Highlights of these celebrations were normally ceremonies around the important date. 
This policy began in 1982 with the Bangkok bicentennial celebration. Heading the 
organisational committee, Prime Minister Prem stated the underlying purpose of the 
celebrations was ‘to glorify the achievements of the Chakri dynasty and the Thai 
nation’.128 Following this credo, the preface of the official publication wrote:
124 National Identity Board, 2000, p. 150 and pp. 165-168.
125 Speech December 1996. Source: http ://kan chan api sek. or .th/speeches/1996/1204.th .htm 1 (accessed on 7 
August 2004).
126 Royal Development Projects Board, 1997, pp.122-130.
127 Pasuk P./Baker, Chris, The Business of Politics in Thailand, Chiang Mai 2004, p.254.
128 The Nation. “Bicentennial Blues”, 28 March 1982, p .ll .  In addition, the government saw the festival 
as an opportunity ‘to revive and promote Thai culture’. The Nation. “Interior Ministry Sets Cultural 
Revival Days”, 26 March 1982, p.6 and The Nation. “Cultural Offensive Gets Into Full Swing”, 30 March 
1982, p.4.
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“Throughout the 200 years of the Bangkok period, the kingdom has been consolidated 
and steered through adverse circumstances by members of the Chakri dynasty. In an 
attempt to express and demonstrate public gratitude to the Chakri kings, HM 
Government, joined by all Thai people, has organised the Rattanakosin Bicentennial 
Celebration on a nationwide basis...The highlights of these celebrations are the royal 
ceremonies between 4th and 21st April 1982. They were held in accordance with ancient 
court traditions, which, with only slight modifications in keeping with times, were 
consequently revived and preserved in the process.”129 The celebrations were a firework 
of court rituals and pageantry. Buddhist and Brahmin rituals were attended by the King 
and his family and in many cases connected with the nation via the participation of the 
people. For example, King Bhumibol paid homage to the official founder of Bangkok, 
King Rama I, at a monument on the 6th of April. At exactly the same time, monks in 
every temple in the country chanted prayers, connecting every part of the kingdom with 
Bangkok and his monarchical ruler.130 On the next day, King Bhumibol paid tribute to 
Phra Sayam Thewathirat, the guardian spirit of the monarchical nation introduced by 
King Mongkut, which was put on public display. The official publication commented: 
“King Bhumibol granted the rare opportunity to the general public to personally pay 
tribute to the Lord Protector of Siam, for although the deity is universally worshipped, 
his image had almost never been seen by the general public.” The statue was on display 
for public viewing for almost one month but the period had to be extended because 
‘people from all walks of life and all comers of the kingdom flocked to the Grand 
Palace to pay homage to this most sacred guardian of the nation and ask for his 
blessing’.131
Other ceremonies included trans-ethnic elements such as the blessing of the 
King by Chinese and Vietnamese monks and a visit of the Crown Prince to Chinatown, 
where the Chinese community organised a project called ‘Peace and Happiness Under 
the Sovereign’s Protection’. The highlight of the activities in Chinatown was a 
procession of portraits of all eight former kings in order to reflect ‘the loyalty and
129 Office o f His Majesty’s Principal Private Secretary, Royal Ceremonies for the Rattanakosin 
Bicentennial, Bangkok 1982, p.i.
130 Office o f His Majesty’s Principal Private Secretary, 1982, p.124.
131 Office o f His Majesty’s Principal Private Secretary, 1982, p.136.
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appreciation for the Chakri kings, past and present, for having granted them shelter and 
protection throughout the two hundred years’.132
Another grand ceremony to promote monarchical nationalism happened in 1987, 
when the state organised the 60th birthday anniversary of King Bhumibol. On his 
birthday (5th of December), the same prayer was chanted all over the country at exactly 
the same time: “He rules the land with righteousness for the progress of the country, the 
people and the religion. He never thinks about the obstacles, dangers and troubles for 
him. He has strong intention to perform the royal duty with perseverance and the 
strength of his endurance and benevolence. He loves the people like a father loves his 
children...When it is cold he gives warmth and when it is warm he gives water...When 
he goes to places with suffering, the suffering is gone because of his power, like the rain 
in the hot summer...He is firmly in dharma...He is the foremost Buddhist.. .Because of 
his power, kindness and grace, the unity, happiness, peace and progress happen to all 
the Thai people in every place in Thailand forever...”133
This prayer combined almost all elements of monarchical nationalism, depicting 
the king as leader who has barami from being righteous, caring, protective and 
supportive. The barami of the king was also stressed by Prime Minister Prem who 
explained that this barami was the cause of the love of the people for their king: 
“ ...You [King Bhumibol] closely share the suffering and the happiness with the people 
in order to extend your barami over them and to get rid of their suffering and create 
peace and happiness for the people...His [the King’s] development project result in 
progress of the countryside and prosperity of the land...This causes the real love and a 
sense of belonging towards their birthplace...the world has accepted that Thailand 
under your barami is a land of peace, progress and prosperity...We feel proud that we 
have a King who is highly in dharma and therefore we would like to give the title ‘the 
Great’ to you while you are still on the throne just as 80 years before, the people gave 
this title to King Chulalongkom while also on the throne.”134 By comparing King 
Bhumibol with King Chulalongkom, Prem exalted not only King Bhumibol’s position 
on par with the most beloved and respected king in modem Thai history but also
132 Office o f His Majesty’s Principal Private Secretary, 1982, p.182.
133 Cited in Khanakammakan amnuaikan chatngan chalemphrakiat phrabatsomdetphrachaoyuhua, 
Raingan kantittam lae pramoenphon kanchatngan chaloemphrakiat
phrabatsomdetphraparamintaramahaphumiphonadunyadetmaharat nueangnai warokatmahamongkon 
chaloemphrachonmaphansa 5 rop [Report on the Evaluation o f the Organisation o f the Ceremonies on 
the Occasion o f the 60th Birthday o f His Majesty King Bhumibol], Bangkok 1989, p.(7).
134 Cited in Khanakammakan amnuaikan chatngan chalemphrakiat phrabatsomdetphrachaoyuhua, 1989, 
pp. (11), (28) and (33).
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confirmed the revival of the monarchical nation. The King was once again the real 
leader of the nation.
The celebrations aimed to disseminate the glory of Thailand which has long 
prospered, the glory and great merit of the King, to persuade the Thais to feel gratitude 
for his kindness and follow in his footsteps, and to construct public sites beneficial for 
the nation, religion and the people.135 Besides the activities on the birthday itself, a 
whole series of royal, secular, religious and other activities were organised. Special 
attention was given to the possibility of the people to participate in events such as public 
appearances of the King ‘to give the masses the chances to pay respect’ or mass 
ordinations.136
For this study, the celebrations in 1987 are especially interesting because the 
government ordered a poll afterwards to receive a feedback of the organisation. 
Although the numbers might not reflect the exact sentiments of people asked about a 
criticism-sensitive issue like the monarchy, they still give a clear trend. 83% of the 
population were aware that their villages, districts or provinces had activities connected 
with the celebrations. 91% of the population said that they participated in one way or 
another in projects or activities, mostly by Buddhist merit making for the King, giving 
donations or attending exhibitions. The poll found out that 97% of the population 
agreed that the celebrations would have a positive impact on their intention to be a good 
and moral person. 96% would try to abandon social vices and 97% saw a positive 
impact on the revival of arts and culture. The same number said that they had an 
increased awareness about the preservation of Thai identity and patriotism, even 99% 
saw increased unity within the people. The final question about their love and sense of 
belonging to the glory of the nation answered 98% positively.137
Banknotes and Stamps
The state promotion of monarchical nationalism can also be seen in banknotes 
and stamps.
135 Khanakammakan amnuaikan chatngan chalemphrakiat phrabatsomdetphrachaoyuhua, 1989, p .i.
136 Khanakammakan amnuaikan chatngan chalemphrakiat phrabatsomdetphrachaoyuhua, 1989, p. 1-3.
137 Poll results in Khanakammakan amnuaikan chatngan chalemphrakiat phrabatsomdetphrachaoyuhua, 
1989, pp.83-87.
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A banknote series issued in the 1990s was designed to ‘make the activities of the 
Chakri dynasty kings known’.138 Monuments of kings were used to transmit certain 
messages. For example, the back of the 100-Baht-banknote featured the monument of 
the Kings Rama V and VI at Chulalongkom University ‘for their activities in the 
promotion of education’.139 The 1000-Baht-banknote showed King Bhumibol and Queen 
Sirikit ‘performing their activities for the benefit of their people, with the Krungchin 
Waterfall, Nan Fon Saen Ha and the Bhumibol dam as supplementary elements’.140 Next 
to the picture is the oath of coronation by Bhumibol, reminding the observer that the 
king vowed to rule with righteousness. This motif was changed slightly in a new issue 
in the mid-1990s, when the King was shown with the royally-initiated Pa Sak Chonlasit 
Dam in Saraburi province and a scene of agricultural activities under the royal New 
Theory.141 Instead of his oath, an extract from a royal speech in 1994 about the dam was 
printed: “The problem of drought, water shortage and floods will be much lessened. I 
understand that the problem will be probably reduced by 80 percent. People numbering 
in the hundreds of thousands will be happier resulting from the Pa Sak and Nakhon 
Nayok projects.”142
As for stamps, the motifs represented Thainess and the Thai nation in the 
1980s.143 For example, the stamp for Children’s Day in 1988 showed two schoolchildren 
in a wai khru (pay respect to the teacher) ceremony while the background was filled by 
a Buddha statue with two national flags beside it.144 The same year also saw a special 
stamp to commemorate a century of Siriraj hospital and King Chulalongkom, a model 
case for monarchical nationalism. An extensive coverage of the longest reign 
celebration of King Bhumibol also came out in 1988. Twelve special stamps featured 
Bhumibol in full dress, the royal regalia and the different thrones.145 By 1998, the 
monarchy was the most frequently featured motif on Thai stamps. The stamp for the 
Red Cross Society depicted Queen Sirikit for the first time. On the Thai Heritage 
Conservative Day, a series of stamps were issued showing ancient sites. Another stamp 
commemorated the state visit to Europe by Chulalongkom. Bhumibol’s work was 
honoured by a stamp with the Bhumibol Dam to celebrate the anniversary of irrigation.
138 Bank o f Thailand, Centenary o f  Thai Banknote, 1902-2002, Bangkok 2002, p. 280.
139 Bank o f Thailand, 2002, p. 282.
140 Bank o f Thailand, 2002, p. 282.
141 Bank o f Thailand, 2002, p. 302.
142 Bank o f Thailand, 2002, p. 312.
143 Vichit Ewitwong, Handbook o f Thai Stamps and Postal History, Bangkok 2001, p.49.
144 Vichit Ewitwong, 2001, p.72.
145 Vichit Ewitwong, 2001, p.72.
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The effects of state policies would have been limited, if other sectors of the 
intelligentsia, for example artists and writers, had not been supportive for the vision of 
Thailand as a monarchical nationalism.
Monarchical Nationalism As Reflected in Art and Literature
Leoussi proposed that the visual arts, especially painting and sculpture, are 
crucial vehicles of cultural nationalism, affirming the ethno-cultural roots of human 
existence. Works of art do become visual symbols of the nation, agents of national 
integration and regulations. She argued further that national art is not an invention of 
elites bent on creating new forms of human association and orientation which they call 
‘national’, in the sense of all embracing, homogenous and integrative of a whole 
society. Rather national art is the work of cultural elites whose aim is to organise, 
streamline and standardise and, in this way, ‘modernise’ pre-existing ethnic identities 
and solidarities. The aim of nationalising cultural elites is not to invent but to revive, 
express and develop. Leoussi, therefore, defined national art as art made by artists 
consciously inspired by their own, ethno-cultural heritage of symbols, memories, myths, 
values, traditions and national environment, either in the form of their art, or in its 
content, or in both aspects of their work.146 Although the impact of the works of many 
Thai artists on the masses can hardly be estimated, the analysis showed that there was a 
broad movement among intellectuals to support the ideas of the monarchical nation 
which should create a significant influence on the population.
The development of a crisis in Thai society was a process which started decades 
earlier but only came to the forefront in the late 1970s. Interestingly, artists were among 
the first ones who reflected on the growing tensions and began asking questions about 
Thai identity as early as the 1950s. The push by Thai governments for modernisation 
began in earnest when Phibun allied himself with the USA in the Korean War. The 
influx of US funding for projects such as the construction of highways accelerated not 
only the expansion of the central government to become a daily reality even in remote 
comers of the kingdom but also induced cultural change more directly and rapidly than 
in the traditional process of selective adaptation. In this context, Meyer put the 
argument forward that modernisation in a society becomes more and more universal. It
146 Leoussi, Athena. “The Ethno-Cultural Roots o f National Art”, Nations and Nationalism, 2004, pp. 144-
145.
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dissolves traditions and undermines the original source of identification and orientation. 
Identity is then created mostly with the help of distinction from the ‘Other’, with the 
result that cultural identity becomes politically defined.147
The first Thais to reflect on modernisation and to reject westernisation were 
artists. They sought a return to ‘Thainess’ which had to be newly defined. The vanguard 
of this movement was Angkam Kalayanapong (b.1926), a poet and painter, who was 
influenced in his work by a lengthy stay in Ayutthaya where he copied murals and made 
architectural designs. In 1957, he wrote the poem ‘The Art of Ayutthaya’ in which the 
fallen heroes were resurrected to re-enact their heroic deeds. Angkam saw in the fall of 
Ayutthaya the occasion to reflect on both the greatness and the weakness of the Thai 
nation. He concluded that the present-day Thais had an inferiority complex because they 
did not have the experience of physically living with the past in modem cities. Angkam 
blamed this situation on modernisation which was nothing else than westernisation. He 
accused the Thai leaders and their technocrats to be ‘Westerner scum’.148 Longing for an 
idyllic ‘Thai’ past, Angkam dismissed the modem city as rotten and was sure that 
authentic Thainess could only be found in the countryside:
“’’Thailand’ applies only to Bangkok.
The country belongs to the forgotten Siam 
Which simply does not count any more,
So steeped are the city people in their filthy pursuits.”149
In a period when Thai art was very much influenced by Western styles and 
techniques, Angkam was the first artist to experiment with traditional Thai elements in 
his paintings.150 He used characters from Thai mythology and mystical plants, symbols 
such as the Bodhi tree, demi-gods and Buddha. They were placed in the context of a 
contemporary vision of the Buddhist cosmos. An analyst, J. Hoskens, praised the work 
of Angkam with following words: “No other painter of his generation has expressed so 
brilliantly and so clearly a quality that is Thai and timeless.”151 However, in the 1950s,
147 Meyer, Thomas, Identiidts-Wahn, Berlin 1997, p. 67.
148 Chettana Nagavajara. “The Sense o f the Past in the Poetry o f Angkam Kalayanapong”, Bangkok 1986,
pp. 18-26.
149 Cited in Chettana, 1986, p.25.
150 Most artists studied with an Italian professor at the only art university in Bangkok and then went on to 
Europe to further their studies. National Committee for Organizing the Celebrations for the 50th 
Anniversary o f His Majesty’s Accession to the Throne, Rattanakosin Art: The Reign o f King Rama IX, 
Bangkok 1996, p.99.
151 Hoskins, John, Ten Contemporary Artists, Bangkok 1984, p. 12.
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‘Thainess’ was a term in flux and Hoskens comment must be categorised as 
retrospective and projecting a later definition on to the past.
In the 1960s, the subject of culture received a more prominent position in 
debates. Magazines such as the Warasan Wattanathamthai (Thai Culture Journal), 
published by the Culture Department (krom watthanatham), stressed the importance of 
‘Thai’ culture. Unlike in the definition of culture during the period of statist 
nationalism, culture was now connected with tradition. In 1963, for example, a letter 
with the question on how one could identify a real patriot was sent to the magazine. 
Although it is not known if the author was an actual person or not, the editor’s answer 
reflected the new orientation towards Thai culture. Besides including platitudes like 
‘patriotism is given from birth’, the answer pointed out that a patriot should follow the 
laws of the nation, order and customs. He also should promote or participate in national 
traditions such as Songkhran [Thai New Year] festival, weddings or ordinations. A 
patriot was supposed to maintain the honour of the nation, too. This would include 
proper dress (especially appropriate traditional dress) or civilised behaviour. Finally, the 
natural resources of the nation, including old buildings, were to be maintained.152
The complaints about the demise of Thai identity or culture by intellectuals grew 
louder during that time. The most prominent social critic Sulak Sivaraksa, for example, 
complained about a lack of knowledge regarding Thai values in 1965. He demanded 
that Thais stop following foreign cultures and proposed as a solution to the problems a 
shift in the value system from materialism.153 Ataht argued similarly that young Thais 
had no knowledge about Thai culture. He criticised the acceptance of ‘bad’ foreign 
culture (‘dancing like being sick’). Only the promotion and support for Thai culture 
would maintain the Thai nation.154 Plaek Santirak saw even more dramatically ‘nation, 
religion and king’ as the last pieces of Thai culture. He complained that most Thais, in 
contrast to foreigners, would not acknowledge the good life in Thailand (‘Thai culture is 
not inferior to the culture of other nations’). He praised Buddhism and the monarchy, 
with the first as good precondition for freedom and democracy and the latter as defender
152 Warasan Watthanathamthai. “Top panha watthanatham [Answering Cultural Problems]”, 1963, p.65.
153 Sulak Sivaraksa. “Khaniyom khong sangkom [Values o f the Society]”, The Social Science Review, 
1965, p.4.
154 Athat. “Kitchakam thi kuan songsoem [Activities Which Should Be Supported]”, 
Warasanwatthanathamthai, 1966, p.68.
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of the freedom of the nation. Plaek proposed to promote Thai culture through the 
media.155
Some intellectuals did not want to wait until the state did something and started 
their own initiative to stop the loss of Thai culture. A good example was Kukrit Pramoj, 
a member of the royal family and prominent politician. He founded the Thammasat 
[University] Mask Dance Group {khon thammasat) in 1966. Kukrit gave as his reason 
not only the preservation of, in his opinion, the highest form of the performing arts but 
also the need to instil Thai identity in the younger generation: “After a certain period of 
training, I noticed that the khon [mask dance] students began to show Thai etiquette and 
think and feel like a Thai.” Kukrit went on to connect this Thainess with the monarchy 
when he argued that ‘this quality of Thainess was clearly brought out when the khon 
students were presented to His Majesty the King [Bhumibol]’.156
Besides academics, other parts of the intelligentsia also started to deal with the 
question of Thai identity. One example is the development of a movement among 
architects and other professionals which sought to protect old areas of the city from 
destruction through commercial development.157 Painters under the leadership of Tawan 
Duchanee (who produced Buddhist-based works) were another group that increased its 
efforts to find answers in the quest to find Thai identity after the events in October 
1976.158 The result was a mix of social criticism and traditional symbols to mirror the 
decaying state of Thai society and culture. An example of this new direction was the 
painting ‘World Crisis’ by Panya Vijinthanasam from 1979. Panya combined his view 
of social conditions to traditional Thai painting style and themes. In this painting, Panya 
depicted a chariot in front of the mouth of a giant demon who ‘eats’ the world. The 
chariot itself is under attack by two snakes, both sent by the chief of snakes on top of 
the demon, which try to drive the chariot into the mouth of the demon. This could be 
interpreted as a criticism of modernisation which lures Thai society (the royal chariot as 
a symbol for the traditional kingdom) into the abyss.159
155 Plaek Sonthirak. “Sanyalak khong thai [Thai Symbols]”, Warasanwatthanathamthai, 1966, pp.9-12.
156 Paritta Chalermpow Koanantakool. “Thai Middle-Class Practice and Consumption o f Traditional 
Dance: ‘Thai-ness’ and High Art”, Singapore 2002, pp. 225-229.
157 Two groups were founded, namely ‘Conservation Group o f the Association o f Siamese Architects’ and 
‘Arts and Environment Protection Association’. Askew, Marc. “Bangkok: Transformation of the Thai 
City”, Geelong 1994, p. 94.
158 Henderson, Virginia, The Social Production o f Art in Thailand: Patronage and Commodisation, 1980- 
1998, Bangkok 1998, p.74.
159 Painting printed in National Committee for Organizing the Celebrations for the 50th Anniversary of 
His Majesty’s Accession to the Throne (hereafter NCO), Rattanakosin Art: The Reign o f King Rama IX, 
Bangkok 1996, p. 152.
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Another example of the ongoing identity crisis was the painting ‘Past No. 2’ by 
Praiwan Dakliang from 1981. This painting shows a temple building falling into ruins, 
abandoned by the monks whose clothes look like they were hastily thrown away. The 
painter uses the traditional idea of the temple as centre for culture, art and morality to 
demonstrate the decay of these elements in a rapidly modernising Thai society. With the 
monks gone, the age of Buddhism came to an end with the result of a rotten culture. 
Criticism was no longer directed at the political circumstances as in the 1970s but at the 
state of society itself.160 The last example of an identity crisis reflected in Thai art is the 
painting ‘Searching’ by Naiyana Chotisuk from 1983. The painting- in dark, sombre 
colours- depicts two children lost in a joyless, unnatural environment. Ladders reaching 
for the sky but leading to nowhere can be seen as a condemnation of the credo of 
economic growth.161
The 1982 Bangkok bicentennial celebrations and the accompanying art 
competition did work as a kind of catalyst for Thai artists. In times of an identity crisis, 
it was an emotional defence to fall back on Thai traditional arts and the institutions most 
connected with Thai identity: the monarchy and Buddhism. An example is the painting 
‘Royal Visit to Bangkok’ by Sathit Thimvattanabunthoeng in 1982.162 This painting 
depicts a famous visit of King Ananda Mahidol and his brother Bhumibol to Sampaeng, 
the Chinatown of Bangkok. The cheerful atmosphere and the bright colours of the 
picture stand in deep contrast to the gloomy and sad atmosphere of the picture 
‘Searching’. The picture also reflected an important aspect of the monarchical nation, 
namely the transethnic approach to Thainess symbolised by the dominance of the Thai 
and Chinese flags. The real visit by the royal brothers happened at a time when 
expressing ones Chineseness was officially discouraged.
Another example of the revived image of the monarchy as the caring institution 
of the nation and so for the revival of the monarchical nation was the painting ‘In Praise 
of the Royal Activities’ by Jamnan Sarasak in 1990.163 It depicts the wall of the atelier 
of the artist himself. It shows a canvas just being painted with some activities of the 
Princess Mother. The wall besides the canvas has pictures of the Princess Mother, 
depicting her in the role of mother not only for her son, King Bhumibol, but also for the 
nation in general. The atmosphere of this painting is that of a family affair so that the
160 Painting printed in NCO, 1996, p. 170.
161 Painting printed in NCO, 1996, p.164.
162 Painting printed in NCO, 1996, p.297.
163 Painting printed in NCO, 1996, p.298.
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observer feels at ease. Thus this painting is not only emphasising the active role of the 
monarchy but also focuses on the idea of the nation as a family with the royal family at 
its head.
The last example for the new direction of art in praise of the monarchical nation 
is the bronze figure ‘Under His Majesty’s Shelter’ of Wijit Apichatkriengkrai from 
1995.164 This umbrella-shaped sculpture depicted a variety of King Bhumibol’s 
activities and showed him beloved and respected by all. The centre scene is made from 
his coronation when the King vowed to rule with righteousness over the kingdom. The 
top of the sculpture is made out of his royal seal, symbolising his role as being the apex 
of society.
Monarchical Nationalism as Reflected in the General Population
Besides the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia, monarchical nationalism also 
found support within a wider population. Decisive for this overwhelming success was 
his reputation of a monarch with outstanding charisma and barami.
To demonstrate the importance of barami, it is helpful to refer to a description 
of King Bhumibol visits in the provinces in the 1950s. The accounts of occurring 
‘miracles’, although written by a member of the royal family and therefore maybe 
biased, indicated that beliefs and traditional views of kingship were not affected by the 
change of government in 1932 and the following period of political nationalism.165 The 
observer reported that the rain would stop when the King stepped outside to plant a tree 
in Phrae province and started again when he returned to the house. In another story, the 
writer described the scene when the King left the helicopter in Petchabun province and 
normally shy vultures started to circle around his head ‘like an umbrella’.166 These 
‘observations’ (with supposedly hundreds of witnesses) followed the traditional view of 
a king with barami and his subsequent power over nature. Although in more recent 
times, people do not directly refer to a ‘healing touch’ of the King any longer, they still 
connect his deeds with a sacred dimension such as in the case of a farmer whose eye 
operation was paid for by the King: ‘The King gave me sight’.167 However, not only
164 Painting printed in NCO, 1996, p.299.
165 This was despite a general lack o f information about the activities o f the monarchy up to the early 
1950s. Kingshill, Konrad, Ku Daeng- Thirty Years Later, DeKalb 1991, p.246.
166 Kukrit Pramoj. “Sathaban phramahakasat thai [The Thai Monarchical Institution]”, Sayamrat 
sapdawichan, 1987, p.23.
167 Cited in FCCT, 1988, p. 108. See in general Bloch, Maurice, The Royal Touch, London 1973, p.30.
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nature but also human beings were attracted by his charisma. In another story, a hill 
tribe villager was described during a visit by the King: “He bent down to prostate 
himself at the King’s feet, then he put his head in front of them and declared to the 
people around with a loud voice lull of confidence and with the face full of tears: ‘From 
now on, I become Thai’.”168
An example of the attractiveness of the monarchical nation, especially its trans­
ethnic approach, was a monument erected by the Chinese community. To honour ‘their’ 
King, the Chinese constructed a gate in commemoration of the King’s 72nd birthday in 
1999. Located at the beginning of Yaowarat Road, the main traffic artery through 
Chinatown in Bangkok, it can not be overlooked. It was designed in a distinctive, 
Northern Chinese style combined with symbols of the Thai monarchy. In the official 
leaflet of the Chinese community for this gate we find the description that it ‘represents 
the loyalty and gratefulness of Chinese immigrants to Thailand, who have taken refuge 
under His Majesty’s supreme protection’. Between ceramic dragon figurines was the 
elevated Royal Crest which letters were made of pure gold. According to the Chinese 
myth, the dragon is a mythical deity possessing magical powers, who is capable of 
transformation and bestowing rain. It was also the symbol of the monarch in China. As 
usual for Chinese buildings and monuments, the gate followed feng shui principles and 
included many auspicious numbers like nine stones in the rear which stand for Rama 
IX. The number nine also represented ‘eternal solidness’. The Chinese Text in the 
centre of the gate is especially interesting: It is the handwriting of Crown Princess Maha 
Chakri Sirindhom and reads: ‘Long Live the King!’.169
King Bhumibol received also strong support from the people for his 
development projects. In 1975, His Majesty’s Personal Affairs Division set up a new 
section to deal exclusively with the King’s projects. Its main task was to coordinate the 
placement of various types of donation made directly to the King. Besides cash and 
cheques, donors offer to the King land and property they wish to be utilized for the 
benefit of royal development work or projects.170 Large part of these donations go to the 
several royal foundations established from the King’s own funds. For example, 
Ratchaprachasamasai Foundation which promotes research and development for the
168 Kukrit Pramoj, “Phom pai rap sadet phrachaoyuhua thi ubon (16 pruetsachikayon 2498) [When I Went 
to Welcome His Majesty the King at Ubol (16 November 1955)]”, Chunlasan thaikhadi sue/csa, 14 
Reprint 1998, p.5.
169 Based on Prayudhi Mahagitsiri, The Commemoration Gate Project Honouring His Majesty the King’s 
Sixth-Cycle Birthday, Bangkok 2000.
170 National Identity Board, 2000, p. 167.
253
relief of leprosy and provides accommodation and advice for lepers who have problems 
in society, caring for their children and providing medical treatment, education and 
employment.171 The Ratchaprachanukhro Foundation was established to relieve victims 
of natural or mass disasters, such as storms, floods, fires or major accidents.172 The 
Saichaithai Foundation aimed to provide emergency funds to civilian, military and 
police officials and volunteers who were maimed or wounded in action while 
conducting internal security operations.173 Apart from individuals who donate directly to 
the King, the private sector arranged many kinds of activities to raise funds to donate to 
the King to support these royal foundations such as marathon competitions or concerts.
A further example that King Bhumibol was able to create loyalty to the 
monarchical nation was the recent release of a CD. An independent group of retired 
civil servants and artists joined together for a project called ‘Songs for the Father’ in 
order to conduct a campaign against all that ‘poison’ the nation such as drugs and 
internal instability. They stated that their inspiration was from the gratitude they have 
for the king who continually provides ways to solve problems of the nation and the 
people. The CD contains 16 songs which all its lyrics taken from the King’s concepts, 
theories, works as well as from the royal projects and the royal speeches. The songs 
‘Love the King and Care for Your Children’, ‘Beloved Thailand’ and ‘Wars against 
Drugs’ talk about the King’s concern of drugs problem, ‘Self Sufficient Economy’ talks 
about the King’s theory, ‘Royal Rain’ is taken from one of his projects, ‘Thai Rice’ and 
‘Thai Elephant’ are taken from royal speeches. ‘The Heart of Thai Dogs’ is from the 
King’s book The Story o f  Thongdaeng. This CD was made to commemorate the 60th 
anniversary of being on the throne but it also aimed to promote unity and solidarity. The 
profits gained are earmarked to be presented to the King to support his royal 
Chaipattana Foundation.174 It is important to note that the songs do not praise the King 
directly but use his ideas and concepts to promote a vision of a happy, peaceful and 
prosperous nation- the King’s nation.
To sum up, King Bhumibol orientates his interpretation on earlier forms of the 
monarchical nation during the monarchical rule. Although many basic ideas and the
171 National Identity Board, 2000, pp.227-228.
172 National Identity Board, 2000, p.231.
173 National Identity Board, 2000, p.234.
174 Wiphani Chilan, “Pleng phuea po pleng thi khonthai khuan fang [Songs for the Father, Songs that 
Thais Should Listen]”, Matichon, 21 March 2006, p.33.
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ways of dissemination with the help of symbols, legends and traditions are similar, his 
vision of the nation is not a direct continuation but an adaptation to the system of 
constitutional monarchy. Monarchical nationalism under King Bhumibol is no longer 
directly connected to the political realm. However, his monarchical nationalism 
indirectly has a political agenda. It seeks to stabilise Thai society by making the people 
happy and prosperous. Encouraging the use of ‘local wisdom’ or traditional knowledge, 
it aims to strengthen Thai society and culture from within. The King emphasises the 
participation of the people in the process in order to enable them to feel part of the 
monarchical nation. By following the traditional concept of kingship, especially his 
practising of the ten kingly virtuous and barami, the King turns himself into a moral 
role model which attracts the people in times of rapid modernisation, change or even 
political turmoil. It is not the constitution which makes King Bhumibol powerful but it 
his vision of a monarchical nation which aims to be home to everyone within the 
borders of the nation-state of Thailand. His personal charisma and embodiment of 
tradition, his activities to benefit the population, his belief in the strength of their own 
culture and his moral behaviour is re-assuring for the people and gives them hope that 
the Thai nation is strong enough to compete with other nations in an age of 
globalisation.
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Conclusion
Monarchy, this thesis has demonstrated, can play the central role in the forming 
of nations and nationalism. In the case of Thailand, its importance goes far beyond the 
commonly acknowledged role of being a symbol of the nation. In the past, the Thai 
kings linked the nation firmly with the monarchy and actively guided the loyalty of the 
people towards this monarchical or ‘king’s’ nation. This meant that the monarch was 
inseparably embedded in the nation which he defined and led. The people were not the 
‘owner’ of the nation but entered a social contract with the ruler and so became part of 
it. The king had the duty to provide material prosperity and emotional re-assurance to 
create happiness. In return, the people should be loyal to the monarchy and therefore to 
the nation. From this point of view, there was no need for a democratic element as long 
as the ruler was able to fulfil his role and delivered on his promises. Although the 
monarchical rule ended, monarchical nationalism was attractive enough to stage a 
comeback during the reign of the current incumbent King Bhumibol.
How was the monarchy able to successfully create, maintain and lead this nation 
over such a long period of time? Following the analysis in this thesis, I might suggest 
that the answer lies- in the case of Thailand- in a combination of several factors.
First, the Thai nation was the result of a long process. This process started with 
the development of an ethnie and a system of cultural cores between the thirteenth and 
sixteenth centuries. Between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries, features of a 
pre-modem nation emerged in the late Kingdom of Ayutthaya, while elements of a 
modem nation appeared after the foundation of the Kingdom of Bangkok in 1782. It is 
important to note that this process was neither linear nor continuous. However, the fact 
that elements of the Thai nation were rooted in the past, made it possible for the kings to 
base the modem Thai nation on a long existing symbol-myth complex centred on a Thai 
interpretation of monarchy and Buddhism. This connection of the nation with widely 
recognised cultural elements made it difficult for competing interpretations of the nation 
to convince the people to switch loyalties.
Second, Thai nationalism as an ideology was a product of an intra-elite power 
struggle between the monarchs and the nobility in the nineteenth century. King 
Mongkut created monarchical nationalism in order to bypass the powerful nobles and to 
get direct access to the people. Therefore, this nationalism was not a reaction to pressure
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from ‘below’. The monarchs actively shaped nationalism with the help of the existing 
symbol-myth complex in their favour, occupying the main symbols, myth and traditions 
and using existing national sentiments. In the twentieth century, other nationalisms were 
unable to evoke these symbols without reinforcing the monarchical connection. As 
history has shown, monarchical nationalism (re-)appeared when the monarchy was 
under pressure from competing power groups. This was not only the case during the 
reign of King Bhumibol who had to defend the institution against the efforts of Phibun 
to sideline him but also in the reigns of King Mongkut and King Chulalongkom who 
were ‘under attack’ by the Bunnag family.
Third, Thai nationalism was never a fixed ideology and changed according to 
competing views of the nation within different ruling power groups and the 
intelligentsia. This resulted in a contest between monarchical, statist and royal 
nationalism. Failures of the various nationalisms were closely connected to the inability 
to create an emotional bond with the monarchy or the nation. King Vajiravudh, for 
example, caused the demise of monarchical nationalism because of his changes to 
essential parts of it and his poor choice of dissemination. The governments of Phibun 
and Thanom were not able to create loyalty to their version of a political nation because 
they stuck to symbols connected with the monarchy and because of their dictatorial rule. 
It should be noted that no liberal-democratic nationalism developed because the 
monarchical nationalism of King Bhumibol offered an alternative to the political 
nationalisms of the military regimes.
Fourth, this thesis also has shown that an analysis of the development of the 
Thai nation and nationalism cannot be conducted without looking into the contributions 
of individual monarchs. The traditional ideal for rulers to produce intellectual works 
such as literature resulted in an ongoing process of shaping the ideas of Thai society and 
culture which were reflected in the different stages of the Thai nation. With the arrival 
of monarchical nationalism in the nineteenth century, the activities of the monarchs and 
their ideas were increasingly publicly displayed with the help of traditions, festivals and 
ceremonies. This public appearance of the monarchy increased not only its popularity 
but also turned the concepts of charisma and barami into crucial factors for the 
efficiency of monarchical nationalism. Both concepts required an even more active role 
of the king who could not rely on divinity alone but had the duty to ‘perform’. This put 
the monarchs in a position where they could form the nation for their own benefit 
without being dependent on the state. The best example is the current incumbent, King
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Bhumibol. He emphasised righteousness as the basis of his work which provided him 
with the image of having an exceptional high degree of barami. He adapted monarchical 
nationalism successfully to the limits and circumstances of a constitutional monarchy. 
The extensive use of symbols, myth and traditions by the king, together with his barami 
gained through his work, are the main reasons for the revived popularity of monarchical 
nationalism.
In general terms, the analysis has shown that the conventional modernist 
interpretation of the formation of the Thai nation and nationalism can be inadequate 
because the importance of a historical dimension is neglected. Furthermore, this thesis 
identified a topic which does not get enough attention in the field of nationalism studies: 
the role of the monarchy in the formation of the nation and nationalism. Although the 
Thai case is exceptional because the country was never colonised and therefore the 
monarchy was available to be part of an indigenous nationalism, more research about 
the role of the monarchy in other countries should be done as well. Based on the 
findings of this thesis, what are some possible avenues for future research in the Thai 
case? This thesis suggests two subjects which would deserve further examination in the 
near future. First, the ongoing competition between the different visions of the nations 
deserves a closer look. This struggle again became evident in the clash between 
oppositional forces and the government under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in the 
beginning of 2006. While the demonstrators demanded a return to the ideals of the 
monarchical nation, Thaksin insisted on the state leadership of the nation. Since his first 
government in 2001, Thaksin attempted a re-definition of Thai nationalism. His 
business nationalism gave utmost importance to the state which was controlled by parts 
of the business elite such as himself. Nationalism became a tool for promoting 
economic growth at all costs. King Bhumibol’s ideas of self-sufficiency and moral 
conduct were seen as obstacle. Thaksin, therefore, aimed to lessen the role of the 
monarchy as much as possible in order to strengthen his influence on nationalism. As 
for the past, the intra-elite competition was so crucial in forming the different faces of 
Thai nationalism, there is more need to know about the views of the various elite 
groups. While this thesis has focussed on the key thinkers and proponents, it would be 
helpful to identify more influential persons in the promotion and dissemination of each 
nationalism. The aim should be to gain insight into the intellectual debates behind the 
policies which were not always lone decisions by the leaders. In this context, the ideas
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of people like Prince Naris during the reign of Chulalongkom and General Ham 
Leenanond during the Prem government could give valuable background information.
Second, as this thesis focussed on nationalism of elite groups, it would be an 
important step to analyse in detail the reaction of the masses to each of the dominant 
nationalisms. This must take into consideration the impact of secularisation and 
democratisation on the view of the nation but also the emergence of alternative 
nationalisms as a counter reaction to the elitist nationalisms. Little systematic and 
theoretical work has been undertaken on these alternative nationalisms (with the 
exception of the oppositional nationalism of the 1920s). For example, only a few 
objective and independent theoretical studies about the left-leaning nationalisms of the 
1950s and 1970s exist.
This case study of Thailand has confirmed the common perception that nation 
and nationalism are concepts marked by variety and therefore unlikely ever to be 
narrowed down to a single theoretical definition. Therefore, as this thesis has indicated, 
it is necessary to further the study of nationalism from different perspectives. I do not 
claim that the Thai nation and nationalism is solely the product of the monarchs or that 
their emergence and the development was inevitable because of their actions. However, 
I identified the monarchy as the central institution in regard to the Thai nation and 
nationalism. Part of the success of the kings was their willingness to adapt the concept 
of a monarchical nation to changing circumstances without losing the ability to rely on 
symbols, myth and traditions in order to create loyalty to the monarchy and the nation. 
Hopefully, this thesis can contribute to a better understanding of the Thai nation and 
nationalism.
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Glossary of Frequently Used Terms
Baht Thai currency
bap an offense against moral law, sins, guilt, vice, de-merit
barami the Ten Perfections, prestige, influence, grandeur,
charisma
bun merit, good deeds which according to Buddhism will bring
rewards to the doer in a future life 
chakra a discus, the chakra is used as a weapon by Vishnu and
becomes the symbol of the Chakri dynasty 
chakravathin wheel-turning monarch, Great King
Chakri current royal dynasty
chat nation
dharma the teachings of the Buddha, truth, righteousness,
dharmaracha king who rules by the dharma, righteous king
jataka stories about former incarnations of the Buddha
kathin offerings presented to monks at the end of the rainy
season, particularly yellow robes; the annual congregation 
of the laity at a temple to present the robes to all the monks 
in the temple
linga phallic symbol of god Siva
mueang town, city, land
Pali language the language of Buddhism
phokhun father lord, Sukhothai-style ruler
phothisat Bodhisattva, the one destined for Buddhahood
phrai free commoners
phuttharacha Buddha-king
ramakian the Thai version of the Indian epic Ramayana
sakdina hierarchical organisation of society
sangha Buddhist order
thewaracha God-king
thotsapitratchatham the Ten Kingly Virtues
traiphum ‘Three Worlds’, a Buddhist cosmology
wat temple
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Source: Baker, Chris/Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History o f  Thailand, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 200.
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